Guy
Tremblay:—This
case
was
heard
at
Montreal,
Quebec,
on
May
18,
1978.
1.
Point
at
Issue
The
point
at
issue
is,
whether
the
legal
expenses
of
$500
incurred
by
the
appellant
by
contesting
his
wife’s
demand
for
an
increase
in
the
alimentary
allowance,
are
deductible
as
an
expense
under
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
of
the
new
Act
ie
as
an
expense
“incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing,
income
from
the
business
or
property”.
According
to
the
appellant,
an
alimentary
allowance
is
a
“right”
and
as
such
constitutes
a
“property”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraphs
248(1
)(a)
and
18(1
)(a)
of
the
new
Act.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
The
appellant
has
the
burden
of
showing
that
the
respondent’s
assesment
was
not
justified.
This
burden
of
proof
is
based
not
on
a
particular
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
but
on
several
judicial
decisions,
among
them
a
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
renedered
in
R
W
S
Johnston
v
MNR,
[1948]
CTC
195;
3
DTC
1182.
3.
The
Facts
|
are
not
.
|
dispute.
|
are
|
respond-
|
The
facts
are
not
in
dispute.
They
are
well
described
in
the
respondent’s
Reply
to
Notice
of
Appeal
in
subparagraphs
(a),
(b)
and
(c)
of
paragraph
5,
as
amended
at
the
beginning
of
the
sitting:
5.
In
assessing
the
Appellant
for
his
1974
taxation
year,
Respondent
relied,
inter
alia,
upon
the
following
presumptions
of
facts:
(a)
During
the
relevant
taxation
year,
the
Appellant
deducted
the
sum
of
$500
under
the
following
heading:
legal
fees
relating
only
to
Court
action
with
respect
to
deduction
of
alimony
payment;
(b)
This
deduction
was
refused
by
the
Respondent,
as
it
does
not
constitute
an
alimony
payment
under
article
60(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
1970-71-72,
SC
c
63;
(c)
The
Appellant
himself
admitted
that
this
sum
cannot
constitute
an
alimony
payment
under
the
said
Act.
4.
Law—Comments
4.1
The
main
sections
of
the
law
concerned
in
the
case
at
bar
are
paragraphs
18(1)(a)
and
248(1)(a)
definition
of
“property”
which
read
as
follows:
18.
General
limitations.
(1)
In
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
from
a
business
or
property
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
General
limitation—an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
or
property.
248.(1)
“Property”
means
property
of
any
kind
whatever
whether
real
or
personal
or
corporeal
or
incorporeal
and,
without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
includes
(a)
a
right
of
any
kind
whatever,
a
share
or
a
chose
in
action.
4.2
The
Appellant’s
Contention
According
to
the
appellant,
an
alimentary
allowance
is
a
“right”
and
as
such
constitutes
a
“property”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraphs
18(1)(a)
and
248(1)(a)
quoted
above.
“Property
.
.
.
includes
a
right
of
any
kind
whatever.
.
By
contesting
his
wife’s
demand,
the
appellant
was
successful
in
maintaining
the
alimentary
obligation
at
its
existing
level.
Legal
expenses
incurred
with
respect
to
establishing
the
amount
payable
under
an
alimentary
right
are
expenses
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
income
from
a
property
as
any
reduction
to
the
taxpayer
of
such
payments,
or
successful
defence
against
an
increase
in
such
payments
have
the
effect
of
earning
income
to
the
taxpayer
for
the
reason
that
such
alimentary
payments
represent
a
deduction
to
the
taxpayer
in
arriving
at
his
net
income.
It
is
an
admitted
accounting
principle
that
a
reduction
of
an
expense
must
be
considered
as
income.
4.3
Respondent’s
Contention
According
to
the
respondent,
if
an
alimony
for
the
one
who
receives
it
is
a
right,
then
it
is
an
obligation
for
the
one
who
has
to
pay
it.
An
obligation
is
not
a
right.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
quoted
articles
1059
and
1486
of
the
Civil
Code
which
read
as
follows:
1059:
those
things
only
which
are
objects
of
commerce
can
become
the
object
of
an
obligation.
1486:
everything
may
be
sold
which
is
not
excluded
from
being
an
object
of
commerce
by
its
nature
or
destination
or
by
special
provision
of
law.
Concerning
the
right
which
is
the
alimony,
it
is
a
right
“intuitu
personae”.
(Article
165
CC
ss,
concerning
the
obligations
arising
from
marriage
and
article
173
CC
concerning
the
respective
rights
and
duties
of
husband
and
wife
were
quoted.)
It
is
not
a
right
which
is
an
object
of
commerce.
If
the
alimony
is
considered
as
an
expense
by
the
Income
Tax
Act,
it
is
not
in
virtue
of
the
basic
principle
expressed
in
paragraph
18(1
)(a)
(which
is
a
general
accounting
principle)
but
because
it
is
expressed
in
a
specific
article
(paragraph
60(b)
of
the
new
Act).
Otherwise
it
would
not
be
deductible.
The
legal
fees
concerning
such
alimony,
not
being
specifically
provided
as
deductible,
the
expense
cannot
be
deducted
in
the
computation
of
the
net
income.
4.4
Comments
The
Board
understands
the
reasons
given
by
the
appellant
but
concurs
with
those
given
by
the
respondent.
Moreover,
the
Board
adds
that
the
legal
fees
concerning
a
right,
or
property
is
not
automatically
deductible.
Such
a
property
or
right
can
be
of
capital
or
personal
nature.
The
Board
is
of
the
opinion
that
an
alimony
that
a
person
has
to
pay,
is
of
a
personal
nature.
That
is
why
to
be
deductible
the
alimony
had
to
be
specific.
It
is
the
same
for
the
legal
expense
concerning
alimony.
The
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
The
Board
maintains
that
opinion
even
if
there
is
at
least
one
judgment
(not
cited
by
the
appellant)
which
confirms
his
contention.
It
is
the
case
of.
Jean
Boos
v
MNR,
27
Tax
ABC
283;
61
DTC
520.
In
that
case,
among
other
things,
an
amount
of
$1,737.90
of
legal
expense
(incurred
by
Mrs
Boos
in
pursuing
her
appeals
in
the
various
courts
to
obtain
alimony)
was
claimed
as
expense
in
the
computation
of
the
net
income.
After
quoting
paragraph
12(1)(a)
of
the
old
Act
(paragarph
18(1)(a)
of
the
new
Act)
the
Chairman
Cecil
L
Snyder
of
the
former
Tax
Appeal
Board,
expressed
as
follows:
The
point
was
readily
disposed
of
as
to
whether
the
legal
expenses
might
be
deducted
from
the
income
received.
There
are
a
number
of
recent
decisions
by
the
Exchequer
Court
and
by
this
Board
to
the
effect
that
under
certain
circumstances
legal
fees
expended
by
a
taxpayer
appellant
may
be
deducted
as
permitted
by
the
last-quoted
section
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
the
present
appeal
counsel
for
the
Minister
did
not
contest
the
appellant’s
claim
to
have
these
legal
fees
deducted.
The
terms
used
by
Mr
Snyder
are
very
general.
The
Board
has
not
found
any
judgment
specifically
allowing
legal
expense
in
obtaining
or
contesting
alimony,
nor
any
judgment
where
principles
justifying
a
decision
to
deduct
such
expense
could
be
found.
A
specific
article
should
be
included
in
the
Act
to
permit
that
kind
of
expense.
Under
the
strict
interpretation
of
the
present
Act
the
Board
unfortunately
must
dismiss
the
appeal.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
is
dismissed
in
accordance
with
the
above
Reasons
for
Judgment.
Appeal
dismissed.