The
Chairman:—This
is
the
appeal
of
Dr
Harold
T
Robbins
from
an
assessment
in
respect
of
the
1973
taxation
year.
Issues
There
are
two
issues
to
be
determined
in
this
appeal
dealing
with
the
allocation
of
value
between
land
and
buildings
on
the
disposition
of
the
property.
The
first
issue
is
whether
the
Minister
can
allocate
a
value
for
the
building
different
from
that
agreed
to
by
the
parties
in
an
arm’s
length
transaction.
The
second
issue
is
whether
the
value
allocated
to
the
building
by
the
Minister,
in
the
circumstances,
is
reasonable
and
in
accordance
with
subsection
68(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63
as
amended.
Assessment
The
appellant
sold
an
apartment
building
in
1973
for
$847,000.
The
pertinent
agreement
of
sale
allocated
a
value
of
$7,000
for
equipment,
$540,000
for
building
and
improvements
and
$300,000
for
the
land.
The
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
the
building
on
July
31,
1972,
was
$533,454.11.
In
filing
his
tax
returns
the
appellant
placed
a
net
value
of
disposition
on
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
the
building
of
$529,012
and
claimed
a
terminal
loss
of
$4,442.11.
By
letter
dated
October
27,
1977,
the
respondent
revised
his
Original
position,
amending
thereby
paragraphs
1(c),
3,
4(h)
4(i),
6
and
7
of
his
reply
to
notice
of
appeal.
Said
letter
reads
as
follows:
October
27,
1977.
Dear
Sir:
RE:
Dr
Harold
T
Robbins
v
MNR
Our
File:
TO
63205-1
The
respondent
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
has
reviewed
his
position
in
the
above
appeal.
His
revised
position
is
as
follows:
1.
the
part
of
the
sale
price
of
$847,000
for
the
land,
buildings
and
equipment
at
130
Bellamy
Road,
Scarborough
that
can
reasonably
be
regarded
as
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
the
building
is
$608,000
and
not
$620,000
as
referred
to
in
paragraphs
1(c),
4(h),
4(i)
and
6
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal;
2.
aS
a
result
of
paragraph
1
above,
the
net
proceeds
of
disposition
of
the
Said
building
to
the
appellant
are
the
amount
of
$595,626
and
not
$607,383.92
as
referred
to
in
paragraphs
1(c)
and
4(i)
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal
and
the
cost
of
disposition
of
the
property
attributable
to
the
said
building
is
the
amount
of
$12,374
and
not
$12,616.02
as
referred
to
in
paragraphs
1(c)
and
4(i)
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal;
and
3.
the
amount
that
is
properly
included
in
computing
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
taxation
year
1973
on
account
of
the
recapture
of
capital
cost
allowance
in
respect
of
the
said
building
is
$62,172
and
not
the
amount
of
$73,929.85
referred
to
in
paragraphs
3,
4(i)
and
7
of
the
reply
to
notice
of
appeal.
Since
the
Minister
will
be
taking
this
position
at
the
hearing
of
the
appeal
I
would
ask
that
you
file
this
letter
with
the
pleadings.
I
have
sent
a
copy
of
this
letter
to
the
taxpayer’s
solicitor,
George
Campbell
Miller.
The
Minister’s
position,
therefore,
is
that
the
net
proceeds
on
the
disposition
of
the
building
is
in
excess
of
its
undepreciated
capital
cost
by
$62,172
which
was
included
in
computing
the
appellant’s
1973
income.
Summary
of
Facts
The
appellant,
a
dentist,
being
in
poor
health,
decided
to
move
to
Florida.
Other
than
his
personal
residence
on
Old
Colony
Road
and
his
dental
practice,
the
appellant
was
the
sole
owner
of
a
69-suite
apartment
building
on
Bellamy
Road
which
was
purchased
in
1968
for
$915,000
and
operated
under
the
name
of
Halmar
Holdings
Limited.
Late
in
1969
the
subject
apartment
building
was
put
up
for
sale
on
an
open
listing
at
$1,050,000.
On
April
15,
1970
a
written
offer
for
$925,000
was
made
io
the
appellant
who
made
a
counter-offer
of
$975,000
and
the
prospective
buyer
then
raised
the
original
offer
to
$950,000.
Negotiations
were
unsuccessful
and
the
sale
did
not
take
place.
The
appellant’s
residence
was
sold
in
August
of
1971
and
he
purchased
a
condominium
in
Florida.
(Exhibit
A-1.)
By
March
of
1972
the
appellant
had
received
no
further
offers
on
the
apartment
building
and
he
contacted
a
Mrs
Rotenberg,
a
real
estate
agent,
who
advised
the
appellant
that
the
apartment
building
market
was
poor
and
that
apartment
buildings
were
then
being
purchased
by
syndicates
at
very
low
prices.
Mrs.
Rotenberg
subsequently
made
an
offer
of
between
$850,000-$860,000
which
was
not
accepted
because
of
the
conditions
contained
in
the
offer.
The
appellant
wished
to
have
a
non-conditional
offer
and
wanted
to
keep
the
prepaid
rent
so
as
to
have
as
much
cash
as
possible
for
his
move
te
Florida.
It
is
alleged
that
the
appellant’s
solicitor
and
accountant
advised
him
of
the
importance
to
him
of
placing
the
value
of
the
building
as
low
as
possible
and
to
allot
as
high
a
value
to
the
land
as
possible.
A
copy
of
the
Canada
Tax
Journal
was
alleged
to
have
been
given
to
the
appellant
at
that
time.
(Exhibit
A-3.)
The
appellant
did
not
have
the
subject
land
evaluated
by
a
professional
appraiser,
but
allegedly
consulted
a
developer
who
informed
him
that
in
1969
the
cost
of
land
was
in
excess
of
$4,000
per
unit.
He
also
made
some
inquiries
from
a
real
estate
agent
as
to
the
value
of
comparable
lands
and
Exhibit
A-4
purports
to
be
a
survey
of
asking
prices
prepared
by
Metropolitan
Trust.
In
further
discussion
with
Mrs
Rotenberg,
the
appellant
alleges
that
he
insisted
that
the
value
of
the
land
should
be
fixed
at
$4,500
per
unit
plus
$700
required
for
rezoning,
because
of
its
proximity
to
a
GO
Station
and
the
high
occupancy
rate
in
the
area.
Mrs
Rotenberg
presented
an
offer
to
purchase
(Exhibit
A-2)
which
had
omitted
in
it
such
conditions
as
number
of
parking
spaces,
forfeiture
of
prepaid
rent
and
the
breakdown
of
land
and
building
values.
The
appellant
added
to
the
agreement
those
conditions.
which
he
felt
were
necessary
including
an
allocation
of
value
of
$7,000
for
equipment,
$540,000
for
the
building
and
$300,000
for
the
land.
The
amendments
were
accepted
by
the
purchaser
and
the
transaction
closed
at
a
sale
price
of
$847,000
for
land,
equipment
and
building
on
August
1,
1972,
the
first
day
of
the
1973
fiscal
year
of
Halmar
Holdings
Limited.
carried
on
by
the
appellant
relative
to
the
apartment
building.
Evaluation
The
respondent’s
evaluation
of
the
building
is
based
principally
on
an
evaluation
given
by
Mr
Gervase
W
Eldred,
a
real
estate
appraiser
with
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
who
was
qualified
as
an
expert
witness
at
the
hearing.
In
his
appraisal
report
and
analysis
study
(Exhibit
R-3)
Mr
Eldred
concluded
that
in
1972
the
value
of
the
land
was
$232,000.
and
$608,000
for
the
building.
Although
two
cost
approaches
were
calculated
by
Mr
Eldred
in
his
report,
which
gave
a
higher
value
to
the
building
than
$608,000
the
appraiser
discarded
these
two
methods
of
evaluation
and
relied
on
the
residual
basis
method
of
evaluation,
which
comprises
a
study
of
comparable
land
sales
in
order
to
arrive
at
a
value
of
the
land
and
subtracting
that
figure
from
the
sale
price
of
the
land
and
building
in
order
to
arrive
at
a
value
for
the
building.
Mr
Eldred
accepted
the
fair
market
value
of
the
land
and
building
as
being
the
sale
price
of
$847,000
and
that
the
transaction
was
at
arm’s
length.
.,
In
order
to
arrive
at
a
value
of
the
subject
land,
Mr
Eldred
chose
7
out
of
14
vacant
land
sales
in
Scarborough
which
he
considered
to
be
comparable
to
the
subject
land,
taking
into
account
the
time
of
sale,
location,
size
of
the
property,
financial
arrangements
and
the
proximity
to
transportation
facilities.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
suggests,
among
other
things,
that
there
were
no
truly
comparable
sales
available
to
Mr
Eldred
on
which
to
base
his
evaluation
of
the
subject
land;
that
no
consideration
was
given
to
the
proximity
of
the
property
to
the
GO
Station,
a
big
factor
with
respect
to
the
value
of
the
land;
that
Mr
Eldred
did
not
take
land
sale
2
into
account
in
his
report,
which
is
the
best
comparable
and
whose
price
per
unit
unzoned
was
$3,560
and
that
sales
1,
3,
4,
5,
6
and
7
were
properties
miles
away
from
the
subject
property
and
not
valid
comparables.
In
dealing
with
the
seven
comparable
sales,
Mr
Eldred
stated
as
follows
at
page
8
of
his
report:
Several
apparent
arm’s
length
sales
of
similar
land
in
the
Borough
of
Scarborough
were
investigated.
The
prices
paid
in
each
case
were
considered,
and
suitable
adjustments
on
these
prices
were
made
for
time
of
sale,
location
of
comparables,
size
of
parcel,
financing,
proximity
of
facilities,
Shape
and
potential,
and
any
other
pertinent
factors.
It
is
common
to
break
down
such
sales
into
a
usefully
comparable
unit
of
comparison,
such
as
price
per
square
foot
or
per
acre.
On
page
16
Mr
Eldred
recognizes
these
differences
in
the
several
land
sales
studied
and
states:
Sale
#2
most
closely
resembles
the
subject
in
size,
location
and
time,
but
it
is
subject
to
a
lower
zoning
nature.
Sale
#3
closely
resembles
the
subject
in
size
and
zoning,
but
is
located
farther
east
and
was
a
sale
to
Ontario
Housing
Corporation,
which
is
Suspect
as
not
truly
reflecting
the
open
market
situation.
sales
1
and
4
are
smaller
lots,
sales
5,
6
and
7
being
larger
lots
very
close
to
Highway
401
and
Sheppard
Avenue
facilities.
It
is
my
opinion
that
sale
#2
alone
cannot
be
relied
upon
solely
to
represent
market
value
for
the
subject
location
and,
in
view
of
the
range
of
values
indicated
by
the
other
comparables
after
suitable
adjustments,
a
rate
of
$190,000
per
acre
or
$3,300
per
unit
is
applicable
to
the
subject.
|
$190,000
X
1.159
acres
|
—
|
$220,210
|
|
$
|
3,300
«
69
units
|
.
■=
|
$227,700
|
I
consider
that
the
value
indicated
by
the
per
unit
rate
is
most
applicable
in
the
subject
case.
In
an
unique
situation
such
as
this,
where
a
‘theoretical’
land/
building
value
is
required,
consideration
must
be
given
to
the
costs
of
permits
etc.
being
a
necessary
prerequisite
to
development.
All
the
purchasers
of
the
comparable
lands
were
aware
of
the
levies
payable
prior
to
development,
and
based
their
purchase
prices
accordingly.
However,
in
the
case
of
the
subject,
the
land
was
already
developed
at
the
appraisal
date,
thus
effectively
had
the
benefit
of
all
necessary
permits.
In
considering
the
value
to
land,
therefore,
it
is
reasonable
to
assume
that
a
willing
and
knowledgeable
purchaser
would
have
been
prepared
to
pay
more
for
land
having
the
benefit
of
permits—the
subject
land—than
he
would
for
‘raw’
land
requiring
the
payment
of
levies,
necessary
fees
and
costs
involved,
consequent
time,
delays
etc.
Finding
of
Facts
From
the
report
and
from
the
evidence
given
by
Mr
Eldred,
it
seems
to
me
that
all
the
factors
which
could
affect
the
value
of
the
comparable
sales
studies
were
taken
into
account
and
adjusted
accordingly
in
arriving
at
a
value
of
the
subject
land
in
1972
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
this
was
not
in
fact
done.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
in
cross-examining
Mr
Eldred
suggested
that
the
possible
future
expenditure
of
$50,000
for
heating
equipment
and
the
construction
of
sidewalks
around
the
building
would
affect
the
value
of
the
building.
Mr
Eldred
answered
that
latent
defects
that
might
exist
in
a
building
has
little
or
no
bearing
on
the
evaluation
of
the
building
arrived
at
on
a
residual
basis.
Notwithstanding
counsel
for
the
appellant’s
thorough
examination
of
Mr
Eldred,
he
did
not,
in
my
opinion,
prove
any
meaningful
discrepancies
in
the
procedure
followed
by
Mr
Eldred
in
his
appraisal
report.
On
the
other
hand,
the
appellant’s
testimony
as
to
how
he
arrived
at
the
value
of
the
land
also
using
the
land
residual
basis
by
informally
discussing
the
matter
with
a
neighbour
developer,
or
with
Mr
Darke
of
Metropolitan
Trust
Company,
is
most
incomplete
and
the
documents
included
in
Exhibit
A-4
are
far
from
being
clear
or
conclusive
that
the
Minister’s
evaluation
for
the
building
is
not
a
reasonable
allocation
which
the
appellant
must
clearly
establish
if
the
Minister’s
evaluation
is
to
be
set
aside.
In
my
opinion,
the
appellant’s
evidence
has
failed
to
establish
that
the
Minister’s
allocation
of
$608,000
for
the
building
is
unreasonable.
The
second
point
to
determine
is
whether
the
Minister
can
properly
allocate
a
value
to
the
building
which
he
considers
to
be
reasonable
when
the
values
of
land
and
building
have
been
specifically
allocated
in
the
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale.
Land
There
is
no
dispute
that
the
subject
transaction
was
at
arm’s
length
and
the
evidence
supports
the
position
that
the
price
paid
for
the
property
was
its
fair
market
value
at
the
time
of
sale.
The
real
estate
market
for
apartment
buildings
was
down.
Properties
were
being
bought
by
syndicates
at
low
prices
and
the
subject
property
had
in
fact
been
listed
for
sale
for
a
relatively
long
period
of
time
before
being
purchased
by
a
syndicate.
In
my
view
the
determination
of
the
second
issue
is
simply
whether
the
allocation
of
the
value
of
the
land
and
building
allegedly
agreed
to
in
the
sale
contract
was
the
result
of
bona
fide
negotiations
in
which
each
party
attempted
through
hard
bargaining
to
settle
on
a
value
for
the
building
which
was
advantageous
to
him
or
whether
the
value
was
fixed
unilaterally
by
the
appellant
without
any
serious
opposition
from
the
purchasers.
On
the
basis
of
the
evidence,
I
can
accept
that
the
appellant
was
anxious
to
sell;
that
he
wanted
a
sale
free
of
conditions,
and
that
he
negotiated
to
obtain
the
highest
price
possible
for
his
property.
However,
it
is
not
clear
from
the
evidence
that
hard
bargaining
with
respect
to
the
allocation
of
value
of
the
building
did
in
fact
take
place
between
the
appellant
and
the
purchasers.
Whereas
the
appellant
was
most
anxious
to
sell,
the
purchasers,
because
of
the
poor
state
of
the
market,
sought
the
lowest
possible
price.
In
April
of
1972
an
offer
of
some
$850,000
was
made
through
the
agent,
Mrs
Rotenberg,
but
was
refused
by
the
appellant
because
of
the
conditions
specified
therein.
Subsequent
negotiations
with
Mrs
Rotenberg
dealt
principally
with
the
appellant’s
request
that
the
offer
be
without
conditions;
that
in
order
to
obtain
the
most
cash
possible
he
would
have
to
retain
the
prepaid
rent.
A
meeting
was
held
with
the
purchasers
and
the
appellant
at
the
property
early
in
April
1972.
The
appellant,
in
direct
examination,
alleges
that,
on
the
advice
of
his
solicitor
and
accountant,
he
asked
through
Mrs
Rotenberg,
that
a
new
offer
be
made
without
conditions,
with
an
allocation
of
$4,500
per
unit
for
the
building
and
a
correction
in
the
number
of
parking
spaces
involved.
These
conditions
were
allegedly
accepted
by
the
purchasers.
On
May
2,
1972,
the
purchasers
made
an
offer
of
$847,000
(Exhibit
A-2).
However,
none
of
the
stipulations
about
which
the
appellant
claims
to
have
been
adamant
were
included
in
the
new
offer.
The
offer
was
subsequently
amended
to
include
the
appellant’s
stipulations.
There
appears
to
be
some
inconsistence
in
the
appellant’s
testimony
with
reference
even
to
discussions
with
the
purchasers
about
the
allocation
of
values
and
there
is
no
aceptable
evidence
of
any
real
hard
bargaining
with
the
prospective
buyers.
During
cross-examination
the
appellant
stated:
A
We
had
already
had
an
offer—again,
to
recall,
it
was
approximately
the
same
as
this
offer
here
but
retaining
the
prepaid
rents.
I
think
it
was
a
little
in
excess
of
what
this
was
but
with
all
the
conditions
attached.
What
I
was
bargaining
for
at
that
point
in
time
was
to
get
a
clean
offer.
I
wanted
_
a
Clean
offer.
I
was
willing
to
entertain
an
offer
that
was
clean
with
roughly
the
same
price.
Q
1
take
it,
then,
that
you
did
not
discuss
the
allocation
of
the
price
if
you
did
not
discuss
the
price,
is
that
fair?
A
Yes,
it
is
probably
fair
at
this
point
in
time
to
say
that,
yes.
Further
in
dealing
with
the
allocation
of
the
value
of
the
building,
the
appellant
stated:
Q
And
you
also
said
that
you
did
not
discuss
that
question
with
the
potential
buyers
when
you
met
with
them
at
the
building
the
second
time
somewhat
later
in
April?
A
I
can’t
recall
if
I
did
discuss
it
with
them.
I
think
I
discussed
all
kinds
of
things
with
them
then
because
my
main
concern,
at
that
time,
was
getting
a
Clean
offer.
This
is
what
I
was
concerned
about.
And
I
was
also
discussing
if
the
price
was
going
to
be
low
I
had
to
have
a
clean
offer
from
instructions
from
Mr
Miller
and
Mr
Laywine.
I
think
I
would
discuss
that:
I
can’t
remember
specifically
if
I
discussed
that.
I
am
sure
that
would
be
one
of
the
many
varied
topics
of
discussion.
I
think
I
would
have
discussed
it.
The
above
statement
of
the
appellant
is,
in
my
view,
in
serious
contrast
with
what
the
appellant
stated
in
examination-in-chief:
With
this
information
I
had
another
meeting
with
Mrs
Rotenberg
and
her
investors
at
the
building
on
Bellamy
and
discussed
with
them
and
adamantly
(sic)
told
them
that
if
the
offer
was
going
to
be
as
low
as
they
indicated
that
I
would
have
to
remove
the
conditions,
I
would
have
to
have
a
clean
offer,
I
would
have
to
put
an
allocation
which
I
felt
was
a
fair
and
just
price
for
land
approximately
somewhere
between
$4,500
or
$5,200
considering
this
other
land
would
be
$4,500
per
unit
plus
$700
required
to
rezone.
And
they
were
quite
adamant
in
the
fact
that
if
they
maintained
the
building,
kept
the
building,
retained
the
building,
and
were
not
able
to
sell
it,
they
would
have
to
have
a
building
value,
as
I
was
already
forewarned
by
my
accountant
and
my
lawyer,
as
high
as
possible
in
order
for
them
to
depreciate
it.
The
appellant
alleges
to
have
discussed
the
allocation
for
land
and
building
with
Mrs
Rotenberg,
by
telephone,
on
several
occasions:
Q
Did
you
have
any
discussions
with
Mrs
Rotenberg
or
the
buyers
personally
between
that
meeting
at
the
building
and
when
you
received
the
offer
on
2nd
May?
A
Yes.
I
didn't
have
any
meeting
with
the
buyers
but
I
had
many
discussions
with
Mrs
Rotenberg
because
the
buyers
personally
they
didn't
want
to
have
the
conditions
removed.
They
were
still
concerned
that
the
conditions
were
going
to
be
removed.
Also
I
told
them
or
told
Mrs
Rotenberg
that
it
was
necessary
that
we
have
a
further.
discussion
with
allocation
because
as
pointed
out
to
me
by
Mr
Miller
and
Mr
Laywine
that
we
have
this
in
the
offer,
that
this
should
be
in
the
offer.
This
had
to
be
determined.
However,
the
offer
that
was
made
on
May
2,
1972,
subsequent
to
the
alleged
telephone
conversations
did
not
contain
any
of
the
appellant’s
stipulations
and
he
explains
their
absence
as
follows:
Q
The
offer
which
was
presented
has
been
marked
as
Exhibit
A-2,
I
believe.
If
you
reached
an
agreement
why
was
the
offer
silent
on
the
question
of
allocation?
A
The
reason
was
because
she
neglected—it
was
silent
on
several
things.
there
was
an
apportionment
of
the
chattels,
it
was
silent
with
respect
to
the
change,
if
you
will
note,
with
respect
to
the
allocation
of
the
prepaid
rents.
And
it
was
also—
Q
I
think
you
described
a
total
of
three
or
four
changes
which
were
made
to
this
offer.
My
question
is,
if
you
made
it
very
clear
to
Mrs
Rotenberg
that
it
was
necessary
that
there
be
an
allocation
of
price
and
if
you
reached
an
agreement
about
allocation,
why
was
that
not
put
in
this
offer?
A
This
agreement,
to
the
best
of
my
knowledge,
it
was
agreed
upon.
The
only
thing
that
Mrs
Rotenberg
did—essentially
this
is
the
same
offer
that
came
in
1970
and
she
neglected
to
put
this
in,
she
neglected
as
per
agreed.
Essentially
the
same
offer
as
the
1907
offer.
Considering
all
the
circumstances
of
this
appeal,
it
is
most
difficult
to
conclude
that
the
allocation
of
value
for
the
building
was
the
result
of
hard
bargaining
between
the
appellant
and
the
purchasers.
Section
68
of
the
Act
reads
as
follows:
68.
Where
an
amount
can
reasonably
be
regarded
as
being
in
part
the
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
any
property
of
a
taxpayer
and
as
being
in
part
consideration
for
something
else,
the
part
of
the
amount
that
can
reasonably
be
regarded
as
being
the
consideration
for
such
disposition
shall
be
deemed
to
be
proceeds
of
disposition
of
that
property
irrespective
of
the
form
or
legal
effect
of
the
contract
or
agreement;
and
the
person
to
whom
the
property
was
disposed
of
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
the
property
at
the
same
part
of
that
amount.
As
I
understand
it,
though
expressed
in
different
terms
in
the
various
decisions
cited
by
both
counsel,
the
key
to
the
interpretation
and
the
application
of
section
68
is
that
the
allocation
of
value
of
various
assets,
in
a
contract,
to
be
accepted
by
the
taxing
authorities
and
binding
by
the
parties
must
be,
as
suggested
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
the
result
of
a
mutual
decision
between
the
vendor
and
purchaser.
However,
in
order
to
determine
whether
the:
allocation
is
in
fact
based
on
a
mutual
decision,
the
Courts
have
introduced
the
concept
of
“the
genuinely
negotiated
apportionment
which
results
from
bargaining
between
the
parties
to
the
agreement”.
The.
onus
of
establishing
that
the
allocation
was
arrived
at
by
mutual
consent
after
genuine
bargaining
rests
on
the
appellant.
If
he
fails
to
satisfy
that
onus,
the
allocation
stipulated
in
the
agreement
is
not
decisive
and
the
reasonableness
of
the
allocation
for
tax
purposes
must
be
determined
on
other
grounds
‘‘irrespective
of
the
form
or
legal
effect
of
the
contract
or
agreement”.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
Minister
is
empowered
by
section
68
to
assess
the
taxpayer
on
the
basis
of
a
value
for
the
building
which
he
considers
to
be
reasonable
and
which
can
differ
from
that
stipulated
in
the
agreement.
In
the
circumstances,
for
the
appellant
to
be
successful
in
his
appeal,
he
must
have
established:
a)
that
the
apportionment
of
values
stipulated
in
the
contract
resulted
from
genuine
hard
bargaining
between
the
parties
and
is
decisive;
or
b)
failing
that,
he
must
have
established
that
the
apportionment
of
values
made
by
the
Minister
was
not
reasonable
and
should
be
set
aside.
On
the
basis
of
the
evidence
before
me,
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
appellant
did
not
satisfy
the
burden
of
proof
in
either
respect.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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