Frederick Lan Brownlee v. Minister of National Revenue, [1978] CTC 2780

Delmer E Taylor:—This is an appeal against an income tax assessment in which the Minister of National Revenue disallowed the amount of $182.71 claimed for purchase of uniforms in the year 1975. The respondent relied, inter alia, upon subparagraph 8(1)(i)(iii) and subsection 8(2) of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1952, c 148 as amended by section 1 of SC 1970-71-72, c 63 and as amended thereafter for the 1975 taxation year.

Facts

The appellant is a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and, prior to July 17, 1975, held a non-commissioned rank in that Force. On July 17, 1975, by order-in-council, he was promoted to the commissioned rank of inspector.

Section 21 of the RCM Police Act (RSC) allows for the making of Regulations pursuant to the Act. Regulation 198—during 1975—stated “Every Officer shall at his own expense supply himself with such uniforms as the Commissioner deems necessary”. In computing his income and deductions for the 1975 taxation year, the appellant included the amount of $182.71 as a deduction for uniforms.

Contentions

The position of the appellant was that:

—Commissioned ranks are appointments which are unforeseen and bestowed upon members without notice and sparingly. A member of the Force cannot “apply” for such an appointment as an individual could do aspiring to a commissioned rank in the Military Reserve.

—RCM Police administrative manual, appendix 2-3, pages 1 and 2, sets forth the uniforms deemed necessary by the Commissioner for a commissioned officer.

—While required by law to have uniforms, he is not required or allowed to wear the uniforms but rather must, in addition, purchase civilian clothing to perform his duties.

The respondent contended that:

—during the 1975 taxation year the appellant’s income was from an office or employment;

—the said uniform expenses claimed by the appellant represented an amount not expended for supplies that were consumed directly in the performance of the duties of his office or employment;

—the said uniform expenses claimed by the appellant were not an amount that the appellant was required by his contract of employment to supply and pay for.

Evidence

The appellant supported his position in a detailed and well-prepared presentation outlining the circumstances of his employment and particular function in the Force. In addition, it was pointed out that Since the year in question, certain changes had occurred in the Regulations which now provide for the issue of such uniforms at the expense of the Force.

Counsel for the respondent, while not specifically acknowledging that the appellant was required by his contract of employment to provide the uniform, relied heavily upon the point that the amount had not been expended for supplies.

Argument

Cases presented to the Board for consideration, and to which reference was made by both parties, were as follows:

Christopher John Goodman v MNR, 8 Tax ABC 320; 53 DTC 225;

Herman Luks (No 2) v MNR, [1958] CTC 345; 58 DTC 1194; William Robert Martyn v MNR, 35 Tax ABC 428; 64 DTC 461;

Norman Lusby Goodwin v MNR, [1971] Tax ABC 42; 71 DTC 67;

William H. Payne v MNR, [1976] CTC 2302; 76 DTC 1233.

Findings

The Board is satisfied that the evidence supports a conclusion that the appellant was required by his contract of employment to supply and pay for the uniform. However, that does not make the uniform what could be described as “‘supplies consumed directly in the performance of the duties of his office or employment”. There is no doubt that there were rather unusual circumstances which surrounded this particular expenditure, and ones which indicated to the appellant that it should be treated differently than the vast majority of uniform purchases. However, “uniforms” in that sense of the word cannot be so restricted as to exclude many other items of clothing, and could even include regular business suits. It was well argued by the appellant that the uniform, when and if worn, could only be worn during the performance of his duties, whether ceremonial or professional. However, to define the term “supplies” so as to include items of individual dress would be an extreme extension in my view. Likewise, to refer to the uniform as “consumed” would require considerable latitude in perspective. But the word “directly” provides a further major block to the appeal in my opinion. Even if uniforms were “supplies”, and even if “consumed”, that is not done “directly in the performance of the duties of his office or employment”, they would be more accurately described as consumed indirectly. Such items fall under the general deduction provisions of paragraph 8(1 )(a) of the Act, which deduction it is noted was claimed by the appellant in filing his income tax return.

Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.