The
Chairman:—On
May
9,
1977
an
application
under
section
174
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
was
filed
with
the
Tax
Review
Board
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
which
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
is
referred
to
as
the
appellant
and
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
as
third
party.
The
said
application
reads
as
follows:
IN
RE
the
Application
under
Section
174
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
Between:
CAVERHILL,
LEARMONT
&
CO
LIMITED,
Appellant,
—
and
—
THE
MINISTER
OF
NATIONAL
REVENUE,
Respondent,
—
and
—
CANADIAN
HORTICULTURAL
INDUSTRIES,
Third
Party.
APPLICATION
UNDER
PAR
174(3)(b)
OF
THE
INCOME
TAX
ACT
CONSIDERING
THAT
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
has
filed
a
Notice
of
Appeal
before
the
Tax
Review
Board
on
the
28th
day
of
September,
1976,
for
its
1973
taxation
year;
CONSIDERING
THAT
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
has
filed
a
Notice
Of
Objection,
dated
November
16,
1976,
against
the
Minister’s
assessment,
dated
October
13,
1976,
by
which
the
Minister
added
an
amount
of
$21,500
as
taxable
income,
pursuant
to
section
9(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
A)
THE
QUESTION
IN
RESPECT
OF
WHICH
THE
RESPONDENT
REQUESTS
A
DETERMINATION
IS:
Whether
the
amount
of
$21,500,
paid
by
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
to
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
is
to
be
considered:
1.
as
an
amount
disbursed
by
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
for
the
purchase:
of
goodwill
from
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
so
that
consequently:
i)
the
purchaser,
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited,
having
acquired
a
Capital.
asset,
the
expense
of
which
is
not
deductible
pursuant
to
section
18(1)b)
of
the
Act,
must
treat
this
asset
in
accordance
with
section
14(5)a)
of
the
Act,
and
not
pursuant
to
section
18(1
)a)
of
the
Act.
ii)
the
vendor,
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
has
sold
a
capital
asset,
the
proceeds
of
which
are
taxable,
pursuant
to
section
14(1)
of
the
Act.
2.
or
as
a
payment
pursuant
to
an
agreement
to
share
profits,
So
that
consequently:
i)
this
amount
of
$21,500
is
a
deductible
expense
for
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited,
within
the
meaning
of
section
18(1)a)
of
the
Act.
li)
this
amount
of
$21,500
is
a
taxable
income
for
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
pursuant
to
section
9(1)
of
the
Act.
**'
.
B)
THE
TAXPAYERS
THAT
THE
RESPONDENT
SEEKS
TO
HAVE
BOUND
BY
THE
DETERMINATION
OF
THE
QUESTION
ARE:
—
CAVERHILL,
LEARMONT
&
CO
LIMITED
—
CANADIAN
HORTICULTURAL
INDUSTRIES
C)
STATEMENT
OF
FACTS
AND
REASONS:
1.
The
facts
on
which
the
Respondent
relies
and
on
which
he
based
the
assessments
are
the
following:
a)
during
the
year
1972,
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited,
referred
to
as
the
Appellant,
entered
into
an
agreement
with
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
hereafter
referred
to
as
“CHI”
b)
that
the
purpose
of
this
agreement
was
to
give
the
Appellant
the
right
to
use
the
name
“CHI”
and
the
right
of
distribution
of
“CHI”
for
certain
products
c)
that
under
this
agreement,
the
Appellant
was
to
pay,
for
a
five-year
period,
annual
amounts
varying
between
2%
and
10%
on
the
sales
of
the
products
depending
of
the
said
products
d)
that
in
the
year
1973,
the
Appellant
and
“CHI”
entered
into
a
new
agreement
whereby
the
Appellant
would
acquire
the
use
of
the
name
“CHI”
and
the
right
of
distribution
of
certain
products
of
“CHI”
for
a
total
price
of
$21,500,
agreed
upon
by
both
parties
e)
that
for
its
year
1973,
the
Appellant
claimed
a
deduction
for
the
said
amount
of
$21,500,
as
being
an
expense
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
producing
or
gaining
income
f)
that
the
Respondent
disallowed
this
deduction
and,
by
Notice
of
Assessment,
dated
December
30,
1975,
the
Respondent
added
‘this
amount
to
the
Appellant’s
income,
considering
the
said
amount
as:
a
payment
for
the
acquisition
of
an
eligible
capital
expenditure
g)
this
was
confirmed
by
way
of
Notification
by
the
Minister,
on
‘the
22nd
of
June,
1976
h)
that
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
filed
a
Notice
of
Appeal
before
the
Tax
Review
Board,
on
the
28th
day
of
September,
1976,
for
its
1973
taxation
year
i)
that
the
Minister
assessed,
on
October
13,
1976,
the
company
known
under
the
name
of
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
for
its
1973
taxation
year,
on
the
basis
that
an
amount
of
$21,500
was
taxable
income,
pursuant
to
section
9(1)
of
the
Act
j)
that
“CHI”
filed
a
Notice
of
Objection
against
this
assessment,
on
November
16,
1976.
The
Respondent
relies,
inter
alia,
on
sections
3,
9(1),
14(1),
15(5)a),
14(5)b),
18(1)a)
and
18(1
)b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(1970-71-72,
ch
63);
a)
the
determination
of
the
true
nature
of
the
agreement
binding
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
and
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
during
the
1973
taxation
year,
and
more
particularly,
if
this
agreement
constitutes
in
facts
and.
in,
law,
an
agreement
for
the
purchase
and
sale
of
goodwill
or
an
agreement
to
share
profits,
will
decide
if
the
expense
incurred
by
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
was
for
the
acquisition
of
a
capital
asset,
the
expense
of
which
is
not
deductible
pursuant
to
section
18(1)b)
of
the
Act,
and
therefore
taxable
in
the
hands
of
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
in
accordance
with
the
sale
of
goodwill
and
pursuant
to
section
14(1)
of
the
Act,
or
if
the
expense
incurred
by
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
is
deductible.
pursuant
to
section
18(1)a)
of
the
Act
and
therefore,
taxable
in
the
hands
of
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
pursuant
to
section
9(1)
of
the
Act.
WHEREAS,
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited,
taxpayer,
has
appealed
before
the
Tax
Review
Board
‘against
the
Respondent’s
assessment
for
its
1973
taxation
year,
by
Notice
of
Appeal,
dated
September
28,
1976;
WHEREAS,
the
Respondent
has
assessed
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
taxpayer,
for
its
1973
taxation
year;
WHEREAS,
the
determination
of
the
question
set
forth
in
the
present
Application
will
affect
assessments
in
respect
of
both
taxpayers
whom
the
Respondent
seeks
to
have
bound
by
it;
THAT
the
present
Application
be
granted;
THAT
the
Tax
Review
Board
make
an
order
joining
the
parties
named
in
paragraph
(B)
to
the
Appeal
of
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited,
and
THAT
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries,
party
and
taxpayer,
be
bound
by
the
decision
rendered
by
the
Tax
Review
Board
in
the
appeal
filed
by
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited.
DATED
AT
MONTREAL,
this
4th
day
of
May
1977.
(signed)
Louise
Bélair
Louise
Bélair,
Solicitor
for
the
Respondent
cc:
THE
REGISTRAR
Tax
Review
Board
381
Kent
Street
Ottawa,
Ontario
K1A
0M1
Me
Robert
B
Issesman
MARTINEAU,
WALKER,
ALLISON
ET
AL
The
Stock
Exchange
Tower
PO
Box
242,
Victoria
Square
Montréal,
Québec
H4Z
1E9
Mr
C
A
Lindsay
E
W
PLAYFORD
LTD
5851
Upper
Lachine
Road
Montréal,
Québec
H4A
2B8
On
August
12,
1977
the
Tax
Review
Board
issued
an
order
naming
the
three
parties
referred
to
in
the
application
setting
September
19,
1977
as
the
date
on
which
the
application
would
be
heard:
ORDER
WHEREAS
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
is
of
the
opinion
that
a
question
of
law,
fact,
or
mixed
law
and
fact,
arising
out
of
one
and
the
same
transaction
or
occurrence
or
series
of
facts
and
occurrences
is
common
to
assessments
in
respect
of
two
or
more
of
the
named
taxpayers,
AND
WHEREAS
the
said
Minister
of
National
Revenue
has
applied
to
the
Tax
Review
Board,
pursuant
to
section
174(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
for
a
determination
of
the
said
question,
AND
WHEREAS
the
Minister
has
complied
with
all
the
provisions
of
subsection
(2)
of
the
said
s
174
of
the
said
Act:
I"
THIS
BOARD
DOTH
HEREBY
ORDER
that
the
said
question
shall
be
determined
by
the
Board
and
that
the
said
application
shall
be
dealt
with
at
the
sittings
to
be
held
at
Montreal
on
the
19th
day
of
September,
1977.
Signed
at
Ottawa,
Canada,
this
12th
day
of
August,
1977.
(signed)
Lucien
Cardin
Lucien
Cardin
Chairman
Mr
Brian
M
Schneiderman,
attorney
for
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
CHI),
opposed
the
application.
In
his
remarks,
as
I
understood
him,
Mr
Schneiderman’s
principal
contentions
were:
1.
that
pursuant
to
paragraphs
174(3)(a)
and
(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
taken
together
if
one
person
has
appealed
his
assessment,
the
Board
can
no
longer
determine
the
question
set
out
in
the
application;
2.
that
the
decision
of
the
Board
in
an
appeal
to
which
a
third
party
was
joined
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(a)
could
not
be
binding
on
the
third
party:
3.
that
the
Department
of
National
Revenue’s
practice
of
issuing
contradictory
assessments
in
matters
arising
out
of
the
same
transactions
and
then
seeking
to
have
the
questions
determined
under
section
174
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
wrong
in
principle;
4.
that
joining
a
third
party
to
an
appeal
would
cause
procedural
problems
in
the
hearing
of
such
an
appeal
and
more
importantly
would
jeopardize
the
statutory
rights
of
third
parties.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
contended
that
even
though
section
174
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
may
lack
clarity
and
that
procedural
difficulties
might
arise
in
joining
a
third
party
to
an
appeal,
the
section
was
included
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
a
definite
purpose
and
that
in
applying
section
174
the
intention
the
legislator
had
in
drafting
the
section
should
be
sought
and
applied.
Both
counsel
were
very
eager
and
indeed
asked
the
Board
in
its
decision
to
attempt
to
clarify
as
many
points
as
possible
arising
from
the
application
of
section
174
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
am
not
at
all
certain,
after
studying
the
whole
of
section
174
and
each
of
its
subsections,
that
its
application
as
it
is
now
written,
can
attain
the
objective
Parliament
apparently
had
in
mind
without
giving
rise
to
anomalous
situations
and
indeed
without
seriously
curtailing
certain
taxpayers’
rights
in
the
process.
No
one
would
disagree
with
the
statement
that
while
attempting
to
avoid
duplication
of
lengthy
procedures,
section
174
was
meant,
in
general
terms,
to
be
an
aid
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
assessing
certain
taxpayers
who
have
participated
in
a
common
transaction
and
whose
tax
liabilities
are
impossible
to
assess
properly
without
some
prior
determination
having
been
made
as
to
the
facts
and/or
law
in
respect
of
the
transaction.
In
attempting
to
provide
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
with
some
basis
on
which
to
make
its
assessment
in
such
circumstances,
Parliament,
in
drafting
section
174,
it
would
appear,
attempted
with
a
view
of
saying
judicial
time
to
cover
taxpayers
involved
in
a
common
transaction
who,
on
the
same
issue
were
at
different
stages
of
our
taxation
procedures,
including
taxpayers
who
had
not
yet
even
been
assessed.
Here,
as
I
see
it,
is
one
source
of
the
problem.
174.
(1)
Reference
to
Federal
Court
or
Tax
Review
Board
of
common
questions.—Where
the
Minister
is
of
the
opinion
that
a
question
of
law,
fact
or
mixed
law
and
fact
arising
out
of
one
and
the
same
transaction
or
occurrence
or
series
of
transactions
or
occurrences
is
common
to
assessments
in
respect
of
two
or
more
taxpayers,
he
may
apply
to
the
Tax
Review
Board
or
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
for
a
determination
of
the
question.
It
would
appear
from
subsection
174(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
that
the
Minister
may
file
an
application
for
a
determination
of
a-question
as
to
which
of
two
or
more
taxpayers
who
were
parties
to
the
same
transaction
should
be
assessed.
The
question
having
been
determined,
the
Minister
would
normally
proceed
to
assess
accordingly.
In
practice,
however,
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
usually
has,
prior
to
filing
an
application
for
the
determination
of
that
very
question,
already
assessed
one
or
more
of
the
taxpayers
and
quite
often
has
issued
contradictory
assessments
to
taxpayers
involved
in
the
same
transaction.
The
propriety,
or
otherwise,
for
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
make
such
contradictory
assessments
will
be
referred
to
later.
174.
(2)
An
application
under
subsection
(1)
shall
set
forth
(a)
the
question
in
respect
of
which
the
Minister
requests
a
determination,
(b)
the
names
of
the
taxpayers
that
the
Minister
seeks
to
have
bound
by
the
determination
of
the
questions,
and
(c)
the
facts
and
reasons
on
which
the
Minister
relies
and
on
which
be
based
or
intends
to
base
assessments
of
tax
payable
by
each
of
the
taxpayers
named
in
the
application,
(emphasis
mine)
and
a
copy
of
the
application
shall
be
served
by
the
Minister
on
each
of
the
taxpayers
named
in
the
application
and
on
any
other
persons
who,
in
the
opinion
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
or
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division,
as
the
case
may
be,
are
likely
to
be
affected
by
the
determination
of
the
question.
From
the
wording
of
paragraph
174(2)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
it
seems
clear
that
assessments
already
made,
as
well
as
assessments
yet
to
be
made
are
envisaged.
Although
the
last
paragraph
of
subsection
174(2)
is
not
chronologically
clear,
it
seems
evident
that
what
was
intended
was
that
all
persons
who
could
be
affected
by
the
determination
of
the
question
be
named
in
the
application
and
in
the
Board’s
notice
of
hearing
of
the
application.
174.
(3)
Where
Board
or
Court
may
determine
question.—Where
the
Tax
Review
Board
or
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
is
satisfied
that
a
determination
of
the
question
set
forth
in
an
application
under.
this
section
will
affect
assessments
in
respect
of
two
or
more
taxpayers
who
have
been
served
with
a
copy
of
the
application
and
who
are
named
in
an
order
of
the
Board
or
the
Court,
as
the
case
may
be,
pursuant
to
this
subsection,
it
may
(a)
if
none
of
the
taxpayers
so
named
has
appealed
from
such
an
assessment,
proceed
to
determine
the
question
in
such
manner
as
it
considers
appropriate,
or
(b)
if
one
or
more
of
the
taxpayers
so
named
has
or
have:
appealed,
make
such
order
joining
a
party
or
parties
to
that
or
those
appeals
as
it
considers
appropriate.
The
order
of
the
Board,
or
Court,
referred
to
in
the
first
paragraph
of
subsection
174(3)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
can
only
be
an
order
addressed
to
all
taxpayers
affected
by
the
determination
of
the
question,
giving
notice
of
the
time
and
place
at
which
the
Minister’s
application
will
be
heard
and
summoning
all
named
taxpayers
to
attend.
At:
the
hearing;
all
summoned
taxpayers
are
given
the
opportunity
of
opposing
the
application
giving
reasons
why
they
should
not
be
included
in
the
determination
of
the
question.
Some
confusion
has
arisen
in
respect
of.the
Board’s
order
with
reference
to
the
Minister’s
application
and
the
order
has
been
amended
accordingly.
In
my
view,
that
order
is
simply
a
notice
of
hearing
of
the
Minister’s
application.
The
order
is
not
meant,
nor
in
my
opinion
should
it
presume
to
either
determine
the
question
or
join
the
taxpayers
to
an
existing
appeal
at
that
stage,
its
purpose
is
to
permit
the
taxpayers
concerned
to
speak
to
the
Minister’s
motion.
Once
the
Minister’s
application
has
been
heard,
the
Board.
must
then
be
governed
by
either
one
of
the
two
distinct
procedures
which
are
set
out
respectively
in
paragraphs
174(3)(a)
and
(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
practice
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
of,
seeking,
in
its
application,
to
have
a
question
determined
and
at
the
same
time
seek
to
join
taxpayers
to
an
appeal
is,
in
my
view,
questionable.
It
would
seem
to
me
that
a
clear
distinction
must
be
made
between
the
determination
of
a
question
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(a)
and
a
decision
of
the
Board
to
join
taxpayers
to
an
appeal
according
to
paragraph
174(3)
(b).
Where
none
of
the
taxpayers
have
appealed
from
the
Minister’s
assessment,
the
Board
proceeds
to
determine
the
question,
at
that
time
or
later,
in
the
manner
it
considers
appropriate.
Since,
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(2)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
some
taxpayers
may
not
yet
have
been
assessed,
the
determination
of
the
question
can
only:
be
as
to
which
of
the
taxpayers
named
in
the
Board’s
order
should
be
assessed
and
the
quantum
of
the
assessment
also
determined.
Where
one
or
more
of
the
taxpayers
named
in
the
Minister’s
application
have
appealed
their
assessment,
the
Board
then
makes
a
second
order
joining
the
party
or
parties
to
the
existing
appeals.
Notwithstanding
any
procedural
difficulties
that
might
arise
once
other
taxpayers
have
been
joined
to
an
appeal,
the
Board
must
then
decide
on
the
merits
of
the
original
appeals
and,
in
my
opinion,
all
the
taxpayers
who
were
joined
to
those
appeals
would
necessarily
be
bound
by
the
Board’s
decision.
174.
(4)
Determination
final
and
conclusive.—Where
a
question
set
forth
in
an
application
under
this
section
is
determined
by
the
Tax
Review
Board
or
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division,
the
determination
thereof
is,
subject
to
any
appeal
therefrom
in
accordance
with
the
Federal
Court
Act,
final
and
conclusive
for
the
purposes
of
any
assessments
of
tax
payable
by
the
taxpayers
named
by
it
pursuant
to
subsection
(3).
Notwithstanding
the
generality
of
the
restriction
of
section.
174,
I
believe
that
there
is
a
fundamental
difference
between
the
determination
by
the
Board
of
a
question
set
forth
in
an
application.
under
paragraph
174(3)(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and:.a
decision
to
be
rendered
by
the
Board
on
the
merits
of
an
appeal
validly
before
it
to
which
other
taxpayers
have
been
joined
according
to
paragraph
174(3)(b).
In
the
first
instance,
it
seems
clear
that
the
Board’s
decision
is
not
one
as
a
result
of
an
appeal
from
an
assessment;
it
is
a
determination
of
a
question
affecting
taxpayers
who
have
not
appealed
from
their
assessments
or
who
have
not
yet
been
assessed.
Whereas
if
the
Board
has
before
it
an
appeal
to
which
other
taxpayers
have
been
joined
under
paragraph
174(3)(b),
the
Board
must
decide
the
issue
in
the
appeal
before
it.
The
decision
rendered
by
the
Board
would,
in
my
opinion,
then
be
an
appeal
from
the
Minister’s
assessments.
The
question
arises
as
to
whether
any
of
the
parties
in
a
joined
appeal
can
appeal
from
the
Board’s
decision
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
in
a
procès
de
novo
pursuant
to
section
172
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
or
are
they
precluded
from
doing
so
by
the
wording
of
subsection
174(4)?
In
the
case
of
Attorney
General
of
Canada
v
James
C
Weaver
and
Freda
J
Weaver,
[1975]
CTC
646
at
651;
75
DTC
5462
at
5465,
which
appears
to
be
the
first
application
for
review
of
a
Tax
Review
Board
decision
under
section
174,
the
learned
judge
the
Honourable
Mr
Justice
Urie
concluded:
It
thus
seems
clear
that
no
appeal
is
provided
either
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
or
under
the
Federal
Court
Act
from
a
determination
made
by
the
Tax
Review
Board
pursuant
to
section
174
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Further,
on
the
same
page
of
the
Weaver
case
(supra),
the
Honourable
Mr
Justice
Urie
states:
A
decision
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
made
pursuant
to
section
174
is
not
one
as
the
result
of
an
appeal
from
an
assessment.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
by
subsection
174(3),
the
Board
may
only
make
the
determination
applied
for
if
none
of
the
taxpayers
affected
has
appealed
from
their
assessments.
This
is
certainly
applicable
to
paragraph
174(3)(a)
which
deals
with
the
determination
of
the
question
when
‘none
of
the
taxpayers
have
appealed
but
does
it
also
apply
to
paragraph
174(3)(b)
where
the
decision
of
the
Board
is
one,
in
my
opinion,
as
the
result
of
an
appeal
from
assessments?
The
wording
of
the
restriction
of
subsection
174(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
clearly
makes
no
distinction
between
paragraphs
174(3)('a)
and
174(3)(b)
and
is
applicable
to
taxpayers
who
have
appealed
from
their
assessment
as
well
as
those
who
have
not
appealed.
The
Honourable
Mr
Justice
Urie
referred
to
the
anomaly
which
arises
when
the
Minister
seeks
to
have
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
determine
a
question
of
law,
or
mixed
law
and
fact
under
section
174
where
the
decision
is
appealable
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
whereas
if
the
Minister
had
chosen
to
have
the
question
determined
by
the
Tax
Review
Board
the
taxpayer
loses
all
right
of
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court,
his
only
redress
being
a
judicial
review
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
under
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
The
learned
Justice
has
properly
pointed
out
the
anomalous
situation
which
arises
in
treating.
taxpayers
differently
depending
on
whether
the
Minister
files
an
application
under
section
174
with
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
or
with
the
Tax
Review
Board.
However,
the
Tax
Review
Board
is
very
conscious
of
several
other
anomalies
which
arise
when
it
attempts
to
apply
section
174.
If
the
principal
objective
of
section
174
is
to
ascertain
how
the
Minister
is
to
assess
taxpayers
involved
in
a
common
transaction
when
none
of
the
taxpayers
have
appealed,
the
Board,
in
determining
the
question,
specifies
which
of
two
or
more
taxpayers
are
to
be
assessed
or
reassessed
and
by
how
much.
It
is
conceivable
that
that
restricted
scope
of
the
Board’s
determination
as
to
which
taxpayer
is
to
be
assessed
could
be
considered
as
final
and
subject
only
to
a
judicial
review
under
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
In
principle,
such
taxpayers,
having
been
so
assessed
by
the
Minister,
should
normally
have
the
right
to
appeal
to
the
Tax
Review
Board
from
the
Minister’s
assessment
pursuant
to
section
169
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
with
a
further
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
pursuant
to
section
172
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
practice,
however,
since
the
whole
basis
of
the
assessment
has
already
been
reviewed
by
the
Board
in
determining
the
question,
an
appeal
to
the
Board
on
the
same
issue
would
be
an
unjustifiable
loss
of
judicial
time.
It
would
nevertheless
be
in
keeping
with
our
established
appeal
procedure,
that
taxpayers
who
have
been
assessed
or
reassessed
by
the
Minister
as
a
result
of
the
Board’s
determination
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(a)
be
allowed
to
appeal
the
Minister’s
assessment
to
the
Federal
Court—
Trial
Division.
To
preclude
the
taxpayer
from
normally
appealing
from
an
assessment
as
a
consequence
of
a
procedure
established
to
facilitate
the
Minister’s
assessment
of
certain
taxpayers
in
exceptional
and
different
circumstances
cannot,
in
my
opinion,
have
been
intended
by
Parliament.
On
the
other
hand,
when
applying
paragraph
174(3)(b),
the
Board
is
clearly
seized
with
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
and
it
must
decide
the
issue
in
the
appeal
whether
or
not
other
taxpayers
have
been
joined.
In
theory,
taxpayers
who
are
joined
to
an
appeal
should
have
the
right
to
file
their
own
notice
of
objection
or
notice
of
appeal
in
the
ordinary
manner.
It
appears
to
me
that
the
delays
for.
filing
such
notices
are
provided
for
in
subsection
174(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Once
taxpayers
who
have
been
joined
to
an
appeal
or
appeals
under
paragraph
174(3)(b)
have
filed
the
customary
notices,
the
Board
would
hear
simultaneously
all
the
appeals
and
its
decisions,
in
my
opinion,
would
be
a
decision
from
the
taxpayers’
appeals
from
their
respective
assessments
in
accordance
with
section
169
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
binding
on
all
appellants.
In
my
opinion;
the
Honourable
Mr
Justice
Urie,
who
in
the
Weaver
case
(supra),
had
to
deal
with
an
application
under
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
with
reference
to
the
Board’s
determination
of
a
question
under
paragraph
174(3)(a)
did
not
need
to,
nor
in
my
opinion
did
he
consider
decisions
of
the
Board
rendered
as
a
result
of
appeals
from
assessments
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(b).
In
applying
subsection
174(4)
as
written,
the
effect
is
that
the
taxpayer,
who
has
seen,
in
accordance
with:
paragraph
174(3)(b),
other
taxpayers
joined
to
the
appeal
which
he
has
instituted
from
his
own
assessment
loses
the
right
he
originally
had
of
appealing
the
Board’s
decision
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
pursuant
to
section
172
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
Here
again,
it
appears
to
me
to
be
inequitable
for
the
taxpayer,
under
those
circumstances,
to
lose
the
right
of
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
and
to
be
restricted
to
a
judicial
review
under
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
as
a
result
of
a
statutory
procedure
designed
to
permit
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
assess
taxpayers
more
accurately
in
admittedly
difficult
circumstances.
I
do
not
believe
that
that
result
was
in
any
way
intended
by
Parliament.
174.
(5)
Time
during
consideration
of
question
not
counted.—The
time
between
the
day
on
which
an
application
under
this
section
is
served
on
a
taxpayer
pursuant
to
subsection
(2),
and
(a)
in
the
case
of
a
taxpayer
named
in
an
order
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
or
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division,
as
the
case
may
be,
pursuant
to
subsection
(3),
the
day
on
which
the
question
is
finally
determined
pursuant
to
paragraph
(3)(a)
or
on
which
an
order
is
made
under
paragraph
(3)(b),
or,
(b)
in
the
case
of
any
other
taxpayer,
the
day
on
which
he
is
served
with
notice
that
he
has
not
been
named
in
an
order
of
the
Board
or
the
Court,
as
the
case
may
be,
pursuant
to
subsection
(3),
shall
not
be
counted
in
the
computation
of
(c)
the
4-year
period
referred
to
in
subsection
152(4),
(d)
the
time
for
service
of
a
notice
of
objection
to
an
assessment
under
section
165,
or
(e)
the
time
within
which
an
appeal
may
be
instituted
under
section
169
or
subsection
172(2),
for
the
purpose
of
making
an
assessment
of
the
tax
payable
by
the
taxpayer,
serving
a
notice
of
objection
thereto
or
instituting
an
appeal
therefrom,
as
the
case
may
be.
If
subsection
174(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
to
be
interpreted
as
being
a
prohibition
for
taxpayers
from
appealing
to
the
Federal
Court
—Trial
Division
from
assessments
made
by
the
Minister
as
a
result
of
a
determination
by
the
Board
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(a),
and
a
prohibition
for
taxpayers
from
appealing
from
their
assessment
because
other
taxpayers
have
been
joined
to
their
original
appeals
under
paragraph
174(3)(b)
then
the
inclusion
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
in
subsection
174(5)
and
the
wording
of
that
section
as
if
affects
the
Tax
Review
Board
is,
in
my
view,
meaningless
and
inoperative,
which
again
cannot
be
what
Parliament
had
intended.
In
summarizing
my
personal
conclusions
after
studying
section
174
as
a
whole
and
in
its
subsections
they
are:
1.
The
purpose
of
section
174
is
to
permit
the
Minister
to
assess
more
accurately
taxpayers
who
are
involved
in
a
common
transaction.
2.
In
establishing
a
procedure
to
achieve
the
stated
purpose
while
at
the
same
time
saving
judicial
time,
the
taxpayers’
rights
of
appeal
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
from
their
assessments
appear
to
have
been
jeopardized.
3.
The
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
has
stated
that
the
Board
may
only
make
a
determination
under
paragraph
174(3)(a)
if
none
of
the
taxpayers
have
appealed
from
their
assessments.
4.
The
practice
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
in
its
applications
under
section
174
of
simultaneously
seeking
to
have
the
question
determined
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(a)
and
requesting
that
certain
taxpayers
[be]
joined
to
an
existing
appeal,
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(b),
is
contrary
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal’s
obiter
dictum
in
the
Weaver
case
(supra).
5.
The
practice
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
of
issuing
contradictory
assessments
to
taxpayers
involved
in
a
common
transaction
and
then
applying
to
the
Tax
Review
Board
for
determination
of
the
question
under
section
174
appears
to
me
to
be
most
questionable.
Particularly
since
the
rights
of
the
taxpayers
to
appeal
the
Board’s
decision
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
are
curtailed
in
a
procedure
chosen
by
the
Minister.
6.
In
theory,
if
not
in
practice,
a
determination
by
the
Board
of
a
question
under
paragraph
174(3)(a)
when
none
of
the
taxpayers
have
appealed
and
where
one
or
more
taxpayers
may
not
have
yet
been
assessed,
is
aimed
more
particularly
at
identifying
which
of
the
taxpayers
in
a
common
transaction
are
to
be
assessed
and
which
are
not
to
be
assessed.
Such
a
determination
by
the
Board
might
conceivably
not
be
appealable
by
the
taxpayer
or
the
Minister
other
than
by
way
of
a
judicial
review
under
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
However,
once
a
taxpayer
has
been
assessed
pursuant
to
a
determination
by
the
Board,
the
taxpayer,
in
my
opinion,
should
not
be
precluded
from
appealing
his
assessment
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division.
7.
When
taxpayers
are
joined
to
an
existing
appeal
under
paragraph
174(3)(b),
the
opportunity
of
filing
a
notice
of
objection
and
a
notice
of
appeal
should
be
given
the
joined
taxpayers.
However,
a
decision
of
the
Board
would
be
binding
on
all
taxpayers
so
joined
to
an,
original
appeal
to
the
Board.
In
my
Opinion,
there
is
no
valid
‘reason
why
any
or
all
of
the
taxpayers,
who
have
so
appealed
from
their
assessments,
should,
under
the
circumstances,
be
precluded
from
appealing
the
Board’s
decision
to
the
Federal
Court—Trial
Division
under
section
172
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
That
is,
of
course,
other
than
the
interpretation
of
the
wording
to
be
given
to
subsection
174(4).
...
:
—.
-.
.
.
.-J
«<
The
foregoing
has
been
written
at
the
request
of
both
counsel
to
the
instant
application
before
the
Board
and
because
of
the
lack
of
clarity,
the
inherent
contradictions
of
section
174
as
well
as
the
anomalous
results
to
which
its
application
gives
rise.
The
Board
can
well
imagine
the
difficulty
and
the
practical
problems
that
exist
in
assessing
taxpayers
in
the
above
described
circumstances,
however,
I
believe
the
Board
would
not
be
assuming
its
responsibilities
if
it
remained
silent
as
to
the
undesirable
results
that
occur
in
trying
to
apply
section
174
as
it
is
now
written.
Most
of
the
foregoing
is
by
way
of
obiter
dictum
and
meant
to
be
helpful.
Decision
In
the
present
application,
the
respondent
seeks
to
have
a
specific
question
as
set
out
above
determined
by
the
Board
and
seeks
as
well
to
have
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
joined
in
an
appeal
instituted
by
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited.
On
the
basis
that
the
Board
may
only
determine
a
question
pursuant
to
paragraph
174(3)(a)
when
none
of
the
taxpayers
named
in
an
appeal
have
appealed
their
assessment
and
since
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited
does
have
a
valid
appeal
before
the
Board,
that
part
of
the
Minister’s
application
is
therefore
rejected.
However,
Canadian.
Horticultural
Industries
having
participated
in
a
common
transaction
with
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited,
an
appellant
before
this
Board,
the
Board
orders
that
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
be
joined
to
the
appeal
of
Caverhill,
Learmont
&
Co
Limited.
The
evidence
is
that
Canadian
Horticultural
Industries
has
filed
a
notice
of
objection
to
its
assessment
and
may
therefore
file
a
notice
of
appeal
with
this
Board
pursuant
to
subsection
174(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
within
the
delay
set
out
in
section
169
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
filing
a
notice
of
appeal
to
be
counted
from
the
date
of
this.
order.
The
requirements
of
section
169
having
been
met,
the
Board
will
serve
a
notice
of
hearing
on
the
parties
and
the
joined
appeals
will
be
heard
according
to
a
procedure
deemed
by
the
Board
as
appropriate
in
the
circumstances.