CASEY,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
Superior
Court,
district
of
Montreal,
rendered
March
3,
1949,
holding
two
of
the
appellants,
Arthur
W.
Gilmour
and
Dominic
Vincelli
in
contempt
of
Court.
The
facts
are
these
:
In
October
of
1948
a
Winding-up
Order
was
issued
against
Die-Plast
Co.
Ltd.,
and
David
Grobstein
was
appointed
liquidator.
It
appears,
on
the
strength
of
the
proceedings
before
us
that
one
Dorothy
Myerson,
a
shareholder
of
the
Company,
had
been
the
owner
of
the
building
in
which
the
Company
operations
were
carried
on,
and
that
she
had
leased
this
building
to
the
Company.
It
is
alleged
that
this
lease
had
disappeared
and
also
that
Dorothy
Myerson
had
sold
the
immoveable
to
her
father.
In
January
of
1949,
the
liquidator
made
a
petition
before
the
Superior
Court
asking
that
the
sale
of
the
property
be
set
aside
and
that
the
lease,
of
which
the
written
evidence
had
disappeared,
be
declared
in
existence.
This
petition
was
contested,
and
for
the
purpose
of
the
hearing,
Arthur
W.
Gilmour
and
Diminic
Vincelli,
both
employees
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Income
Tax
Division,
were
served
with
subpoenas
duces
tecum.
It
is
clear
that
the
petitioner
proposed
to
have
these
witnesses
disclose
whatever
information
concerning
the
lease
they
had
acquired
in
their
official
capacities,
and
to
submit
their
evidence
as
an
element
of
proof
tending
to
establish
the
existence
of
the
disputed
agreement.
Present,
however,
at
the
hearing
was
counsel
for
the
Department,
who
objected
to
the
examination
of
the
appellants
and
to
the
production
of
the
documents
requested,
the
latter
having
been
obtained
:
«6
.
.
in
pursuance
of
their
official
duties
solely
for
the
information
and
use
of
the
taxation
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
Officials
of
Taxation
Division
engaged
in
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
and
are
of
such
confidential
nature
that
their
production
would
be
prejudicial
to
the
public
interest
.
.
.”?
To
support
this
objection
the
affidavit
of
Mr.
V.
W.
T.
Seully,
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
was
filed.
Since
this
document
has
a
bearing
on
the
issues,
it
is
well
to
reproduce
it
immediately
:
“1.
I
have
read
copies
of
subpoenas
issued
on
the
25th
day
of
February
1949
at
the
instance
of
the
petitioners
in
these
proceedings
and
directed
to
and
served
on
A.
W.
Gilmour,
Director
of
Income
Tax,
400
Youville
Square,
Montreal,
P.Q.,
and
Dominic
Vincelli,
c/o
Director
of
Income
Tax,
400
Youville
Square,
Montreal,
P.Q.,
requiring
them
to
attend
as
witnesses
in
these
proceedings
on
the
3rd
day
of
March,
1949,
at
ten-thirty
o’clock
in
the
forenoon
before
Mr.
Justice
L.
Boyer
to
give
evidence
and
to
bring
with
them
reports
and
documents
concerning
information
given
to
them
on
behalf
of
Die-Plast
Company
Limited
with
regard
to
the
lease
held
by
that
Company
for
the
premises
at
6540
Hutchison
Street,
Montreal,
P.Q.
2.
A.
W.
Gilmour
and
Dominic
Vineelli
are
officers
of
the
Taxation
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
of
the
Government
of
Canada
employed
in
the
service
of
His
Majesty
in
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
and
bound
by
the
terms
of
Section
81
of
that
Act.
3.
The
documents
described
in
the
subpoenas
are
reports
or
official
minutes
or
correspondence
or
copies
of
correspondence
setting
out
or
dealing
with
material
or
information
obtained
by
or
provided
to
A.
W.
Gilmour
and
Dominic
Vincelli
under
the
terms
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
in
pursuance
of
their
official
duties
solely
for
the
information
and
use
of
the
Taxation
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
officials
of
the
Taxation
Division
engaged
in
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
and
are
of
such
confidential
nature
that
their
production
would
be
prejudicial
to
the
public
interest
and
I
accordingly
object
to
their
production.
4.
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
it
would
be
prejudicial
to
the
public
interest
for
A.
W.
Gilmour
and
Dominic
Vincelli,
or
either
of
them,
to
give
vive
voce
evidence
described
in
the
subpoenas
or
relating
to
information
which
they,
or
either
of
them,
have
obtained
in
the
course
of
their
duties
as
officers
of
the
Taxation
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
engaged
in
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
and
I
accordingly
object
to
such
evidence
being
given.”
The
next
entry
of
interest
in
the
procès
verbal
is
the
decision
on
this
objection.
At
page
6
of
the
Joint
Case
we
read:
‘‘ce
n’est
pas
à
un
officier
du
Département
du
Revenu
National
de
décider
si
les
témoins
doivent
témoigner
;
mais
ce
droit
appartient
exclusivement
aux
Tribunaux
de
décider
en
cette
matière
;
en
outre,
la
compagnie,
en
assignant
les
témoins
dans
sa
propre
cause,
abandonne
son
privilège
;
Ordre
est
donné
aux
témoins
de
témoigner
;
la
Cour,
les
déchargeant
de
toute
responsabilité.”
The
two
witnesses,
Gilmour
and
Vineelli,
were
then
sworn
and
after
they
had
refused
to
testify
and
to
produce
the
reports
and
documents
requested,
they
were
declared
in
contempt
of
Court.
The
decision
of
the
learned
trial
Justice
was
reduced
to
writing
and
must
now
be
reproduced:
“ATTENDU
QUE:
Le
témoin
Vincelli,
un
employé
du
Département
Fédéral
du
Revenu
ayant
été
dûment
assigné
et
ayant
prêté
serment,
le
procureur
de
département
s’est
opposé
à
ce
qu’il
témoigne
en
invoquant
la
loi
de
la
taxe
sur
le
Revenu,
a
produit
un
affidavit
du
Député
Ministre
du
Département
des
Finances,
à
l’effet
que
ses
employés
ne
pouvaient
être
forcés
de
témoigner
et
qu’il
leur
avait
défendu
de
ce
faire
et
argumenté
au
même
effet
en
citant
certaines
décisions
où
les
circonstances
n’apparaissaient
pas.
Le
procureur
du
syndic
a
soutenu
le
contraire
en
représentant
de
plus
que
la
Compagnie
en
faillite
représentée
par
le
Requérant
consent
à
l’examen
et
qu’il
était
dans
l’intérêt
de
la
justice
que
l’examen
ait
lieu.
La
Cour
s’étant
alors
ajournée
à
2.15
p.m.
jugement
est
rendu
comme
suit
après
délibéré
:
CONSIDERANT
QUE:
Toute
la
cause
repose
sur
l’existence
d’un
bail
en
faveur
de
la
Compagnie,
qui
a
disparu
et
le
Requérant
veut
établir
qu’il
est
aux
mains
du
Département
et
qu’au
moins
ses
officiers
l’ont
vu
alors
qu’ils
étaient
au
bureau
de
la
Compagnie
Faillie
;
La
preuve
de
ce
fait
est
essentielle
et
dans
l’intérêt
de
la
Justice,
un
officier
du
Département
n’a
ni
le
droit
ni
le
pouvoir
d’interpréter
la
loi
et
de
décider
si
un
témoin
doit
répondre
et
à
quelles
questions
il
doit
répondre
et
surtout
décider
d’avance
sans
les
avoir
entendues,
la
légalité
des
questions
posées
plus
tard
au
cours
d’un
procès.
Ce
droit
appartient
exclusivement
aux
tribunaux
c’est
à
eux
de
décider
suivant
les
circonstances.
Dans
l’espèce,
l’article
en
question
est
dans
l’intérêt
seul
du
contribuable
et
il
consent,
par
le
Syndic
qui
le
représente,
à
ce
que
la
preuve
soit
faite
comme
il
le
demande.
Il
s’agit
d’un
privilège
pour
favoriser
le
contribuable,
afin
de
ne
pas
nuire
à
son
crédit
et
auquel
il
peut
renoncer
comme
au
privilège
du
médécin
et
de
l’avocat
et
la
sanction
n’affecte
pas
la
question,
mais
n’a
pour
but
que
d’assurer
le
privilège.
D’ailleurs
la
question
à
être
posée
aux
témoins
ne
s’applique
pas
au
rapport
sur
le
Revenu.
Pour
ces
motifs,
déclare
que
les
dits
témoins
devront
témoigner.
Jugement
étant
ainsi
rendu,
les
témoins
Dominic
Vincelli
et
Arthur
Gilmour,
de
nouveau,
furent
appelés
et
assermentés,
mais
refusèrent
péremptoirement,
malgré
l’order
de
la
Cour,
de
répondre
à
toute
question,
invoquant
l’ordre
de
leur
supérieur
et
ce,
pas
même
à
la
question
à
l’effet
qu’ils
auraient
visité
le
bureau
de
la
Compagnie.
Vu
ce
que
ci-dessus,
DECLARE
les
dits
témoins
Dominic
Vineelli
et
Arthur
Gilmour,
en
mépris
de
Cour
laissant
aux
parties
tout
recours
que
ce
droit.”
In
attacking
this
judgment
the
appellants
argue
that
they,
as
officials
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
were
forbidden
by
law
to
disclose
the
information
sought;
that
C.C.P.
332
is
applicable;
that
documents
and
papers
in
the
possession
of
the
Department
are
privileged;
and
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
is
the
only
person
who
has
the
right
to
decide
whether
such
documents
may
be
produced,
and
that
this
power
of
decision
cannot
be
destroyed
by
the
consent
of
the
taxpayer.
Before
discussing
the
merits
of
this
decision,
I
wish
to
make
the
following
observations
:
(1)
The
decision
of
the
learned
trial
Judge
holding
the
witnesses
in
contempt
of
Court
is
a
judgment
that
is
susceptible
of
appeal,
and
is
one
that
this
Court
may
either
confirm
or
quash.
(2)
The
refusal
which
provoked
this
judgment
was
a
refusal
to
disclose
information
that
the
witnesses
had
acquired
in
the
discharge
of
their
official
duties,
and
to
produce
documents
prepared
from
this
information
or
similarly
acquired.
(3)
The
affidavit
of
the
Hon.
Dr.
J.
J.
McCann,
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
which
was
produced
before
this
Court
is
to
be
treated
as
though
it
had
been
produced
before
the
Superior
Court.
This
affidavit
reads
:
“1.
THAT
I
have
taken
communication
of
the
Affidavit
of
V.
W.
T.
Scully,
then
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Taxation,
sworn
to
on
the
first
day
of
March,
1949,
at
which
time
I
was
Minister
of
National
Revenue;
2.
THAT
the
said
Affidavit
has
my
authorization
and
consent
and,
insofar
as
may
be
necessary,
I
hereby
on
my
own
behalf
reiterate
the
averments
and
renew
the
objection
contained
therein.’’
(4)
This
appeal
was
not
opposed,
the
petitioners
in
the
Superior
Court,
respondents
here,
having
filed
a
declaration
of
submission
to
justice.
Turning
now
to
the
merits,
it
may
be
noted
that
our
attention
was
drawn
to
Section
81
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1927,
ce.
97,
which
reads:
“81.
No
person
employed
in
the
service
of
His
Majesty
shall
communicate
or
allow
to
be
communicated
to
any
person
not
legally
entitled
thereto,
any
information
obtained
under
the
provisions
of
this
Act,
or
allow
any
such
person
to
inspect
or
have
access
to
any
written
statement
furnished
under
the
provisions
of
this
Act.
2.
Any
person
violating
any
of
the
provisions
of
this
section
shall
be
liable
on
summary
conviction
to
a
penalty
not
exceedng
two
hundred
dollars.
1917,
c.
28,
s.
11.”
and
to
Section
121
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(1948,
11-12
Geo.
VI,
ec.
52)
which
reads:
‘121.
Every
person
who,
while
employed
in
the
service
of
His
Majesty,
has
communicated
or
allowed
to
be
communicated
to
a
person
not
legally
entitled
thereto
any
information
obtained
under
this
Act
or
has
allowed
any
such
person
to
inspect
or
have
access
to
any
written
statement
furnished
under
this
Act
is
guilty
of
an
offence
and
liable
on
summary
conviction
to
a
fine
not
exceeding
$200.”
While
these
two
sections
differ
somewhat
in
wording,
for
the
purpose
of
this
case
they
are
identical
in
meaning.
They
prohibit
any
employee
from
divulging
any
information
to
any
person
not
legally
entitled
thereto.
But
since
in
this
case
it
was
the
taxpayer
who
asked
for
information
concerning
his
own
affairs,
it
is
difficult
to
see
how
he
could
be
regarded
otherwise
than
as
such
a
person.
That
evidently
was
the
opinion
of
the
learned
trial
Judge.
It
will
be
recalled
that
when
the
learned
trial
Judge
first
ordered
appellants
to
testify
he
said
‘‘les
déchargeant
de
toute
responsabilité’’.
With
his
conclusion
on
this
point
I
am
in
full
agreement.
But
the
right
of
the
Department
to
object
to
the
disclosure
cannot,
in
this
case
at
least,
find
its
basis
in
these
sections
of
the
law.
If
this
were
the
only
justification
put
forward,
I
would
not
hesitate
to
confirm
the
judgment
a
quo.
The
objection
however,
was
based
on
the
broader
principle
that
no
officer
of
State
can
be
compelled
to
disclose
information
when
such
disclosure
would
be
against
the
public
interest.
This
immediately
turns
us
to
C.C.P.
332,
which
reads:
“332.
He
(the
witness)
cannot
be
compelled
to
declare
what
has
been
revealed
to
him
confidentially
in
his
professional
character
as
religious
or
legal
adviser,
or
as
an
officer
of
state
where
public
policy
is
concerned.”
I
am
satisfied
that
these
two
witnesses
fall
within
the
category
of
officers
of
state’’.
Also
that
the
information
acquired
by
them,
by
word
of
mouth,
inspection
of
documents
or
otherwise,
was
information
obtained
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
“solely
for
the
information
and
use
of
the
Taxa-
tion
Division
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
and
Officials
of
the
Taxation
Division
engaged
in
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act.”
It
remains
only
to
be
decided
whether
a
matter
of
public
policy
is
concerned.
If
so,
they
could
not
be
compelled
to
testify,
and
the
judgment
a
quo
must
be
quashed.
The
learned
trial
Judge
took
the
position
that
he
alone
had
the
right
to
decide
whether
a
matter
of
public
policy
was
concerned.
He
said
it
in
his
decision
on
the
preliminary
objection
and
again
in
the
judgment
a
quo.
By
so
doing
he
created
the
only
issue
involved
in
this
appeal.
In
his
work
De
la
Preuve,
Langelier,
relying
on
the
authority
of
Gugy
v.
Maguire,
13
L.C.R.
33
says
at
pagt
591:
“840.
Mais
à
qui
appartient-il
de
décider
si
la
déclaration
qu’on
voudrait
obtenir
d’un
fonctionnaire
est
contre
l’intérêt
public?
C’est
au
fonctionnaire
lui-même,
et
non
au
juge.”
The
importance
of
the
Gugy
judgment,
a
decision
of
this
Court,
is
shown
in
the
opening
paragraphs
of
the
notes
of
Meredith,
J.,
At
page
51
he
says:
“The
Judges
of
this
Court
are
all,
I
believe,
agreed
in
the
opinion
that
the
Head
of
the
Department
of
state
cannot
be
compelled,
at
the
instance
of
a
private
suitor,
to
produce
an
official
document
in
his
custody,
when
the
production
of
the
document
would,
on
grounds
of
public
policy,
be
inexpedient.
The
question
then
arises:
with
whom
does
it
rest
to
determine
whether
the
production
of
a
particular
document
is,
on
such
general
grounds,
inexpedient?
The
majority
of
the
Court
hold
that
the
Head
of
the
Department
having
official
custody
of
the
paper
is
necessarily
the
proper
person
to
determine
the
question,
while
one
of
the
members
of
the
Court
(M.
Justice
Mondelet)
maintains
that
it
must
be
determined
by
the
judge.
The
general
principles
of
law
as
well
as
the
decisions
of
the
Courts,
both
in
England
and
the
United
States,
appear
to
me
to
be
entirely
in
favour
of
the
opinion
of
the
majority
of
the
Court.’’
Since
the
decision
in
the
Gugy
case
there
have
been
others
in
the
same
sense.
Reference
may
be
made
to
Alain
v.
Belleau,
1
P.R.
98;
Hebert
v.
Latour,
15
R.P.
5;
Rheault
v.
Landry,
55
S.C.
1,
and
Boyer
v.
Boyer,
50
P.R.
174.
It
appears
to
me
that
these
decisions
constitute
a
jurisprudence
which
supports
the
contention
that
it
is
only
the
head
of
a
Department
of
State
who
is
in
a
position
and
who
has
the
right
to
decide
whether
the
disclosure
will
be
against
the
public
interest,
and
the
further
proposition
that
no
Court
has
the
right
to
go
behind
the
decision—in
this
case—of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
It
would
require
a
very
compelling
reason
to
warrant
any
interference
with
this
jurisprudence
and
to
justify
an
opinion
contrary
to
that
expressed
in
these
decisions.
Neither
in
the
judgment
a
quo
nor
elsewhere
have
I
been
able
to
find
such
a
reason.
The
learned
trial
Judge
takes
the
position
that
the
privilege
claimed
is
one
which
exists
in
favour
of,
and
for
the
protection
of
the
taxpayer.
If
this
is
accepted,
then
it
is
reasonable
to
say
that
the
taxpayer
can
waive
it.
But
the
privilege
is
not
of
this
type.
It
is
one
in
favour
of
the
public
interest,
with
the
result
that
the
nature
of
the
information
sought,
that
the
taxpayer
may
wish
to
have
it
disclosed,
that
the
dispute
is
between
two
private
individuals,
are
all
matters
of
no
importance
the
moment
the
Minister
declares
that
the
information
should
not
be
disclosed.
In
the
case
of
Duncan
v.
Cammel
Laird
&
Co.
(1942),
L.J.R.
406,
it
is
pointed
out
that
the
refusal
to
disclose
is
sometimes
based
on
the
fact
that
the
information
is
of
a
type
which,
on
the
broad
rule
of
public
policy
and
convenience,
should
be
kept
secret
and
that
it
is
at
other
times
based
on
the
fact
that
it
belongs
to
a
class
of
information
which
should
not
be
revealed.
At
page
412
we
read:
“It
will
be
observed
that
the
objection
is
sometimes
based
upon
the
view
that
the
public
interest
requires
a
particular
class
of
communications
with,
or
within,
a
public
department
to
be
protected
from
production
on
the
ground
that
the
candour
and
completeness
of
such
communications
might
be
prejudiced
if
they
were
ever
liable
to
be
disclosed
in
subsequent
litigation,
rather
than
upon
the
contents
of
the
particular
document
itself.’’
This
disposes
of
any
argument
based
on
the
contention,
no
matter
how
well
founded
in
other
respects,
that
the
information
sought
in
this
case
is
of
no
conceivable
importance
to
anyone
Save
the
parties
concerned.
This
view
of
the
matter
gives
to
the
Minister
far-reaching
power
and
certainly
makes
possible
situations
in
which
the
individual
may
suffer.
But
that
argument,
based
as
it
is
on
the
possible
consequences
of
an
abuse
of
power,
or
of
an
improper
exercise
of
discretion,
cannot
destroy
the
broader
principle
that
‘‘a
private
inconvenience
should
be
submitted
to
rather
than
introduce
a
public
mischief’’.
At
the
most
it
indicates
the
need
of
a
remedy
which
could
be
supplied
by
the
competent
authority,
or
which
perhaps
already
exists.
Meredith,
J.,
in
the
Gugy
case
(page
63),
says:
.
.
.
If
the
appellant
thinks
himself
aggrieved
by
the
decision
of
that
officer,
he
may
probably
appeal
to
the
Governor
in
Council,
with
a
right
of
a
further
appeal
to
parliament;
but
if,
we
hold,
the
question,
as
to
the
production
or
non
production
of
the
paper,
is
to
be
determined
by
the
secretary,
then
we
cannot
be
called
upon
to
pronounce
any
opinion
upon
the
sufficiency
or
insufficiency
of
the
reasons
urged
for
the
nonproduction
of
the
paper.’’
and
perhaps
this
disposes
of
this
aspect
of
the
matter.
Also,
while
dealing
with
the
consequences,
it
is
not
to
be
supposed
that
the
Minister
will
in
all
cases
find
that
the
disclosure
is
against
public
interest.
It
is
easy
to
conceive
of
cases
in
which
the
public
interest
will
be
better
served
by
the
disclosure
than
by
the
suppression.
Of
this
we
have
an
example
in
the
case
of
Ship
v.
The
King,
8
C.R.
26.
In
that
case
the
Minister
did
not
intervene.
We
can
only
suppose
that
he
regarded
it
as
one
in
which
the
balance
was
in
favour
of
disclosure
and
by
not
intervening
he
left
it
to
the
Courts
to
decide
whether
those
who
sought
the
information
were
legally
entitled
thereto.
On
the
whole
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
learned
trial
Judge
was
not
entitled
to
go
behind
the
expressed
opinion
of
the
Minister.
He
should
have
accepted
the
statement
that
the
disclosure
would
be
against
the
public
interest.
Had
he
done
so
he
would
have
necessarily
recognized
the
witnesses
as
being
non-compellable.
For
these
reasons
I
would
maintain
this
appeal
and
annul
the
judgment
a
quo.
I
feel
that
the
costs
should
go
against
the
respondents,
Die-
Plast
Co.
Ltd.
and
David
Grobstein,
the
petitioners
in
the
Superior
Court.
One
cannot
complain
about
their
having
issued
the
subpoenas
and
had
they
not
insisted
after
the
production
of
the
first
affidavit,
I
would
have
been
disposed
to
allow
this
appeal
without
costs.
However,
the
proces
verbal
discloses
that
after
the
initial
objection
had
been
made
and
dismissed,
they
asked
that
the
witnesses
be
declared
in
contempt
of
Court.
It
seems
to
me
that
the
respondents
provoked
the
situation
which
then
arose,
and
I
think
that
they
should
be
condemned
to
pay
the
costs
before
this
Court.
EDGE,
J.:—Pour
les
fins
d’enquête,
sur
une
requête
dans
laquelle
David
Grobstein
est
requérant
en
sa
qualité
de
syndic
à
la
faillite
de
Die-Plast
Company
Limited
et
Dorothy
Myerson,
Sol
Levites
et
Nathan
Myerson
sont
intimés,
ceux-ci
ont
assigné
comme
témoins
Arthur
W.
Gilmour,
Directeur
de
l’impôt
sur
le
Revenu
et
des
Droits
de
Succession,
et
Dominic
Vincelli,
assesseur
du
Département
de
l’impôt
sur
le
Revenu,
ces
témoins
représentant
le
Ministre
du
Revenu
National
pour
le
Canada.
La
requête
avait
pour
objet
d’établir
l’existence
d’un
bail
et
de
faire
mettre
de
côté
un
acte
de
vente.
A
l’enquête,
comme
on
le
constate
par
les
déclarations
de
Vincelli
et
Gilmour,
ceux-ci
ont
refusé
de
témoigner.
Vincelli,
d’une
part,
en
déclarant
que
son
serment
de
garder
le
secret
lui
défendait
de
témoigner
et
Gilmour,
d’autre
part,
en
déclarant
qu’il
ne
pouvait
produire
aucun
des
documents
et
des
rapports
concernant
la
compagnie
en
faillite
à
raison
des
instructions
qu’il
avait
reçues
du
Sous-Ministre
du
Revenue
National
et
de
son
serment
d’office.
En
fait,
un
affidavit
de
V.
Seully,
Sous-Ministre
du
Revenu
National
a
été
produit
et
il
atteste
qu’il
serait
préjudiciable
à
l’intérêt
publie
pour
Gilmour
et
Vincelli
de
témoigner
relativement
aux
documents
décrits
dans
le
subpoena,
parce
qu’il
y
aurait
violation
des
dispositions
de
L’Acte
de
l’impôt
de
guerre
sur
le
revenu.
Le
pétitionnaire
demande
a
la
Cour
que
Vincelli
et
Gilmour
fussent
déclarés
en
mépris
de
Cour.
Le
Juge
rejeta
les
objections
du
département
et
a
déclaré
que
les
témoins
Vincelli
et
Gilmour
devaine
témoigner.
Et
c’est
lorsqu’ils
ont
été
appelés
et
entendus
comme
témoins
que,
au
cours
de
l’enquête,
il
déclara
chacun
d’eux
en
mépris
de
Cour.
Le
procureur
du
pétitionnaire
a
demandé
de
suspendre
toute
sentence
afin
de
permettre
au
procureur
du
département
de
porter
en
appel
la
décision
du
Juge.
Après
avoir
pris
connaissance
des
notes
des
Juges
de
la
Cour
d’Appel
dans
la
cause
Gugy
v.
Maguire,
13
L.C.R.
33,
cette
cause
dispose
du
cas
dont
est
appel,
et
plus
particulièrement
des
notes
élaborées
de
M.
le
Juge
Casey,
appuyées
d’un
grand
nombre
de
décisions,
je
concours
dans
l’opinion
de
M.
le
Juge
Casey
et
j’en
viens
à
la
conclusion
suivante
:
C’est
au
Ministre
ou
à
toute
autre
personne
en
autorité
dont
un
employé
relève,
et
non
à
la
Cour,
qu’il
appartient
de
décider
si
cet
employé
doit
divulger
les
communications
ou
documents
qui
lui
sont
faits
en
sa
qualité
officielle.
Dans
l’espèce,
outre
qu’un
texte
formel
de
l’Acte
de
l’impôt
de
guerre
sur
le
revenu
défend
aux
fonctionnaires
du
Département
du
Revenu
National
de
faire
connaître
le
contenu
des
rapports
de
l’impôt
sur
le
Revenu,
les
témoins
Vincelli
et
Gilmour
tenus
au
secret
sous
leur
serment
d’office
ayant
reçu
instruction
d’une
personne
en
autorité,
le
Sous-Ministre
du
Département
du
Revenu
National,
de
ne
rien
divulguer
de
ce
qui
pouvait
constituter
le
dossier
de
la
Die-Plast
Company
Limited,
la
Cour
ne
pouvait
les
forcer
à
le
faire,
ni
à
produire
aucun
document
s’y
rapportant.
Je
maintiendrais
l’appel
et
j’adopte
les
conclusions
dans
les
notes
de
M.
le
Juge
Casey,
quant
aux
frais.
Judgment
accordingly.
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