ARCHIBALD,
J.:—The
appellant,
Alloy
Metal
Sales
Limited,
was
incorporated
on
December
27,
1940,
to
become
the
organization
for
the
distribution
of
certain
products
of
the
International
Nickel
Company
of
Canada,
Limited.
Prior
to
that
date,
the
International
Nickel
Company
of
Canada,
Limited,
had
attended
to
the
distribution
of
its
own
products.
Paragraph
6
of
the
Appeal
contains
the
following
words:
“6.
The
appellant
has
accordingly
since
the
first
of
January,
1941,
carried
on
the
business
of
distributing
and
selling
the
products
of
The
International
Nickel
Company
of
Canada,
Limited
and
its
subsidiaries
such
as
nickel
alloys
and
rolled
nickel
and
nickel
alloy
shapes
and
in
addition
has
distributed
certain
metals
such
as
stainless
steel
produced
by
others
and
its
standard
profit
was
fixed
by
the
Board
of
Referees
under
The
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act,
prior
to
the
enactment
of
Section
15A
of
that
Statute
at
the
sum
of
$60,000.00.’’
Section
15A
of
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act
reads
as
follows
:
“15A.
Notwithstanding
anything
in
this
Act
contained,
in
any
case
where
a
company
has
a
controlling
interest
in
any
other
company
or
companies
(hereinafter
called
controlled
company
or
companies)
incorporated
in
1940
or
thereafter
.
.
.
and
the
sum
of
the
capital
employed
by
such
company
and
such
controlled
company
or
companies
at
the
time
of
incorporation
is
not
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
substantially
greater
than
the
capital
employed
by
such
first-
mentioned
company
prior
to
the
incorporation
of
such
controlled
company
or
companies,
the
standard
profits
of
all
such
controlled
companies
taken
together
shall
not
exceed
$5,000
in
the
aggregate,
and
shall
be
allocated
to
each
of
such
controlled
companies
in
such
amounts
as
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
may
direct.
In
any
such
ease
a
reference
to
the
Board
of
Referees
shall
not
be
made
notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
section
five
of
this
Act.’’
The
contention
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
is
that
inasmuch
as
this
legislation
is
retroactive
and
has
retrospective
effect,
this
section
must
be
strictly
construed
and
that
ambiguity
being
evident
by
reason
of
the
second
paragraph
of
the
section
the
Court
should,
in
construing
the
whole
of
Section
15A
resort
to
discussions
in
Parliament
to
assist
it
in
determining
the
reason
for
the
legislation.
After
giving
careful
thought
to
the
wording
of
the
subsection,
I
am
unable
to
see
that
there
is
any
such
ambiguity
in
the
wording
of
the
section
as
to
justify
resort
to
the
discussions
in
Parliament
at
the
time
when
consideration
was
being
given
to
the
legislation.
The
argument
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
is
that
if
resort
is
had
to
the
Hansard
debates
at
the
time
of
the
enactment
of
this
legislation,
it
will
be
apparent
that
the
purpose
of
the
Act
was
to
prevent
an
abuse
from
creeping
in
which
would
permit
companies
to
incorporate
wholly
owned
subsidiaries
for
the
purpose
of
limiting
income
tax
assessments.
There
is
certainly
nothing
in
the
section
itself
containing
any
reference
to
such
an
abuse.
There
is
no
recital
nor
any
preamble
to
indicate
anything
of
the
kind.
If
the
wording
of
the
section
means
anything
at
all,
it
means
that
the
standard
profits
of
the
Alloy
Metal
Sales
Limited
cannot
exceed
$5,000.00
a
year,
notwithstanding
any
provision
in
the
Act.
The
point
was
squarely
before
this
Court
in
the
appeal
of
The
Royal
City
Sawmills
Limited
v.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1950]
Ex.
C.R.
276;
[1950]
C.T.C.
403.
That
case
was
tried
before
Sidney
Smith,
D.J.,
and
at
p.
278
[[1950],
C.T.C.
at
p.
404],
the
learned
judge
states:
‘‘In
my
opinion
there
can
be
no
doubt
that,
from
first
to
last,
this
was
a
controlled
company
in
the
sense
of
this
section
(indeed
the
point
was
not
contested)
;
that
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
(and,
I
may
add,
in
my
own
as
well)
the
sum
of
the
capital
of
parent
and
offspring
was
not
substantially
greater
than
the
capital
of
the
parent
company
at
the
relevant
time;
and
that
its
date
of
incorporation
and
chargeable
accounting
periods
come
within
the
statutory
time.
How,
then,
can
it
be
said
that
the
company
falls
outside
the
wide
net
of
this
section
?
The
main
argument
was
that
having
had
its
standard
profit
fixed
at
$28,500
in
1941,
the
section
could
not
now
operate
to
reduce
them
to
$5,000;
that
this
would
be
tantamount
to
retrospective
legislation;
and
that
the
section
left
much
room
for
doubt
as
to
whether
this
was
the
intention.
But
the
section
introduced
a
new
standard
profit
for
certain
companies
of
which
this
was
one.
It
contains
no
hint
that
Parliament
intended
that
the
section
should
not
apply
to
companies
within
its
ambit
whose
standard
profits
had
previously
been
fixed
by
some
other
measure.
If
such
had
been
the
intention
nothing
would
have
been
easier
than
to
say
so.
In
the
absence
of
such
language
the
qualfication
of
its
terms
by
any
such
implication
is
not
legitimate.
The
provision
may
seem
harsh
to
the
appellant
company,
but
if
the
provision
is
clear
the
Court
has
no
jurisdiction
to
mitigate
such
harshness,
if
any
there
be.
In
my
opinion
this
statutory
provision
interpreted
according
to
income
tax
principles
and
to
the
actual
terms
of
the
language
used
amounts
to
saying:
‘If
you
are
a
controlled
company
your
standard
profits
shall
not
exceed
$5,000
notwithstanding
any
machinery
in
the
Act
which
may
hitherto
have
given
you
a
greater
standard
profit
!
The
appeal
must
be
dismissed
with
costs.??
In
this
appeal,
it
is
complained
that
the
result
has
worked
hardship
on
the
appellant
because
the
income
tax
as
assessed
is
greatly
in
excess
of
any
assessment
that
would
have
been
made
had
no
wholly
owned
subsidiary
been
established
for
the
purpose
of
attending
to
the
sales
of
the
various
products
referred
to
in
its
Letters
Patent,
and,
while
it
may
be
regrettable
that
this
condition
has
resulted,
nevertheless,
in
my
view,
proper
construction
of
the
statute
does
not
permit
the
interpretation
sought
by
the
appellant.
The
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.