SIDNEY
SMITH,
D.J.:—The
Company
appeals
from
assessments
for
income
tax
covering
several
years,
and
also
from
assessments
for
excess
profits
tax
which
do
not
cover
quite
the
same
period.
But
since
all
the
assessments
seem
to
be
governed
by
the
same
principles,
I
need
not
go
into
details.
The
Company
operates
an
investment
trust
business
and
the
main
difficulties
that
arise
in
the
case
are
due
to
the
complexity
of
the
relations
between
the
Company
and
its
agents
and
clientele.
The
Company
makes
use
of
two
trust
companies
and
there
is
a
multiplicity
of
agreements
between
one
or
more
of
the
Companies
and
the
clientele.
I
need
not
conjecture
whether
these
complications
serve
any
useful
practical
purpose;
but
it
is
necessary
to
find
the
essential
legal
relations
of
these
parties,
stripped
of
unessential
complexities.
It
seems
to
me
that
the
two
trust
companies
are
nothing
but
agents
for
the
appellant
Company,
and
that
this
case.
should
be
dealt
with
as
though
the
appellant
Company
itself
carried
out
all
transactions
into
which
the
clientele
enter.
Without
elaborating
on
the
tortuous
courses
pursued,
I
may
say
that
I
view
the
appellant’s
business
as
one
for
giving
investors
an
opportunity
for
investing
in
securities
without
having
to
pay
for
them
in
full.
Clients
are
allowed
to
buy
by
instalments
fractional
shares
in
blocks
of
securities
that
are
lumped
together.
One
peculiarity
of
the
arrangement
is
that
holders
of
these
fractional
interests
can
buy
further
interests
at
market
price
at
any
time,
and
can
also
at
any
time
compel
the
appellant
to
buy
them
back
at
the
market
price.
Consideration
of
the
scheme
shows
that,
though
the
client
gains
or
loses
by
fluctuations
of
the
market,
the
appellant
neither
gains
nor
loses
on
interests
that
are
outstanding
in
the
hands
of
clients,
though
the
appellant
is
affected
by
market
fluctuations
in
securities
that
are
merely
passive
in
the
appellant’s
hands
and
are
not
the
subject
of
any
transaction
at
the
time.
What
have
been
assessed
in
this
case
are
the
increases
in
market
value
of
securities
that
have
been
lying
passive
in
the
appellant’s
hands.
Appellant
claims
that
these
increases
in
value
are
capital
increment
and
not
income
at
all
;
the
Minister
claims
that
they
constitute
a
profit
in
a
commodity
that
it
is
the
appellant’s
business
to
deal
in,
and
so
are
income
within
the
relevant
Acts.
The
Minister
points
to
the
fact
that
the
appellant’s
Memorandum
of
Association
lists
the
buying
and
selling
of
securities
as
one
of
the
appellant’s
objects.
This,
however,
though
a
factor
to
be
considered,
is
far
from
conclusive.
The
question
is
not
whether
a
company
can
carry
on
a
particular
business,
but
whether
that
is
in
fact
its
business.
As
I
have
said,
the
appellant
has
neither
profits
nor
losses
on
securities
while
they
are
the
subject
of
deals
with
clients.
Though
it
can
gain
or
lose
on
securities
that
are
lying
passive
in
its
hands,
it
is
as
liable
to
lose
as
to
win,
according
to
the
general
market.
The
real
source
of
income
or
profit
that
is
its
raison
d’étre
is
its
right
to
be
paid
various
fees
and
emoluments
which
are
given
various
fancy
labels
and
are
deducted
on
a
percentage
basis
from
all
moneys
that
pass
through
its
hands.
The
effect
of
all
this
is
that,
though
buying
and
selling
interests
in
securities
are
essential
to
the
appellant’s
business,
these
transactions
are
not
its
livelihood.
In
fact,
with
regard
to
these
transactions,
the
appellant
is
in
much
the
position
of
a
broker
relying
on
commissions.
It
is
only
on
fluctuations
in
the
market
for
shares
not
being
bought
or
sold
that
appellant
can
make
a
profit.
It
does
not
seek
the
profit,
which
is
just
as
likely
to
be
a
loss.
If
profit,
it
is
a
fortuitous
profit.
It
is
true,
as
the
Crown
says,
that
these
securities
are
held
for
the
very
purposes
of
the
appellant’s
business.
But
that
is
not
in
itself
enough
to
make
them
taxable.
A
logging
company
may
hold
timber
lands
essential
to
its
business,
but
if
it
is
not
a
trader
in
timber
lands,
an
increase
in
their
value
is
capital,
not
income.
The
Crown
will
answer
that
that
is
an
isolated
transaction,
and
the
land
is
not
bought
for
re-sale;
that
here
there
is
a
course
of
dealing
in
securities,
and
they
are
bought
for
re-sale.
Again,
I
do
not
think
that
is
necessarily
enough.
Take
the
case
of
a
man
who
runs
a
picture
gallery,
and
counts
on
making
his
profit
by
charging
admissions.
To
keep
clients
interested
he
may
have
to
keep
his
collection
constantly
changing,
and
so
constantly
to
keep
buying
and
selling
pictures,
even
though
he
has
no
desire
to
be
a
dealer,
and
even
though
he
is
as
likely
to
loose
as
to
gain
by
his
deals.
I
cannot
believe
that
his
gains
or
losses
would
have
any
bearing
on
his
taxable
income;
he
is
a
Showman
not
a
dealer.
Similarly
the
appellant
keeps
securities
not
as
a
dealer,
but
as
an
inducement
to
persuade
clients
to
buy
and
to
pay
its
commissions.
These
securities
are
like
the
tools
of
a
trade
;
the
user
of
tools
must
keep
replacing
them,
and
may
be
lucky
enough
to
have
them
rise
in
value
after
replacement;
but
I
quite
fail
to
see
how
the
increase
could
be
treated
as
income.
Or
there
might
be
a
music-teacher
who
stocked
flutes
and
supplied
them
at
cost
to
pupils,
so
that
he
could
make
money
giving
them
lessons.
I
cannot
believe
that
any
rise
in
the
value
of
his
stock
could
be
taxed
as
income.
The
Crown
would
have
more
to
go
on
if
the
appellant
actually
made
profit
from
sales
and
re-purchases,
even
if
this
was
fortuitous
and
unsought,
though
I
very
much
doubt
whether
even
then
the
profit
would
be
income.
Here,
however,
the
profit,
far
from
being
made
from
sale
and
re-purchase
transactions,
can
only
be
made
while
the
appellant
has
no
transactions
in
those
securities.
That
seems
to
me
decisive;
so
I
hold
that
the
increases
in
value
are
capital
increment
and
not
taxable
income.
This
conclusion
makes
it
unnecessary
for
me
to
consider
the
appellant’s
other
argument
that
even
if
a
profit
made
by
market
gains
was
taxable,
this
could
not
be
taxed
until
it
was
realized
by
re-sale;
though
I
appreciate
the
strength
of
that
submission
too.
lt
would
allow
the
appeal.
Appeal
allowed,