SIDNEY
SMITH,
D.J.:—This
appeal
is
brought
from
a
judgment
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
sustaining
the
appellant’s
income
tax
assessments
for
the
years
1947
and
1948.
Only
the
former
year
need
be
dealt
with
as
the
same
principles
apply
to
both.
The
appellant
was
incorporated
in
the
Province
of
British
Columbia
and
carries
on
a
general
shipping
business
in
this
Province,
and
also
in
the
United
States
of
America
by
means
of
branches
in
Los
Angeles
and
San
Francisco
and
sub-agents
in
Seattle
and
Portland.
In
the
taxation
years
prior
to
1944
the
appellant,
generally
speaking,
made
a
profit
on
its
United
States
operations
as
well
as
on
its
Canadian
operations.
During
the
relevant
years
it
claimed
and
received
under
Section
8
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
relief
for
income
taxes
paid
to
the
Revenue
authorities
of
the
U.S.
on
income
earned
in
the
United
States.
In
the
taxation
years
1944
to
1946,
however,
appellant
suffered
losses
on
its
United
States
operations
and
did
not
then
claim
such
losses
as
a
deduction
from
income
in
these
taxation
years.
But
in
the
taxation
years
1947
and
1948
appellant
again
made
a
profit
on
its
U.S.
operations,
and
in
its
income
tax
returns
for
such
years
it
claimed
that
it
was
entitled
to
deduct
the
losses
suffered
by
it
in
the
taxation
years
1944
to
1946
from
its
income
earned
in
the
U.S.
in
the
taxation
years
1947
and
1948.
Appellant
says
that
it
is
entitled
to
deduct
these
losses
under
Section
5(1)
(p)
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act;
it
admits
that
under
Section
6(1)
(j)
of
the
Act
it
is
prohibited
from
deducting
such
losses
in
the
taxation
year
in
which
the
losses
were
incurred;
but
it
contends’
there
is
no
such
prohibition
in
Sec.
6(1)
(j)
with
respect
to
losses
suffered
in
the
previous
three
years.
The
Crown
contends
otherwise
and
that
is
the
issue
in
this
case.
The
relevant
statutory
provisions
of
Sections
5
and
6,
reduced
to
material
skeleton
form,
are
as
follows:
Section
3—‘
1
Income
’
’
means
the
annual
net
profit
.
.
.
directly
or
indirectly
received
by
a
person
...
from
any
...
business
.
.
.
whether
derived
from
sources
within
Canada
or
elsewhere
.
.
.
Section
5(1)—“Income”
.
.
.
shall
.
.
.
be
subject
to
the
following
deductions
:—
(p)
Amounts
in
respect
of
losses
sustained
in
the
3
years
immediately
preceding
.
.
.
the
taxation
year,
but
.
.
.
Section
6(1)—“..
.
a
deduction
shall
not
be
allowed
in
respect
of
(j)
net
losses
sustained
in
.
.
.
any
taxation
period
.
.
.
in
any
foreign
country,
after
the
taxpayer
has
in
respect
of
any
such
period
.
.
.
received
reciprocal
tax
relief
under
this
Act
for
taxes
paid
to
any
such
country
in
respect
of
profits
earned
therein.’’
It
is
common
ground
that
the
amount
of
income
subject
to
Canadian
taxation
in
any
particular
year
must
be
ascertained
under
the
provisions
of
the
Canadian
Income
War
Tax
Act;
that
appellant
elected
to
claim
and
received
tax
relief
under
Section
8
of
the
Act
during
the
relevant
period;
that
accordingly
Section
6(1)
(j)
precludes
it
from
deducting
net
losses
sustained
in
the
taxation
year
for
which
the
tax
is
being
computed.
But
on
the
other
hand
appellant
says
it
is
not
precluded
by
Section
6(1)
(j)
from
deducting
losses
for
the
three
preceding
years
(1944,
1945,
1946)
from
U.S.
profits
earned
in
1947;
that
it
retains
this
right
under
Section
5(1)
(p)
;
that
the
quantum
of
income
derived
from
sources
within
the
U.S.
during
the
years
1947
can
only
be
arrived
at
after
due
allowance
for
business
losses
incurred
in
the
U.S.
during
1944,
1945
and
1946,
as
provided
by
Section
5(1)
(p)
of
the
Act;
that
the
question
in
issue
is
not
the
deduction
of
losses
as
envisaged
in
Section
6(1)
(j)
but
rather
the
proper
application
of
the
over-riding
definition
of
income
in
Section
3
and
in
Section
5(1)
(p).
The
Crown’s
answer
is
short
and
simple,
if
anything
can
be
regarded
as
simple
in
income
tax
matters.
It
says
it
comes
squarely
within
the
provisions
of
Section
6(1)
(j).
It
submits
that
this
section
was
enacted
in
1935
to
remedy
an
unfavourable
situation
which
was
found
to
exist
in
the
case
of
a
company
carrying
on
business
in
Canada
and
abroad.
The
Crown
brought
to
my
attention
and
adopted
the
observations
of
Mr.
H.
H.
Stikeman
on
this
point
in
the
Canada
Tax
Service,
Vol.
A,
Section
6,
Para.
(j),
p.
6-501:
“This
section
was
designed
to
remedy
a
condition
whereby
the
Canadian
Revenue
would
bear
a
burden
when
losses
were
incurred
and
receive
no
tax
when
profits
were
earned.
As
it
now
stands,
a
Canadian
company
which
brings
into
account
profits
earned
in
any
country
which
affords
reciprocal
relief
from
taxation
under
section
8
of
the
Act
may
claim
as
a
credit
against
the
Canadian
Tax
on
such
profits
the
tax
paid
to
the
country
where
the
profits
arose.
It
follows,
therefore,
that
little
or
no
tax
is
paid
in
Canada
in
respect
of
such
profits.
It
would
therefore
be
improper
to
permit
profits
made
in
Canada
to
be
reduced
by
losses
incurred
in
a
foreign
country
and
in
respect
of
which
no
tax
is
ever
paid
in
Canada.”’
I
accept
this
statement
of
the
Crown’s
submission.
The
question
is
whether
the
section,
as
drafted,
is
adequate
to
bring
the
circumstances
of
appellant’s
case
within
its
scope.
I
think
it
is.
The
language
of
the
section
is
wide.
It
speaks
of
"taxation
period’’;
not
"taxation
year.’’
I
cannot
find
these
terms
synonymous.
It
provides
no
ground
for
saying
that
while
the
losses
of
any
one
taxation
year
may
not
be
offset
against
income
in
that
year,
yet
by
virtue
of
Section
5(1)
(p)
losses
of
the
three
preceding
years
may
be
thus
set
off.
As
pointed
out
by
the
learned
Appeal
Board
this
would
be
a
curious
anomaly,
were
it
so.
It
seems
to
me
such
a
construction
would
require
very
express
language,
which
is
altogether
missing
here.
Appellant
based
an
argument
on
the
expression
‘‘net
losses’’
found
at
the
commencement
of
Section
6(1)
(j).
Whatever
these
words
may
mean
in
their
context
I
do
not
think
they
mean
that
the
aforesaid
foreign
losses
are
to
be
deducted
from
foreign
income
before
the
computation
of
tax.
Nor
do
I
think
any
inference
favourable
to
appellant
can
be
drawn
from
the
circumstance
that
Section
5(1)
(p)
was
first
passed
in
1940
and
did
not
assume
its
present
form
until
1944.
I
must
take
the
Act
as
it
stood
during
the
years
in
question.
And
doing
so,
I
cannot
overlook
the
force
of
the
Crown’s
submission
that
the
provisions
of
Section
5(1)
(p)
are
general,
while
those
of
Section
6(1)
(j)
are
specific
in
that
they
deal
with
the
computation
of
tax
on
foreign
income,
and
thus
override
those
of
Section
5(1)
(p).
An
alternative
point
raised
by
appellant
was
the
question
of
double
taxation,
and
Article
XVI
of
the
Canada-United
States
of
America
Tax
Convention
Act,
1943,
was
referred
to.
But
I
can
find
no
case
of
double
taxation
here,
and
even
if
there
were,
I
do
not
see
what
this
Court
could
do
about
it.
I
have
not
found
this
an
easy
case.
Appellant’s
argument
was
attractive,
and
reasonable,
and
it
is
with
some
regret
that
I
find
I
am
unable
to
give
way
to
it.
But
in
the
end,
it
seems
to
me
clear
enough
that
the
language
of
the
statute
cannot
be
construed
as
appellant
would
have
it.
And
I
am
bound
by
the
statute.
The
result
is
that
the
argument
put
forward
on
behalf
of
appellant
fails
and
this
appeal
must
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.