Potter,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
Beckford
Lithographers
Limited,
hereinafter
called
the
appellant,
from
a
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
dated
the
19th
day
of
February,
1953,
and
mailed
on
the
23rd
day
of
February,
1953,
dismissing
an
appeal
from
assessments
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
hereinafter
called
the
respondent,
whereby
he
disallowed
a
deduction
of
$5,160.07
from
the
appellant’s
declared
income
for
the
taxation
year
of
1949
and
a
deduction
of
$7,147.42
for
the
taxation
year
of
1950,
both
of
which
amounts
have
been
shown
in
the
appellant’s
returns
as
having
been
paid
to
a
Mrs.
F.
Schmuk-
ler
of
Brooklyn,
New
York,
as
a
‘‘service
charge
for
use
of
collateral”
and
deducted
from
its
gross
income
for
those
years
as
interest
paid
or
payable.
At
the
instance
of
Mr.
Moe
Becker
of
Mount
Vernon,
New
York,
the
appellant
was
incorporated
by
letters
patent
issued
under
the
Companies
Act
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
on
the
29th
day
of
November,
1946,
with
head
office
in
the
City
of
Toronto
in
that
Province,
and
with
a
capital
divided
into
100
Class
“A”
5
per
cent
Cumulative,
Redeemable
|
|
Preference
Shares
at
a
par
value
of
|
5,000.00
|
15,000
Class
“B”
Preference
Shares
of
No
Par
Value
|
15,000.00
|
30,000
Common
Shares
of
No
Par
Value
|
30,000.00
|
|
$50,000.00
|
The
100
shares
of
Class
‘‘A’’
preferred
stock
were
issued
for
cash
considerations
in
the
following
proportions:
Lorne
Sandi-
ford,
20%;
Memory
Lane
Limited
(a
Canadian
corporation
controlled
by
Moe
Becker
and
his
associates),
20%
;
Moe
Becker,
60%.
Mr.
Moe
Becker,
president
of
the
company,
was
called
as
a
witness
and,
while
his
evidence
with
reference
to
the
distribution
of
the
shares
of
the
company
and
his
personal
undertakings
with
the
Industrial
Development
Bank
and
the
Dominion
Bank
was
vague
and
in
some
respects
contradictory,
the
following
appear
to
be
the
facts
:
The
only
amount
of
cash
put
into
the
capital
of
the
appellant
was
$5,000.00,
the
amount
paid
for
the
Class
‘‘A’’
preferred
stock,
and
the
15,000
Class
“B”
preferred
sshares
and
the
30,000
common
shares
were
issued
for
considerations
other
than
cash,
viz.,
the
assignment
of
reproduction
rights,
franchises
and
good
will.
Arrangements
were
made
with
the
Industrial
Development
Bank
to
finance
the
purchase
of
equipment
and
with
the
Dominion
Bank
to
finance
the
activities
of
the
appellant.
While
he
first
said,
that
he
gave
his
personal
notes
to
one
of
the
banks
to
obtain
credit
for
the
appellant,
he
later
withdrew
that
statement
and
said
that
he
gave
a
guarantee
of
the
company’s
overdraft.
United
States
bonds
to
the
total
value
of
$50,000.00
were
obtained
by
Becker
from
his
father-in-law,
Harry
Schmukler,
since
deceased,
and
his
mother-in-law,
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler,
to
be
used
as
collateral
security
for
his
guarantee
or
guarantees
to
the
two
banks,
but
it
finally
became
evident
that
$15,000.00
of
these
bonds,
which
were
obtained
from
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler
and
were
payable
to
bearer,
were
used
as
collateral
security
for
his
guarantee
of
the
credit
of
the
appellant.
There
was
no
agreement
in
writing
made
with
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler
when,
in
March,
1947,
she
furnished
him
with
$15,000.00
in
United
States
bearer
bonds.
“Q.
.
.
.
What
was
your
understanding
with
Mrs.
Schmukler
as
to
the
return
of
her
property
to
her?
“A.
The
original
understanding
was
strictly
an
oral
one
that
we
would
use
the
bonds
and
return
them
to
her
at
our
earliest
convenience,
or
possibility
of
returning
them
to
her.
There
was
really
no
formal
understanding
at
that
time.”
«
Mr.
Becker’s
evidence
with
reference
to
the
clipping
of
the
coupons
from
these
bonds
was
also
contradictory.
According
to
Mr.
Becker,
Mr.
Harry
Schmukler
having
died
in
1946,
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler,
the
widow,
felt
that
the
bonds
were
not
bringing
in
sufficient
income,
and
she
required
them
for
her
own
use,
but
he,
Becker,
was
unable
to
arrange
for
their
release
by
the
bank.
As
a
result
of
discussions
with
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler
or
her
advisors,
an
agreement
was
entered
into
on
December
5,
1947,
and
filed
as
“Exhibit
14”,
which
was
in
part
as
follows:
“THIS
AGREEMENT
made
in
duplicate
this
5th
day
of
December,
1947.
BETWEEN:
FAY
SCHMUKLER,
of
the
City
of
Brooklyn
in
the
State
of
New
York,
Widow,
hereinafter
called
the
Party
OF
THE
FIRST
PART
—and—
BECKFORD
LITHOGRAPHERS
LIMITED,
a
corporation
organized
and
existing
under
the
laws
of
the
Province
of
Ontario,
hereinafter
called
the
‘
Company’
OF
THE
SECOND
PART
‘““WHEREAS
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
has
heretofore
loaned
certain
securities
of
the
par
value
of
Fifteen
Thousand
Dollars
($15,000.00),
as
listed
in
Schedule
4
A’
attached
hereto,
to
one
Moe
Becker,
President
of
the
Company,
to
lodge
with
the
Dominion
Bank
as
collateral
security
to
his
personal
guarantee
of
the
Company’s
indebtedness
to
the
said
Bank;
“AND
WHEREAS
it
was
contemplated
and
intended
that
the
said
securities
would
be
released
and
returned
to
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
on
or
before
the
date
of
this
Agreement
;
“AND
WHEREAS
the
said
securities
have
been
hypothecated
for
the
purposes
of
the
Company
to
The
Dominion
Bank
and
The
Industrial
Development
Bank
and
the
Company
is
presently
unable
to
have
the
same
released
and
returned
to
the
Party
of
the
First
Part;
“WITNESSETH
that
in
consideration
of
the
premises
and
the
agreements
herein
contained,
the
parties
hereto
covenant
and
agree
as
follows:
1.
The
Company
shall
use
its
best
endeavour
to
have
the
said
securities
released
and
returned
to
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
as
quickly
as
possible.
2.
As
from
the
1st
day
of
January,
1948
and
continuing
until
all
of
the
said
recited
securities
shall
have
been
released
and
returned
to
the
Party
of
the
First
Part,
the
Company
shall
pay
to
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
annual
sums
equivalent
to
one
per
centum
(1%)
of
its
net
sales,
exclusive
of
any
sales
to
Memory
Lane
Limited,
computed
on
a
calendar
year
basis.
Such
annual
sums
shall
be
due
and
payable
on
the
15th
day
of
February
next
following
the
close
of
each
calendar
year
respectively
during
the
currency
of
this
Agreement.
In
the
event
of
the
said
securities
being
released
and
returned
before
the
end
of
any
calendar
year,
the
net
sales
in
respect
of
such
calendar
year
shall
be
apportioned
to
the
date
of
the
release
and
return
of
the
said
securities
to
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
and
the
amount
payable
in
respect
thereto
shall
be
due
and
payable
within
forty-five
(45)
days
thereafter.
3.
Nothing
herein
contained
shall
prejudice
or
alter
the
rights
of
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
in
and
to
the
said
securities
or
operate
to
prevent
her
from
demanding
the
return
thereof
at
any
time.’’
The
agreement
was
executed
by
Fay
Schmukler
and
by
Beckford
Lithographers
Limited,
Moe
Becker
president,
and
L.
J.
Sandiford
secretary-treasurer,
and
was
under
seal.
Schedule
‘‘A’’
showed
3
X
$5,000.00
United
States
of
America
Treasury
Bonds,
214
per
cent,
due
December
15,
1972-67,
serial
No.
1888
1A,
No.
78881
1A,
and
No.
89987
H.
It
will
be
noted
that
the
recitals
and
terms
of
this
agreement
do
not
agree
with
the
evidence
of
Moe
Becker
previously
quoted
to
the
effect
that
the
original
understanding
was
strictly
oral,
that
the
bonds
would
be
returned
at
their
earliest
convenience,
and
that
‘‘there
was
really
no
formal
understanding
at
that
time”.
It
is
to
be
noted
that
Becker
said
in
cross-examination
as
follows:
“Q.
Now
I
believe
you
made
this
clear,
but
I
want
it
to
be
perfectly
clear,
the
advances—I
understand
that
but
I
wish
you
to
confirm
it—that
the
advances
on
these
bonds
was
a
personal
advance
to
you?
“A..Yes.
“Q.
And
that
you
gave
them
to
the
Bank
to
support
your
cuarantee
?
“A.
Yes.
“Q.
And
the
Bank
held
them
as
your
bonds?
“A.
Yes.”
In
the
allegations
of
fact
set
out
in
the
appellant’s
notice
of
appeal
from
the
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
and
dated
June
3,
1953,
it
was
alleged
in
paragraph
B
as
follows
:
“1.
The
aforesaid
amounts
were
paid
by
the
Appellant
for
the
use
of
property
necessarily
required
and
used
in
the
conduct
of
its
business
and
where
an
outlay
or
an
expense
made
and
ineurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
appellant’s
business.
2.
The
said
payments
were
not
an
outlay
of
or
payment
on
account
of
capital.’’
In
the
respondent’s
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
dated
August
21,
1953,
the
following
was
alleged
:
“B.
5.
The
Respondent
relies
upon
Sections
11
and
12
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
6.
The
Respondent
says
that,
if
the
amounts
of
$5,160.07
and
$7,147.42
were
paid
by
the
Appellant
as
alleged
by
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
which
is
not
admitted,
such
amounts
were
not
outlays
or
expenses
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(a)
of
subsection
(1)
of
Section
12
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
7.
The
Respondent
further
says
that
if
the
said
amounts
were
expended
by
the
Appellant,
as
alleged
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
which
is
not
admitted,
such
amounts
were
out-
days
on
account
of
capital
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
1
of
section
12
of
the
said
Act.
8.
The
Respondent
further
says
that
if
the
said
amounts
were
expended,
as
alleged
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
which
is
not
admitted,
they
were
not
interest
on
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(c)
of
subsection
1
of
Section
11
of
the
said
Act.”
In
its
trading
profit
and
loss
statement
for
the
year
ended
December
31,
1949,
attached
to
its
income
tax
return
for
that
year
covering
the
fiscal
period
ending
the
31st
of
December,
1949,
the
appellant
showed
as
an
item
of
interest
and
exchange
$11,321.02,
which
was
broken
down
in
item
25(a)—Interest
Paid
or
Payable
as
follows
:
Dominion
Bank,
Toronto
|
2,202.31
|
Industrial
Development
Bank,
Toronto
|
2,649.74
|
Industrial
Acceptance
Corp.,
Toronto
|
187.72
|
Harris-Seybold
(Canada)
Limited,
Toronto
|
321.16
|
Mrs.
F.
Schmukler
|
|
1800
Bay
Parkway,
|
|
Brooklyn,
N.Y.,
U.S.A.
|
|
Service
Charge
for
Use
of
Collateral
|
5,910.09
|
|
$11,321.02
|
As
a
result
of
representations
made
by
the
appellant,
the
respondent
amended
his
assessment
for
the
1949
taxation
year
by
reducing
the
amount
of
$5,910.09,
disallowed,
to
$5,160.07,
as
set
out
in
the
notification
by
the
Minister
dated
March
24,
1952.
In
its
trading
profit
and
loss
statement
for
the
fiscal
period
ending
the
3lst
of
December,
1950,
the
appellant
showed
as
an
item
of
interest
and
exchange
$14,090.64,
which
was
broken
down
under
item
2(h)—Interest
Paid
To:
On
loans
from
shareholders
L.
J.
Sandiford
|
475.00
|
|
M.
Becker
|
219.00
|
750.00
|
|
Less
:
|
|
Accrued
1st
January,
1950
|
565.08
|
|
Accrued
31st
December,
1950
_..
493.75
|
71.33
|
678.67
|
Industrial
Development
Bank
-.
|
|
2,968.35
|
The
Dominion
Bank,
Toronto
-.
|
|
3,296.20
|
Mrs.
F.
Schmukler,
|
|
1800
Bay
Parkway,
|
|
Brooklyn,
N.Y.,
U.S.A.
|
|
Service
Charge
for
Use
of
Collateral
|
|
7,147.42
|
|
$14,090.64
|
In
other
words,
the
appellant
has
shown
and
deducted
from
income
interest
paid
to
the
Industrial
Development
Bank
and
the
Dominion
Bank
as
interest
on
loans
from
those
corporations
and
then
has
also
claimed
the
amounts
paid
to
Mrs.
Schmukler
of
$5,160.07
and
$7,147.42
for
the
use
of
$15,000.00
in
bonds
used
by
Moe
Becker
as
collateral
security
to
obtain
from
those
institutions
the
loans
on
which
the
interest
shown
was
paid
to
them.
If
the
appellant
had
paid
to
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler
six
per
cent
per
annum
for
the
use
of
the
bonds
which
she
had
furnished
to
Moe
Becker,
the
company
would
have
been
paying
double
interest
on
some
parts
of
its
borrowing
from
the
Industrial
Development
Bank
and
the
Dominion
Bank.
The
relevant
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148,
are
as
follows
:
“11.
(1)
Notwithstanding
paragraphs
(a),
(b)
and
(h)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
12,
the
following
amounts
may
be
deducted
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
:
(c)
an
amount
paid
in
the
year
or
payable
in
respect
of
the
year
(depending
upon
the
method
regularly
followed
by
the
taxpayer
in
computing
his
income),
pursuant
to
a
legal
obligation
to
pay
interest
on
(i)
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
from
a
business
or
property
(other
than
property
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt),
or
(ii)
an
amount
payable
for
property
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
therefrom
or
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
a
business
(other
than
property
the
income
from
which
would
be
exempt),
or
a
reasonable
amount
in
respect
thereof,
whichever
is
the
lesser
;’’
“12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
is
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
or
a
business
of
the
taxpayer,
(b)
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depre-
ciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
part,”
Section
12(1)
(a)
is
derived
from
Section
6(a)
and
(e)
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1927,
c.
97,
as
amended,
which
was
as
follows:
“6.
In
computing
the
amount
of
the
profits
or
gains
to
be
assessed,
a
deduction
shall
not
be
allowed
in
respect
of
(a)
disbursements
or
expenses
not
wholly,
exclusively
and
necessarily
laid
out
or
expended
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
income;
(e)
carrying
charges
or
expenses
of
unproductive
property
or
assets
not
acquired
for
the
purposes
of
a
trade,
business
or
calling
or
of
a
liability
not
incurred
in
connection
with
a
trade,
business
or
calling
;
’
’
In
Bennett
and
White
Construction
Company
Limited
v.
M.N.R.,
[1949]
S.C.R.
287;
[1949]
C.T.C.
1,
the
appellant
company
had
paid
large
amounts
to
the
guarantors
of
its
bank
loans
and
in
the
fiscal
year
ending
October
31,
1941,
$20,969.34
were
paid
to
the
‘guarantors,
and
for
the
year
following,
$23,984.15,
and
these
were
disallowed
by
the
Department.
The
matter
eventually
came
before
this
Court,
and
the
late
Mr:
Justice
O’Connor
dismissed
the
appeal
of
the
company
with
costs
and
affirmed
the
assessment.
On
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
Mr.
Justice
Locke
said
at
pages
289
and
290
[C.T.C.
at
page
4]:
‘’While
the
amounts
paid
to
the
guarantors
were
described
as
interest
in
the
various
resolutions
which
authorized
their
payment,
this
was
clearly
inaccurate.
Interest
is
paid
by
a
borrower
to
a
lender:
a
sum
paid
to
a
third
person
as
the
consideration
for
guaranteeing
a
loan
cannot
be
so
described.
Section
6(a)
prohibits
the
deduction
of
disbursements
or
expenses
not
wholly,
exclusively
and
necessarily
laid
out
or
expended
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
income
and
the
first
matter
to
be
determined
is
whether
amounts
such
as
these,
paid
t()
enable
the
company
to
obtain
the
necessary
working
capital
for
its
operations
by
way
of
loans
from
the
bank,
are
properly
so
described.
a
The
learned
judge
then
reviewed
all
the
authorities.
and
at
page
291
[C.T.C.
at
page
5]
said:
_.
;.
“They
were,
in
my
opinion,
simply
expenditures:
incurred
in
obtaining
the
capital
to
make.
the
large
deposits
required,
to
purchase
equipment
and
generally
to
finance
the
operations.
A
sum
expended
as
interest
for
the
use
of
capital
is
clearly
to
be
distinguished
from
expenditures
such
as
these,
being
the
cost
of
obtaining
guarantees
without
which
the
loans
would
not
have
been
made
by
the
bank,
expenditures
of
the
same
character
as
the
cost
of
floating
issues
of
bonds
or
debentures
or
of
selling
shares
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
capital.”
Mr.
Justice
Rand,
after
stating
the
facts,
said
at
page
293
[C.T.C.
at
page
7]
:
4
Now
the
Crown
has
allowed
the
deduction
of
interest
paid
to
the
bank,
and
it
must
have
been
either
on
the
footing
that
the
day-to-day
use
of
the
funds
was
embraced
within
the
business
that
produced
the
profit,
or
that
the
interest
was
within
section
5,
paragraph
(b).
But
setting
up
that
credit
right
or
providing
the
banking
facilities
is
quite
another
thing
from
paying
interest
;
it
is
preparatory
to
earning
the
income
and
is
no
more
part
of
the
business
carried
on
than
would
be
the
work
involved
in
a
bond
issue.
.
.
.
4
Within
the
meaning
of
the
Act,
the
premiums
create
part
of
the
capital
structure
and
are
a
capital
payment;
Watney
v.
Musgrave
(1880),
5
Ex.
D.
241.
They
furnish
a
credit
apparatus
to
enable
the
business
to
be
carried
on,
and
although
they
affect
the
distributable
earnings
of
the
company,
they
do
not
affect
the
net
return
from
the
business.
That
was
the
view
of
O’Connor,
J.,
below,
and
I
agree
with
it.”
Kellock,
J.,
concurred
with
Locke,
J.
Estey,
J.,
said
at
page
298
[C.T.C.
at
page
12]
:
“The
disbursements
of
the
guarantors
here
in
question
were
made
not
as
interest
on
the
money
borrowed
but
as
the
purchase
price
for
the
guarantee
that
made
borrowing
under
the
line
of
credit
possible.
The
appellant,
upon
obtaining
this
line
of
credit,
was
enabled
to
complete
its
financial
arrangements
at
the
bank,
which
enabled
it
to
undertake
the
larger
volume
of
business.
Sums
borrowed
under
such
circumstances
are
capital
and
the
sums
paid
are
not
deductible
under
the
provisions
of
6(1)
(a).”
In
my
opinion,
the
judgments
in
Bennett
and
White
Construction
Company
Limited
v.
M.N.R.
(supra),
[1949]
S.C.R.
287;
[1949]
C.T.C.
1,
apply
to
this
case,
and
therefore
hold
that
the
sums
of
$5,160.07
and
$7,147.42,
paid
by
the
appellant
to
Mrs.
Fay
Schmukler
and
disallowed
as
deductions
by
the
respondent
from
the
taxable
income
of
the
appellant
for
the
1949
and
1950
taxation
years,
were
not
outlays
or
expenses
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
within
the
meaning
of
Section
12(1)
(a)
and
were
not
interest
on
borrowed
money
used
for
the
purpose
of
earning
income
within
the
meaning
of
Section
11(1)
(c),
but
were
payments
on
account
of
capital
within
Section
12(1)
(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
appeal
will
therefore
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.