THORSON,
P.:—The
appellant
appeals
directly
to
this
Court
from
its
income
tax
assessments
for
the
taxation
years
ending
September
30,
1950,
and
September
30,
1951.
In
its
income
tax
returns
for
these
years
the
appellant
claimed
capital
cost
allowances
on
its
furniture
and
equipment
in
the
amounts
of
$11,633.98
for
1950
and
$9,823.96
for
1951.
The
Minister
allowed
claims
of
only
$5,058.15
for
1950
and
$4,563.29
for
1951.
He
disallowed
$6,578.83
for
1950
and
$5,260.67
for
1951
and
in
re-assessing
the
appellant
for
the
said
years
added
the
disallowed
amounts
to
the
amounts
of
taxable
income
reported
by
it
in
its
returns.
The
appellant
objected
to
the
assessments
on
the
ground
that
the
cost
of
the
furniture
and
equipment
had
been
$100,000
and
that
it
was
entitled
to
capital
cost
allowances
based
on
this
amount
and
gave
notices
of
objection
accordingly.
The
Minister
had
determined
that
the
capital
cost
of
the
depreciable
property
had
been
$35,000
instead
of
$100,000,
as
claimed,
and
disallowed
the
appellant’s
claims
accordingly.
In
reply
to
its
objections
to
the
assessments
he
notified
it
as
follows
:
“The
Honourable
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
having
reconsidered
the
assessments
and
having
considered
the
facts
and
reasons
set
forth
in
the
Notices
of
Objection
hereby
confirms
the
said
assessments
as
having
been
made
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Act
and
in
particular
on
the
ground
that
for
the
purposes
of
paragraph
(a)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
11
of
the
Act
and
The
Income
Tax
Regulations
made
thereunder,
of
the
assets
acquired
by
the
taxpayer
from
St.
Regis
Hotel,
Edmonton,
Limited,
the
capital
cost
of
the
depreciable
property
has
been
currently
determined
to
be
$35,000.00
at
the
time
of
purchase.”
The
appellant
then
brought
its
appeal
to
this
Court.
The
issue
in
the
appeal
is
thus
entirely
one
of
fact.
Here
there
is
no
question
of
a
transaction
not
at
arm’s
length
and
no
exercise
of
discretion
was
involved.
The
only
matter
for
consideration
is
what
was
the
amount
of
the
capital
cost
of
the
depreciable
property
in
respect
of
which
the
claims
for
capital
cost
allow.
ances
were
made.
The
appellant
alleges
that
it
was
$100,000
The
Minister
found
that
it
was
$35,000.
The
assessments
carry
a
statutory
presumption
of
their
validity
and
stand
until
they
have
been
shown
to
be
erroneous
either
in
fact
or
in
law.
To
succeed
in
the
appeal
from
them
the
appellant
must
prove
that
the
finding
of
the
Minister
that
the
capital
cost
of
the
depreciable
property
in
question
was
$35,000
was
errone-
ous.
If
it
fails
to
discharge
the
onus
of
proof
that
the
law
casts
on
it
its
appeal
must
be
dismissed
:
vide
Dezura
v.
M.N.R.,
[1948]
Ex.
C.R.
10
at
15;
[1947]
C.T.C.
375;
Johnston
v.
M.N.R.,
[1947]
Ex.
C.R.
483;
[1947]
C.T.C.
258;
[1948]
8.C.R.
486
at
489;
[1948]
C.T.C.
195;
Goldman
v.
M.N.R.,
[1951]
Ex.
C.R.
274
at
281;
[1951]
C.T.C.
241;
[1953]
1
S.C.R.
211;
[1953]
C.T.C.
95.
In
support
of
its
contention
that
the
capital
cost
of
the
furniture
and
equipment
was
$100,000
the
appellant
relied
upon
a
conditional
sale
agreement
between
St.
Regis
Hotel
Edmonton
Limited
and
the
appellant,
dated
September
17,
1946,
by
which
it
acquired
the
furniture
and
equipment
in
question.
Prior
to
that
date
there
had
been
negotiations
between
the
persons
who
subsequently
became
shareholders
of
the
appellant
and
St.
Regis
Hotel
Edmonton
Limited
for
the
purchase
of
the
contents
of
the
St.
Regis
Hotel
and
a
lease
of
the
hotel
premises.
After
the
appellant
had
been
incorporated
and
it
had
been
ascertained
that
it
would
be
likely
to
get
the
desired
beer
licence
the
agreement
was
signed
and
subsequently
it
took
possession
of
the
St.
Regis
Hotel
premises.
But
while
the
purchase
price
in
the
agreement
is
stated
as
$100,000
it
is
plain
from
the
agreement
itself
and
the
evidence
of
Earl
Cooper,
the
appellant’s
vice-president,
and
Peter
Sachkiw,
its
managing
director,
both
of
whom
were
called
as
witnesses
for
the
appellant,
that
this
price
of
$100,000
covered
not
only
the
goods
and
chattels
specified
in
the
agreement
but
also
a
lease
of
the
St.
Regis
Hotel
premises
for
a
period
of
five
years
with
an
option
of
renewal
for
a
further
three
years.
Both
Mr.
Cooper
and
Mr.
Sachkiw
admitted
that
the
lease
of
the
hotel
premises
was
worth
more
than
the
goods
and
chattels.
Under
the
circumstances,
the
agreement
is
not
proof
that
the
capital
cost
of
the
furniture
and
equipment
in
question
was
$100,000,
as
alleged
by
the
appellant,
and
it
does
not
prove
that
its
capital
cost
was
more
than
$35,000,
as
found
by
the
Minister.
On
this
oround
alone,
since
the
appellant
has
not
proved
that
the
Minister’s
finding
was
erroneous
in
fact,
its
appeal
would
have
had
to
be
dismissed.
But
the
evidence
does
not
stop
with
the
agreement.
It
was
established
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
Court
that
the
capital
cost
of
the
furniture
and
equipment
to
St.
Regis
Hotel
Edmonton
Limited,
from
which
the
appellant
acquired
it
on
September
17,
1946,
was
$27,500
and
that
since
then
the
appellant
had
bought
replacements
to
the
extent
of
$10,278.58.
It
was
also
shown
that
when
the
appellant
had
to
leave
the
hotel
premises
in
1951
after
it
had
failed
to
exercise
its
option
to
renew
the
lease,
it
sold
the
furniture
and
equipment
for
$38,750.
By
that
time
prices
were
higher
than
they
had
been
in
1946.
There
was
also
the
evidence
of
Mr.
A.
R.
Lily,
an
insurance
adjuster
of
long
experience,
who
made
an
appraisal
of
the
equipment
and
contents
of
the
St.
Regis
Hotel
building
on
September
18,
1946.
He
put
their
value
at
$34,500
after
taking
into
consideration
the
usual
depreciation
for
the
length
of
time
the
property
had
been
in
use.
While
Mr.
Lily’s
valuation
was
made
for
insurance
purposes
he
expressed
the
opinion
that
the
amount
of
his
valuation
was
the
cash
value
of
the
property
at
the
time.
I
am
satisfied
that
it
was
not
greater
than
this
amount.
I
pass
over
the
opinion
evidence
of
Mr.
P.
Herring,
with
which
I
was
not
impressed,
and
refer
to
the
information
given
by
Mr.
P.
A.
Fairbrother.
He
had
ascertained
that
the
original
cost
of
the
furniture
and
equipment
to
St.
Regis
Hotel
Edmonton
Limited
had
been
$27,525.08,
some
of
it
going
back
to
the
1930’s,
and
that
its
book
value
at
the
time
of
the
sale
and
lease
to
the
appellant
was
$5,962.16.
Under
the
circumstances,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
a
larger
amount
on
which
to
base
its
capital
cost
allowances
than
that
of
$35,000
found
by
the
Minister.
It
was
more
than
ample.
That
being
so,
there
was
no
error
in
the
assessments
appealed
against
and
the
appeal
herein
must
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.