CAMERON,
J.:—This
is
an
Information
exhibited
by
the
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada
in
which
the
Crown
claims
payment
of
excise
tax
from
the
defendant
under
the
provisions
of
Section
80A
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1927,
c.
179,
as
amended,
together
with
certain
penalties.
That
section
is
in
part
as
follows:
“80A.
1.
There
shall
be
imposed,
levied
and
collected,
an
excise
tax
equal
to
fifteen
per
cent
of
the
current
market
value
of
all
dressed
furs,
dyed
furs
and
dressed
and
dyed
furs,—
(i)
imported
into
Canada,
payable
by
the
importer
or
transferee
of
such
goods
before
they
are
removed
from
the
custody
of
the
proper
customs
officer;
or
(ii)
dressed,
dyed,
dressed
and
dyed
in
Canada,
payable
by
the
dresser
or
dyer
at
the
time
of
delivery
by
him.”
The
Information
alleges
that
the
defendant
was
a
dresser
and
dyer
of
furs
and
upon
delivery
by
it
of
such
goods
was
liable
for
the
tax
imposed
by
that
section;
that
during
the
period
from
February
2,
1953,
to
February
6,
1953,
it
delivered,
dressed
and
dyed,
furs
that
were
dressed
and
dyed
by
it
in
Canada;
and,
alternatively,
that
during
the
said
period
it
delivered
dyed
furs
that
were
dyed
by
it
in
Canada.
The
defendant
is
a
corporation
carrying
on
business
in
Canada
and
having
its
head
office
at
Toronto.
It
was
incorporated
in
1938
and
for
a
few
years
carried
on
the
business
of
dressing
and
dyeing
furs
exclusively.
About
1941
as
a
sideline,
it
began
to
purchase
certain
sheepskins
and
to
process
them
into
“mouton”.
Since
1947
its
operations
have
been
confined
exclusively
to
the
latter.
This
is
a
test
case.
The
defendant
prior
to
February
2,
1953,
was
required
to
and
did
pay
excise
tax
on
‘‘mouton’’
and
I
gather
from
the
evidence
that
all
companies
carrying
on
similar
operations
have
at
all
times
paid
that
tax.
The
Regulations
under
the
Act,
dated
October,
1951,
required
dressers
and
dyers
of
sheepskin
shearlings
to
account
for
the
excise
tax
on
certain
of
such
shearlings
in
accordance
with
the
departmental
unnumbered
circular
dated
August
27,
1951.
Briefly,
the
defence
is
that
the
defendant
purchased
sheepskins,
not
furs;
that
‘‘mouton’’,
which
it
sells,
is
not
within
the
term
‘‘furs’’;
and
that
in
any
event
the
process
which
it
followed
in
the
production
of
‘‘mouton’’
was
neither
the
dressing
and
dyeing
of
furs
nor
the
dyeing
of
furs.
“Furs”,
it
says,
do
not
include
“mouton”.
It
becomes
necessary,
therefore,
to
set
out
in
some
detail
the
nature
of
the
defendant’s
operations.
It
was
known
that
lambs
of
the
Merino
strain
after
their
first
shearing
(called
“shearlings”)
had
certain
fur
fibre-like
characteristics
and
that,
when
processed
and
“plasticized”
to
resist
rain
for
better
wear,
these
“shearlings”
could
be
dyed
to
simulate
beaver,
nutria
or
seal.
The
defendant
purchased
Grade
One
Merino
Shearlings
in
carload
lots,
usually
from
meat
packers
and
wool
pullers,
the
greatest
proportion
being
purchased
in
the
United
States
and
only
a
very
few
in
Canada.
Ex.
1
is
a
sample
of
raw
sheepskins
so
purchased
by
the
defendant.
It
is
first
scoured
and
then
tanned;
then
the
fibres
are
ironed
or
electrified
at
a
high
temperature
and
then
subjected
to
plasticizing.
Plasticizing
consists
of
coating
the
fibres
with
formaldehyde
resin
and
baking
them
at
a
high
temperature,
the
operation
being
designed
to
give
the
fibres
rigidity
so
that
when
the
sheepskin
has
been
further
processed
it
retains
its
smooth
surface
for
some
time,
the
straightness
of
the
fibres
being
maintained.
Then
the
skins
are
given
the
colour
desired
by
dyeing
and
after
a
further
ironing,
the
product
is
ready
for
sale
and
is
called
‘‘mouton’’
—
the
French
equivalent
of
‘‘sheep’’.
When
sold
it
is
used
for
making
ladies’
coats,
for
trimming
station
wagon
coats
and
other
coats
or
jackets,
for
trimming
gloves,
overshoes
and
the
like.
Its
uses,
therefore,
parallel
the
uses
of
“furs”
as
that
term
is
ordinarily
understood.
The
defendant
sells
it
to
manufacturers
‘‘by
the
foot’’,
his
sale
price
being
substantially
less
than
for
the
‘‘furs’’
which
it
is
designed
to
simulate.
Sheepskins
are
not
sold
at
regular
fur
auction
sales
which
are
conducted
annually
at
various
points
in
Canada.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
submits
that
in
order
to
bring
his
client
within
the
liability
imposed
by
Section
80A,
the
Crown
must
establish
that
what
it
did
was
to
dress,
or
dye,
or
dress
and
dye,
a
fur,
and
he
argues,
therefore,
that
the
first
and
main
question
for
determination
is
this
—
Is
a
sheepskin
(or
the
Merino
type
shearling
which
his
client
bought)
a
fur?
He
contends,
of
course,
that
no
one
would
consider
what
he
calls
‘‘a
barnyard
sheepskin’’
to
be
a
fur.
In
my
view,
however,
that
is
not
the
question
to
be
answered.
It
is
rather
this.
Was
that
which
the
defendant
delivered
(“mouton”)
—
a
dyed
fur
or
a
dressed
and
dyed
fur?
The
word
‘‘furs’’
is
not
defined
in
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
nor
(so
fas
as
I
am
aware)
in
any
other
Act
in
pari
materia.
The
words
of
that
Act
are
not
applied
to
a
particular
science
or
art
and
in
my
opinion
are
therefore
to
be
construed
as
they
are
understood
in
common
language.
In
Craies
on
Statute
Law,
4th
Ed.,
p.
151,
reference
is
made
to
the
judgment
of
Lord
Tenterden
in
Att.-Gen.
v.
Winstanley
(1831),
2
D.
&
Cl.
302,
in
which
at
p.
310
he
said
that
‘‘the
words
of
an
Act
of
Parliament
which
are
not
applied
to
any
particular
science
or
art
are
to
be
construed
as
they
are
understood
in
common
language’’.
The
author
referred
also
to
Grenfell
v.
I.R.C.,
[1876]
1
Ex.
D.
242,
248,
in
which
Pollock,
B.,
stated
that
if
a
statute
contains
language
which
is
capable
of
being
construed
in
a
popular
sense,
‘‘such
a
statute
is
not
to
be
construed
according
to
the
strict
or
technical
meaning
of
the
language
contained
in
it,
but
is
to
be
construed
in
its
popular
sense,
meaning,
of
course,
by
the
words
‘popular
sense’,
that
sense
which
people
conversant
with
the
subject-matter
with
which
the
statute
is
dealing
would
attribute
to
it’’.
Reference
may
also
be
made
to
Milne-Bingham
Printing
Co.
Ltd.
v.
The
King,
[1980]
S.C.R.
282,
283,
in
which
Duff,
J.,
(as
he
then
was)
when
considering
the
meaning
of
the
word
“magazines”
as
contained
in
the
Special
War
Revenue
Act,
1915,
said:
“The
word
‘magazine’
in
the
exception
under
consideration
is
used
in
its
ordinary
sense,
and
must
be
construed
and
applied
in
that
sense’’.
In
The
King
v.
Montreal
Stock
Exchange,
[1935]
S.C.R.
614,
616;
[1935-37]
C.T.C.
107,
a
case
involving
the
interpretation
of
the
word
‘‘newspapers’’
as
used
in
Schedule
III
of
the
Special
War
Revenue
Act,
Kerwin,
J.,
said:
‘‘In
the
instant
case,
the
word
under
discussion
is
not
defined
in
any
statute
in
pari
materia
and
it
remains
only
to
give
to
it
the
ordinary
meaning
that
it
usually
bears’’.
He
then
referred
to
the
definition
of
the
word
as
contained
in
Webster’s
New
International
Dictionary.
Again,
in
At
t.-Gen.
v.
Bailey
(1847),
1
Ex.
281,
it
was
held
that
the
word
“spirits”,
being
‘‘a
word
of
known
import
.
.
.
is
used
in
the
Excise
Acts
in
the
sense
in
which
it
is
ordinarily
understood”.
Further
reference
may
be
made
to
Attorney-General
of
Ontario
v.
Mercer
(1882),
8
A.C.
767
at
778,
and
to
King
v.
Planters
Nut
and
Chocolate
Company
Ltd.
[1952],
Ex.
C.R.
91;
[1951]
C.T.C.
366,
in
the
latter
of
which
cases
I
had
to
consider
the
meaning
to
be
attributed
to
the
word
‘‘shortening’’
as
found
in
Schedule
III
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act.
Before
considering
the
meaning
attributed
to
‘‘furs’’
by
those
conversant
with
the
trade,
I
think
it
advisable
to
refer
to
the
definitions
found
in
some
of
the
recognized
dictionaries.
Many
of
the
definitions
relate
to
matters
which
are
not
here
relevant
and
need
not
be
mentioned.
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary
“1.
A
trimming
or
lining
for
a
garment,
made
of
the
dressed
coat
of
certain
animals;
hence,
the
oat
of
such
animals
as
material
for
such
use.
Also,
a
garment
made
of,
or
trimmed
or
lined
with,
this
material
;
now
chiefily
pl.
2.
Short,
fine,
soft
hair
of
the
sable,
ermine,
beaver,
otter,
bear,
etc.
Growing
thick
upon
the
skin,
and
distinguished
from
the
ordinary
hair.’’
Webster’s
New
International
Dictionary,
2nd
ed.,
p.
1020
“Fur
is
a
strip
or
piece
of
the
dressed
pelt
of
any
of
certain
animals,
as
a
sable,
ermine,
or
furry
seal,
or
one
or
more
of
such
pelts,
worn
as
a
trimming
or
lining
to
a
garment
for
warmth
or
ornament,
or
as
a
mark
of
office
or
state,
or
badge
of
certain
university
degree;
hence,
such
a
dressed
pelt
or
pelts
as
a
material
for
trimmings,
linings
or
garments.
9
’
Funk
&
Wagnall’s
New
Standard
Dictionary
of
the
English
Language
1945,
p.
993
“1.
The
short,
soft
fine
coat
thinly
covering
the
skin
of
many
mammals
distinguished
from
hair
and
there
it
is
the
coat
itself.
Fur
is
a
superior
non-conductor
of
heat,
resists
water,
and
is
most
perfect
on
certain
aquatic
and
Arctic
carnivores.
2.
Skins
of
fur
bearing
animals,
peltry.
The
natural
supply
of
furs
is
drawn
from
the
Carnivora,
Ungulata,
Rodentia
and
Marsupialia,
of
which
the
more
common
varieties
are
the
badger,
used
for
carriage
rugs
and
the
British
trade.”
Encyclopaedia
Britannica,
1952,
Vol.
9
“P.
935.
The
covering
of
the
skin
in
certain
animals
lying
alongside
another
covering
called
the
overhair
or
guard
hair.
The
fur
is
barbed
lengthwise
and
is
soft,
silky,
downy
and
inclined
to
curl.
On
the
living
animal
the
overhair
keeps
the
fur
filaments
apart,
prevents
their
tendency
to
mat
or
felt,
and
protects
them
from
injury,
thus
securing
to
the
animal
an
immunity
from
cold
and
storm.
P.
938.
The
classification
of
animals
as
fur
bearing
and
non
fur
bearing
has
always
been
arbitrary
and
with
the
refinement
of
modern
methods
of
manipulation
of
skins
the
terms
are
becoming
very
elastic.
Roughly
speaking,
the
term
‘fur’
is
applied
to
skins
which
have
a
deep
coating
of
hair,
a
layer
of
comparatively
short,
soft,
curly,
barbed
hairs
next
to
the
skin,
protected
by
longer,
smoother
and
stiffer
hairs
which
grow
up
through
these
and
are
known
as
guard
hair
or
over
hair.
The
greater
number
of
species
of
fur
bearing
animals
belong
to
the
Carnivora,
Rodentia,
Ungulata
and
Masupialia.
The
Ungulata
provide
antelopes,
goats,
ponies
and
sheep.
Then
in
Corpus
Juris
Secundum,
Vol.
37,
p.
1407,
the
following
appears
:
“Fur.
(English)
The
soft,
silky,
curly,
downy
and
longitudinally
barbed
filament,
which,
mixed
with
a
hair
that
is
straight
and
smooth,
and
comparatively
long,
coarse
and
rigid,
constitutes
the
pelage
of
certain
animals
native
to
the
colder
climes.
The
term
is
usually
reserved
for
the
short,
fine
hair
of
certain
animals
whose
skins
are
largely
used
for
clothing,
yet,
in
a
commercial
sense,
it
has
been
regarded
as
including
other
skins,
more
properly
designated
by
the
term
‘peltry’,
and
as
including,
in
that
sense,
the
covering
of
all
animals
whose
skin
is
used
either
for
warmth
or
ornament,
with
the
hair
on.
’
’
For
the
purposes
of
this
case,
I
think
I
may
discard
the
definitions
which
refer
to
the
hair
of
certain
animals,
it
being
obvious
that
the
hair
by
itself
would
not
be
subjected
to
dressing
and/or
dyeing
to
be
converted
into
garments.
Likewise,
I
think
I
may
discard
the
definitions
which
refer
to
garments
made
out
of
or
trimmed
with
fur.
In
my
opinion,
the
primary
meaning
which
is
to
be
found
in
these
definitions
is
the
coat
of
certain
animals
—
that
is,
the
skin
with
the
hair
intact
—
which
is
used
for
trimming
or
lining
garments.
It
will
be
noted,
also,
that
in
Funk
&
Wagnall’s
Dictionary
the
animals
included
in
the
Ungulata
species
are
considered
as
fur-bearing
animals
and
that
the
Encyclopaedia
Britannica
states
that
Ungulata
includes
antelope,
goats,
ponies
and
sheep.
It
will
be
noted,
also,
that
the
article
extracted
from
Corpus
Juris
states
that
in
a
commercial
sense
the
word
‘‘furs’’
includes
‘‘the
covering
of
all
animals
whose
skin
is
used
either
for
warmth
or
ornament,
with
the
hair
on.”
I
turn
now
to
consider
the
evidence
as
to
the
manner
in
which
“mouton”
is
viewed
in
the
trade.
The
only
oral
evidence
introduced
by
the
plaintiff
was
that
of
W.
E.
Shepherd,
Manager
of
the
Fur
Department
in
Robert
Simpson’s
Company
at
Toronto,
a
position
which
he
has
held
for
seventeen
years.
He
is
also
the
buyer
for
that
department,
is
in
charge
of
fur
storage
and
the
fur
factory,
as
well
as
the
retail
outlets,
and
is
a
group
buyer
of
furs
for
the
entire
company.
His
department
employs
about
125
people
and
Simpson’s
is
one
of
the
largest
fur
retailers
in
Toronto.
For
many
years
that
company
has
sold
‘‘mouton’’
garments
in
large
numbers.
So
far
as
he
knew,
‘‘mouton’’
was
sold
exclusively
in
the
fur
departments
of
department
stores
and
in
fur
retail
stores.
In
his
opinion,
a
shearling
of
the
Merino
type
is
a
fur
bearing
animal.
Asked
to
state
from
his
experience
whether
‘‘mouton’’
was
regarded
as
a
fur
in
the
trade,
Mr.
Shepherd
said
:
“Yes,
I
would
definitely
say
that
it
is.
It
is
sold
by
fur
manufacturers
whom
we
buy
from.
It
is
dressed
and
dyed
by
fur
dressers
and
dyers.
It
is
exhibited
in
our
store
and
other
stores
as
a
fur
and
operated
on
as
such,
being
sold
in
fur
departments
and
to
our
customers
we
present
it
as
a
fur
coat
having
purchased
it
as
fur
from
a
manufacturer
who
in
turn
has
had
it
processed
by
a
fur
buyer
and
therefore
we
consider
it
a
fur
coat
because
of
the
fact
that
it
is
processed
along
that
line
and
identified
in
all
departments
as
a
fur.”’
He
added,
also,
that
customers
regarded
a
‘‘mouton’’
coat
as
a
fur
coat,
that
fur
manufacturers
and
buyers
looked
upon
“mouton”
as
a
fur,
that
it
is
sold
in
fur
fashion
shows,
including
those
at
his
own
store
and
that
in
the
fur
storage
business
(including
that
of
Simpson’s)
“mouton”
coats
are
accepted
as
fur
coats.
In
his
own
store
‘‘mouton’’
coats
are
sold
in
the
fur
department
as
fur
coats.
Mr.
Shepherd
was
asked
to
express
an
opinion
as
to
his
views
on
certain
passages
in
Pictorial
Encyclopaedia
of
Furs
by
Arthur
Samet.
He
considered
the
author
to
be
one
of
the
outstanding
authorities
on
fur
in
North
America,
that
he
used
this
book
frequently
and
that
it
was
used
in
all
of
Simpson’s
many
branches.
He
fully
agreed
with
the
following
statements
in
that
text
:
“In
a
commercial
sense,
this
is
true,
for
an
animal’s
skin
with
the
hair
intact
and
used
in
our
fur
trade
is
called
a
‘fur’.
Yet
not
all
commercial
fur
bearers
have
real
fur
and
the
monkey
is
one
of
them.
P.
447.
‘Dressing’.
The
process
of
converting
the
fur
skin
from
the
raw
state
in
order
to
preserve
the
skin
and
bring
out
a
natural
gloss
and
beauty
of
the
hair
and
give
the
pelt
a
softness,
pliability
and
feel.
P.
447.
‘Fur
fibre’.
The
true
fur.
Soft
interlocking
downy
fibres
that
act
as
a
blockade
preventing
the
chill
from
entering
the
body
of
the
animal.
Also
called
wool
hair,
ground,
under
ground,
under
hair
and
under
fur.
P.
448.
‘Tanning’.
A
process
of
converting
the
skin
of
an
animal
into
leather.”
The
witness
also
agreed
with
the
author,
who,
in
the
Scheme
of
Classification,
at
p.
451,
included
‘‘mouton’’
as
one
of
the
hoofed
animals
(Ungulata),
and
in
the
alphabetical
list
of
fur
bearers,
included
“lamb”.
I
may
add,
also,
that
in
the
List
“Persian”
is
included
under
the
general
heading
“Lamb”.
In
cross-examination
the
witness
stated
that
he
agreed
with
a
statement
of
Samet
at
p.
92
that
‘‘When
processed
and
‘plasticized’
to
resist
rain
for
better
wear,
this
shearling
(i.e.
of
the
Merino
type)
could
be
dyed
to
simulate
beaver,
nutria
or
seal”.
While
agreeing
that
‘‘simulate’’
might
mean
“imitate”,
he
explained
that
the
practice
of
processing
known
furs
to
imitate
other
furs
was
well
known
in
the
trade
and
he
referred
to
muskrat
which
could
be
dyed
to
represent
Alaska
Seal
and
is
called
a
Hudson
Seal;
and
also
to
rabbit
which
can
be
made
to
look
like
Lapin,
Beaver
or
Hudson
Seal.
He
said
that
‘‘mouton’’
was
a
genuine
fur
and
not
an
imitation.
The
plaintiff
also
filed
a
large
number
of
advertisements
in
the
daily
papers,
published
in
many
of
the
larger
cities
in
Canada
by
leading
department
stores
and
by
retailers
dealing
exclusively
in
furs
(Exhibits
G1
to
G17).
I
shall
refer
specifically
to
but
a
few
of
these.
Ex.
G1
is
an
advertisement
by
Hudson’s
Bay
Company
in
Calgary
and
is
headed
‘‘New
Water
Repellant
Moutonia”
.
.
.
‘‘The
Amazing
New
Processed
Fur
by
Universal
Dressers
and
Dyers’’
(the
defendant
company).
Many
of
these
advertisements
include
‘
1
mouton
”
or
‘‘mouton
lamb
’
’
under
the
general
heading
of
‘‘Furs’’.
‘‘Mouton’’
is
referred
to
as
‘‘The
hard-wearing
young
flattering
fur’’,
“Perfect
coats
in
the
hard-
wearing
fur’’,
‘‘Lustrous
furs’’,
“Beautifully
matched
skins
of
the
ever
popular
furs
”,
“
Mouton
in
a
fur
that
will
give
satisfactory
wear’’.
Ex.
H.
includes
the
1953
catalogues
of
Eaton’s
and
Simpson
Sears.
Therein
“mouton”
is
described
as
‘‘
A
good
wearing
fur’’,
“A
deep
thick
pile
fur’’;
and
under
the
heading
‘‘The
gift
of
a
fur
coat’’.
Throughout
these
catalogues,
‘‘mouton’’
coats
appear
in
conjunction
with
other
varieties
of
fur
coats.
Exhibits
I-1
to
I-7
are
trade
publications
such
as
Fur
Age
Weekly,
Women’s
Wear
Daily,
Canadian
Fur
Review
and
T
escan
Fur
and
Fashion
Review.
In
all
these
publications,
‘‘mouton’’
(or
its
trade
name
‘‘moutonia’’)
is
treated
and
advertised
as
a
fur.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
had
agreed
that
he
would
not
require
formal
proof
of
the
publication
of
Exhibits
G,
H
and
I.
At
the
trial,
however,
he
submitted
that
they
were
inadmissable
on
the
ground
of
irrelevancy,
that
they
were
not
connected
in
any
way
with
the
defendant
who
should
not,
therefore,
be
affected
by
them
in
any
manner.
I
have
reached
the
conclusion,
however,
that
they
are
admissable
as
evidence
—
and
perhaps
the
best
evidence
—
of
the
manner
in
which
those
engaged
in
the
buying
and
selling
of
furs
and
of
“mouton”
actually
regarded
the
latter.
It
is
of
some
interest,
also,
to
note
how
Mr.
Moskoff
—
President
of
the
defendant
corporation
—
viewed
its
product
prior
to
the
commencement
of
these
proceedings.
FX.
L
is
a
copy
of
a
letter
dated
May
22,
1952,
from
the
defendant
company
(and
written
by
Mr.
Moskoff)
to
H.
M.
Short
of
the
Hudson’s
Bay
Company
at
Winnipeg.
The
opening
sentence
is
—
“Enclosed
you
will
find
commercial
copy
for
your
forthcoming
‘Moutonia’
demonstration”.
The
copy
attached
refers
to
“Lovely
to
look
at
fur
—
a
fur
they
now
call
Moutonia’’,
‘‘I
urge
all
my
listeners
to
visit
the
fur
salon
of
the
Hudson’s
Bay
Company’’,
‘‘In
my
estimation
and
the
estimation
of
the
leading
fur
stylists,
Moutonia
is
the
greatest
step
in
scientific
approach
the
fur
industry
has
ever
seen”.
Ex.
K
is
an
article
in
the
Financial
Post
of
June
22,
1946,
written
by
one
Dack
from
material
supplied
by
Mr.
Moskoff.
Among
other
things
it
says
“Three
or
four
years
ago
there
wasn’t
a
mouton
fur
coat
in
captivity.
Now
mouton
is
offering
the
customers
fur
coats
at..
.
”
4
Mouton
has
made
‘fur
coats
for
all
’
a
real
possibility’’,
‘‘The
mouton
coat
is
more
desirable
than
most
other
fur
coats,
Mr.
Moskoff
says’’.
Counsel
for
the
defendant
made
much
of
the
fact
that
in
the
advertisement
of
‘‘mouton’’
and
in
the
labels
of
44
mouton”
garments
in
retail
stores,
it
was
described
as
‘‘sheared,
processed
lamb”.
I
do
not
think
that
that
fact
leads
to
the
inference
that
44
mouton”
was
not
considered
to
be
a
fur
by
dealers.
In
so
describing
it,
dealers
were.
complying
with
the
provisions
of
P.C.
2336
of
May
16,
1951,
‘‘
Regulations
respecting
the
labelling
of
fur
garments’’,
under
the
National
Trade
Mark
and
True
Labelling
Act.
In
these
Regulations
44
fur”
means
‘‘the
skin
of
any
animal
whether
furbearing,
hair-bearing
or
wool-bearing,
that
is
not
in
the
unhaired
condition’’.
Every
dealer
in
fur
garments
is
required
to
use
descriptive
labels
which
bear
the
true
fur
name
for
the
fur
in
the
garment
as
set
forth
in
the
schedule.
That
schedule
requires
that
the
fur
trade
names
of
Alaskan
Mouton,
American
Broadtail,
Laskin
Beaver,
Laskin
Mouton
and
Lincoln
Lamb
shall
bear
the
true
fur
name
of
‘‘sheared,
processed
lamb”.
The
true
fur
name
of
44
dyed
rabbit’’
must
be
applied
to
very
many
fur
trade
names
such
as
Baltic
Seal,
Baby
Beaver
and
the
like.
I
have
mentioned
this
matter
solely
for
the
purpose
of
indicating
that
in
my
view
‘‘mouton’’
was
described
as
‘‘sheared,
processed
lamb’’
in
order
to
comply
with
the
regulations
and
not
for
the
purpose
of
indicating
that
in
the
minds
of
the
dealers
it
was
not
considered
a
fur.
Evidence
was
given
on
behalf
of
the
defendant
by
a
number
of
witnesses
of
long
experience
and
prominent
in
the
fur
business
in
Canada.
While
they
were
not
allowed
to
say
that
‘‘mouton’’
was
not
a
fur
within
the
meaning
to
be
attributed
to
44
furs”
in
the
Act
—
that
being
the
very
question
which
I
have
to
decide
—
it
is
abundantly
clear
that
they
did
not
regard
it
as
such.
They
distinguished
it
from
‘‘furs’’
on
a
number
of
grounds.
They
said
it
was
not
from
a
fur
bearing
animal
but
rather
a
wool
bearing
animal
;
that
almost
invariably
fur
bearing
animals
have
two
types
of
hair,
the
undergrowth
and
the
longer
guard
hair,
while
the
sheep
had
no
guard
hair
;
that
the
fur
bearing
animals
generally
have
but
one
layer
of
skin
while
the
sheep
has
two
layers;
that
in
general
furs
are
animals
that
can
be
sold
in
or
close
to
their
natural
state
and
can
be
made
into
attractive
garments;
that
the
processing
of
‘‘mouton’’
is
not
the
same
as
the
dressing
of
furs;
that
the
shearling
is
processed
to
look
like
fur,
is
a
camouflaged
fur
but
not
a
genuine
fur.
It
is
significant
to
note,
however,
that
of
these
witnesses,
all
but
one
sold
“mouton”
garments
in
their
fur
shops
or
fur
departments.
Mr.
Alexandor,
who
for
many
years
has
conducted
a
large
and
exclusive
fur
shop
in
Montreal,
admitted
that
in
his
business
as
a
furrier
he
had
for
eighteen
years
sold
‘‘mouton’’
coats.
Mr.
Wexler,
a
retail
furrier
in
Ottawa,
included
“mouton”
in
his
fur
advertising.
Mr.
Dodman,
Supervisor
of
Furs
for
Henry
Morgan
&
Company,
stated
that
in
their
stores
‘‘mouton’’
garments
were
sold
both
in
the
fur
departments
and
in
the
budget
shops
where
lower-priced
garments
were
sold.
Ex.
G13
is
an
advertisement
of
that
firm,
the
general
heading
being
‘‘Morgan
Budget
Summer
Fur
Sale
Continues’’,
and
a
‘‘mouton’’
coat
(dyed
and
processed
lamb)
is
described
as
‘‘a
summer
budget
fur
feature
’
’—
along
with
Persian
Lamb
and
Muskrat.
He
said
that
the
Better
Business
Bureau,
of
which
he
has
been
president
for
many
years,
does
not
regard
it
as
unethical
to
sell
‘‘mouton’’
in
fur
stores.
Mr.
Dodman
was
also
asked
to
comment
on
the
extract
from
‘‘Samet’’—‘‘In
a
commercial
sense
this
is
true,
for
an
animal’s
skin
with
the
hair
intact
and
used
in
our
fur
trade
is
called
‘fur’
’’,
and
to
the
question,
‘‘Is
that
true
in
your
experience?”
he
replied,
‘‘Usually,
yes’’.
Mr.
Samuel
Silver
is
president
of
Samuel
Silver
Co.
Ltd.
of
Montreal
and
for
many
years
has
been
a
furrier.
He
has
not
sold
garments
made
of
“mouton”
being
of
the
opinion
that
they
are
not
genuine
furs
but
substitutes
for
fur.
He
has
no
knowledge
of
the
practice
in
any
store
other
than
his
own.
It
is
of
great
importance
to
note
that
while
these
witnesses
for
the
defendant
were
all
of
the
opinion
that
‘‘mouton’’
was
not
a
fur
because
it
was
a
skin
of
a
wool
bearing
and
not
a
fur
bearing
animal,
they
were
all
in
complete
agreement
with
the
plaintiff’s
evidence
that
Persian
Lamb
has
always
been
regarded
in
Canada
as
a
proper,
genuine
fur
and
all
the
witnesses
who
were
dealers
considered
it
as
such
and
sold
it
as
a
fur.
Now
Persian
Lamb
fur
is
the
pelt
of
a
young
Caracul
lamb,
killed
almost
immediately
after
birth.
It
has
then
the
special
qualities
which
make
it
desirable
;
but
if
the
lamb
is
allowed
to
age
its
tight
curls
are
lost
and
it
becomes
just
another
sheep,
the
hide
then
being
unsuitable
as
Persian
Lamb.
None
of
the
witnesses
for
the
respondent
could
give
me
any
valid
or
satisfactory
reason
for
including
Persian
Lamb
in
the
category
of
‘‘furs’’
and
excluding
‘‘mouton’’—
which
is
also
the
pelt
of
a
young
lamb
of
the
Merino
type
—
from
that
category.
All
they
could
and
did
say
was
that
Persian
Lamb
had
particularly
desirable
qualities
and
has
always
been
considered
to
be
a
fur.
I
have
no
reason
whatever
to
question
the
honesty
or
sincerity
of
any
of
the
witnesses.
In
the
light
of
the
documentary
and
oral
evidence
relating
to
the
actual
manner
in
which
“mouton”
is
considered
in
the
trade,
I
have
no
hesitation,
however,
in
pre
ferring
the
conclusions
of
the
witness
Shepherd
to
those
of
the
defendant’s
witnesses.
I
think
that
the
views
of
the
defendant’s
witnesses,
while
erroneous,
are
easily
understood.
“Mouton”
is
a
comparative
newcomer
to
the
fur
trade
in
Canada.
It
is
known
that
it
comes
from
a
young
sheep;
the
best
known
product
of
a
sheep
is
its
wool
and
therefore
to
many
individuals
the
sheep
is
a
wool
bearing
animal
and
therefore
not
included
in
the
category
of
fur
bearing
animals
and
so
is
not
a
fur.
To
some
of
them,
at
least,
the
“mouton”
derived
from
the
humble
lamb
is
a
parvenu.
In
my
opinion,
the
Merino
lamb,
which
later
by
processing
becomes
known
as
“mouton”,
may
be
regarded
both
as
a
‘‘
wool
bearing
animal”
and
a
‘‘fur
bearing
animal”.
It
also
has
a
pelt,
which,
with
the
hair
intact
may,
by
processing,
become
‘‘mouton’’
and
be
used
in
garments
precisely
the
same
as
other
furs.
It
has
been
established
to
my
satisfaction
that
‘‘mouton’’,
of
the
same
type
as
that
which
the
defendant
delivered
during
the
period
mentioned,
was
(a)
advertised
as
a
fur;
(b)
treated
in
trade
publications
as
a
fur;
(c)
purchased
by
the
public
as
a
fur;
(d)
considered
by
salesmen
dealing
with
customers
in
retail
stores
as
a
fur;
(e)
considered
as
a
fur
in
the
fur
storage
business;
(f)
sold
in
garments
by
fur
retailers,
in
fur
departments
and
departmental
stores,
and
in
exclusive
fur
shops,
as
fur.
In
my
view,
therefore,
it
has
been
clearly
shown
that
to
those
conversant
with
the
buying
and
selling
and
advertising
of
fur
garments,
the
word
‘‘furs’’
would
be
construed
so
as
to
include
“mouton”.
As
I
have
mentioned
above,
‘‘mouton’’
also
falls
within
the
dictionary
definition
of
furs
which
I
have
adopted.
The
defendant
also
admitted
that
the
‘‘mouton’’
which
it
delivered
was
dyed
by
it
in
Canada.
There
being
no
dispute
as
to
the
amount
of
tax
involved,
the
plaintiff
has
established
all
the
necessary
facts
to
render
the
defendant
liable
under
Section
80A
of
the
Act.
In
view
of
these
findings,
it
is
not
necessary,
perhaps,
to
discuss
the
question
as
to
whether
the
‘‘mouton’’
delivered
by
the
defendant
was
also
“dressed
and
dyed”
by
it.
There
was
considerable
evidence
by
the
defendant
that
the
process
of
preparing
“mouton”
from
shearlings
is
different
in
many
respects
from
that
of
“dressing”
other
furs.
Plasticising
is
usually
confined
to
operations
such
as
those
of
the
defendant.
On
the
other
hand,
there
was
evidence
that
even
the
defendant’s
process
came
within
the
definition
of
“dressing”
set
out
in
Samet’s
text
(supra).
Were
it
necessary
to
make
a
finding
on
this
point,
my
opinion
would
be
that
the
defendant
had
not
only
delivered
dyed
furs,
which
it
had
dyed
in
Canada,
but
also
dressed
and
dyed
furs
which
it
had
dressed
and
dyed
in
Canada.
One
further
point
only
need
be
mentioned.
At
the
trial
counsel
for
the
defendant
introduced
evidence
as
to
certain
artificial
textiles
which
are
made
up
so
as
to
resemble
furs
of
various
sorts.
The
point
urged
by
counsel
was
that
if
‘‘mouton’’
—
which
he
considered
to
be
an
imitation
of
fur
—
could
be
considered
as
a
fur
and
therefore
subject
to
tax,
so
also
could
these
various
synthetic
textiles
which
are
definitely
imitations
of
furs.
I
reserve
my
finding
on
the
admissibility
of
such
evidence
but
upon
consideration
have
reached
the
conclusion
that
none
of
it
bears
any
possible
relevancy
to
the
issue
before
me
and
I
declare
such
evidence
and
the
exhibits
tendered
in
relation
thereto,
wholly
inadmissible.
For
these
reasons,
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
judgment
against
the
defendant
for
the
sum
of
$573.08,
as
excise
tax,
together
with
the
penalties
provided
for
non-payment
by
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
and
costs
to
be
taxed.
In
the
event
of
the
parties
being
unable
to
agree
as
to
the
amount
of
such
penalties,
the
matter
may
be
spoken
to.
Judgment
accordingly.