GIBSON,
J.:—Both
these
appeals
concern
the
taxation
year
1958.
In
both
appeals
there
have
been
minutes
of
partial
settlement
between
the
parties
filed,
and
the
only
issue
for
decision
is
whether
the
appellants
should
be
taxed
in
the
1959
taxation
year
instead
of
the
1958
taxation
year
on
certain
net
income
received
from
the
operation
of
a
business
then
own
by
them
called
the
Royal
Motel,
Windsor,
during
the
period
February
1
to
February
7,
1958.
Specifically
what
is
involved
in
the
dispute
as
to
the
net
income
figure,
is
an
assessment
for
recapture
of
part
of
the
capital
cost
allowance
heretofore
deducted
in
respect
to
the
building
and
equipment
of
the
Royal
Motel.
The
appellants
are
husband
and
wife
and
it
is
admitted
by
the
parties
and
amply
proved
by
the
evidence
that
they
have
been
partners
for
years.
Up
until
1951
they
operated
the
Arlington
Hotel
in
Windsor,
at
which
time
they
sold
it.
Then
in
1953
they
purchased
the
Royal
Motel,
about
which
we-
are
mainly
concerned
in
this
appeal.
They
then
sold
the
Royal
Motel
on
February
7,
1958.
They
also
during
the
material
period
owned
a
duplex
on
Victoria
Avenue
in
Windsor
and
also
the
Marwood
Apartments,
Windsor.
The
fiscal
year
of
the
business
of
the
Royal
Motel
ended
January
31.
The
income
tax
returns
of
the
appellants
for
the
year
1958
and
prior
thereto
were
filed
on
this
basis.
The
appellants
having
sold
the
Royal
Motel
on
February
7,
1958,
included
in
their
income
for
the
1958
taxation
year
the
income
less
allowable
deductions
for
the
period
February
1
to
February
7,
1958,
and
thereby
included
income
for
a
longer
period
than
twelve
months.
This
was
done
on
the
advice
of
their
accountants.
As
a
result
of
the
assessment
made
by
the
respondent
against
the
appellants
wherein
certain
recapture
of
capital
cost
allowance
in
respect
of
the
Royal
Motel
was
added
to
their
1958
income,
the
appellants
filed
a
notice
of
objection
and
in
it
purported
to
make
an
election
under
Section
15(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(as
it
then
read).
The
appellants
in
these
appeals
take
two
positions:
Firstly,
predicated
on
the
partnership
terminating
February
7,
1958,
they
say
they
did
in
fact
make
an
election
under
Section
15(2)
So
as
to
permit
them
the
relief
afforded
by
that
section
which
in
this
case
would
shift,
so
to
speak,
the
recaptured.
capital
cost
allowance
or
a
certain
portion
of
the
recaptured
capital
cost
allowance
in
respect
of
the
Royal
Motel
from
their
income
for
the
1958
taxation
year
to
the
1959
taxation
year;
or,
secondly,
and
alternatively,
that
the
partnership
was
still
in
existence
in
1958
and
at
all
other
material
times
and
that
since
the
fiscal
period
of
the
business
of
the
Royal
Motel
had
not
been
changed
that
the
income
for
the
period
February
1
to
February
7,
1958,
less
allowable
deductions
(which
would
include
capital
cost
allowance)
in
respect
of
the
Royal
Motel
should
be
included
in
their
income
for
the
1959
taxation
year
and
not
1958.
I
am
of
opinion
that
at
all
material
times
the
appellants
were
partners.
The
evidence
of
the
formation
of
the
partnership
was
given.
Inter
alia,
it
is
obvious
from
the
mode
of
dealing
adopted
by
the
appellants
that
they
were
partners
in
the
Arlington
Hotel,
the
Royal
Motel,
the
duplex
and
the
apartment
business.
They
jointly
borrowed
the
money
from
the
Royal
Bank
to
finance
the
Royal
Motel
business.
They
used
one
bank
account
for
all
these
businesses,
and
had
no
other
bank
account,
and
all
receipts
and
payments
were
deposited
into
and
made
from
such
account.
I
think
it
is
clear
that
the
appellants
were
in
a
partnership
at
will.
To
determine
such
a
partnership
there
must
be
notice
of
intention
to
do
so
or
it
must
be
inferred
from
all
the
circumstances
that
such
a
partnership
was
dissolved.
Neither
situation
obtains
in
this
case,
and
as
a
result
I
am
of
opinion
that
the
partnership
at
no
time
was
dissolved
and
exists
today.
These
various
assets
such
as
the
Arlington
Hotel,
the
Royal
Motel,
the
duplex
and
the
apartment
are
and
were
merely
part
of
the
stock-in-trade
of
such
partnership.
In
Lindley
on
Partnership,*
there
is
quoted
in
part
the
judgment
of
Lord
Eldon
in
Crawshay
v.
Maule,
1
Swan.
495
at
508,
which
is
apt
in
this
matter,
and
I
quote
:
‘
Without
doubt,
in
my
absence
of
express
there
may
be
an
implied
contract
as
to
the
duration
of
the
partnership,
but
I
must
contradict
all
authority
if
I
say
that
whenever
there
is
a
partnership,
the
purchase
of
a
leasehold
interest
of
longer
or
shorter
duration,
is
a
circumstance
from
which
it
is
to
be
inferred
that
the
partnership
shall
continue
as
long
as
the
lease.
On
that
argument
the
Court,
holding
that
a
lease
for
seven
years
is
proof
of
partnership
for
seven
years,
and
a
lease
of
fourteen
of
the
partnership
for
fourteen
years,
must
hold
that
if
the
partners
purchase
a
fee
simple,
there
shall
be
a
partnership
for
ever
[sic].
It
has
been
repeatedly
decided
that
interests
in
land
purchased
for
the
purpose
of
carrying
on
trade
are
no
more
than
stock
in
trade.”
In
the
result
therefore,
I
am
of
opinion
that
the
partnership
between
the
appellants
continued
in
1958
and
1959
and
was
not
dissolved
at
any
material
time,
and
therefore
the
income
of
the
appellants
which
is
in
issue
in
this
matter
received
during
the
period
February
1
to
February
7,
1958,
less
all
allowable
deductions,
should
be
taxed
in
the
taxation
year
1959.
The
appeal
is
therefore
allowed.
It
is
not
necessary
to
consider
the
first
position
submitted
by
the
appellants.
But
this
is
the
only
position
taken
by
the
appellants
in
the
pleadings.
The
alternative
position
which
is
the
basis
of
the
decision
on
this
appeal
was
not
raised
in
the
pleadings,
nor
was
this
position
defined
as
an
issue
in
any
pre-trial
order
of
this
Court.
As
a
consequence,
no
costs
are
allowed
to
the
appellants.