KEARNEY,
J.:—The
present
appeal
is
from
a
decision
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
dated
May
25,
1964
(35
Tax
A.B.C.
373),
which
maintained
the
respondent’s
appeal
from
an
assessment
imposed
by
the
Minister
on
July
13,
1961,
whereby
the
sum
of
$34,887.50,
which
allegedly
represented
the
net
profit
realized
by
the
respondent
in
1956
on
two
separate
sales
of
mining
properties
located
in
the
province
of
Ontario,
was
declared
taxable
in
virtue
of
Sections
3,
4
and
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148.
The
aforesaid
profit
was
accordingly
added
to
the
respondent’s
otherwise
taxable
income
in
respect
of
his
taxation
year
1956.
In
maintaining
the
respondent’s
appeal,
the
Chairman
of
the
Board,
Mr.
Cecil
L.
Snyder,
Q.C.,
found,
as
alleged
by
the
respondent,
that
none
of
the
profits
arising
from
the
two
aforesaid
sales
were
subject
to
tax
because
they
fell
within
the
exemption
referred
to
in
Section
10(1)
(j)
and
the
relevant
provisions
of
Section
83
of
the
Act
which
stipulate:
‘10.
(1)
There
shall
not
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
(j)
an
amount
received
as
a
result
of
prospecting
that
section
83
provides
is
not
to
be
included,
83.
(1)
In
this
section,
(a)
.
.
.
.
(b)
‘mining
property’
means
a
right
to
prospect,
explore
or
mine
for
minerals
or
a
property
the
principal
value
of
which
depends
upon
its
mineral
contents,
and
(c)
‘prospector’
means
an
individual
who
prospects
or
explores
for
minerals
or
develops
a
property
for
minerals
on
behalf
of
himself,
on
behalf
of
himself
and
others
or
as
an
employee.
(2)
An
amount
that
would
otherwise
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
an
individual
for
a
taxation
year
shall
not
be
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year
if
it
is
the
consideration
for
(a)
a
mining
property
or
interest
therein
acquired
by
him
as
a
result
of
his
efforts
as
a
prospector
either
alone
or
with
others,
or
(b)
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
a
corporation
received
by
him
in
consideration
for
property
described
in
paragraph
(a)
that
he
has
disposed
of
to
the
corporation.
(3)
An
amount
that
would
otherwise
be
included
in
computing
the
income
for
a
taxation
year
of
a
person
who
has,
either
under
an
arrangement
with
the
prospector
made
before
the
prospecting,
exploration
or
development
work
or
as
employer
of
the
prospector,
advanced
money
for,
or
paid
part
or
all
of,
the
expenses
of
prospecting
or
exploring
for
minerals
or
of
developing
a
property
for
minerals,
shall
not
be
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year
if
it
is
the
consideration
for
(a)
an
interest
in
a
mining
property
acquired
under
the
arrangement
under
which
he
made
the
advance
or
paid
the
expenses,
or,
if
the
prospector
was
his
employee,
acquired
by
him
through
the
employee’s
efforts,
or
(b)
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
a
corporation
received
by
him
in
consideration
for
property
described
in
paragraph
(a)
that
he
has
disposed
of
to
the
corporation.”
The
case
for
the
appellant
is
set
out
in
the
statement
of
facts
contained
in
the
notice
of
appeal,
commencing
at
paragraph
5.
‘65,
The
assessments
with
respect
to
the
respondent’s
1956
taxation
year,
Notices
of
which
were
mailed
to
the
respondent
on
July
18,
1961,
and
July
18,
1963,
are
based
upon
the
following
assumptions
of
fact:
(a)
the
respondent
entered
into
an
agreement
with
Georges
Byles
dated
the
20th
day
of
April,
1956
;
(b)
as
a
result
of
the
agreement
described
in
paragraph
5(a)
herein,
the
respondent
acquired
options
on
the
minerals
or
mining
rights
of
certain
patented
properties;
(c)
the
respondent
entered
into
an
agreement
with
Kenneth
A.
Wheeler
dated
the
17th
day
of
July,
1956,
and
conveyed
his
interest
in
some
of
the
options
on
mineral
rights
described
above
to
Kenneth
A.
Wheeler
for
a
cash
consideration
of
$29,000
and
75,000
shares
of
Van
Doo
Consolidated
Explorations
Limited
;
(d)
by
an
agreement
dated
the
20th
day
of
August,
1956,
duly
amended
by
an
agreement
dated
the
9th
day
of
October,
1956,
the
respondent
conveyed
his
interest
in
some
of
the
other
options
on
mineral
rights
described
above
to
Libby
Investments
Limited
for
the
sum
of
$7,500.00
;
(e)
the
minerals
or
mining
rights
of
the
patented
properties,
referred
to
in
paragraph
5(b)
herein,
had
not
been
reserved
by
the
Crown
in
the
location,
sale,
patent
or
lease
of
such
properties;
(£)
the
patented
properties
referred
to
in
paragraph
5(b)
herein
had
been
sold,
located,
leased
or
included
in
a
license
of
occupation
prior
to
1956
without
reservation
of
the
minerals;’’
I
need
not
set
out
the
remaining
subsections
of
paragraph
5
consisting
of
(g)
to
(k),
inclusive,
as
they
refer
to
the
value
of
the
75,000
Vandoo
shares
mentioned
in
subsections
(c)
and
(d)
supra,
nor
to
subsection
(1)
which
concerns
the
various
amounts
expended
by
the
respondent
in
acquiring
the
properties
in
question,
because—for
reasons
which
appear
later—they
ceased
to
be
an
issue.
“6.
In
purchasing
and
selling
the
options
on
the
mineral
rights
of
certain
patented
properties
during
the
spring
and
summer
of
1956,
the
respondent
engaged
in
the
business
of
dealing
in
mineral
rights.
B.
THE
Statutory
PROVISIONS
ON
WHICH
THE
APPELLANT
RELIES
and
THE
REASONS
WHICH
HE
INTENDS
to
SUBMIT
7.
The
appellant
states
that
the
consideration
which
the
respondent
received
from
Kenneth
A.
Wheeler
and
Libby
Investments
Limited
was
properly
included
in
the
respondent’s
income
for
1956
within
the
provisions
of
Sections
3,
4
and
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
Chapter
148.
8.
The
appellant
states
that
the
consideration
which
the
respondent
received
from
Kenneth
A.
Wheeler
and
Libby
Investments
Limited
was
properly
included
in
the
respondent’s
income
for
1956
because
the
mining
property
sold
to
Kenneth
A.
Wheeler
and
Libby
Investments
Limited
was
not
acquired
in
the
manner
contemplated
by
subsections
(2)
and
(3)
of
Section
83
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
Chapter
148.
THE
RESPONDENT’S
REPLY
A.
STATEMENT
OF
Facts
1.
The
respondent
admits
the
statement
of
facts
as
contained
in
paragraphs
1
to
5(e)
inclusive
and
5(k)
of
the
appellant’s
notice
of
appeal.
2.
The
respondent
does
not
admit
the
allegations
contained
in
paragraph
5(g),
(h),
(i),
(j)
and
(1)
and
paragraph
6
of
the
appellant’s
notice
of
appeal.
3.
The
respondent
acquired
options
on
patented
property
and
mining
rights
by
staking
on
unpatented
property
in
the
County
or
Renfrew.
Mineral
rights
only
were
acquired
in
the
patented
property,
surface
rights
always
being
specifically
excluded.
4.
The
respondent
further
alleges
that
the
purchase
price
payable
pursuant
to
the
agreement
with
Mr.
Wheeler
dated
the
17th
of
July,
1956,
was
reduced
from
$29,000
by
the
sum
of
$4,160.
5.
The
respondent
spent
additional
sums
totalling
$20,903.94
by
the
way
of
expenses
incurred
in
the
course
of
these
transactions.
B.
Statutory
PROVISIONS
AND
REASONS
1.
The
respondent
submits
that
any
profits
realized
from
the
above
transaction
should
be
excluded
from
income
in
accordance
with
Section
83(2)
(a)
and
Section
83(3)
(a)
as
provided
by
Section
10(1)
(3).
2.
In
the
alternative
the
respondent
submits
that
the
expenses
incurred
were
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
these
transactions
and
should
therefore
be
allowed
as
a
deduction
from
the
gross
income.
3.
The
respondent
alleges
that
the
shares
he
received
were
never
sold
or
liquidated
and
accordingly
no
income
was
ever
received
with
respect
to
same
and
should
not
be
included
as
income
of
the
respondent
in
the
year
1956.
4.
The
respondent
also
relies
on
the
reasons
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board.’’
In
their
opening
remarks,
counsel
for
the
parties
declared
that
the
facts
were
‘‘fairly
sufficiently
described
in
the
pleadings”
and
later
they
filed
as
Ex.
A-1
this
agreed
statement
of
facts
:
“For
the
purposes
of
the
appeal
it
is
agreed
that:
1.
(a)
The
total
purchase
price
of
all
the
Raglan
claims
was
$3,716.
(b)
The
total
purchase
price
of
the
Raglan
claims
sold
to
Vandoo
and
Rowan
was
$2,331.67.
2.
(a)
The
total
legal
account
rendered
in
respect
of
the
acquisition
of
the
Raglan
claims
was
$3,500
and
was
rendered
in
1956.
(b)
Of
the
said
sum
of
$3,500,
$2,500
was
paid
in
1956
and
$1,000
in
1957.
3.
(a)
There
was
paid
to
George
Byles
in
1956
by
monthly
payment,
the
sum
of
$2,000.
(b)
There
was
paid
to
George
Byles
in
1956
under
the
September
7,
1956
agreement,
the
sum
of
$8,500.
4.
There
was
paid
in
1956
for
day
labour
in
respect
of
all
the
Raglan
claims,
the
sum
of
$250.
5.
There
was
paid
in
1956
for
transportation
expenses
in
respect
of
all
the
Raglan
claims,
the
sum
of
$700.
6.
Karfilis
paid
to
Walters
in
connection
with
his
obligations
under
the
Wheeler
agreement,
the
sum
of
$3,760.
7.
Karfilis
paid
various
miscellaneous
expenses
in
connection
with
all
the
claims,
the
sum
of
$313.94.
8.
Karfilis
made
the
following
payments
in
March,
April
and
May
of
1957
in
connection
with
work
done
on
all
of
the
Raglan
claims
during
the
year
1956:
(a)
Bryson
the
sum
of
$1,275;
(b)
Mintern
the
sum
of
$1,000;
and
(c)
Thompson
the
sum
of
$725.”
As
a
result,
the
filed
of
factual
disagreement
has
been
greatly
narrowed.
There
remains,
however,
a
vital
point
in
dispute
on
a
mixed
question
of
fact
and
law,
namely,
whether
or
not
the
evidence
discloses
that
the
mining
properties
which
the
appellant
sold
at
a
profit
were
acquired
as
a
result
of
his
efforts
as
a
prospector.
In
resolving
the
question,
much
depends
on
the
appraisal
of
the
respondent’s
testimony
having
regard
to
the
requirements
of
Section
83(2),
(3)
of
the
Act.
I
might
here
observe
that
although
the
parties
had,
in
their
pleadings,
described
the
agreements
entered
into
by
the
respondent
with
the
owners
of
the
patented
lands
in
issue
as
options,
it
is
clear
that
each
of
their
agreements
was
for
the
acquisition
of
a
vested
right
to
a
mining
property
as
that
expression
is
defined
in
Section
83.
No
witnesses
were
called
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
and
apart
from
the
respondent’s
testimony
on
his
own
behalf
the
only
other
verbal
evidence
consisted
of
a
short
statement
by
Mr.
Robert
S.
Montgomery,
who
was
then
legal
adviser
to
the
taxpayer.
The
balance
of
the
evidence
was
made
up
of
documentary
evidence
filed
by
counsel
for
the
parties
respectively.
I
will
have
occasion
later
to
refer
in
some
detail
to
the
respondent’s
testimony
which
has
a
bearing
more
particularly
on
his
qualifications,
his
alleged
prospecting
efforts,
his
negotiations
in
acquiring
the
mining
claims
in
issue
and
the
factors
which
prompted
him
to
do
so.
The
following,
however,
is
a
résumé
in
broad
outline
of
some
facts
which
are
not
in
dispute.
The
respondent,
who,
as
a
side
line,
had
made
some
study
of
geology,
was
interested
in
mining.
He
had
met
George
Byles
who
was
a
full-time
prospector
and,
at
the
latter’s
suggestion,
on
April
20,
1956
(Ex.
R-2)
they
decided
to
form
a
partnership
to
explore
for
minerals
and
share
the
profits
equally.
The
partners
heard
of
what
appeared
to
be
a
new
copper
discovery
in
Raglan
Township
(Ontario)
and
decided
to
investigate
it.
Mr.
Byles
staked
unpatented
claims
which
were
open
for
prospecting
near
the
above-mentioned
find.
The
respondent
negotiated
more
than
twenty
purchase
contracts
(not
merely
options),
for
good
and
valuable
consideration,
with
owners
of
nearby
patented
properties.
On
July
17,
1956,
the
respondent
entered
into
an
agreement
(R-6)
with
one
Kenneth
A.
Wheeler
(hereinafter
sometimes
referred
to
as
“the
Wheeler
sale’’)
whereby
the
respondent
conveyed
his
interests
in
28
patented
claims
and
one
unpatented
claim
for
$1,000
per
claim,
or
$29,000,
plus
7,500
shares
of
Vandoo
Consolidated
Explorations
Limited,
the
then
value
thereof,
by
agreement
of
counsel,
amounted
to
$9,250,
making
a
total
price
in
round
figures
of
$38,000.
The
respondent
next
arranged
to
sell
eleven
patented
lots
(Ex.
R-8),
each
of
which
being
the
equivalent
of
two
mining
claims,
to
a
subsidiary
of
Rowan
Consolidated
Mines
Ltd.
named
Libby
Investments
Ltd.
(hereinafter
sometimes
referred
to
as
‘‘the
Libby
sale’’),
originally
for
$7,500,
and
certain
shares
of
Rowan
Consolidated
Mines
Limited
(cf.
Ex.
R-7
dated
August
20,
1956),
but
delivery
of
the
said
shares
was
later
waived
by
the
respondent
(Ex.
R-8
dated
October
9,
1956).
Thus,
from
the
two
herein
above-mentioned
sales
(with
which
we
are
here
concerned)
the
respondent
realized
about
$46,000
on
which
the
Minister
allowed
some
$12,000
as
cost
of
sales
and
assessed
the
respondent
on
a
net
profit
of
some
$34,000.
Following
the
Wheeler
and
Libby
purchases
mentioned
in
Exhibits
R-7
and
R-8,
a
dispute
arose
between
Karfilis
and
Byles
because
the
respondent
contended
the
unpatented
properties
described
in
the
said
exhibits
belonged
to
him
alone
and
did
not
form
any
part
of
the
grubstaking
and
partnership
agreement
Exhibit
R-6,
while
Mr.
Byles
contended
that
they
did
and
that
he
was
entitled
to
his
share
of
the
proceeds
in
both
instances.
In
order
to
resolve
their
differences,
the
partners,
as
appears
by
Exhibit
R-9,
entered
into
an
agreement
dated
September
7,
1956,
whereby
Mr.
Byles
relinquished
all
his
right,
title
and
interest
arising
from
the
aforesaid
partnership
agreement
of
April
20,
1956,
in
consideration
of
the
receipt
of
$8,500
and
certain
further
undertakings
by
the
respondent
as
set
out
therein.
About
two
years
later,
to
wit,
on
September
4,
1959,
George
Byles
instituted,
as
plaintiff,
an
action
for
an
accounting
against
the
respondent,
as
defendant,
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Ontario,
alleging
that
following
the
settlement
of
September
7,
1956
(Ex.
R-9),
the
respondent
had
received
monies,
stocks
and
bonds
with
respect
to
the
mining
properties
referred
to
in
Exhibit
R-9
and
had
failed
to
deliver
to
the
plaintiff
his
just
share
thereof,
The
said
action
was
settled
out
of
court.
To
conclude
this
preliminary
summary,
I
should
add
that
no
further
sale
of
any
of
the
remaining
properties
was
effected.
Before
the
end
of
1956,
however,
the
drilling
carried
out
by
the
owners
of
the
original
discovery
disclosed
that
it
petered
out
about
a
foot
below
its
surface.
Nothing
worthwhile
was
ever
discovered
on
any
of
the
mining
properties
which
the
partners
had
disposed
of
or
on
the
mining
claims
which
they
retained,
so
the
partners
‘
‘dropped”
their
claims.
For
a
more
ready
appreciation
of
the
testimony
of
the
respondent,
which
follows,
I
propose
here
to
set
out
the
respective
submissions
of
counsel
for
the
parties.
Counsel
for
the
appellant,
in
support
of
what
he
termed
his
main
submission,
urged
that
the
evidence
offered
by
the
respondent
was
inconsistent,
vague,
uncorroborated
and
insufficient
to
discharge
the
burden
of
establishing
that
he
acquired
the
properties
in
issue
as
a
result
of
or
through
bona
fide
prospecting
efforts
of
himself
or
Mr.
Byles.
On
the
contrary,
it
is
claimed
that
the
respondent
and
his
partner
having
learned
of
a
copper
strike
in
the
Raglan
Township,
rushed
into
the
area
without
any
previous
genuine
prospecting
and,
relying
solely
on
the
strength
of
the
said
strike,
proceeded
to
blanket
the
area.
This
was
done
by
Mr.
Byles
staking
all
the
unpatented
properties
which
had
not
already
been
staked
and
the
respondent
acquiring
the
mining
rights
on
as
many
privately
owned
properties
as
he
could
afford
to
buy
and
which
ran
in
a
north-easterly
direction
and
as
close
as
possible
to
the
said
strike.
The
purpose
and
intent
of
the
respondent
in
doing
so
was
not
to
discover
or
develop
a
mining
property
but
to
quickly
dispose
of
his
mining
rights
at
a
profit.
Furthermore
and
most
important,
that
any
prospecting
done
by
the
aforesaid
parties
having
taken
place
after
the
acquisition
of
the
properties
in
issue
the
provisions
of
Section
83(2)(a)
are
consequently
inapplicable.
In
so
far
as
the
applicability
of
Section
83(3)
is
concerned,
it
was
submitted
that
in
order
to
obtain
relief
thereunder
it
would
be
necessary
to
establish
that
Mr.
Byles
prospected
on
the
patented
properties
sold
and
the
evidence
establishes
that
he
was
only
engaged
in
staking
the
un
patented
properties.
Alternatively,
even
if
the
Court
should
find
that
the
respondent
was
entitled
to
relief
by
reason
of
Section
83(3),
such
relief
would
not
extend
to
the
one-half
interest
in
the
partnership
which
the
respondent
acquired
from
Mr.
Byles,
as
this
arose
not
from
prospecting
but
as
a
result
of
an
independent
agreement
between
the
parties,
which
would
render
it
taxable
under
Sections
3,
4
and
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Act.
As
not
infrequently
happens
in
cases
such
as
this,
counsel
for
the
respondent
takes
issue
with
the
main
submission
of
counsel
for
the
appellant
on
grounds
diametrically
opposed
to
those
invoked
by
him.
The
case
for
the
respondent
may
be
briefly
stated
as
follows:
(1)
The
appellant’s
main
contention
is
unfounded
in
fact
and
in
law,
because
the
testimony
of
the
respondent
affords
clear
and
uncontradicted
evidence
that
the
various
efforts
which
he
exercised
in
acquiring
the
properties
in
issue
were
the
very
things
which
constituted
prospecting
in
the
true
sense
of
the
term.*
(2)
The
appellant’s
alternative
submission
is
equally
unfounded,
because
the
so-called
independent
agreement,
which
is
dated
September
7,
1956,
was
not,
as
alleged
by
the
appellant,
an
agreement
whereby
the
respondent
acquired
Mr.
Byles’
original
half-interest
in
the
partnership
dated
April
20,
1956,
but
an
agreement
between
Mr.
Byles
and
the
respondent
to
divide
the
proceeds
of
those
properties
which
had
been
disposed
of
six
months
previously;
it
did
not
change,
in
the
slightest
degree,
the
interest
which
the
two
parties
originally
held;
it
was
merely
an
accounting
of
the
proceeds
thereof
and
has
no
bearing
on
the
instant
case.
(3)
Alternatively,
even
if
the
respondent
is
taxable
on
the
net
profits
realized
by
him
of
the
Wheeler
and
Libby
sales
under
Sections
3,
4
and
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Act,
as
claimed
by
the
appellant,
his
re-assessment
of
approximately
$35,000
is
excessive
and
unwarranted,
because
it
fails
to
make
proper
allowance
for
the
expenditures
made
by
the
respondent
in
acquiring
the
aforesaid
mining
claims,
which
exceeded
$25,000
instead
of
$12,000
allowed
by
the
appellant.
I
might
here
add
a
few
particulars
to
those
already
mentioned
as
to
the
respondent’s
background.
As
appears
by
his
income
tax
return,
in
1956
he
was
a
self-employed
restaurateur
in
Toronto,
where
he
resided.
In
his
examination-in-chief,
he
stated
that
he
was
38
years
old,
that
in
1947
he
became
a
schoolteacher
and
that
in
the
same
year
he
took
out
his
first
mining
licence
and
visited
during
summer
vacations
several
mining
areas
particularly
in
Ontario.
At
university
he
had
taken
a
course
in
geology
and
prior
to
1956
he
had,
on
one
occasion,
staked
a
mining
property
in
the
Red
Lake
district.
The
Byles-Karfilis
agreement
Exhibit
R-2
supra,
in
which
Mr.
Byles
is
described
as
“Party
of
the
First
Part”
and
the
respondent
as
“Party
of
the
Second
Part’’,
is
short
and
reads
as
follows:
‘“Whereas
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
and
the
Party
of
the
Second
Part
are
desirous
of
forming
a
partnership
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
interests
in
mining
claims
and
properties.
Witnesseth
that
in
consideration
of
the
mutual
premises
herein,
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
hereby
agrees
to
devote
his
full
working
time
commencing
the
1st
of
May
1956
to
the
exploration
of
mining
properties
and
obtaining
mining
rights
on
these
properties
by
the
staking
of
claims,
purchasing
of
claims
or
any
other
manner
whatsoever.
All
mining
rights
to
property
and
any
other
interests
obtained
during
the
term
of
this
agreement
or
subsequent
thereto
but
directly
or
indirectly
a
result
of
activities
pursuant
to
this
agreement
shall
be
the
property
of
both
parties
as
tenants
in
common,
each
owning
an
undivided
one-half
interest
in
same
and
any
monies
made
from
the
disposal
of
such
interests
shall
be
split
equally
between
each
party.
The
Party
of
the
Second
Part
will
provide
the
sum
of
$500
per
month
by
the
1st
of
each
and
every
month
during
the
term
of
this
agreement
for
the
use
of
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
provided
that
the
Party
of
the
First
Part
is
actively
carrying
out
the
terms
of
this
agreement.
This
agreement
shall
extend
to
the
end
of
the
normal
prospecting
season.”
The
witness
was
asked:
“Q.
What
was
your
intention
of
the
activity
that
should
be
carried
out
under
the
terms
of
that
agreement
???
The
question
was
objected
to
and
the
objection
reserved.
The
witness
answered:
(€
.
.
I
felt
I
could
learn
a
great
deal
from
him
and
I
also
saw
an
opportunity
of
getting
involved
in
prospecting
in
a
very
interesting
way.
The
only
way
Byles
could
do
this,
he
said,
was
I
could
grubstake—it
was
his
idea
that
we
enter
into
a
grubstake
agreement
whereby
I
would
provide
him
with
a
monthly
payment
of
$500
per
month
and
he
was
to
devote
his
full
time
to
prospecting
anywhere
that
he
saw
fit
or
anywhere
that
I
thought
would
be
interesting,
we
would
work
together
on
it,
the
agreement
that
we
have
a
sharing
on
an
equal
basis
50-50
on
the
things
that
he
himself
would
find.
I
told
him
at
that
time
that
I
was
interested
in
prospecting
on
my
own
also
and
that
he
would
not—or
at
least
I
thought
I
had
made
it
clear
to
him
at
that
time
that
I
was
free
to
enter
into
any
other
grubstake
agreement
with
anyone
else
that
I
wished
and
I
was
also
free
to
prospect
on
my
own
and
he
would
not
share
in
what
I
had
prospected,
but
I
would
share
into
what
he
had
prospected
because
I
was
paying
him
$500
per
month
to
do
this,
sir.
Q.
When
did
you
first
hear
of
the
Raglan
property
?
A.
I
don’t
remember
the
exact
date
but
I
think
it
was
in
the
early
spring
of
1956.
By
this
time
I
had
become
very
interested
in
the
mining
business,
very
interested
in
prospecting,
and
I
had
made—I
was
going
to
say
many
contacts
but
that
would
be
exaggerating—I
had
made
several
contacts
in
the
mining
business
with
mining
engineers,
mining
geologists
and
other
prospectors,
One
of
my
acquaintances
was
Mr.
Murray
Watts
who
is
one
of
the
Canadian
foremost
geologists
and
explorers
-and
he
is
a
friend
of
mine.
He
had
told
me
that
there
were
some
interesting
developments
happening
in
Raglan
Township.
He
said
that
he
thought
the
area
would
be
a
great
prospecting
area
and
that
he
had—his
company
had
discovered
what
he
thought
at
that
time
was
a
major
copper
find.
He
told
me
where
the
area
was.
By
this
time
it
was
general
knowledge
I
guess,
or
most
of
the
good
prospectors
knew
about
it,
and
I
am
not
sure
whether
Byles
knew
about
it
at
the
same
time
or
whether
I
had
told
Byles
or
just
what
happened,
but
our
attention
was
focussed
on
Raglan
Township.
My
first
job
was
'?
to
get
maps
of
the
area,
geological
maps.
I
went
up
to
the
Department
of
Mines
and
got
a
geological
map
of
Raglan
Township,
Lyndock
Township,
and
I
had
two
other
townships.
We
looked
at
the
maps,
we
looked
at
the
geology
of
the
maps.
We
found
out
what
was
open
for
staking
and
what
was
not
open
for
staking.”
Asked
to
clarify
who
he
meant
by
we”,
the
witness
said:
“Well,
I
suppose
initially
I
would
say
that
myself.
Subsequently
I
think
I
would
likely
have
had
discussions
with
Mr.
Byles
and
other
geologists
in
the
area
who
had
been
working
up
there.
And
then
I
went
up
on
the
property
and
I
was
one
of
the
people
to
see
the
original
discovery
and
when
I
walked
on
the
original
discovery,
my
lord,
it
really
looked
very
interesting.
They
had
stripped
the
area
and
it
was—on
surface
it
appeared
like
a
real
big
find.
His
Lordship:
Had
anything
been
done
on
it?
A.
Yes,
but
at
the
time
they
had
stripped
the
overburden
on
it,
they
took
the
trees
down
and
the
earth
on
top
and
exposed
the
strike.
Q.
Where
was
this
in
relation
to
the
claims
you
purchased?
A.
That
was
in
Raglan
Township
near
a
place
called
Heart
Lake.
We
discussed
with
the
geologist
there
which
way
the
strike
was
going
and
I
discovered
that
if
there
were
going
to
be
any
other
finds
in
the
area
the
strike
was
going
in
an
easterly,
north-easterly
direction,
there
was
a
fault
that
appeared
on
the
map
going
from
Raglan
Township
across
to
Lyndock
Township.
And
this
according
to
Watts
and
according
to
other
mining
men,
they
said
there
could
be
something
interesting
somewhere
along
the
line.
.
I
wanted
to
find
out
just
what
structure
there,
through
the
copper
strike,
what
kind
of
rock
bore
this
copper,
whether
there
were
any
quartz
in
it.
So
on
looking
at
the
map
we
found
there
was
some
area
open
and
I
instructed
Byles
to
stake
the
open
property,
it
was
in
the
tip
of
Lyndock
Township
in
there
and
we
staked
and
I
went
up
there
and
staked
myself,
I
think
I
staked
one
or
two
claims
myself
in
the
29
claims
that
we
staked
and
that
was
the
only
property
that
was
open
for
staking.
Following
that
I
went
up
there
at
least,
I
flew
up
there
at
least
eight
times
that
I
can
remember,
and
I
drove
out
there
practically
every
day
and
spent
my
weekends
there
and
spent
weeks
there.
I
travelled
the
area’
generally
myself.
I
went
on
these
farmer’s
properties,
I
wanted
to
find
out
just
what
the
area
was
like.
It
is
a
very.
hilly
country.
And
I
told
them
what
I
was
looking
for
and
I
found
out
that
they
had
owned
their
property
and
I
told
them
that
I
was
interested
in
prospecting
their
farms.
They
were
very
good
about
it,
they
brought
me
samples
of
rocks
that
they
had
found
on
their
property
and
that
area,
my
lord,
is
a
great
iron
ore,
great
iron
ore
deposits
was
in,
that
area,—I
was
not
concerned
in
iron
ore
deposits,
we
were
interested
in
copper—a
great
many
rock
samples
bearing
iron
ore.
When
I
finished
prospecting
I
decided
on
certain
properties
that
I
liked.
I
based
my
decision
on
the
fact
that
I
thought
this
would
be
the
best
place
to
prospect,
and
the
other
factor
was
the
closeness
to
the
Raglan
strike.
Q.
Well,
now,
Mr.
Karfilis,
when
you
went
on
these
properties
did
you
have
permission
to
go
on
these
properties?
A.
Well,
not
the
first
time
I
went
on
I
don’t
think
I
did.
I
don’t
think
I
asked
for
any
permission.
Subsequently
I
think,
yes,
we
did.
If
we
bumped
into
the
farmer
we
would
ask
him
if
we
could
go
on
the
property
and
just
if
he
could
see
a
rock
sample,
or
our
first
question
to
them
was
‘Are
there
any
rock
exposures
on
your
property’
and
if
there
were
we
would—
Q.
Who
is
‘we’?
A.
Well,
again
I
am
talking
of
myself.
On
many
occasions
I
had
other
prospectors
with
me
and
actually
just
day
labourers
that
would
help
me
pick
some
of
these
rocks
up.
We
had
a
couple
of
pick
and
shovel
men.
Q.
Who
were
some
of
these
prospectors
you
had
?
A.
Well,
George
Byles
was
one
of
them,
he
came
on
with
me
on
this
property.
Mintern
was
another.
I
guess
those
are
the
only
ones
that
I
can
think
of
right
now.
Mr.
Montgomery
was
with
me
one
time.
Q.
Why
did
Mr.
Montgomery
come
up
with
you?
A.
After
I
decided,
when
there
was
certain
(ones)
that
I
wanted,
I
would
suggest
to
Mr.
Montgomery
that
we
option
these
things
on
an
option
basis
from
the
farmers
and
Mr.
Montgomery
was
there
to
draw
up
the
necessary
papers.
Q.
I
show
you
an
agreement
dated
July
19,
1956,
between
Arthur
Liedtke
and
R.
8S.
Montgomery.
Can
you
identify
that
agreement?
A.
Yes,
I
can.
Q.
What
is
that
agreement?
A.
Arthur
Liedtke
was
one
of
the
farmers
up
there
who
owned
lot
32
in
concession
7
and
part
of
lot
35
in
concession
8,
and
we
agreed
to
give
Mr.
Liedtke
$125
for
an
option
upon
signing
and
then
a
percentage
of
the
mine
if
and
when
it
was
found,
I
think.
Q.
Is
that
agreement
typical?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Of
the
type
of
agreement
that
you
got
from
any
farmer?
A.
Yes,
they
were
all
the
same.
Q.
The
agreement
says
that
the
party
of
the
second
part
is
R.
8S.
Montgomery
as
trustee.
Why
were
these
agreements
taken
in
the
name
of
R.
8.
Montgomery
as
trustee?
A.
Well,
that
is
to
make
it—to
make
it
a
little
easier
to
process
the
things
through.
I
would
not
be
around
and
Mr.
Montgomery
was,
I
would
be
out
in
the
bush,
and
I
wanted
him
to
be
able
to
do
that.
Q.
Who
was
Mr.
Montgomery
a
trustee
for?
A.
He
was
my
trustee.
Q.
He
was
your
trustee?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Exclusively
your
trustee?
<A.
Yes.”
The
witness
was
asked
to
file
as
Exhibit
R-4
a
sketch
of
all
the
properties
acquired
which
the
witness
thought
consisted
of
150
claims
but
he
was
not
sure.
“Q.
Have
you
any
comment
with
respect
to
why
you
acquired
that
many
claims?
A.
I
could
not
say.
I
just
wanted
to
protect
what
I
thought
was
the
strike,
take
the
strike
area.
On
the
claims
that
we
staked
I
thought
these
were
the—and
they
happened
to
be
at
the
end,
at
the
very
end
of
the
find,
I
thought
they
were
the
best
bet
for
prospecting.
There
was
a
great
deal
of
exposed
rock
on
them.
Q.
Now
you
finally
acquired
all
these
claims.
What
did
you
do
with
the
claims
once
you
had
them?
A.
Well,
I—by
this
time
the
area
became
a
very
exciting
area
in
the
mining
community.
Once
it
became
known
that
I
had
acquired
these
properties
I
had
a
great
many
people
that
contacted
me.
So
I
decided
to
sit
on
them
for
a
while
before
I
made
any
move.
I
went
up—
Q.
Excuse
me,
you
say
they
contacted
you?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Did
you
contact
them?
A.
No,
I
contacted
no
one.
Q.
O.K.
A.
I
decided
not
to
deal
with
these
claims
immediately.
I
thought
we
were
millionaires
at
the
time,
that
the
property
looked
very
exciting.
So
I
picked
what
I
thought
were
the
very
best
prospects
and
we
did
a
considerable
amount
of
trenching
and
grab
sampling
and
assaying
over
the
whole
area
actually,
and
Mining
Corporation—I
decided
to
have
a
holiday,
as
a
matter
of
fact,
I
left
Toronto
and
I
went
up
north
of
Haileybury,
my
wife
was
expecting
at
the
time,
and
they
found
where
I
was.
The
Mining
Corporation
of
Canada
phoned
me,
Noranda
group
phoned
me,
and
a
great
many
of
the
people
interested
in
mining
business
tried
to
get
some
of
these
properties
for
the
companies.
And
do
you
want
me
to
go
On,
sir
?
Q.
Please.
A.
I
finally
decided
to
make
a
deal
with
Mr.
Wheeler
whom
I
happened
to—I
am
not
sure
whether—where
and
how
I
first
met
him,
whether
I
met
him
in
a
business
way
or
whether
I
met
him
on
the
street.
Mr.
Manley
was
acting
for
him
and
they
took
me
to
dinner
in
the
old
club
One-
Two
but
I
.
.
.”
The
witness
described
how,
on
July
17,
he
had
agreed
with
Wheeler
to
sell
him
the
29
claims
referred
to
in
Exhibit
R-6.
The
latter’s
lawyer
dictated
the
terms
of
the
agreement
to
the
respondent,
who
wrote
them
by
hand,
whereupon
the
parties
affixed
their
signatures.
What
has
been
referred
to
as
‘‘the
Rowan”
or
‘‘the
Libby”
sale
was
very
briefly
dealt
with.
“Q.
Now,
going
on
from
the
Wheeler
transaction
did
you
make
any
further
transactions
with
respect
to
these
claims?
A.
Yes,
I
did.
I
met
Arthur
White
who
was
then
controlling
a
company
called
Rowan
Consolidated
Mines.
I
agreed
to
sell
them,
I
think
it
was
30
but
I
am
not
sure
of
the
number
of
claims,
for
$7,500.
Q.
I
produce
an
agreement
which
is
dated
the
blank
day
of
August
1956
between
James
Karfilis,
Libby
Investments
Limited
and
Robert
Stanley
Montgomery.
Can
you
identify
that
agreement?
A.
Yes,
sir.
This
was
the
agreement
that
we
entered
into
in
our
deal
with
Rowan
Consolidated.”
The
witness
then
stated
he
did
not
enter
into
any
other
transactions
with
respect
to
the
properties
in
question.
The
witness
described
how
his
disagreements
with
Byles
arose
and
how
they
were
settled.
See
Exhibits
R-9
and
R-10.
Libby
Investments
Limited
was
a
subsidiary
of
Rowan
Consolidated
and,
as
appears
by
Exhibit
R-7,
it
provided
for
a
payment
of
$2,500,
which
was
acknowledged,
and
a
further
payment
of
$5,000
on
subsequent
dates
and
100
shares
of
Rowan
Consolidated
Mines
Limited.
By
a
later
agreement
dated
October
9,
1956
(Ex.
R-8),
to
which
the
respondent,
the
Libby
Investments
company
and
the
Rowan
company
were
parties,
the
respondent
acknowledged
receipt
of
$5,000
and
waived
any
claim
in
respect
of
the
Rowan
shares.
On
cross-examination
the
witness
was
asked
if
his
idea
in
entering
the
mining
field
was
to
pick
up
some
claims
and
turn
them
over
at
a
profit.
A.
I
don’t
think
so,
sir.
I
think
if
I
had
found
a
mine—I
could
have
sold
the
claims,
the
best
claims
in
the
area
for
a
lot
more
money
than
I
did
.
.
.
I
could
have
made
a
lot
more
money
than
I
did.
Now,
my
intention
was
if
I
could
find
a
mine,
fine,
but
I
had
no
intention,
I
did
not
go
into
this
thing
with
the
idea
that
we
will
go
in
there
and
find
and
sell.
That
was
not
my
intention.
Q.
Well,
did
you
have
the
money
yourself
to
finance
a
mine
or
anything
of
that
nature?
A.
No,
I
don’t
think
anybody
has
enough
money
to
really
finance
a
mine.
Once
the
discovery
is
made
the
financing
is
not
a
difficult
matter,
you
soon
have
the
money.
Q.
What
did
you
do
with
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
to
Mr.
Wheeler
under
the
agreement?
A.
Well,
we
used
part
of
that
money
to
pay
the
expenses
we
were
involved
in.
We
used
part
of
that
money
for
work
that
we
did
on
some
of
the
property
that
we
were
going
to
keep
ourselves.
Q.
Well,
you
spent
quite
substantial
amounts,
didn’t
you?
A.
Yes.
Q.
On
developing
your
own
property?
A.
That
is
right,
sir.
Q.
What
work
did
you
do?
A.
Well,
the
first
job
was
to
bare,
to
take
the
overburden
from
the
area
that
we
prospected,
that
was
the
job,
was
to
trench
and
get
down
to
the
rock
surface.
Q.
Who
was
working
with
you
when
you
were
doing
this?
A.
Well,
this
went
on
over
a
period
of
time.
I
had
people
from
the
area.
I
had
farmers,
I
had
a
geologist
up
there,
Byles
was
up
there.
Q.
You
were
doing
some
fairly
intensive
work
and
used
this
money
that
you
would
get
from
the
sale
of
parts
of
the
claims
to
finance
it,
is
that
right?
A.
Well,
we
did
some
work
prior
to
this
too.
Q.
But
I
am
talking
about
subsequently
?
A.
Yes,
that
is
what
it
was.
Q.
.
.
.
you
paid
some
couple
of
hundred
dollars
or
so
for
day
labour
and
you
had
your
expenses
of
getting
you
back
and
forth
to
this
property.
And
you
paid
a
Mr.
Bryson
$1,275,
is
that
right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
Mintern
$1,000?
A.
Yes,
sir.
Q.
And
Thompson
$725.
And
you
were
all
doing
this
work
that
you
have
just
been
referring
to,
were
they?
A.
That
is
correct.
Q.
You
are
saying
that
they
worked
on
these
claims
that
you
had
kept
and
had
not
sold?
A.
That
is
correct,
yes.’’
The
witness
stated
that
staking
was
carried
out
before
he
“went
and
negotiated
the
purchase’’.
“Q.
And
I
don’t
suppose
you
would
waste
any
time,
would
you?
A.
No,
we
would
do
it
pretty
quickly.
Q.
Sure.
So
would
you
say
within
a
week
or
two
of
the
time
you
had
picked
up
these
options
that
you
had
done
the
staking
?
A.
Yes,
I
think
that
would
be
fair
to
say.
Q.
Now,
then,
your
agreement
with
Byles
you
said
I
think
at
the
time
that
you
entered
into
the
agreement
your
idea
was
that
he
would
be
going
out
as
a
prospector
and
finding,
using
his
own
initiative,
and
I
suppose
doing
geological
work,
and
you
hoped
that
he
would
hit
on
prospects
somewhere
and
stake
some
claims?
A.
Yes.
Q.
But
you
say
that
that
was
not
covered
by
this
transaction
because
all
you
did
in
this
transaction
was
to
go
where
you
told
him
to
go
and
stake
the
claims
that
you
told
him
to
stake,
is
that
what
your
position
is?
A.
Well,
no,
I
am
not
certain
who
heard
about
the
strike.
.
.
.
I
could
not
say,
Mr.
Wright,
whether
I
heard
about
the
strike
first
or
whether
Mr.
Byles
heard
about
the
strike
first.’’
The
respondent
was
questioned
as
to
what,
in
his
opinion,
constituted
prospecting.
“Q.
.
.
.
Now,
then,
from
your
knowledge
would
you
agree
with
me
that
prospecting
is
the
search
for
valuable
mining
occurrences
?
A.
I
agree,
sir.
Q.
And
what
that
involves
is
looking
for
a
property,
is
that
right
?
A.
That
is
correct,
sir.
Q.
And
taking
specimens,
is
that
right?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
maybe
making
certain
tests
on
the
specimens
and
then
assaying
tests
and
things
of
that
sort?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
then
you
also
have
the
possibility
of
geochemical
prospecting?
A.
That
is
right.
Q.
I
think
you
can
do
that
without
a
magnetometer,
or
do
without
electrical
methods
of
testing
resistivity
and
activity
and
by
means
of
geochemical
methods?
A.
That
is
right.
Q.
So
this
is
all
related
to
looking
for
mineral
deposits?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Now,
would
it
be
right
to
say
that
in
many
cases,
or
should
I
say
there
are
probably
two
particular
ways
of
acquiring
mineral
properties
and
one
is
first
of
all
for
a
prospector
to
go
out
in
an
area
which
he
may
have
decided
he
wants
to
go
and
prospect
and
examine
the
area?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
he
combs
over
that
area
having
no
idea
whether
there
is
anything
there
or
not
and
hits
his
axe
on
the
rock
and
picks
samples
off
the
rocks,
he
decides
he
may
have
come
across
something
that
looks
interesting
?*
A.
Well,
before
the
prospector
decides
that
that
is
the
area
he
is
going
to
investigate
the
land
this
is
information
of
something
interesting.
Q.
And
I
appreciate
he
has
some
idea
which
takes
him
to
this
area
he
wants
to
look
into?
A.
Yes,
sir.
Q.
And
he
may
just
have
a
geological
map
and
he
may
decide
that
looks
interesting
and
.
.
.
A.
Or
throughout
similar
areas
of
the
same
character.
Q.
That
is
one
way
to
go
about
acquiring
mining
property,
is
that
correct?
A.
That
is
correct,
sir.
Q.
And
then
the
other
way
in
which
it
can
be
done
is
where
there
has
been
a
strike
in
some
particular
area
and
then
we
have
what
is
a
sort
of
rush,
isn’t
it?
A.
That
is
correct,
sir.
Q.
Into
that
area?
A.
That
is
correct.
Q.
And
in
that
case
the
practice
is
not
so
much
to
go
in
but
to
look
for
claims
that
are
open
in
that
area,
stake
them
as
fast
as
you
can
and
to
look
afterwards
to
see
if
you
have
got
anything,
is
that
right?
A.
That
is
true,
yes.
Q.
And
I
think
that
sort
of
thing
is
called
blanket
staking?
And
he
just
goes
into
an
area
and
covers
the
whole
area
that
is
available
willy-nilly
regardless
of
what
he
might
find
there?
A.
That
is
true.
Q.
And
what
you
do
I
suppose,
if
this
is
referred
to
as
a
hot
area
or
I
think
you
used—it
has
been
used,
I
think
the
expression
‘a
hot
area’?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Yes,
and
the
problem
that
you
may
encounter
if
you
find
that
some
of
these
properties
are
patented
properties
is
that
instead
of
staking
you
have
to
purchase?
A.
That
is
correct.
Q.
The
rights
from
the
original
owner?
A.
Correct,
sir.
Q.
So
that
what
you
are
primarily
concerned
with
in
a
hot
area
is
getting
the
best
claims
you
can
and
should
I
say
getting
whatever
claims
you
can
as
close
as
possible
to
the
original
strike,
right?
A.
That
is
a
factor,
sir.
Q.
And
otherwise
if
you
take
the
time
to
look
carefully
at
it
first
you
are
liable
to
find
somebody
else
goes
in
and
acquires
it
ahead
of
you?
A.
That
is
true.
Q.
And
it
might
quite
often
be
too
late,
once
you
do
the
prospecting.
You
could
then
find,
and
once
you
want
an
agreement,
the
owner
turns
around
and
says,
‘‘
Well,
I
think
it
looks
much
more
interesting’’
and
he
wants
a
high
price
or
else
somebody
else
has
already
bought
it.
A.
That
is
right,
sir.
Q.
Now,
in
connection
with
your
arrangement
with
Mr.
Byles
he
was
a
completely—to
use
a
little
legal
word
and
since
you
are
a
law
student,
we
can
agree
that
he
was
an
independent
contractor,
can
we?
A.
Yes,
sir.
Q.
And
then
you
didn’t
control
his
hours
of
work
or
anything
of
that
nature?
A.
No,
sir.”
Counsel
for
the
appellant
directed
the
attention
of
the
witness
to
a
reference
in
a
publication
entitled
Prospecting
in
Canada
by
A.
H.
Lang
and
stated
that
he
was
going
to
read
it
to
the
witness
and
ask
him
if
there
was
anything
in
it
which
he
would
like
to
comment
upon
or
disagree
with.
The
following
extract
was
then
read:
‘*Prospectors
and
others
often
rush
to
areas
where
new
discoveries
are
reported.
This
is
understandable,
but
unless
one
‘gets
in
on
the
ground
floor’
he
will
probably
find
that
the
area
is
fully
staked
for
a
long
way
around
the
discovery.
Rushes
generally
result
in
staking
bees
participated
in
by
persons
who
are
merely
speculators
who
hope
to
sell
their
claims
promptly,
as
well
as
by
prospectors
who
feel
that
they
have
to
stake
first
and
investigate
afterwards
for
fear
there
will
be
no
open
ground
left.
Latecomers
have
to
prospect
on
the
fringes
of
the
district
or
wait
for
claims
to
lapse.
These
are
not
always
disadvantages,
because
discoveries
may
be
made
miles
away
from
the
original
one,
or
on
hurriedly-prospected
claims
that
are
abandoned.
However,
careful
consideration
should
be
given
before
joining
the
more
popular
rushes,
because
so
many
persons
participate,
transportation
and
other
services
may
be
taxed
to
the
limit,
and
many
of
the
early
reports
may
be
exaggerated.”
Counsel
asked:
‘Does
that
sound
like
a
fair
statement
to
you?
A.
I
think
that
is
a
fair
statement,
sir.’’
The
witness
added:
“I
will
draw
this
to
your
attention
there,
Mr.
Wright,
the
statement
where
they
said
‘unless—’your
first
two
lines
there
which—
Q.
Yes,
‘unless
one
gets
in
on
the
ground
floor’?
A.
Yes,
.
.
.
In
our
particular
case
we
were
the
first
ones
on
the
scene.
Q.
You
felt
you
were
in
on
the
ground
floor?
A.
Well,
we
were
opening
up
the
area,
more
so
than
anyone
else
I
think.”
The
question
was
asked:
‘How
close
were
these
claims
that
you
staked
to
the
original
discovery
?
A.
I
think
we
had
some
claims
less
than
a
half
a
mile,
.
.
.
Q.
You
came
in
and
you
purchased
yours
claims
as
close
as
you
could
get
it?
A.
Yes.
Q.
To
the
original
find?
A.
Yes,
that
is
true.
Q.
Now,
going
back
a
little
bit,
this
whole
expedition
of
yours
in
that
area
resulted
from
your
hearing
of
this
copper
discovery
at
Raglan,
is
that
right?
A.
Yes,
sir.
Q.
And
as
a
matter
of
fact
you
ultimately
abandoned
the
whole
project
yourself
because
you
heard
that
the
Raglan
find
didn’t
turn
out
to
be
anything
after
all,
I
think
you
told
his
lordship
that,
didn’t
you?
A.
Yes,
but
there
was
other
work
in
the
area
around
here
up
to
the
west,
on
which
claims
were
the
ones
on
which
they
also
did
a
considerable
amount
of
drilling
on
the
property
and
the
area
we
abandoned
we
eventually
abandoned
after
the
results
became
known.
Q.
But
you
told
his
lordship
.
.
.
that
the
Raglan
discovery
proved
the
find
was
only
about
12
inches
deep
after
considerable
drilling
they
found
it
was
not
commercial
copper
and
we
dropped
our
claims,
is
that
right?
A.
That
is
correct,
sir.
Q.
You
referred
to
a
gamble,
you
didn’t
base
your
decision
on
what
your
actual
findings
were
but
rather
on
what
was
found
by
the
people
that
originally
interested
you
in
the
area
?
A.
Well,
no,
sir,
I
made
my
own
decision.
In
other
words,
I
don’t
want
to
leave
you
with
the
impression.
we
dropped
that
because
Raglan
became—I
suppose
we
stopped
work
because
economically
it
proved
it
would
not
be
worth
the
gamble
to
drill
our
property
because
of
the
drillholes
that
surrounded
our
property
and
the
best
geological
advice
impelled
me
to
say
that
if
we
drilled
the
chance
of
finding
anything
would
be
very
small.
So
I
dropped
it
on
that
basis.
Q.
Now,
you
took
the
so-called
options
such
as
Exhibit
R-3
at
the
time
because
you
were
worried
that
if
you
didn’t
take
them
somebody
else
could
take
them,
is
that
right?
A.
I
didn’t
consider
that.
I
just
wanted
to
get
what
I
thought
we
could
get.
I
was
not
in
competition
with
any
one
else
at
the
time
we
went
in
there.
Q.
No,
but
the
reason
you
picked
them
up
at
the
time
you
did
was
because
you
were
aware
that
if
you
didn’t
somebody
else
could
get
them?
A.
I
think
that
was
one
of
the
factors.
I
think
the
other
factor
was
we
looked
at
the
area
we
wanted
to
get
before
we
got
it.
We
didn’t
just
go
in
there
and
blanket
the
area
with—claims,
because
we
had
to
pay
and
I
didn’t
have
the
money
at
the
time.
You
had
to
pay
a
certain
amount
of
money
for
these,
the
tax.
So
we
wanted
to
be
sure
that
what
we
did
get
was
worth
getting.
Q.
.
.
.
I
will
ask
you
if
you
were
asked
this
question
and
made
this
answer—it
is
on
page
11:
‘Mr.
WRIGHT
(question
105—on
discovery):
Why
did
you
bother
at
this
stage
getting
options?
What
was
new
that
you
felt
that
rather
than
just
go
on
his
laissez
faire
approach
you
needed
to
have
them
tie
it
up
under
an
option?
A.
Well,
if
I
could
not
acquire
them
someone
else
could
have
come
and
got
them.’
Q.
Now,
then
you
heard
about
this
Raglan
find
and
you
went
up
and
you
told
his
lordship
earlier
you
went
up
and
you
saw
where
the
original
find
was
and
you
examined
the
way
they
had
taken
off
the
overburden
and
so
on
and
then
I
think
you
phoned
Byles
and
you
said,
Get
down
in
Raglan
it
looks
pretty
hot.’
Is
that
right?
A.
Well,
I
am
not
sure
of
that
point,
Mr.
Wright.
I
don’t
know
whether
I
called
Byles,
whether
he
knew
about
it
or
not,
I
am
not
sure.
Q.
No,
between
the
two
of
you
you
found
that
some
land
was
open
for
staking
and
others
was
patented
property
?
A.
Yes,
sir.
Q.
So
on
the
property
that
was
open
for
staking
you
called
Byles
and
he
came
in
and
you
showed
him
where
the
property
was
and
you
staked
that?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Rather
he
staked,
you
didn’t
do
any
staking
there?
A.
I
think
I
staked
one
or
two—I
think
I
staked
at
least
one
claim
or
two
claims
of
that
there.
Q.
I
will
ask
you
if
you
were
asked
this
question
and
made
this
answer—it
is
question
41
to
43,
my
lord,
at
page
seven—
‘You
say
you
went
up
first
of
all
yourself
and
saw
the
property
where
the
original
find
was,
is
that
right?
A.
Right.
Q.
Then
did
you
go
up
with
Byles
following
that?
A.
Yes.
After
my
first
visit
we
ascertained
that
the
area—
there
was
some
land
that
was
open
for
staking
and
other
land
that
we
looked
at
was
patented
property.
Q.
Yes?
A.
So
on
the
property
that
was
open
for
staking
I
called
Byles.
He
came
in.
I
showed
him
where
the
property
was
and
we
staked
that—rather,
he
staked
it;
I
did
not
do
any
staking
there.’
Q.
Would
your
memory
have
been
better
when
you
were
examined
for
discovery
in
October
or
now,
Mr.
Karfilis?
A.
Well,
I
have
had
an
opportunity
of
going
over
this
thing
many
times,
Mr.
Wright.”
I
wish
to
add
that
I
came
across
some
corroborative
evidence
as
to
his
staking
of
one
claim
and
I
am
prepared
to
accept
his
statement
that
he
did
so.
It
was
not,
however
among
those
staked
by
Mr.
Byles
but
the
one
and
only
unpatented
claim
included
in
the
group
of
29
sold
to
Mr.
Wheeler.
I
say
that
because
of
item
(c)
on
page
3
of
Exhibit
R-6,
which
reads
as
follows:
“(c)
1
claim
staked
by
JK.
W.
½
of
Lot
27
Con
VII”
(I
think
‘‘
JK’’
signifies
James
Karfilis,
the
respondent.)
The
said
claim
may
be
seen
on
Exhibit
R-4
and
is
located
between
the
East
½
of
Lot
27,
Concession
VII’’
which
the
respondent
bought
from
Henry
Bardofsky
and
‘‘Lot
26,
Concession
VII’’
acquired
from
Edward
Keller
(referred
to
in
Exhibit
R-6
as
Items
(d)
and
(b)
respectively).
I
should
add
that
although
I
think
that
the
respondent
staked
the
aforesaid
patented
claim
nowhere
in
the
evidence
is
there
any
suggestion
that
he
prospected
it.
It
is
clear,
I
think,
and
counsel
agreed,
that
staking
alone
does
not
constitute
prospecting.
It
follows
therefore
that
the
$1,000
which
the
respondent
received
for
this
one
claim
is
not
subject
to
exemption
under
Section
83.
“Q.
Now,
would
it
be
fair
then
to
say
that
you
really
followed
the
same
procedure
in
connection
with
the
patented
properties
as
in
the
properties
that
had
to
be
staked,
except
that
you
could
not
stake
them
so
you
purchased
them?
A.
Yes,
sir.”
Asked
if
what
he
did
would
be
called
‘‘blanket
staking’’,
he
answered
:
“No,
it
is
not
true
because
there
was
property
available
just
below
the
fault
that
we
didn’t
bother
going
to
at
all.
In
fact,
there
was
property
there
surrounding
the
find
that
was
available
here
that
we
did
not
take.
Q.
When
I
said
‘blanket’
you
were
betting
you
had
claims
on
the
location
and
following
the
location
of
the
strike,
is
that
right?
A.
Yes,
sir.
Q.
Now,
would
it
be
fair
to
say
that
by
far
the
larger
part
of
the
work
that
you
did
on
these
properties
was
done
after
they
had
been
staked
and
purchased?
A.
In
the
overall
picture
I
don’t
think
so,
Mr.
Wright.
I
think
we
spent
more
money
deciding
on
what
we
were
going
to
take
than
what
we
spent
afterwards.
By
the
time
we
were
really
able
to
work
it
didn’t
take
long
to
come
to
the
conclusion
that
maybe
this
is
not
as
good
an
area
as
we
thought.
Q.
You
don’t
have
any
written
record
or
anything
to
indicate
what
work
was
done
prior
to
.
.
.
A.
That
is
correct.
Q.
.
.
.
prior
to
the
purchase
and
what
work
was
done
afterwards?
A.
That
is
true.
Q.
And
you
agreed
with
me
earlier
that
it
looked
like
common
sense
to
tie
the
property
up
first
and
do
you
exploratory
work
afterwards,
didn’t
you?
A.
Yes,
I
did
with
this
qualification
that
we
knew
what
area
we
were
after
and
we
did
go
on
the
property
before
we
made
any
deal
with
any
of
the
farmers.
We
looked
at
rocks.
Q.
You
didn’t
do
anything,
you
didn’t
go
on
the
property,
you
told
Byles
I
think
you
said
to
just
go
up
and
stake
those
properties
right
away
?
A.
Yes,
the
property
that
was
open
for
staking
we
thought
we
would
stake
it
and
get
it.
Q.
And
you
didn’t
do
any
prospecting
at
all?
A.
No,
that
was
open
for
staking
and
so
we
staked
it.
It
was
in
the
general
area
or
the
strike
so
—
Q.
.
.
.
then
would
it
be
fair
to
say
that
—
what
brought
you
“
into
this
area
was
this
Raglan
discovery?
A.
Yes,
that
would
be
fair
to
say,
sir.
Q.
And
that
was
the
reason
that
you
were
in
there
looking
for
these
claims
?
A.
That
is
true,
yes.
Q.
And
it
was
really
the
thing
that
motivated
you
in
acquiring
the
claims?
A.
That
is
true,
sir,
that
would
be
one
of
the
factors.
Q.
Well,
it
was
the
major
factor
?
A.
It
was
the
major
factor
getting
me
interested
in
the
area,
yes.”
The
witness
was
asked
if
he
had
any
reports
or
maps
or
anything
of
that
kind
showing
the
work
that
he
had
done
in
the
area
at
any
time.
“A.
I
did
have,
Mr.
Wright,
but
I
don’t
know
where
they
are.
Q.
There
is
nothing
available
now
that
we
can
look
at
today?
A.
No.
sir.
Q.
.
.
.
but
there
is
no
written
evidence
of
any
kind
to
show
what
work
was
done,
is
that
right?
A.
No,
what
happened
to
those
is
either
Rowan
Consolidated
or
Van
Doo
or
somebody
did
take
my
reports
and
I
just
never
got
them
back.
Q.
Yes.
And
you
don’t
even
have
any
invoices
for
the
transportation
expenses
that
you
had
up
to
the
property
or
anything
like
that?
A.
No,
sir,
I
do
not.
Q.
Or
any
receipts
from—
A.
No.
Q.
Any
of
these
prospectors?
A.
No,
sir,
I
do
not.
Q.
For
payment,
and
actually
three
of
the
prospectors,
Mintern
and
two
others,
Thompson
I
think
was
one,
I
have
forgotten
the
name
of
the
other,
you
didn’t
pay
them
until
1957?
A.
That
is
true,
sir.
Q.
Now,
then,
when
you
refer
to
these
agréments
that
you
obtained
as
options
would
I
be
right
in
saying
that—his
lordship
can
look
at
them
anyway—but
really
what
they
were
for
is
that
you
become
the
grantee
of
the
mineral
rights
in
connection
with
the
property
which
you
took
these
so-called
options
on
?
A.
Yes,
an
option
to
become
the
grantee
of
that
property.
Q.
.
.
.
I
am
talking
about
your
agreement
with
the
different
land
owners,
I
understand
that
for
the
type
of
agreement
that
you
have,
that
terminology
refers
to
it
as
an
option
but
all
I
am
getting
at
is
it
is
really
not
an
option,
it
gives
you
the
exclusive
and
sole
right
to
set
up
mining
operations
and
to
extract
ore
and
you
agree
to
pay
so
much
a
ton
for
the
ore.
A.
But
it
also
says
under
that
agreement,
Mr.
Wright,
it
gives
us
a
considerable
time
to
decide
whether
or
not
we
will
make
payments
on
those
claims
from
the
time
—
in
other
words,
it
gives
us
an
opportunity
to
go
in
there
and
do
any
other
further
work
we
wanted
to
and
then
after
a
time
we
found
there
was
nothing
there,
the
moment
we
stopped
payment
the
option
ceased.
Q.
Well,
could
I
have
Exhibit
R-3,
please,
just
so
we
will
be
clear.
A.
.
.
.
here
is
one
clause,
Mr.
Wright:
‘
Provided
that
the
optionee
shall—’
Q.
This
is
on
page
what?
A.
Page
three
of
the
agreement.
This
would
involve
a
lot
of
money,
and
on
this
one
was
$125.
‘Provided
that
the
optionee
shall
pay
the
municipal
taxes
commencing
next
January
1st
on
the
said
property
during
the
time
he
desires
to
retain
the
exclusive
mineral
rights
on
said
property
and—
Q.
There
you
are
right
there,
you
had
the
exclusive
mineral
rights?
A.
Yes.
‘and
upon
ceasing
to
pay
the
municipal
taxes
the
optionee’s
interest
in
the
said
mineral
rights
shall
cease
and
no
further
claims
may
be
made
by
either
party
under
this
agreement.
’
So
actually
it
gave
us
a
year
to
decide
whether
or
not
there
was
any
thing
in
the
property.*
Q.
Well,
all
I
was
getting
at
is
that
I
would
think
under
an
option
you
would
make
a
payment
of
$20
and
there
is
an
option
to
purchase
the
mineral
rights,
but
that
is
not
the
way
this
reads,
but
this
was
a
payment
by
you
and
you
had
the
mineral
rights
and
you
simply
paid
a
royalty
when
you
took
the
ore
out
of
the
ground,
that
is
all.
I
don’t
think
there
is
anything
unusual
or
anything
about
it,
but
I
just
want
to
make
it
clear
that
it
is
not
an
option
as
I
think
most
people
would
think
of
it
as
an
option.
A.
May
I—it
was
the
intention,
Mr.
Wright,
when
we
decided
to
buy
this
property,
we
wanted
to
get
as
long
a
time
as
we
could
to
investigate
this
property,
and
upon
ceasing,
if
we
didn’t
pay
the
taxes,
Mr.
Montgomery,
my
solicitor,
said
that
will
give
us
a
year
in
which
to
decide,
and
I
don’t
know
anything
about
it.
I
accepted
his
advice
on
it.
Q.
You
just
lost
the
mineral
rights
if
you
didn’t
pay
the
taxes.
In
the
meantime
you
had
them?
A.
My
understanding
is
we
dropped
them
at
that
time.
Q.
That
may
be
the
terminology
in
the
trade,
that
is
all.
A.
Yes.
Q.
For
instance,
here
is
a
receipt.
Before
you
got
those
formal
agreements
my
understanding
is
that
you
went
around
and
took
informal
agreements
and
the
different
landowners
signed
a
receipt?
A.
Yes,
I
did,
sir.
Q.
And
I
am
showing
you
one
dated
June
29th,
1956,
and
that
is
one
such,
is
it?
A.
Yes,
that
is
one
such.
Q.
And
it
says
:
‘Received
$100
for
full
payment
on
mining
rights
for
Carl
Klott’s
two
lots.’
A.
Yes.’’
The
witness
stated
that
there
were
other
similar
agreements.
One
of
these
was
that
of
Mr.
Shutte,
who
decided
to
sign
an
agreement
only
after
his
lawyer
had
approved
of
it
(
ef.
Ex.
A-3),
in
which
he
was
called
‘‘the
vendor’’
and
Mr.
Montgomery,
acting
as
trustee
for
the
respondent,
was
called
‘‘the
purchaser’’.
Another
agreement
was
that
of
Otto
Liedtke,
who
signed
it
on
July
23,
1956,
in
which
he
is
called
‘‘the
grantor’’
and
Robert
S.
Montgomery
is
called
‘‘the
grantee’’
(see
Ex.
A-5).
I
might
add
that
Mr.
Henry
O.
Flequel
signed
an
amended
agreement
on
July
6,
956
(Ex.
A-4),
in
which
the
parties
reverted
to
the
form
used
in
the
majority
of
cases
and
where
he
is
referred
to
as
optionor
and
Robert
S.
Montgomery
as
optionee.
The
witness
was
asked
to
file
as
Exhibit
A-6
a
list
of
all
the
patented
properties
which
he
acquired,
i.e.
over
20
transactions,
containing
the
date
of
purchase,
the
date
of
registration,
a
description
of
the
properties
and
the
price
which
he
paid.
The
earliest
purchase
by
the
respondent
occurred
on
June
28,
1956,
and
the
last
one,
which
was
the
Liedtke
property,
on
July
19,
1956.
Thirteen
of
the
transactions
were
registered
on
July
6,
five
on
July
12
and
five
on
July
30,
1956.
“Q.
Now,
then,
it
is
a
fact,
isn’t
it,
Mr.
Karfilis,
that
you
sold
these
properties,
some
of
them
off
to
Mr.
Wheeler,
before
you
had
final
agreements
from
the
landowners
in
some
cases?
I
mean
you
had
original
agreements,
as
I
understood
it,
but
then
you
found
they
were
not
too
good,
some
of
them
didn’t
have
bars
of
dower
and
so
on
and
you
got
new
ones
and
you
obtained
a
number
of
new
ones
that
you
sold
after
you
sold
them
to
Wheeler
?
A.
Yes,
there
were
some
aspects
of
it
that
we
had
not
completed
right.
Q.
And
you
sold
to
Wheeler
within
days
or
weeks
of
the
time
when
you
were
first
up
on
the
property
?
A.
Well,
not
days,
I
think
weeks
would
be
—
Q.
Two
weeks
maybe.
It
was
some
time
in
the
middle
of
July
that
you
sold
to
him?
A.
Yes.”’
Re-examined
by
Mr.
Cassels,
the
witness
stated
that
in
saying
that
he
had
acquired
150
claims
from
various
property
owners
he
was
guessing
at
the
figure.
Mr.
Wright,
counsel
for
the
appellant,
said:
“Is
the
witness
saying
that
he
made
a
mistake,
that
there
were
60
claims
instead
of
150?
THE
Witness:
Well,
60,
sir,
plus,
that
would
make
it
89,
or
approximately.
Q.
89?
A.
I
am
not
sure
of
that
figure,
sir.
Q.
Well,
it
will
be
closer
than
the
others?’’
On
resumption
of
the
hearing
Mr.
Cassels
asked
the
respondent
the
following
question
:
“Am
I
correct
in
my
understanding
then
that
you
did
not
bother
to
tie
up
the
land
owners
at
all
until
you
had
done
your
investigation
and
found
what
you
thought
was
some
favourable
indication
on
these
properties.
A.
Yes.”’
Mr.
Robert
Stanley
Montgomery,
whose
evidence
was
very
brief,
stated
that
he
went
up
to
the
Raglan
Township
mining
claims
area
on
several
occasions
to
assist
the
respondent
in
securing
valid
title
to
the
patented
properties
he
acquired.
It
was
in
the
month
of
July
that
he
went
for
the
first
time.
The
second
occasion
was
when
the
Shutte
agreement
was
signed
at
the
office
of
Mr.
James
Maloney
because
Mr.
Shutte
wanted
to
have
his
own
attorney
examine
the
document
which
Mr.
Montgomery
had
prepared.
The
document
which
was
signed
is
dated
at
Renfrew
July
6,
1956
(Ex.
A-3).
The
witness
noted
that
the
respondent
obviously
knew
his
way
around
the
country,
which
was
very
hilly,
and
he
introduced
him
to
a
number
of
the
local
people
with
whom
he
was
dealing,
went
up
to
assist
the
respondent
in
negotiating
agreements
with
local
landowners
and
particularly
those
who
wished
the
documents
be
drawn
by
their
own
solicitors,
as
was
the
ease
with
Mr.
Shutte.
He
did
not
remember
how
many
agreements
he
negotiated
but
there
was
a
very
considerable
number.
He
identified
himself
as
the
R.
S.
Montgomery
named
in
the
agreements
as
trustee
and
stated
that
he
was
acting
as
truste
for
the
respondent
and
nobody
else.
As
I
have
already
observed,
the
respondent
possessed
a
dual
quality
:
He
was
both
a
qualified
prospector
and
grubstaker
—and
if
the
circumstances
so
warranted,
was
entitled
to
invoke
both
subsections
(2)
(a)
and
(3)(a)
respectively
of
Section
83.
I
think
the
applicability
of
Section
83(2)
(a),
wherein
the
respondent
claims
relief
on
the
grounds
that
he
acquired
the
properties
as
the
result
of
his
own
prospecting
efforts,
may
be
decided
on
the
facts.
In
order
to
succeed
under
Section
83(2)
the
onus
was
on
the
respondent
to
establish
that
the
mining
properties
in
question
were
acquired
by
him
as
a
result
of
his
efforts
as
a
prospector.
This,
in
my
opinion,
the
respondent
did
not
do,
because
he
failed
to
establish
to
my
satisfaction
that
(a)
he
had
expended
efforts
as
a
prospector
in
relation
to
the
mining
properties
in
question
before
he
acquired
them;
or
(b)
he
acquired
such
properties
‘‘as
a
result
of’’
any
such
efforts.
I
have
already
reviewed
the
relevant
evidence
at
length
and,
in
my
view,
it
is
sufficient
to
say
that
such
evidence
did
not
establish
the
probability
of
either
of
these
facts
being
true.
Now,
with
respect
to
Section
83(3)
(a),
which
envisages
the
case
where,
such
as
in
the
instant
one,
the
respondent,
as
a
grubstaker
or
the
person
who
financed
the
venture,
claimed
relief
by
reason
of
the
prospecting
done
by
a
prospector
under
an
agreement
made
with
him
before
prospecting
and
also
by
reason
of
the
existence
of
an
employer-employee
relationship
between
the
grubstaker
and
the
prospector,
in
this
case
the
prospector
being
Mr.
Byles.
What
I
have
said
mutatis
mutandis
in
respect
of
the
inapplicability
of
Section
83(2)
(a)
applies.
It
is
thus
incumbent
on
the
respondent
to
establish
that
Mr.
Byles,
who
was
not
called
as
a
witness,
carried
out
prospecting
on
the
groups
of
patented
claims
in
issue
prior
to
their
acquisition
and
that
it
was
through
these
prospecting
efforts
that
the
respondent
acquired
the
said
claims.
In
my
opinion,
the
respondent
has
failed
to
put
evidence
before
the
Court
of
prospecting
by
Mr.
Byles
sufficient
to
discharge
such
onus
and
therefore
failed
to
establish
that
he
is
entitled
to
invoke
the
aforesaid
subsections.
A-further
reason
for
the
inapplicability
of
Section
83(3)
is
to
be
found
in
the
admission
by
the
respondent
that
no
employer-employee
relationship
existed
between
himself
and
Mr.
Byles.
In
view
of
the
above-mentioned
holding,
it
is
unnecesary
for
me
to
adjudicate
on
the
appellant’s
alternative
argument,
supra.
Subject
to
the
under-mentioned
adjudication
in
respect
of
the
respondent’s
alternative
submission,
the
appeal
is
maintained
in
part.
There
remains
for
consideration
the
respondent’s
alternative
submission,
namely,
that
even
if
the
profits
made
by
the
respondent
were
in
no
respect
exempt
in
virtue
of
Section
83
but
taxable
under
Section
139(1)
(e)
the
respondent
is
entitled.
to
deduct
some
additional
expenses
incurred
in
the
earning
of
the
said
profits
which
the
appellant
failed
to
take
into
account
when
he
added
$35,164.17
to
the
respondent’s
otherwise
taxable
income
for
his
taxation
year
1956.
This
aspect
of
the
case
presents
no
difficulty
because,
as
appears
by
the
under-mentioned
schedule
which
was
delivered
to
the
Court
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
subject
to
a
small
amendment
which
I
will
refer
to
later,
counsel
for
the
parties
agreed
on
the
amount
of
expenditures
incurred
by
the
respondent,
assuming
that
he
was
not
entitled
to
any
benefit
under
Section
83:
SCHEDULE
to
REFLECT
PROFITS
REALIZED
UPON
PURCHASE
AND
SALE
OF
RAGLAN
CLAIMS,
ASSUMING
THE
RESPONDENT
Is
TAXABLE
ON
THE
WHOLE
PROFIT
REALIZED
Proceeds
of
sale
:
(a)
To
Wheeler
$29,000
cash
|
$29,000.00
|
To
Wheeler
75,000
escrowed
shares
|
|
of
Vandoo
valued
at
$9,250
|
9,250.00
|
(b)
To
Rowan
$7,500
cash
|
7,500.00
|
Total
cash
value
of
proceeds
of
sale
|
$45,750.00
|
Less
cost
of
sales:
|
|
Total
expenses
including
$8,500
paid
to
Byles
|
25,739.94
|
Profit
|
$20,010.06
|
Counsel
for
the
appellant
declared
that
owing
to
an
oversight
he
did
not
include
under
the
title
of
Cost
of
sales”
5,000
Vandoo
shares
the
agreed
value
of
which
was
$750.
Consequently,
after
deduction
of
the
said
$750
the
amount
of
the
respondent’s
otherwise
taxable
income
for
1956
amounts
to
$19,260.06
instead
of
$35,164.17
as
assessed
by
the
appellant.
The
respondent’s
alternative
submission
is
justified.
The
assessment
will
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
accordingly.
As
success
is
divided
there
will
be
no
order
as
to
costs.