HALL,
J.
(in
Chambers)
:—The
application
for
leave
to
appeal
to
this
Court
from
the
judgment
of
the
learned
President
of
the
Exchequer
Court
dismissing
an
application
by
the
applicants
for
an
order
quashing
the
respondent’s
appeal
from
the
judgment
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
dated
August
20,
1964
with
respect
to
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
1953
taxation
year
and
which
also
dismissed
a
motion
by
the
applicants
for
an
order
striking
out
from
the
respondent’s
Notice
of
Appeal
in
respect
of
the
assessment
for
the
1953
taxation
year
all
those
parts
thereof
alleging
misrepresentation
or
fraud
should
be
refused.
The
substantial
question,
namely,
whether
an
appeal
from
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
to
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
is
or
is
not
in
the
nature
of
a
trial
de
novo
which
the
applicants
contend
should
be
dealt
with
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
has
already
been
decided
by
the
Court
in
Campbell
v.
M.N.R.,
[1953]
1
S.C.R.
3;
[1952]
C.T.C.
334.
In
that
case,
Locke,
J.,
speaking
for
the
Court,
said:
“The
proceedings
on
an
appeal
in
such
matters
to
the
Exchequer
Court
are
in
the
nature
of
a
trial
de
novo
and
the
appellant
again
gave
evidence
in
that
Court
([1951]
Ex.
C.R.
290;
[1951]
C.T.C.
258)
and
was
cross-examined
at
length,
and
further
evidence
was
given
by
his
wife
as
to
the
reasons
which
had
led
her
husband
to
sell
certain
of
the
properties.”
and
at
pp.
6,
337:
“While
the
proceedings
before
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
by
way
of
appeal
from
decisions
of
the
Minister,
the
proceedings
in
the
present
matter
are
indistinguishable
from
those
upon
the
trial
of
issues
in
other
courts
of
record.
By
subsection
(2)
of
Section
91
of
the
Act,
upon
completion
of
the
steps
required
by
the
statute
on
an
appeal
to
the
Exchequer
Court,
the
matter
is
to
be
deemed
as
an
action
in
that
Court
and
the
proceedings
are
conducted
in
the
same
manner
as
in
other
actions.”
Mr.
Johnston
argued
that
these
extracts
from
Campbell
v.
M.N.R.
(supra)
were
obiter
dicta.
I
am
unable
to
agree
with
that
submission.
Locke,
J.
cites
[1951]
Ex.
C.R.
290
which
is
the
case
of
Goldman
v.
M.N.R.,
[1951]
C.T.C.
241.
In
that
judgment
Thorson,
J.,
then
President
of
the
Court,
went
very
fully
into
the
point
in
issue
here
and
concluded
with
this
statement
with
which
I
agree:
“There
are,
I
think,
several
reasons
for
accepting
the
submission
of
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
the
appeal
to
this
Court
from
a
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board,
whether
by
the
taxpayer
or
the
Minister,
is
a
trial
de
novo
of
the
issues
involved
therein.
While
there
are
several
descrip-
tions
of
the
proceedings
as
an
appeal
and
while
it
is
true
that
on
the
appeal
the
Registrar
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
is
required
by
Section
91(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
transmit
to
the
Registrar
of
this
Court
‘all
papers
filed
with
the
Board
on
the
appeal
thereto
together
with
a
transcript
of
the
record
of
the
proceedings
before
the
Board’
there
is
no
provision
that
the
appeal
must
be
based
on
such
record.
On
the
contrary,
Section
89(3)
requires
the
appellant
to
set
out
in
the
notice
of
appeal
a
statement
of
the
allegations
of
fact,
the
statutory
provisions
and
reasons
which
he
intends
to
submit
in
support
of
his
appeal
and
Section
90(1)
calls
upon
the
respondent
to
serve
and
file
a
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
admitting
or
denying
the
facts
alleged
and
containing
a
statement
of
such
further
allegations
of
fact
and
of
such
statutory
provisions
and
reasons
as
he
intends
to
rely
on.
There
is
nothing
in
these
provisions
to
restrict
the
parties
to
the
allegations
of
fact
made
before
the
Board.
Additional
facts
or
even
different
facts
may
be
alleged.
Then
Section
91(2)
provides
that
upon
the
filing
of
the
material
referred
to
in
Section
91(1)
or
91A
and
of
the
reply
required
by
Section
90,
‘the
matter
shall
be
deemed
to
be
an
action
in
the
court
and,
unless
the
Court
otherwise
orders,
ready
for
hearing’.
This
section
is
almost
identical
with
Section
63(2)
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act.
Its
purpose
is
to
give
the
parties
the
benefits
of
the
proceedings
in
an
action
to
establish
their
respective
allegations
which
would
not
be
available
in
an
ordinary
appeal.
There
would
be
no
purpose
in
these
provisions
if
Parliament
intended
that
the
appeal
should
be
heard
on
the
basis
of
the
record
before
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board.
They
contemplate
that
the
issues
as
defined
by
the
statement
of
facts
and
the
reply
should
be
tried
by
this
Court
according
to
the
processes
of
an
action
in
this
Court.
This
necessitates
a
trial
de
novo.
While
this
view
lends
itself
to
the
possibility
that
the
taxpayer
or
the
Minister
may
make
a
different
case
or
defence
in
this
Court
from
that
made
before
the
Board
and
it
may
seem
anomalous
that
Parliament
should
permit
this
there
is
nothing
in
the
Act
to
bar
it.
The
freedom
of
the
Court
to
deal
with
the
issues
raised
before
it,
without
regard
to
the
proceedings
before
the
Board,
is
further
indicated
by
the
provision
in
Section
91(3)
that
any
fact
or
statutory
provision
not
set
out
in
the
notice
of
appeal
or
reply
may
be
pleaded
or
referred
to
in
such
manner
and
upon
such
terms
as
the
court
may
direct
and
by
the
power
given
to
the
court
by
Section
91(4)
of
disposing
of
the
appeal
by
dismissing
it,
vacating
or
varying
the
assessment
or
referring
it
back
to
the
Minister.
All
these
considerations
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
appeal
to
this
Court
from
a
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board,
whether
by
the
taxpayer
or
by
the
Minister,
is
a
trial
de
novo
of
the
issues
involved,
that
the
parties
are
not
restricted
to
the
issues
either
of
fact
or
of
law
that
were
before
the
Board
but
are
free
to
raise
whatever
issues
they
wish
even
if
different
from
those
raised
before
the
Board
and
that
it
is
the
duty
of
the
Court
to
hear
and
determine
such
issues
without
regard
to
the
proceedings
before
the
Board
and
without
being
affected
by
any
findings
made
by
it.”
The
second
branch
of
the
application,
namely,
to
strike
out
certain
parts
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal
with
respect
to
the
1955
taxation
year
clearly
deals
with
a
procedural
matter.
Section
99(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
gives
the
Court
or
a
judge
the
discretionary
power
to
strike
out
a
Notice
of
Appeal
or
any
part
thereof.
The
learned
President,
Jackett,
J.,
in
exercising
his
discretion,
refused
to
strike
out
the
parts
of
the
Notice
of
Appeal
objected
to.
‘¢
.
.
it
was
never
intended
that
decisions
in
the
Exchequer
Court
on
ordinary
questions
of
practice
or
procedure
should
be
subject
to
revision
by
this
Court.’’
Kerwin,
C.J.
in
Coast
Construction
Company
v.
The
King,
[1951]
S.C.R.
759
at
762.
The
application
for
leave
to
appeal
will
therefore
be
dismissed
with
costs.