Noel,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
to
income
tax
for
the
taxation
year
1954
wherein
a
tax
in
the
sum
of
$7,300.87
was
levied
by
reason
of
the
Minister’s
findings,
namely
that
a
sale
of
the
taxpayer’s
land,
furniture
and
fixtures
and
building
took
place
in
the
year
1954
and
not
in
the
year
1955
and
that
recaptured
depreciation
on
buildings
and
terminal
loss
on
furniture
and
fixtures
is
determined
on
a
disposal
price
allocated
as
follows:
|
Land
|
$
1,000
|
|
Furniture
and
fixtures
|
44,500
|
|
Building
|
204,500
|
|
$250,000
|
The
Minister,
therefore,
added
on
to
the
taxable
revised
income
of
the
taxpayer
in
an
amount
of
$4,067.47
the
following:
|
Depreciation
claimed
on
furniture
|
|
|
and
fixtures
|
$
1,019.56
|
|
Depreciation
on
building
|
17,219.92
|
|
$22,306.95
|
and
subtracted
|
Terminal
loss
on
furni-
|
|
|
ture
and
fixtures
|
$6,478.52
|
|
|
1955
loss
|
454.13
|
6,932.65
|
|
$15,374.30
|
thus
establishing
the
revised
taxable
income
in
the
amount
of
$15,374.30
on
which
a
tax
of
$3,074.86
should
be
paid.
To
this,
the
Minister
added
an
amount
of
$4,226
as
the
amount
taxable
under
Section
43
on
recaptured
depreciation
on
the
building
on
a
basis
of
$13,313.12,
thus
forming
a
total
tax
of
$7,387.
The
sole
issue
here,
therefore,
turns
on
the
question
as
to
when
or
in
what
year,
1954
or
1955,
the
properties
of
the
appellant
were
disposed
of.
If
this
Court
decided
that
the
disposal
took
place
in
the
year
1955,
the
appeal
should
be
allowed,
if
not,
then
it
should
be
denied.
Such
is
the
agreement
arrived
at
between
the
parties
and
expressed
by
counsel
at
the
opening
of
the
hearing
of
this
case.
They
also
agreed
that
the
depreciation
aspect
shall
be
reduced
from
$13,313.12
to
$10,566.90
and
of
course
if
the
appeal
is
successful
the
terminal
loss
of
furniture
and
fixtures
shall
no
longer
be
deductible.
The
appellant,
an
Alberta
company,
conducted
during
the
year
1954
a
hotel
business
in
the
Town
of
Peace
River,
in
the
Province
of
Alberta,
under
the
managership
of
one
H.
G.
Curlett.
On
or
about
December
1,
1954,
Nick
Radomsky,
John
Tanasi-
chuk
and
M.
N.
Gorynuk
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
purchasers),
submitted
to
Maber
Ltd.,
a
real
estate
firm,
an
offer
to
purchase
the
business,
real
property
and
chattels
of
the
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.,
the
appellant
(hereinafter
sometimes
called
the
taxpayer),
for
the
sum
of
$250,000.
This
offer
to
purchase,
produced
as
Exhibit
2,
contained
no
date
of
sale
and
was
open
for
acceptance
to
the
taxpayer
up
to
midnight
on
December
3,
1954,
and
was
signed
by
the
parties,
Mr.
H.
G.
Curlett
signing
on
behalf
of
the
taxpayer.
Maber
Ltd.
then
caused
an
agreement
to
purchase
to
be
drawn,
dated
December
6,
1954,
produced
as
Exhibit
3,
which
was
also
signed
by
the
parties
thereto,
including
once
again
Mr.
Curlett
on
behalf
of
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
The
clauses
of
some
significance
for
the
disposition
of
the
present
appeal
in
this
document
are
the
following:
“Twenty-Five
THousAND
DOLLARS
.
.
.
in
cash
to
be
held
in
trust
by
Maber’s
Ltd.,
paid
upon
the
execution
of
this
Agreement
to
Purchase
from
the
Sixth
(6)
Day
or
December,
1954,
to
and
including
the
Sixth
(6)
Day
or
February,
1955.
It
is
FURTHER
UNDERSTOOD
AND
AGREED
BY
THE
PURCHASERS
that
they
cannot
have
possession
of
the
above
mentioned
Hotel
before
the
Third
(3)
Day
or
JANUARY,
1955.
BEFORE
POSSESSION
IS
GIVEN
an
additional
sum
of
SEVENTY-
Five
THOUSAND
Dollars
.
.
.
shall
be
paid
into
MABER’S,
Ltd.
(6)
It
is
F'URTHER
AGREED
the
Purchasers
shall
advertise
not
later
than
the
Twenty-Third
(23)
Day
or
DECEMBER,
1954,
in
the
proper
newspaper
to
secure
such
license
within
the
time
herein
limited.
Upon
license
being
granted
THE
Vendor
will
immediately
grant
possession
of
the
said
described
premises,
Provided
the
date
of
possession
is
not
before
the
THIRD
(3)
Day
of
JANUARY,
1955.
(7)
If
the
Purchasers
are
refused
a
license
to
sell
beer
on
the
said
premises,
their
deposit
of
Twenty-Five
Thousand
Dol
LARS
($25,000)
shall
be
returned
to
them
and
this
Agreement
shall
become
null
and
void.
(8)
Upon
possession
being
given,
all
taxes
and
insurance
premiums
shall
be
adjusted
as
to
the
date
of
possession,
and
all
stock
of
goods
in
trade,
and
all
supplies
on
hand
shall
be
invoiced
to
the
Purchasers
at
cost
price,
and
they
shall
pay
for
same.
(11)
Upon
the
above
monies
having
been
paid
into
the
offices
of
MABER’S
Ltd.,
we
will
immediately
execute
the
necessary
TRANSFER,
and
BILL
oF
SALE,
and
other
documents
required
in
deals
of
this
nature,
and
deliver
same
to
Maber’s,
Ltd.,
to
be
delivered
to
the
Purchasers
upon
payment
of
the
purchase
monies
to
ourselves.
(12)
In
the
event
that
the
property
or
any
part
thereof,
shall
be
destroyed
by
fire,
or
damaged
greatly
and
not
repaired
satisfactorily,
as
the
case
may
be,
subsequently
to
the
execution
of
this
Agreement,
and
prior
to
the
date
we
take
possession
of
the
premises
at
the
time
herein
limited,
we
shall
have
the
privilege
of
withdrawing
from
this
Agreement
and
be
released
from
any
obligation
contained
herein
and
agreed
to
be
done
by
us,
and
shall
have
the
return
of
all
our
monies
we
have
paid
under
the
terms
of
this
Agreement.
TIME
SHALL
Be
OF
THE
ESSENCE
OF
THIS
Agreement.”
The
purchasers
then
incorporated
an
Alberta
company
under
the
name
of
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
and
the
taxpayer
caused
to
be
drawn
a
transfer
of
land
document
(Exhibit
6)
dated
December
22,
1954,
in
favour
of
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
;
the
affidavits
accompanying
this
document
were
completed
on
January
7,
1955,
and
the
document
was
registered
in
the
Land
Titles
Office
for
the
North
Alberta
Land
Registration
District
as
instruments
#6879
J.T.
on
January
11,
1955.
A
bill
of
sale
(Exhibit
4)
of
the
chattels
of
the
taxpayer
to
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.,
dated
December
22,
1954,
was
registered
in
the
Peace
River
Registration
District
as
instrument
#1231
on
January
14,
1955.
This
bill
of
sale
was
completed
as
to
the
affidavit
of
the
grantee
by
Nick
Radomsky
on
January
12,
1955.
On
December
22,
1954,
a
chattel
mortgage
(Exhibit
5)
was
drawn
up
between
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
and
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
as
collateral
security
to
a
real
estate
mortgage
in
favour
of
the
latter
to
secure
payment
of
the
sum
of
$150,000,
the
first
payment
to
become
due
and
payable
on
March
1,
1955,
under
the
affidavit
of
Mr.
Curlett,
the
main
shareholder
of
the
taxpayer
and
its
manager,
who
stated
therein
that
the
amount
set
forth
in
the
chattel
mortgage
is
justly
due.
The
only
clauses
of
some
significance
here
are
the
following
:
The
said
sum
together
with
interest
as
hereinafter
provided
by
equal
consecutive
monthly
payments
of
two
thousand
dollars,
on
the
first
day
of
each
and
every
month
until
fully
paid
and
satisfied,
the
first
of
above
payments
to
become
due
and
payable
on
the
first
day
of
March,
nineteen
hundred
and
fifty
five.
(March
1,
1955,
A.D.)
.
all
of
which
said
goods,
chattels,
livestock,
implements,
farming
implements,
tools
and
appliances,
furniture,
household
stuff,
personal
property
and
effects
set
forth
in
the
schedule
hereto
annexed.’’
(comprising
all
of
the
unexpendable
chattels
of
the
taxpayer)
‘‘are
now
owned
by
and
in
the
possession
of
the
mortgagor
.
.
.”
This
document
was
registered
on
January
20,
1955.
On
December
22,
1954,
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
granted
to
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
a
mortgage
(Exhibit
7)
on
the
property
purchased
from
the
latter
in
the
amount
of
$150,000
payable
with
interest
by
equal
consecutive
monthly
payments
of
$2,000
on
the
first
day
of
each
and
every
month
until
fully
paid
and
satisfied.
It
also
carried
the
clause
to
the
effect
that
‘‘the
first
of
the
above
payments
to
become
due
and
payable
on
the
first
day
of
March,
1955”
as
well
as
the
following
one:
"It
is
understood
and
agreed
that
the
interest
payable
under
the
terms
of
this
mortgage
shall
be
computed
from
the
3rd
day
of
January
1955.”
This
document
was
registered
in
the
Land
Titles
Office
under
#6880
on
January
4,
1955.
On
December
22,
1954,
Mr.
Curlett,
a
director
of
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.,
signed
under
oath
a
statement
(Exhibit
8)
showing
the
names
and
addresses
of
all
the
creditors
of
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
as
required
under
the
Bulk
Sales
Act.
In
a
letter
dated
the
week
prior
to
December
28,
1954,
Mr.
Curlett,
on
behalf
of
the
taxpayer,
surrendered
the
existing
beer
licence
of
the
taxpayer.
Mr.
Bryant
D.
Richards,
C.A.,
an
accountant
for
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
stated
that
in
a
return
prepared
by
him
upon
information
obtained
from
the
shareholders
of
the
company
and
its
solicitor
and
filed
for
the
company
for
the
year
1954
the
assets
of
the
former
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
showed
as
part
of
the
fixed
assets
of
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
on
hand
as
at
December
31,
1954.
Mr.
H.
G.
Curlett,
the
manager
and
main
shareholder
of
the
taxpayer,
stated
that
the
above
documents
and
particularly
Exhibit
3,
the
agreement
to
purchase,
were
drawn
up
and
signed
in
the
following
circumstances.
He
met
the
prospective
purchasers,
Messrs.
Nick
Radomsky,
M.
N.
Gorynuk
and
John
Tana-
sichuk,
accompanied
by
Mr.
Maber,
on
December
6,
1954,
in
his
office.
He
stated
that
it
was
here
that
he
came
down
to
a
price
of
$250,000
from
$300,000,
set
the
rate
of
interest
to
be
charged
at
5%,
the
cash
payment
at
$100,000
and
the
balance
payable
at
the
rate
of
$2,000
a
month.
He
adds
that
the
sale
was
to
be
made
on
January
3,
1955
because
(cf.
p.
12
of
the
transcript)
:
‘‘A.
Because
I
had
earnings
of
just
on
$25,000
or
thereabouts
which
was
the
maximum,
we
could
have
21%
or
20%
it
was
I
believe
at
that
time
and
I
wouldn’t
make
the
sale
in
1954
and
have
to
regain
my
depreciation
in
1955
at
51%
and
I
explained
that
to
them
in
taking
down
the
price
of
$50,000
I
didn’t
want
to
lose
a
further
$10,000
which
I
would
have
to
pay
in
depreciation,
regained
depreciation
and
was
very
thoroughly
understood
by
all
the
parties
at
that
meeting.”
This
is
corroborated
by
the
real
estate
agent,
Mr.
Maber,
who
at
p.
40
of
the
transcript
states:
“A.
Oh,
there
was
quite
a
bit
of
discussion
and
he
’phone
his
accountant
and
he
agreed
to
take
the
$50,000.00
loss
provided
I
got
the
deposit
raised
and
that
the
deal
would
not
be
completed
before
1955.
He
couldn’t
sell
it
in
1954.”
And
at
p.
41
:
“Q.
And
what
was
said
about
the
sale
as
you
recall
it?
A.
Well,
the
$50,000
cut
in
price
was
discussed
to
quite
an
extent,
the
boost
in
the
deposit
to
$25,000
was
discussed,
and
the
date
of
sale,
or
the
date
that
the
sale
was
to
become
effective
was
discussed,
to
quite
some
length.
Q.
And
what
was
the
arrangement
about
the
sale,
what
was
said
about
that?
A.
That
the
sale
would
be
consummated
or
completed
on
the
3rd
day
of
January,
1955
and
not
before.
Q.
Why
was
that?
A.
Mr.
Curlett
was
having
an
income
tax
problem,
he
was,
it
meant
he
would
have
to
lose,
I
think,
approximately
around
about
another
$10,000
off
of
the
price,
he
had
already
taken
a
$50,000.00
reduction
and
he
didn’t
feel
like
taking
any
more.
Q.
What
did
the
purchasers
say
to
that?
A.
Well
I
don’t
remember
what
they
said
but
they
agreed
to
it
anyway
because
we
signed
the
agreement
that
way.
’
’
And
in
connection
with
Exhibit
3
he
was
asked
:
“Q.
Why
did
you
word
it
in
the
manner
in
which
it
is
worded?
The
part
about
the
sale
and
possession
and
so
on?
A.
Well
so
as
the
date
of
possession
and
the
sale
of
the
hotel
would
be
in
1955
and
not
in
1954.’’
This
is
also
corroborated
by
Mike
Gorynuk,
one
of
the
purchasers,
at
p.
61
of
the
transcript.
This
gentleman
is,
however,
no
longer
interested
in
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
“Q.
Now
can
you
tell
His
Lordship
if
there
was
any
discussion
about
the
date
you
were
to
purchase
the
Victory
Hotel?
A.
Well,
I
remember
I
remember
talking
over
the
date
that
was
set
for
taking
over
possession,
January
4th,
1954,
in
’55.
Q.
Yes,
and
did
Mr.
Curlett
say
anything?
A.
No,
he
just,
that
was
the
arrangement.
Q.
But
what
did
he
say
about
the
arrangement?
A.
Well,
he
couldn’t
release
it
during
the
year
’54
due
to
some
of
his
tax
problems.
Q.
And
he
told
you
that?
A.
He
told
us.
Q.
Did
you
agree
to
that?
A.
Yes.”
And
later
at
p.
62:
“Q.
And
at
the
time,
or
at
some
time
during
these
proceedings
Mr.
Curlett
had
mentioned
to
you
that
as
far
as
he
was
concerned
it
had
to
be
possession
in
1955
because
of
his
tax
problem?
A.
That
is
right.’’
Mr.
Maber
then
went
back
to
his
office,
drew
up
Exhibit
3
himself
and
brought
it
back
to
Mr.
Curlett’s
office
where
it
was
signed.
Mr.
Curlett
adds
that
his
intention
was
that
he
was
to
own
and
operate
the
hotel
until
January
3,
1955,
and,
in
effect,
the
taxpayer
did
operate
the
hotel
until
that
date
and
retained
and
reported
the
income
that
came
from
the
hotel
up
until
January
3,
1955.
It
is
necessary
in
the
Province
of
Alberta,
in
order
to
obtain
or
maintain
a
liquor
licence,
to
show
undisputed
occupancy
for
the
period
of
the
licence
and
the
taxpayer
here
held
the
licence
for
the
month
of
December
1954
until
January
3,
1955,
when
it
was
surrendered.
Indeed,
two
licences
are
not
permitted
for
the
same
hotel
and,
therefore,
the
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.’s
licence
was
effective
until
the
close
of
business
on
January
3,
1955,
and
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.’s
licence
when
obtained
would
be
effective
as
from
the
opening,
on
January
4,
1955.
This
last
licence,
although
dated
January
4,
1955,
had
been
released
by
the
Liquor
Board
on
December
31,
1954.
The
clause
in
Exhibit
3
dealing
with
the
agreement
to
purchase
from
December
6,
1954
to
and
including
February
6,
1955
was
for
the
purpose,
according
to
both
Mr.
Curlett
and
Mr.
Maber,
of
covering
the
purchasers
or
purchaser
with
the
Alberta
Liquor
Board;
indeed
they
had
to
advertise
for
four
consecutive
weeks
in
the
local
newspaper
and
sufficient
time
had
to
be
provided
so
that
if
they
missed
one
issue
they
would
still
have
sufficient
time
to
publish
in
four
consecutive
issues;
this
was
confirmed
by
Mr.
Maber
who
explained
the
significance
of
the
date
of
February
6,
1955,
in
Exhibit
3,
at
p.
42
of
the
transcript:
‘
A.
Yes,
these
agreements
here
had
to
go
through
the
Liquor
Control
Board
and
they
demanded
that
they
be
in
such
a
way
and
such
wording,
now
at
that
time
they
had
to
advertise
four
consecutive
weeks
before,
to
give
people
a
chance
to
protest
the
new
licensee
coming
in,
that
was
part
of
the
Act.
Now
if
they
missed
a
week,
if
the
newspaper
made
a
mistake
which
they
have
done,
there
has
been
instances
of
it,
they
had
to
start
all
over
again
with
their
advertising
and
go
for
four
more
consecutive
weeks,
so
you
had
to
allow
two
months
on
your
agreement,
or
sixty
days,
in
case
of
some
mistake
or
something
like
that
in
regard
to
the
advertising.’’
And
at
p.
58
of
the
transcript:
“A.
.
.
.
you
see
there
is
80
days,
22
days
in
these
deals
that
you
cannot
do
anything
with,
people
are
just
sitting
waiting
for
this
advertising
and
for
the
license
and
it
is
quite
a
usual
thing
in
that
period
we
always
drew
up
the
documents
about
a
week
ahead
of
time,
sometimes
two
weeks
ahead
of
time
and
they
were
all
held
in
trust
until
the
deal
was
completed,
until
we
got
the
license.
These
people
were
not
going
to
buy
the
hotel
if
they
did
not
get
the
license,
but
we
did
draw
up
the
papers
before
hand,
dozens
and
dozens
of
times,
and
they
just
laid
around
until
the
deal
was
completed.’’
Mr.
Curlett
went
to
Peace
River
for
the
take-over
on
January
3,
1955,
where
he
took
stock
in
the
beverage
room,
the
coffee
shop,
the
basement
of
merchandise
used
in
the
coffee
shop.
He
also
took
the
room
register
office
at
midnight
on
January
3,
1955,
and
the
necessary
adjustments
were
made
accordingly
and
up
to
midnight
of
January
3,
1955,
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.,
the
taxpayer,
had
the
entire
revenue.
The
interest
on
the
mortgage,
as
we
have
seen,
was
charged
from
January
3,
1955,
and
the
insurance
was
adjusted
as
of
January
3,
1955,
also.
Mr.
Curlett
stated
that
the
taxpayer
did
not
pay
any
of
the
municipal
taxes
on
the
property
in
the
year
1955
as
he
says
the
matter
of
taxes
never
came
into
discussion,
they
were
not
levied
yet
and
he
did
not
know
what
they
would
be.
However,
Mr.
Maber,
the
real
estate
agent,
in
connection
with
this
matter
of
taxes
stated
that
on
the
date
of
the
take-over,
January
4,
1955,
he
went
down
to
the
town
office,
checked
the
taxes
and
obtained
the
amount
for
1954.
He
came
back
and
worked
out
three
days
which
did
not
amount
to
very
much
and
adjusted
the
municipal
taxes
for
the
first
three
days
of
1955.
With
respect
to
the
insurance
coverage,
Mr.
Curlett
states
that
the
name
of
the
insurance
policy
was
not
changed
from
that
of
the
taxpayer
to
that
of
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
until
after
January
3,
1955.
Until
such
time
as
the
mortgage
was
returned
from
the
registry
office,
which
was
in
1955,
the
insurance
was
carried
in
the
name
of
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
and
when
the
mortgage
was
returned,
a
transfer
of
the
insurance
was
made
and
the
premium
was
adjusted
back
to
January
3,
1955.
According
to
Mr.
Curlett,
he
tried
to
get
the
insurance
policy
but
it
is
no
longer
available
in
the
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.
’s
file.
He
recalls
receiving
a
letter
from
Mr.
O’Brien,
the
solicitor
for
the
purchasers,
dated
December
24,
1954,
requesting
him
to
attend
to
having
the
existing
insurance
policy
changed
in
the
name
of
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
with
the
loss
payable
to
the
taxpayer
but
persists
in
saying
that
the
solicitor
would
just
assume
he
would
do
that,
but
that
this
was
not
done
until
the
end
of
January
1955.
He
admitted
that
he
paid
Maber
Ltd.,
the
real
estate
agent,
a
commission.
Mr.
Curlett
knew
that
$25,000
deposit
money
had
been
paid
over
to
Mr.
Maber
for
the
account
of
the
taxpayer,
and
when
asked
whether
he
thought
he
was
bound
by
Exhibit
3
when
it
was
signed
on
December
6,
1954,
he
replied:
‘‘If
there
was
no
catastrophe
happening
and
they
put
up
the
balance
of
$75,000,
I
certainly
would
.
.
.”?
A
further
question
as
to
whether
once
the
amount
of
$75,000
was
paid
up,
he
would
then
consider
himself
bound
by
the
document
(Exhibit
3),
he
replied:
“A.
No,
there
were
two
clauses
in
there,
one
that
they
were
to
receive
a
licence
or
the
deposit
was
to
be
refunded
and
the
other
one
was
that
if
there
was
a
fire
in
the
hotel
that
they
had
the
privilege
of
backing
out.
Q.
But
they
had
the
privilege,
not
you,
is
that
right?
A.
Well—
Q.
If
there
was
a
fire?
A.
That
is
the
way
the
document
reads
and
undoubtedly
it
would
have
been
my
fire
if
a
fire
had
occurred
before
the
3rd
day
of
January,
there
would
have
been
no
argument
then
as
to
whose
it
was.”
An
inventory
of
the
nonexpendables
was
taken
in
December
1954
and
of
the
expendables
on
January
3,
1955.
Mr.
Curlett
states
that
he
is
not
familiar
with
the
certification
on
Exhibit
5,
which
is
the
chattel
mortgage,
to
the
effect
that
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
is
the
owner
of
the
property
as
of
December
22,
1954.
The
taxpayer,
through
Mr.
Curlett,
admitted
that
on
December
22,
1954,
he
had
all
the
security
he
asked
for,
chattel
and
land
mortgages,
and
that
all
that
was
left
to
be
done
was
to
register
the
mortgages.
He
added,
however,
‘‘that
until
the
mortgage
was
registered
and
that
he
had
the
abstract
to
show
that
his
security
was
the
first
on
the
title,
had
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.
got
into
difficulties,
or
a
judgment
or
a
lien
made
against
it,
it
would
have
been
prior
to
his
mortgage.”
He
also
admitted
signing
Exhibit
8
on
December
22,
1954,
to
the
effect
that
there
were
no
creditors
of
Victory
Hotels
Ltd.,
a
document
required
under
the
Alberta
Bulk
Sales
Act.
Asked
as
to
whether
the
idea
of
signing
the
document
was
to
satisfy
the
requirements
of
the
Bulk
Sales
Act
because
there
had
been
a
bulk
sale
on
December
22,
1954,
he
replied:
‘‘No
this
would
be
to
complete
the
deal
at
the
third
day
of
January,
you
cannot
make
a
deal
of
this
nature
and
put
the
documents
all
through
and
register
them
and
search
them
and
take
stock
of
the
hotel
and
transfer
a
licence,
you
cannot
do
all
of
these
things
in
one
day.”
Mr.
Maber
stated
that
on
December
6,
1954,
he
deposited
in
his
trust
account
at
the
bank
a
certified
cheque
in
the
amount
of
$5,000,
one
of
$25,000
on
December
8,
1954,
and
one
of
$75,000
on
December
23,
1954.
On
January
10,
1955,
he
issued
a
certified
cheque
for
$25,000
and
another
one
for
$75,000
on
January
12,
1955.
Mr.
Maber
states
that
if
the
liquor
licence
had
not
been
issued
to
the
purchasers,
they
would
have
received
their
money
back
and
the
deal
would
have
been
cancelled
in
accordance
with
a
clause
in
the
agreement
(Exhibit
3).
He
interprets
the
clause
to
the
effect
that
the
purchasers
cannot
have
possession
of
the
hotel
before
January
3,
1955,
as
meaning
that
ownership
shall
not
pass
until
that
date.
Mr.
Maber
admitted
that
the
purchasers
wanted
the
transaction
to
be
completed
in
1954
for
the
same
reason
that
Mr.
Curlett
wanted
it
in
1955
but
he
told
them
it
would
have
to
be
1955
and
he
added
that
they
agreed
after
discussion
that
they
would
take
possession
and
the
sale
would
be
completed
in
1955.
At
p.
54
of
the
transcript
he
was
asked:
“Q.
Isn’t
it
correct
then,
Mr.
Maber,
that
because
each
side
wanted
a
different
year
you
left
the
agreement
at
the
word
‘
possession
’
and
did
not
put
in
language
that
would
have
made
it
clear?
A.
Well,
it
is
clear
enough
to
me
but
I
am
not
a
lawyer
you
see.”
The
sole
question
to
be
resolved
here
is
were
the
properties
of
the
taxpayer
disposed
of
in
1954
or
in
1955.
The
pertinent
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
the
following
:
‘20.
(1)
Where
depreciable
property
of
a
taxpayer
of
a
prescribed
class
has,
in
a
taxation
year,
been
disposed
of
and
the
proceeds
of
disposition
exceed
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
to
him
of
depreciable
property
of
that
class
immediately
before
the
disposition,
the
lesser
of
(a)
the
amount
of
the
excess,
or
(b)
the
amount
that
the
excess
would
be
if
the
property
had
been
disposed
of
for
the
capital
cost
thereof
to
the
taxpayer,
shall
be
included
in
computing
his
income
for
the
year.’’
Disposition
of
property
is
partly
defined
by
Section
20(5)
(b)
which
reads
as
follows:
“(b)
‘disposition
of
property’
includes
any
transaction
or
event
entitling
a
taxpayer
to
proceeds
of
disposition
of
propert
;’’
and
under
Section
20(5)
(c)
:
“(c)
‘proceeds
of
disposition’
of
property
include
(i)
the
sale
price
of
property
that
has
been
sold,”
There
is
no
question,
but
that
the
intent
of
the
parties
was
that
the
sale
of
the
properties
of
the
taxpayer
be
effective
January
3,
1955.
However,
what
Mr.
Maber,
the
real
estate
agent,
was
trying
to
do
and
what
he
did
do,
appears
to
be
something
quite
different.
Indeed
it
would
seem
that
we
have
here
in
1954:
(a)
a
valid
contract
of
sale;
(b)
an
arrangement
whereby
an
amount
of
$100,000
is
in
the
hands
of
Mr.
Maber,
the
real
estate
agent
;
(c)
all
of
the
conveyancing
documents
including
the
mortgage
and
the
chattel
mortgage
are
signed
but
not
registered
;
(d)
the
bulk
sale
declaration
is
completed
;
(e)
the
liquor
licence
is
issued
at
the
end
of
1954,
but
is
effective
only
on
January
4,
1955;
(f)
and
also
the
right
of
the
purchasers
to
get
out
of
this
contract
of
one
or
two
or
both
of
the
following
things
happened
:
(1)
if
there
was
a
fire
before
possession
and
then
only
if
the
purchasers
so
elect;
(2)
if
the
liquor
licence
was
not
available.
The
only
matters,
therefore,
to
be
completed
were
(a)
the
taking
of
possession
of
the
properties
and
hotel
business
at
midnight
on
January
3,
1955;
(b)
the
matter
of
insurance;
(c)
the
adjustment
of
municipal
taxes;
(d)
the
inventory
of
expendables;
(e)
the
taking
of
the
room
registry;
(f)
the
completion
of
the
affidavits
or
declarations
which
accompanied
the
conveyancing
documents
and,
finally
(g)
the
registration
of
the
bill
of
sale,
the
chattel
mortgage
and
the
mortgage.
The
only
evidence
on
behalf
of
the
contention
of
the
Minister
to
the
effect
that
the
intent
of
the
parties
was
to
have
this
transaction
take
place
in
1954
is
that
of
Mr.
Bryant
D.
Richards,
C.A.,
who
drew
up
some
books
and
a
return
indicating
that
the
assets
of
the
taxpayer
were,
in
1954,
the
property
of
the
Valleyview
Hotel
Company
Ltd.,
the
purchaser,
after
talking
to
the
shareholders
of
this
company
and
its
solicitor.
This,
in
my
opinion,
cannot
override
the
preponderance
of
the
evidence
which
is
to
the
effect
that
the
parties
intended
this
sale
to
take
place
in
the
year
1955.
There
is
no
question
also
that
the
taxpayer
undeniably
had
the
use
and
the
control
of
the
properties
and
business
and
was
entitled
to
its
proceeds
up
until
January
3,
1955,
and
the
interest
on
the
mortgage
was
computed
as
of
that
date.
The
explanation
given
by
the
taxpayer
as
to
why,
if
the
intent
was
that
the
sale
be
effective
on
January
3,
1955,
all
the
con-
veyancing
documents
with
the
exception
of
the
registration
and
the
completion
of
the
necessary
affidavits
had
been
signed
and
completed
before
the
year
1955,
that
one
‘‘cannot
make
a
deal
of
this
nature
and
put
the
documents
all
through
and
register
them
and
search
them
and
take
stock
of
the
hotel
and
transfer
licence
in
one
day’’,
although
plausible,
is
not
entirely
satisfactory.
However,
coupled
with
the
fact
that
in
order
to
obtain
a
liquor
licence
for
a
hotel
in
Alberta
it
is
necessary
to
establish
occupancy,
and
four
weeks
prior
thereto,
publish
a
notice
in
the
newspaper
on
four
consecutive
weeks,
it
does
become
more
persuasive,
particularly,
may
I
add,
when
the
issuance
of
the
liquor
licence
is
a
sine
qua
non
condition
without
which
the
purchase
would
not
stand.
I
believe
that
this
transaction
was
dealt
with
in
this
manner
because
of
the
necessity
of
obtaining
the
liquor
licence
as
the
main
incentive
here,
undoubtedly
was
not
the
buildings
and
land,
but
the
hotel
business.
Would,
however,
the
completion
of
a
valid
contract
of
sale
in
1954
prevent
the
taxpayer
from
contending
that
he
disposed
of
these
properties
on
January
3,
1955,
the
date
upon
which
he
turned
over
to
the
purchasers
the
physical
possession
of
the
properties?
The
words
“disposed
of’’
in
Section
20
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
of
the
widest
meaning
and
should,
in
my
opinion,
be
given
their
widest
ordinary
or
popular
meaning
bearing
in
mind,
however,
that
they
are
being
used
in
a
taxation
statute,
in
a
matter
where
the
properties
which
are
to
be
“
disposed
of”
are
the
assets
used
to
earn
the
very
income
from
which,
according
to
certain
specified
rates,
depreciation
can
be
charged
off.
Let
me
add
that
they
may
even
be
given
in
an
apprporiate
context
a
wider
meaning
than
their
normal
meaning,
unless
of
course,
the
Income
Tax
Act
itself
has
restricted
this
meaning.
Indeed,
in
the
context
of
Section
20
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
it
is
not
unreasonable
to
give
the
words
“disposed
of’’
their
widest
meaning
which
would
be
‘‘to
part
with’’,
‘‘to
pass
over
the
control
of
the
thing
to
someone
else”
so
that
the
person
disposing
no
longer
has
the
use
of
the
property.
Indeed,
Bell
in
the
South
African
Legal
Dictionary,
at
p.
182,
defines
‘‘
disposed
of”
as
follows
:
‘
to
part
with;
to
pass
over
the
control
of
a
thing
to
someone
else.”
The
expressions
‘‘disposed
of’’,
‘‘lost’’
or
‘‘destroyed’’
were
dealt
with
in
the
Australian
case
of
Hentey
Howe
P.T.V.
Ltd.
v.
Federal
Commissioner
of
Taxation,
88
C.L.R.
151,
and
from
that
decision
it
will
be
seen
that
the
words
‘‘disposed
of’’
are
given
a
very
wide
meaning.
May
I
add
that
the
section
of
the
Australian
Income
Tax
Act
in
which
these
expressions
were
found
is
very
similar
to
our
Section
20.
It
was
therein
stated
that:
‘‘
The
entitled
expression
'disposed
of’,
‘lost’
or
'destroyed'
is
apt
to
embrace
every
event
by
which
property
ceases
to
be
available
to
the
taxpayer
for
use
in
producing
assessable
income,
either
because
it
ceases
to
be
his,
or
because
it
ceases
to
be
physically
accessible
to
him,
or
because
it
ceases
to
exist.”
and
at
p.
156
of
this
same
decision
(supra)
it
is
stated
:
“the
idea
of
ordering,
managing,
controlling,
arranging,
the
idea
of
the
exercise
of
an
existing
power
over
a
thing
is
generally
inherent
in
the
word
‘disposed’
itself
and
that
essential
idea
is
not
lost
when
the
word
is
used
with
a
preposition
to
denote
an
act
of
alienation
or
creation
of
a
new
interest
in
property.’’
The
evidence
also
discloses
here
that
the
taxpayer
was
not
only
selling
land
and
chattels
and
buildings,
but
what
he
was
doing
mainly
was
selling
a
business
as
a
going
concern.
There
is
no
doubt
that
had
this
hotel
not
been
a
going
concern,
the
sale
would
not
have
taken
place,
at
least
not
for
the
price
that
was
paid.
Indeed,
the
importance
attached
to
the
transfer
of
the
liquor
licence
for
instance
making
it
a
sine
qua
non
condition
to
the
deal
establishes
without
doubt
that
the
purchaser
was
buying
a
business.
If
such
is
the
case
here,
and
I
believe
that
this
is
so,
the
words
“disposed
of’’
means
the
disposal
of
the
assets
of
the
business
in
a
manner
such
that
the
business
is
no
longer
carried
on
by
the
person
who
has
disposed
of
it.
The
question,
therefore,
is
had
these
assets,
the
properties
of
the
taxpayer,
been
disposed
of
as
a
business
or
were
they
still
available
to
the
taxpayer
during
the
whole
of
the
year
1954
to
earn
income?
The
answer,
of
course,
is
obvious,
all
the
revenue
including
that
from
the
rooms,
the
meals,
the
coffee
shop,
etc.,
were
the
property
of
the
taxpayer
up
to
and
including
January
d,
1999.
The
interpretation
of
the
words
‘‘disposed
of’’
in
the
above
manner
with
the
very
wide
meaning
I
have
given
them
as
including
the
use
and/or
control
of
the
subject
matter
of
the
disposals
should
and
can,
in
my
opinion,
be
given
that
meaning
providing,
however,
that
the
Income
Tax
Act
has
not
otherwise
restricted
their
meaning.
We
have
seen
that
Section
20(5)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
states
that
“
‘disposition
of
property’
includes
any
transaction
or
event
entitling
a
taxpayer
to
proceeds
of
disposition
of
property”
and
Section
20(5)(c)
states
that
‘‘
‘proceeds
of
disposition’
of
property
include
(i)
the
sale
price
of
property
that
has
been
sold’’.
These
sections
do
not
define
but
merely
include
as
a
disposition
of
property
a
transaction
(a
sale
for
instance)
entitling
a
taxpayer
to
proceeds
of
disposition
of
property,
i.e.
to
the
sale
price
of
the
property
sold.
It
would
indeed
appear
that
the
meaning
of
“disposition
of
property’’
has
been
somewhat
restricted
by
the
Act
when
a
disposal
of
property
takes
place
by
means
of
a
sale;
in
such
a
case
there
is
a
disposal
of
property
aS
soon
as
a
taxpayer
is
entitled
to
the
sale
price
of
the
property
sold.
The
verb
‘‘entitled’’
according
to
the
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary
means
“to
give
a
rightful
claim
to
something’’.
The
French
text
of
the
Act
uses
the
words
‘‘donnant
droit”
which
of
course
mean
to
give
a
right
to.
Was
the
taxpayer
here
entitled
to
the
sale
price
of
the
property
sold?
In
the
present
instance
the
agreement
carried
two
conditions
which,
if
not
fulfilled,
would
prevent
the
transaction
from
being
complete:
(a)
a
liquor
licence,
and
(b)
if
there
was
a
fire
before
possession.
We
have
seen
that
the
deposit
money
in
an
amount
of
$100,
000
was
held
in
escrow
or
in
trust
by
the
real
estate
agent
until
possession
was
given
in
1955
and
that
no
money
was
to
be
paid
out
or
was
paid
out
to
the
vendor
until
after
the
take-over
on
January
4,
1955.
Indeed,
Exhibit
3,
the
agreement
to
purchase,
indicates
clearly
that
Maber
Ltd.
was
chosen
by
both
parties
to
hold
the
deposit
money
until
such
time
as
the
conditions
were
fulfilled
and
the
purchaser
had
obtained
possession
of
the
properties
which
possession
could
not
occur
earlier
than
January
3,
1955.
It
cannot,
therefore,
be
said
that
the
taxpayer
was
entitled
to
the
monies
or
the
‘‘proceeds
of
disposition’’
until
January
3,
1955,
or
such
time
after
that
date
that
all
the
conditions
of
the
agreement
had
been
fulfilled.
I,
therefore,
find
that
the
properties
of
the
appellant
were
not
disposed
of
in
the
year
1954,
but
only-
in
the
year
1955.
The
Minister
was,
therefore,
wrong
in
assessing
the
appellant
as
he
did
in
the
year
1954
and
its
appeal
against
the
assessment
must
be
allowed
with
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.