WOO’I‘TON,
J.:—This
was
an
appeal
by
way
of
stated
case.
The
stated
case
reads
as
follows:
“
James
Stewart
Tyhurst
was
charged
that
he
did,
on
the
14th,
15th,
16th,
17th,
18th
and
19th
days
of
November,
A.D.
1960,
unlawfully
fail
to
file
T1
1959
Income
Tax
Return,
after
demand
under
Section
44(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
contrary
to
Section
131(1)
of
the
‘Income
Tax
Act
.
The
charge
was
heard
by
me
on
the
19th
day
of
April,
1961
and
7th
day
of
June,
1961.
On
the
former
day,
Mr.
J.
D.
Beaubier
appeared
for
the
Attorney
General
of
Canada
and
Mr.
R.
V.
Anderegg
for
the
accused.
On
the
latter
day,
Mr.
J.
D.
Beaubier
again
appeared
for
the
Attorney
General
of
Canada
and
Mr.
C.
R.
J.
Skatfeld
appeared
for
the
accused.
I
dismissed
the
charge
for
the
sole
reason
that
the
Crown
had
not
proved
the
receipt
by
the
accused
of
a
demand
issued
pursuant
to
Section
44(2)
of
the
‘Income
Tax
Act
.
The
accused
called
no
evidence.
The
evidence
called
by
the
Crown
consisted
of
an
Affidavit
of
an
officer
of
The
Department
of
National
Revenue,
which
I
found
complied
with
Section
136(5)
and
(6)
of
the
‘Income
Tax
Act
and
from
which
I
accordingly
found:
1.
That
a
registered
letter
from
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
was
mailed
on
October
11th,
1960,
to
James
Stewart
Tyhurst
that
he
file
by
November
11th,
1960,
a
form
T1
for
the
taxation
year
1959.
2.
That
James
Stewart
Tyhurst
did
not
on
the
14th,
15th,
16th,
17th,
18th
or
19th
days
of
November,
1960,
file
a
form
T1
for
the
taxation
year
1959.
No
further
evidence
was
adduced
by
the
Crown
and
I
held:
(a)
That
the
James
Stewart
Tyhurst
referred
to
in
the
Crown
Affidavit
evidence
as
having
been
sent
a
letter
of
demand
was
the
accused,
because
counsel
appeared
for
him
in
answer
to
a
summons.
(b)
That
no
evidence
was
required
to
be
adduced
by
the
Crown
that
the
James
Stewart
Tyhurst
referred
to
in
the
Crown’s
Affidavit
evidence
as
having
been
sent
a
letter
of
demand,
is
the
same
person
as
the
accused
named
in
the
summons.
(ce)
That
by
reason
of
my
finding
(a)
and
(b)
and
by
reason
of
Section
136
of
the
‘Income
Tax
Act’,
a
prima
facie
case
was
established
of
the
demand
and
that
it
was
sent
to
the
accused.
(d)
That
there
was
no
presumption
raised
by
Section
136
of
the
‘Income
Tax
Act’
that
the
demand
was
received
by
the
accused,
and
for
this
reason,
I
dismissed
the
charge.
On
the
14th
day
of
June,
Mr.
J.
D.
Beaubier,
as
agent
for
the
Attorney
General
of
Canada,
applied
to
me
to
state
a
case
for
the
consideration
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
British
Columbia.
The
question
upon
which
the
opinion
of
this
Honourable
Court
is
requested
is
whether
I
was
correct
in
holding
that
the
Crown
must
prove
that
the
accused
received
the
demand
sent
by
registered
mail
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Section
44(2)
of
the
‘Income
Tax
Act’
before
the
accused
may
be
convicted
of
the
above
charge.
Dated
at
Vancouver,
British
Columbia,
this
18th
day
of
July,
1961.
‘Gordon
W.
Scott’
DEPUTY
Police
MAGISTRATE
for
the
City
of
Vancouver”
Mr.
Skatfeld
for
the
respondent
took
preliminary
objections
as
to
the
procedure
by
the
appellant
and
claimed
that
I
had
no
jurisdiction
to
hear
this
appeal
because
certain
formalities
required
to
be
completed
were
not
so
complied
with
and
the
principal
objections
were:
1.
That
there
was
no
proof
that
the
application
for
the
stated
case
was
made
within
the
time
required
by
Section
734
of
the
Criminal
Code.
2.
That
there
was
no
proper
proof
of
service
of
the
stated
case
and
notice
of
appeal.
Mr.
Skatfeld
cited
the
following
case:
Regina
v.
Moroz,
83
C.C.C.
239,
and
other
cases.
I
have
carefully
considered
these
preliminary
objections
and
have
also
had
reference
to
the
cases
on
the
subject
of
procedure
cited
in
Crankshaw,
7th
Edition,
at
page
1267,
and
Snow,
6th
Edition,
at
page
749.
I
have
concluded
that
if
there
were
fatal
irregularities
then
such
irregularities
are
not
apparent
upon
the
face
of
the
proceedings
nor
are
irregularities
to
be
found
in
the
documents
on
file.
As
to
the
service
of
the
writ
and
the
notice
of
appeal,
I
have
read
the
affidavit
of
Hilton
Francis
Bacon,
Constable
of
the
Royal
Canadian
Mounted
Police
and
although
this
affidavit
of
service
is
somewhat
informal
in
its
appearance
and
its
context,
it
conveys
sufficient
information
in
proof
of
service
to
require
a
conflicting
affidavit
to
be
filed
if
the
service
is
to
be
challenged.
The
appellant
has
offered
no
material
in
proof
of
irregularities
and
I
therefore
find
that
the
preliminary
objections
fail.
This
brings
me
to
the
merits
of
the
stated
case.
The
relative
section
involved
here
is
subsection
(5)
of
Section
136
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
reads
as
follows
:
“Proof
of
Service
by
Mail
136.
(5)
Where,
by
this
Act
or
a
regulation,
provision
is
made
for
sending
by
mail
a
request
for
information,
notice
or
demand,
an
affidavit
of
an
officer
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
sworn
before
a
commissioner
or
other
person
authorized
to
take
affidavits
setting
out
that
he
has
charge
of
the
appropriate
records,
that
he
has
knowledge
of
the
facts
in
the
particular
case,
that
such
a
request,
notice
or
demand
was
sent
by
registered
letter
on
a
named
day
to
the
person
to
whom
it
was
addressed
(indicating
such
address)
and
that
he
identifies
as
exhibits
attached
to
the
affidavit
the
post
office
certificate
of
registration
of
the
letter
or
a
true
copy
of
the
relevant
portion
thereof
and
a
true
copy
of
the
request,
notice
or
demand,
shall
be
received
as
prima
facie
evidence
of
the
sending
and
of
the
request,
notice
or
demand.”
Mr.
Skatfeld
argued
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
that
if
the
subsection
is
to
have
the
force
suggested
for
it
by
the
Crown
the
following
words
should
be
added
thereto,
namely,
‘‘and
the
receipt
of
the
request,
notice
or
demand
by
the
accused’’
or
some
words
to
like
effect.
And
of
course
these
additional
words
are
not
there.
In
my
opinion,
however,
such
words
are
unnecessary
if
the
comprehensive
meaning
is
given
to
the
following
words
‘‘and
of
the
request,
notice
or
demand”
that
includes
the
meaning
of
the
effect
and
fact
of
receipt
by
the
individual
to
whom
such
request,
notice
or
demand
was
addressed.
If
such
comprehensive
meaning
is
not
given
then
the
said
words
‘‘and
of
the
request,
notice
or
demand”
in
the
context
of
the
subsection
appear
to
have
no
meaning
or
purpose
whatever.
Reference
to
recognized
dictionaries
indicates
quite
clearly
that
in
the
comprehensive
interpretation
of
the
words
‘‘request’’,
44
notice”
and
‘‘demand”,
there
is
a
meaning
which
includes
the
fact
of
the
receipt
by
the
individual
addressed
of
the
request,
notice
or
demand.
Particularly
on
this
subject
of
the
interpretation
I
refer
to
the
Oxford
University
Dictionary
1955
at
page
477
when
dealing
with
the
word
44
demand”
we
have
the
following
among
other
interpretations:
‘‘the
action
or
fact
of
demanding
in
legal
form’’.
The
extent
of
this
meaning
here
is
made
more
conclusive
by
the
marginal
note
of
the
subsection,
viz.,
‘‘
Proof
of
Service
by
Mail’’.
I
accordingly
answer
the
question
raised
by
the
learned
Magis
trate
in
the
negative
and
remit
the
case
to
him
for
his
disposal
thereof.
Appeal
allowed.