Judgment Accordingly. The Reader’s Digest Association (Canada) Ltd., Selection Du Reader’s Digest (Canada) Ltee. v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1961] CTC 342, 61 DTC 1189

RINFRET, J.:—Je n’ai aucune querelle avec les arguments présentés par les procureurs de l’intimé à l’effet que, pour interpréter un statut quelconque, pour en découvrir la signification, il faille s’en tenir au texte et que, si celui-ci n’offre aucune ambiguité, l’on n’a pas à rechercher hors texte les indices qui permettraient de lui donner une signification autre que celle qui découle du texte.

C’est ainsi que la longue citation, extraite de Craies on Statute Law, 5 éd., pages 121, 122, reproduite à la page 40 du mémoire de l’intimé, ne permet pas Un discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment to refer to the parliamentary history of the statute’’. Plus loin, dans l’extrait, l’on reviendra à plusieurs reprises à la “construction” du statut au “meaning of an Act”, au “sense and meaning of the Act’’ à 1’ ‘‘interpretation of the construction ??.

C’est dans cette veine que Lord Wright disait :

“It is clear that the language of the Minister of the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure which eventually becomes law is inadmissible and the report of commissioners is even more removed from value as evidence of intention, because it does not follow that their recommendations were accepted.”

Ce texte de Craies est tiré d’un chapitre intitulé ‘‘ What sources of information outside a statute may be used for throwing light upon its meaning”.

Craies s’en explique d’ailleurs dans une autre partie de son ouvrage (voir 4 éd.—je n’ai pas pu me procurer la 5 —page 67) :

“Strictly speaking, there is no place for interpretation or construction except where the words of a statute admit of two meanings. The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive, if possible, at their meaning without, in the first place, reference to other cases.”

“Rules of construction have been laid down because of the obligation imposed on the Courts of attaching a meaning to confused and unintelligible sentences.”

Comme on le voit, il s’agit uniquement ici d’interprétation, de construction, de signification.

En parcourant le mémoire de l’intimé, l’on note que, dans toutes les causes citées, il est, de fait, question d’ interprétation ou de signification des textes des statuts.

Dans Gosselin v. R., 33 S.C.R. 255, le Juge en chef a refusé de référer ‘‘to the debates in Parliament for the purpose of construing any statute’’.

La citation de Alderson, B., In re Gorham, 5 Ex. 667, est au même effet, “We do not construe Acts of Parliament by reference to history’’; Pollock, C.B., dans Barbat v. Allen, 7 Ex. 616, parle également d’interprétation d’un statut ; plus loin, Peckam, J., de la Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis, s’abstient ‘‘of resorting to the speeches of individual members (of a legislative body) . . . the proper way to construe a legislative Act is from the language used in the Act’’.

Dans Vacher & Sons Limited v. London Society of Compositors, [1913] A.C. 107, le House of Lords avait encore à inter- prêter le langage du Parlement dans le Trade Disputes Act of 1906 ; Lord Atkinson y affirme que ‘ The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the Legislature has committed an absurdity ””.

Aurait-il persisté dans la même opinion s’il se fût agi d’illégalité ou d’inconstitutionnalité ?

Dans Truax v. M.N.R., 5 Tax A.B.C. 399, dans Alloy Metal Sales Limited v. M.N.R., [1952] C.T.C. 55, et dans Mountain Park Coals Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1952] C.T.C. 292, il s’agissait encore d’interprétation de statuts.

Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 10éme éd., pages 27 et 28, n’admet pas, lui non plus, l’admissibilité de la ‘‘ parliamentary history of an enactment . . . to explain its meaning’’.

J’admets done aisément que pour rechercher la signification d’un statut, point n’est besoin de sortir du texte de la législation si, comme dans le présent cas, le texte est clair, précis et n’offre aucune ambiguité.

Je n’ai pas à me préoccuper ici de l’attitude que j’adopterais s’il n’était question que d’interprétation et que le texte était ambigu ni si, comme le Juge en chef, dans Gosselin v. R., 33 S.C.R. 255, ‘‘I would not be unwilling . . . to concede that such a reference (réference au Hansard) might sometimes be useful’’.

Ce n’est pas en effet le problème qui nous est soumis.

Dans la présente instance il n’est pas question d’interprétation mais bien de constitutionnalité; la demanderesse admet que le texte de la législation est clair, mais elle soutient que le Parlement du Canada n’avait pas l’autorité sous l’Acte de V Amérique Britannique du Nord, pour la passer.

Je n’ai pas à me prononcer sur la validité de sa prétention, non plus d’ailleurs sur le poids à accorder aux témoignages qu’il désire incorporer à sa preuve, ce sont là des matières pour le Juge du fonds; ma seule fonction est de déterminer si l’appelante a le droit de tenter d’établir par la preuve qu’il recherche l’absence de pouvoir du Parlement Fédéral pour légiférer en la matière soumise.

La preuve qu’il cherche à introduire est-elle admissible pour conclure à la possibilité d’inconstitutionnalité.

Dans la recherche d’autorités au support de la prétention de l’une ou l’autre partie, il faut se garder d’appliquer sans restriction la doctrine anglaise puisque la conception de l’inconstitutionnalité là-bas est ici ne saurait être la même.

En Angleterre, la capacité législative est suprême dans tous les domaines ; ici, les corps législatifs ne sont suprêmes que dans les domaines de leur compétence.

‘* “Unconstitutional’ as applied to an English Act of Parliament, merely means that the Act in question, as, for instance the Irish Church Act 1869, is, in the opinion of the speaker, opposed to the spirit of the English Constitution: it cannot mean (as it might if applied to a French or American Act) that the Act is either a breach of law or void.’’ (Craies, 4th ed., page 70, Note 1.)

D’où l’importance pour nous de rechercher le but que cherche à atteindre le pouvoir législatif et s’il a, de par la Constitution, l’autorité pour en légiférer.

L’on a affirmé, lors de l’audition, qu’il n’existait aucun précédent à l’effet qu’un discours d’un ministre ait été admis en preuve.

Je n’ai pas vérifié la référence, mais je me fie à Craies, 4 ed., page 122, immédiatement après la longue citation de l’appelante à la page 40 de son factum: ‘‘In one case (South Eastern Railway v. Railway Commissionner s (1880), 5 Q.B.D. 217, 236) Cockburn, C.J., to ascertain the main purpose of the Railway & Canal Traffic Act, 1854, referred to the speech of the Minister made on its introduction in Parliament.’’

J’ai lu avec grand intérêt l’étude préparée par le doyen Vincent C. MacDonald, du Dalhousie Law School sur “Extrinsic Evidence and Questioned Statutes’’, parue dans 16 Can. Bar Review 1939, et je me permets d’en reproduire certains extraits:

Page 87—

‘‘In the matter of determining the meaning of the terms of the Statute Extrinsic Evidence is admissible or not, according to ordinary principles, which require little discussion. But in determining the character of a statute as properly falling within a class of subject within the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature, consideration of the purposes and effect of the legislation becomes decisive, and the limits of permissible reference to extraneous facts may well be broadened.”

Page 88—“Colourable legislations”—

“Legislatures in Canada have often sought to obtain desired objects by casting their enactments into such a form as appeared calculated to conceal this real character as encroachments on spheres denied to them. The Courts, however, have insisted that the true nature and character of the legislation in the particular instance must always be determined in order to determine the class (of subjects) to which it belongs’, and ‘it is the result of this investigation, not the form alone which the statute may have assumed under the Law of the draughtsman, that will determine within which of the categories of subject matters mentioned in Sections 91 and 92 the legislation falls (and for this purpose) it may be necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determining what it is the Legislature is really doing’ (A.-G. Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 à 337). On this issue, the legislative history of the enactment may have evidential value. P.A.T. Association v. A.-G. Canada, [1931] A.C. 317.”

Russell v. R. (1882), 7 App. Cas. 839:

“One of the questions to be considered is always whether in substance the legislation falls within an enumerated class of subjects or whether, on the contrary, in the guise of an enumerated class it is an encroachment on an excluded class’’. P.A.T. Association v. A.-G. Canada, [1931] A.C. 310, 317. “It is not competent either for the Dominion or a Province under the guise or the pretence or in the form of an exercise of its own powers to carry out an object which is beyond its powers and a trespass on the exclusive powers of the other. Ref. Re Alberta Bills, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 439 (P.C.).”’

Page 89—

“Recently, however, there has been a significant extension in this ‘detective’ process; for the Courts have begun to look outside the impugned legislation for evidence of its colourable character. A.-G. v. Reciprocal Insurers.

Page 90—‘ ‘ Taxation of Banks ’ ’—

“As to this the Privy Council agreed with the opinion of Kerwin, J., that there was no escape from the conclusion that instead of being in any true sense taxation it was merely part of a legislative plan to prevent the operation within the province of those banking institutions which have been called into existence and given the necessary powers to conduct their business by the only proper authority, the Parliament of Canada. ‘This,’ said the Privy Council, ‘is a sufficient ground for holding that the Bill is ultra vires. ”

“In considering the Alberta measure for taxation of banks, Duff, C.J., began on the basis that its true legal character was ‘to be found by ascertaining the effect of the legislation in the known circumstances to which it is to be applied .

Page 91—

“In the Privy Council Lord Maugham said that in examining the effect of the legislation ‘the Court must take into account any public general knowledge of which the Court would take judicial notice, and may in a proper case require to be informed by evidence as to what the effect of the legislation may be.”

Page 92—

“It would appear, also, that in ascertaining the purpose and effect of legislation, in order to determine whether or not it is a colourable encroachment on forbidden field, reference may be had to the Report of the Royal Commission. Thus in the reference as to article 498 of the Criminal Code in which Counsel called its attention to the Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads referred to in the Order of Reference, the Privy Council said: ‘It probably would not be contended that the statement of the Minister in the order of Reference that the Section was enacted to give effect to the recommendation of the Royal Commission bound the Provinces or must necessarily be treated as conclusive by the Board. But when the suggestion is made that the legislation was not in truth criminal legislation, but was in substance merely an encroachment on the Provincial field, the existence of the Report appears to be a material circumstance.’’

Re—Validity of the Coal and Petroleum Products Control Board Act.

“The Court of Appeal of B.C. admitted on the issue of encroachment, the Report of a Royal Commissioner ‘in so far only as it finds facts which are relevant to the ascertainment of the said alleged purpose and effect of the enactment.’ Home Oil Distributors v. A.-G. British Columbia, [1939] 1 W.W.R.

49. (See at page 51 for reference to other taxation cases in which extraneous facts and practices have been admitted on the issue of the directness of the tax.) ”

Dans un autre article paru dans 30 Can. Bar Rev. 1952, page 769, “The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History—Canon of Construction or Counsel of Caution’’, D. G. Kilgour va encore plus loin et il incluait dans la même catégorie les cas de simple interprétation comme ceux d’intentions; il cite à la page 770 Turner, L.J., dans Hawkins v. Gathercole :

“In construing Acts of Parliament, the words which are used are not alone to be regarded. Regard must also be had to the intent and meaning of the Legislature . . . we have therefore to consider not merely the words of this Act of Parliament, but the intent of the legislature, to be collected from the cause and necessity of the Act being made, from a comparison of its several parts, and from foreign (meaning extrinsic) circumstances, so far as they can justly be considered to throw light upon the subject ((1885) De G.M. & G., 1, 20, 22). This restatement has often been cited as authoritative. See Viscountess Rhondda’s Claim, [1922] 2 A.C. 339 at 369, 397).”’

Si, dans la cause de Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468, le Conseil Privé a accepté en preuve le rapport de commissaires et si Lord Atkin a pu dire :

‘“Their Lordships do not cite this report as evidence of the facts there found, but as indicating the materials which the Government of the Province had before them before promoting in the legislature the statute now impugned.’’

Si le juge Kerwin (comme il était alors) a accepté le rapport des commissaires, dans Home OU Distributors Ltd. v. A.-G. British Columbia, [1940] S.C.R. 444:

“In coming to this conclusion I have taken the report of the commissioner appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council as being a recital of what was present to the mind of the legislature, in enacting the principal Act . . . There can, I think, be no objection in principle to the use of the report for that purpose . . .”?

Si, dans la même cause, Davis, J., a pu dire (page 453) :

“A rule somewhat wider than the general rule may well be necessary in considering the constitutionality of legislation under a federal system where legislative authority is divided between the central and the local legislative bodies.’’

Si, dans Birks v. Cité de Montréal, [1955] S.C.R. 799, la Cour Suprême a admis en preuve deux lettres qui avaient été écrites aux membres du Conseil de Montréal, sans preuve que les conseillers avaient été influencés par ces lettres, et ce, dans le but d’établir le véritable objet et la nature du règlement, je ne vois pas pourquoi l’on ne permettrait pas à l’appelante de se servir du discours du Ministre des Finances, parlant au nom du Cabinet dans un discours préparé d’avance, approuvé par le Cabinet et diffusé par tous les moyens disponibles à travers le pays (à supposer qu’il puisse en faire la preuve) pour établir la vraie raison d’être de la présente législation et (s’il peut l’établir) le manque de compétence pour le Parlement Fédéral de légiférer en pareille matière.

Le discours du Ministre des Finances, parlant au nom du Cabinet, a infiniment plus de poids que les discours des individual members’’ que Lord Maugham refusait avec raison d’admettre en preuve dans A.-G. Alberta v. A.-G. Canada, [1939] A.C, 131.

Supposons pour un instant qu’un ministre, présentant une législation, affirme sans ambage : ‘‘Je suis autorisé par le Gouverneur Général en Conseil de vous faire part de sa conviction que le sujet de la législation que nous vous proposons n’est pas de sa compétence, mais nous avons jugé bon de le présenter sous une forme qui donne l’apparence de juridiction’’.

Pourrait-on encore prétendre qu’un tel discours ne pourrait pas être admissible pour l’établissement de l’inconstitutionnalité de la loi en question?

Je l’ai dit au début de mes remarques, je le répète, en permettant à l’appelante de faire la preuve de ce qu’elle a en vue, je ne me prononce pas sur la valeur de ces divers témoignages ; ayant décidé de l’admissibilité, le juge du fonds les appréciera.

Par ces motifs, je ferais droit à l’appel avec dépense, infirmerais les jugements de première instance, et autoriserais l’appelante à faire la preuve des faits sur lesquels elle désire se baser pour appuyer sa prétention d’inconstitutionnalité.

MONTGOMERY, J.:—I agree with my colleague Mr. Justice Rinfret that this appeal should be maintained.

Our Civil Code and our Code of Civil Procedure set forth the restrictions upon the evidence which parties may be compelled to give and which our courts may take into consideration (see articles 1233 to 1237 of the Civil Code and 312 to 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure). I cannot agree that there are further absolute bars to the admission of evidence in the absence of clear and conclusive authority. I accept that speeches made in the legislature may be of little or no value in the majority of cases, even cases where the constitutionality of an Act is called into question, but the circumstances here are special. The statements regarding which appellant seeks to introduce evidence were made by the responsible Minister of the Crown, the Minister of Finance, in the course of the Budget Speech introducing the tax in question. I am unable to see any valid reason why the courts, in con- sidering this legislation, should be deprived of this assistance in determining the intent of the legislature, which may be material in order to determine whether the legislation is constitutional.

We are not at this stage called upon to express any opinion as to whether the tax in question might be found to be unconstitutional, assuming the intent of the legislature to be that asserted by appellant.

CHOQUETTE, J.:—Appel de divers interlocutoires déclarant une preuve inadmissible.

Par voie d’action directe, l’appelante s’attaque à la validité de la Loi 4-5 Eliz. II, ch. 37, dont l’article 9 se lit comme suit:

“9. (1) Il doit être imposé, prélevé et perçu, à l’égard de chaque exemplaire d’une édition spéciale d’un périodique non canadien publié au Canada, une taxe de vingt pour cent de la valeur des announces y contenues.

(2) La taxe imposée par le paragraphe (1) à l’égard d’une édition spéciale doit être payée par l’éditeur de celle-ci, aux dates et de la manière que les règlements prescrivent.”

Au soutien de son action, elle allègue qu’il s’agit d’une législation déguisée et que l’objet réel de cette loi est de restreindre l’activité commerciale d’un groupe d’éditeurs au profit d’un autre groupe, partant, de régir une forme particulière de commerce. Ainsi, cette loi empiéterait sur le champ provincial de la propriété et des droits civils, outre qu’elle violerait des engagements internationaux (GATT).

Aux fins d’établir cette prétention, l’appelante a tenté de verser au dossier le texte d’un discours prononcé aux Communes par le ministre qui proposa cette législation, discours dans lequel il explique le but et l’objet réel de la loi. Elle a aussi tenté de prouver que le même ministre avait fait diffuser ce discours par le truchement de la presse, de la radio et de la télévision. Elle a aussi voulu établir qu’en prononçant ce discours et en le faisant diffuser à travers le pays, le ministre parlait et agissait au nom de son Gouvernement. Elle a enfin voulu mettre en preuve que la législation attaquée avait été adoptée dans la forme proposée, sans modifications, et que la Chambre avait consenti aux trois lectures du projet en une même journée.

Jugeant cette preuve inadmissible, le juge a refusé d’admettre vingt-quatre questions posées par la demande à l’ancien ministre des finances, au ministre actuel, au greffier des Communes et à un représentant de la presse, aux fins d’établir les faits susmen- tionnés. C’est de ces vingt-quatre décisions que la demanderesse appelle.

Au soutien de son pourvoi, l’appelante invoque la règle jurisprudentielle selon laquelle les tribunaux peuvent prendre connaissance des circonstances qui ont entouré la passation d’une loi dont la validité est attaquée (surrounding circumstances) aux fins d’en déceler le but, l’objet, l’effet et le caractère. Cette règle me paraît bien expliquée dans l’étude du professeur V. C. MacDonald, publiée à 17 Can. Bar Rev. 77 (voir page 88: “Colourable Legislation’’). C’est en vertu de cette règle que le juge a permis la preuve que les deux périodiques de l’appelante (The Reader’s Digest et Sélection du Reader’s Digest) sont les deux seuls périodiques imprimés et publiés au Canada qui soient visés par la législation attaquée, et que deux autres périodiques (Time Magazine et Photographic Trade News) sont les deux seuls périodiques, imprimés à l’étranger et publiés au Canada qui soient frappés par la même législation.

Mais, les “circonstances” qui ont entouré la passation d’une loi incluent-elles les débats parlementaires dont elle a été l’objet? Spécialement, le discours explicatif du ministre qui en a proposé l’adoption, au nom du cabinet dont il est membre? La prépondérance des arrêts m’oblige à répondre négativement à cette question.

Craies, On Statute Law, 5 éd., pages 121 et 122 :

“Debates in Parliament. It is not permissible, however, in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment, to refer to the parliamentary history’ of a statute in the sense of the debates which took place in Parliament when the statute was under consideration. As was said by Willes, J., in Millar v. Taylor-. ‘The sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into law, and not from the history of changes it underwent in the House where it took its rise. That history is not known to the other House or to the Sovereign.’ The alterations made in it during its passage through Committee are, as the Court said in R. v. Hartford College ‘wisely inadmissible to explain it’. In Herron v. Rathmines, etc., Commissioners, Lord Halsbury, L.C., said, with reference to the construction of a local Act: ‘I very heartily concur in the language of FitzGibbon, L.J., that ‘‘we cannot interpret the Act by any reference to the Bill, nor can we determine its construction by any reference to its original form’’.’

In Administrât or-General of Bengal v. Prem Lal Hullick, the Judicial Committee, per Lord Watson, said: ‘Their lord- ships observe that the two learned Judges who constituted the majority in the Appellate Court, although they did not base their judgment on them, refer to the proceedings of the Legislature which resulted in the passing of the Act (No. 11) of 1874 as legitimate aid in the construction of section 31. Their lordships think it right to express their dissent from that proposition. The same reasons which exclude these considerations when the clauses of an Act of the British Legislature are under construction are equally cogent in the case of an Indian statute.’ More recently Lord Wright in the Privy Council said : ‘It is clear that the language of a Minister of the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure which eventually becomes law is inadmissible and the report of commissioners is even more removed from value as evidence of intention, because it does not follow that their recommendations were accepted.’

The same rule is adopted in Canada. In Australia it has been ruled that the debates in the Federal Convention which framed the Commonwealth Constitution afterwards brought into force by Imperial legislation cannot be used for the interpretation of the Constitution.”

Dans Gosselin v. R. (1903), 33 S.C.R. 255, M. le Juge en chef Sir H. E. Taschereau étudie la question aux pages 263 et suivantes.

A la page 264, il dit:

There is a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body. The reason is that it is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an Act by the members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did, and those who spoke might differ from each other; the result being that the only proper way to construe a legislative Act is from the language used in the Act and, upon occasion, by a resort to the history of the times when it was passed. United States v. Freight Association.’ ”’

Il conclut, à la page 268:

“In Lefroy’s valuable book (The Law of Legislative Power in Canada), pages 1 and 21, are collected the judicial opinions wherein the general rule has been more or less disregarded in the construction of the British North America Act. The reports of the codifiers of the Civil Code of Lower Canada are also often referred to in Quebec and in this court, as also in the Privy Council (see, for instance Symes v. Cuvillier), but these cannot be put upon the same footing in regard to this rule as are the debates in Parliament upon a bill. ’ ’

L’appelante voudrait distinguer les cas où la validité de la loi est mise en question de ceux où elle ne l’est pas; mais cette distinction ne me paraît s’appuyer sur aucune des autorités citées, sauf ce que dit M. le Juge en chef Taschereau dans le passage précité, quant à l’interprétation de la Constitution elle-même.

Il ne faut pas confondre l’intention du Parlement avec l’intention des membres du Cabinet ou l’intention du proposeur d’un projet de loi. L’interprétation du proposeur me paraît d’ailleurs avoir trouvé peu de faveur après de Lord Halsbury, si on en Juge par ce passage de Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, à la page 26 de sa lOième édition :

‘‘Lord Halsbury states, however, that he has, on more than one occasion, said that the worst person to construe a statute is the person who is responsible for its drafting, for he is much disposed to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the language which in fact he has employed. ’ ’

Il ne faudrait pas, non plus, attribuer à la Cour Supérieure un pouvoir de contrôle et de surveillance sur le Parlement et les Législatures, comme celui qu’elle exerce sur les corporations, en vertu de l’article 50 du Code de Procédure. A l’égard des lois, cette Cour ne peut statuer que sur leur constitutionnalité.

On a prétendu que la règle qui soustrait les débats parlementaires à l’examen du juge n’avait rien d’absolu, que cette règle en était une de prudence plutôt que de principe, et qu’il y aurait avantage pour les juges à consulter ces débats dans l’examen des lois dont le sens ou la validité sont contestés. (Voir l’étude du Professeur D. G. Kilgour, publiée à 30 Can. Bar Rev. 769, à la page 786.) Mais, dans l’état actuel de la jurisprudence—qui est celle de tribunaux de dernier resort—je ne vois pas comment nous pourrions déroger à la règle établie.

Un autre motif me porte à exclure du dossier le discours dont l’appelante désire faire la preuve. Compte tenu du petit nombre de périodiques atteints, le texte attaqué me paraît suffisamment clair pour permettre à l’appelante de faire valoir, avec ou sans succès, l’argument qu’elle veut tirer de ce discours, sans avoir à le produire. Bien plus, si l’appelante devait réussir dans ses conclusions, je ne crois pas que ce serait à cause du discours en question, mais à raison du texte même de la loi qu’elle attaque, joint aux autres circonstances dont la preuve est admissible.

En d’autres termes, le texte étant clair, le sort de l’action ne peut dépendre (a) que d’un état de choses antérieur à la loi; et

(b) de l’effet de la loi sur cet état de choses. Aucun discours au monde ne saurait déterminer le sens, la portée ou la constitutionnalité de cette législation.

Je suis donc d’avis que le juge de première instance n’a pas erré en refusant d’admettre la preuve de ce discours et en déclarant, D.C. à la page 95 :

They’ve held in certain cases, certain special cases dealing with special legislation before them, and in certain cases, it is permissible to call extrinsic evidence; nowhere is that extrinsic evidence according to what was said or not said by members of the House of Commons, or members of the Senate, or members of the Legislature, or Ministers of the Crown, or either one or the other: That’s the point before us.”

Le discours des Communes étant écarté, je ne vois pas que la diffusion de ce discours, ou le fait que son auteur ait parlé ou agi au nom du Cabinet dont il est membre, ou le fait que la Chambre ait adopté le projet sans modifications, ou qu’elle ait consenti aux trois lectures dans la même journée ou à la même séance, soient de quelque importance dans la solution du litige.

Pour toutes ces raisons, je rejetterais l’appel avec dépens.

PRATTE, J.:—Par les motifs exposés par M. le juge Choquette dans ses notes, je rejetterais cet appel avec dépens.

Owen, J.:—This is an appeal from twenty-four interlocutory judgments, rendered on October 26, 1959, during the trial of this case before the Superior Court for the District of Montreal. All of these judgments maintain objections of respondent to evidence which appellant sought to introduce in the record.

The facts and the legal problems involved are set out in detail in the notes of my colleague Mr. Justice Choquette.

In the action the validity of the Federal statute is attacked on the ground that the true object or intent (or the pith and substance) of the impugned legislation is to benefit one segment of the Canadian publishing industry at the expense of another segment of the Canadian publishing industry. Appellant contends that the impugned statute attempts to enact, in the form of a taxing statute, legislation to regulate an individual form of trade and commerce which falls within the class of property and civil rights reserved exclusively to Provincial jurisdiction.

In an effort to prove the true object or intent and the effect of the impugned legislation the appellant attempted to introduce evidence relating to the Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance in the House of Commons.

The purpose of the questions according to appellant is to prove (pages 4 to 6 appellant’s Factum) :

“ (1) that the Minister of Finance had declared to Parliament

that the object of the Government of Canada in promoting the impugned legislation before Parliament was to equalize competition between various segments of the publishing industry and, as alleged by Appellant, intended thereby to aid one segment of the publishing industry at the expense of another segment of the publishing industry ;

(2) that the Minister of Finance in expressing the avowed object of the Government in promoting the impugned legislation was speaking on behalf of and with the authority of the Government of Canada;

(3) that the bill which the Government of Canada presented to Parliament in order to carry out the expressed object of the Government in promoting the legislation was enacted by the House of Commons in the form presented by the Government, without amendment, and that the said bill passed first, second and third reading of the House of Commons without amendment at a single sitting of the House of Commons;

(4) that the bill as so enacted by the House of Commons was enacted by the Senate without amendment ;

(5) that the avowed object of the Government of Canada in promoting the impugned legislation, as stated by the Minister of Finance, was recorded in the official report of the House of Commons and distributed to the public;

(6) that the Government of Canada did give to the press, radio and television communication services, outside of the precincts of the House of Commons, a statement of the avowed objects of the Government in promoting the impugned legislation, and the said statement was printed, published and broadcast throughout the whole of Canada;

(7) that the effect of the said legislation was that Appellant’s two said publications were the only publications printed and published in Canada which became subject to the said tax.’’

Respondent summarizes the matter as follows (page 14 respondent’s Factum) :

“A close examination of those twenty-four (24) questions which were all disallowed by the Court clearly demonstrates that Appellant attempted to insert into the record the text or at least a summary of a speech alleged to have been made in the House of Commons by the Minister of Finance preceding the first reading of the Bill and purporting to explain the intent of the Government of Canada in promoting the legislation.”

The basis of the decisions appealed from appears to be that while in certain exceptional cases extrinsic evidence may be allowed, the evidence which appellant attempted to make did not fall within any such exception (page 95, J.C.) :

“His Lordship:—They’ve held in certain cases, certain special cases dealing with special legislation before them, and in certain cases, it is permissible to call extrinsic evidence; nowhere is that extrinsic evidence according to what was said or not said by members of the House of Commons, or members of the Senate, or members of the Legislature, or Ministers of the Crown, or either one or the other. That’s the point before us.”

The fundamental question raised by this appeal is whether, in a case where the validity of a statute is attacked, the pith and substance or true object and intent of the legislation is to be determined by looking only at the words used in the impugned statute or whether a Court may also look at extrinsic evidence such as the Budget Speech.

The principal arguments put forward by appellant are :

1. That while in the interpretation of a valid statute a Court may be limited to seeking the meaning of words used in the statute, nevertheless where the validity of the statute is impugned and the Court is seeking to determine whether the words used expressed the real intent of the legislative body then the Court is not bound by the form or words of the statute but may seek extrinsic aids in determining its true object or intent.

2. That evidence may be given for the assistance of the Court in taking judicial notice of facts of general public knowledge.

3. That there is no privilege or immunity attached per se to documents or statements emanating from Parliament and that even if there had been some privilege attached to statements made in the House of Commons that privilege would no longer exist in relation to matters which had already been published.

The principal arguments put forward by respondent are:

1. That the language of the impugned legislation is clear, precise and unambiguous and the Court in construing the Act is bound to give effect to what the lesiglature has said. This argument boils down to a contention that because the words clearly state that it is a taxing statute the Court can go no further and must accept this statement because the text does not lack clarity and precision. It implies that the same rule is applicable to the interpretation of a statute and to the determination of its true object and intent.

2. That there is no precedent in jurisprudence allowing the introduction of speeches made in Parliament in order to prove the purpose and object of a statute even if its constitutionality is being challenged. The cases, cited by respondent under this heading, all (with one exception, the Home Oil case) deal with cases involving the interpretation of a statute and not the validity or constitutionality of a statute. In the Home Oil case, which dealt with constitutionality of a statute, extrinsic evidence was admitted.

3. That extrinsic evidence has been allowed with restrictions when the impugned legislation:

(a) Was ambiguous, equivocal or devoid of coercive effect;

(b) It was a remedial or corrective legislation seeking to better a stated situation;

(c) In a case of difficulty, the impugned text was susceptible of multiple interpretations.

I would hold that, exceptionally, when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved, extrinsic or extraneous evidence is admissible for the purpose of proving the true object and intent or the pith and substance of the legislation. Authority for this holding is found in the following cases :

1. A.-G. Alberta v. A.-G. Canada, [1939] A.C. 117.

This case was referred to the Privy Council by the Governor- General of Canada on the submission that three bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Alberta were ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature. In order to determine the true character of the legislation it was considered necessary to look at the legislative history of Alberta as leading up to the measure In question.

2. Henry Birks & Sons (Montreal) Ltd. v. The City of Montreal et al., [1955] S.C.R. 799.

This case involved the validity of a Quebec statute and a municipal by-law. Copies of two letters addressed to the Mayor of the City by Paul-Emile Cardinal Léger and by Mer. Grégoire of the University of Montreal were allowed to be filed in the record. The Court found that they were pertinent to the issue and should be taken into consideration in endeavouring to arrive at the true object and purpose of the enactment (page 21, appellant’s Factum) :

“Fauteux, J. (speaking for himself and Chief Justice Kerwin and Judges Estey, Cartwright and Abbott), at page 802:

‘Il est à peine nécessaire de rappeler que suivant la jurisprudence du Comité Judiciaire du Conseil Privé, il n’est pas toujours suffisant pour déceler la nature et le caractère d’une loi dont la constitutionnalité est attaquée, de s’arrêter à la détermination de son effet légal mais qu’il faut souvent rechercher dans le texte de la loi, dans son historique, dans les faits établis au dossier ou ceux tenus comme étant généralement de la connaissance judiciaire, s’il n’est pas de raisons de supposer que l’effet légal n’établit pas véritablement la nature, le but et l’objet de la loi.’ ”’

3. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, Market Clearing House Lid., W. E. Williams & E. E. Barrow v. Acton Kilby & Turner’s Dairy Ltd. et al., [1941] S.C.R. 578.

The validity of a Provincial statute was attacked and extrinsic evidence with respect to legislative history was admitted (page 19, appellant’s Factum) :

‘“Mr. Justice Taschereau (speaking for himself and Rinfret and Crockett, JJ.), at page 583:

‘The Appellants have also submitted that some evidence given to show the intent and effect of the orders was improperly admitted. I agree with the majority of the Court of Appeal, that the evidence was admissible and that the objection cannot stand. In certain cases, in order to avoid confusion extraneous evidence is required to facilitate the analysis of legislative enactments, and thus disclose their aims which otherwise would remain obscure or even completely concealed. The true purposes and effect of legislation, when revealed to the courts, are indeed very precious elements which must be considered in order to discover its real substance. If it were held that such evidence may not be allowed and that only the form of an Act may be considered, then colourable devices could be used by legislative bodies to deal with matters beyond their powers . . .’ ??

4. Proprietary Articles Trade Association et al. v. A.-G. Canada et al., [1931] A.C. 310.

This case dealt with the constitutionality of Section 498 of the Criminal Code and Combines Investigation Act. Legislative history was considered by the Court (page 42, appellant’s Factum) :

“Lord Atkin at page 317 :

‘Both the Act and the section have a legislative history, which is relevant to the discussion. Their Lordships entertain no doubt that time alone will not validate an Act which when challenged is found to be ultra vires; nor will a history of a gradual series of advances till this boundary is finally crossed avail to protect the ultimate encroachment. But one of the questions to be considered is always whether in substance the legislation falls within an enumerated class of subject, or whether on the contrary in the guise of an enumerated class it is an encroachment on an excluded class. On this issue the legislative history may have evidential value.’ ”’

5. Ladore v. Bennett, [1939] A.C. 468.

The constitutionality of a Provincial statute was attacked and the report of a Royal Commission was considered by the Court. The report was placed before the Court by consent.

6. Board of Trustees of Regina Public School District No. 4 v. Board of Trustees of Gratton Separate School District No. 13, 50 S.C.R. 589.

In this case dealing with the constitutionality of Section 933 of the Saskatchewan School Assessment Act the Supreme Court ruled that it was bound to consider the legislative history of the subject matter.

7. In re A Reference as to the Validity of Section 5(a) of The Dairy Industry Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 45—Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. A.-G. Quebec and others, [1951] A.C. 179.

In this case, the Court referred to the legislative history behind the legislation.

8. A.-G. British Columbia v. A.-G. Canada, [1937] A.C. 368.

In this case involving the validity of Section 498(a) of the Criminal Code a report of a Royal Commission was filed by consent (page 43, appellant’s Factum) :

“Lord Atkin at page 376:

‘Counsel for New Brunswick called the attention of the Board to the Report of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads, which is referred to in the order of reference. It probably would not be contended that the statement of the Minister in the order of reference that the section was enacted to give effect to the recommendations of the Royal Commission bound the Provinces or must necessarily be treated as conclusive by the Board. But when the suggestion is made that the legislation was not in truth criminal legislation but was in substance merely an encroachment on the Provincial field, the existence of the report appears to be a material circumstance.’ ”

9. A.-G. Alberta v. A.-G. Canada, [1943] A.C. 356.

In this case the Privy Council was called upon to pronounce on the validity of the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, of Alberta and the historical background was examined by the Court.

While there may be no precedent exactly in point where the text of a speech given by a Minister in the House of Commons has been allowed, over objection, as evidence regarding the true object and intent of a statute attacked on the grounds of unconstitutionality, I am of the opinion that the present case comes within the exception stated above and I would allow extrinsic evidence with respect to the Budget Speech in question.

The problem as to what weight may be given to such evidence is quite separate from the problem as to its admissibility.

For these reasons I would maintain the present appeal with costs, dismiss the objections to evidence, set aside the interlocutory judgments appealed from, and return the record to the Supericr Court.

Appeal allowed.