KEARNEY,
J.:—The
issue
requiring
determination
in
the
present
case
is
whether,
in
the
light
of
the
particular
circumstances
later
described,
gains
realized
by
the
appellant
from
sales
of
shares
in
Britalta
Petroleums
Ltd.
in
the
vears
1951
and
1952
represent
taxable
income
or
capital
gains.
Briefly,
the
facts
reveal
that
in
May
1949
the
appellant
together
with
Messrs.
Cloakey,
Slipper,
Ker
and
Mainwaring
as
associates
(hereinafter
sometimes
referred
to
as
the
Canadian
group)
subscribed,
severally
but
in
a
single
agreement,
at
a
price
of
]/2’
cen
^
per
share,
for
common
stock
of
Britalta
Petroleums
Ltd.
(hereinafter
sometimes
called
Britalta
or
the
Company)
aggregating
250,000
shares,
out
of
which
the
appellant’s
allotment,
as
well
as
that
of
Messrs.
Ker
and
Mainwaring,
amounted
to
¥%,
or
41,160
shares,
and
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
were
each
entitled
to
4
interest
and
received
62,600
shares
respectively.
I
will
omit
reference,
for
the
moment,
to
any
further
shares
of
the
Company
which
the
appellant’s
associates
acquired
and
deal
solely
with
the
appellant’s
added
interest
therein.
In
consideration
of
the
payment
by
the
appellant
of
$208
for
the
aforesaid
41,160
shares,
he
became
entitled,
at
his
option,
to
subscribe
for
an
additional
83,533
at
the
same
price
per
share,
totalling
$416,
which
sum
he
duly
paid
in
November
1949.
In
March
1951,
under
circumstances
later
described,
the
appellant
acquired
an
additional
20,833
shares
of
company
stock
from
one
Jas.
C.
Ralston
at
the
price
of
600
per
share.
As
a
result,
speaking
in
round
figures,
the
appellant’s
total
holdings
amounted
to
145,000
shares,
and
during
the
taxation
years
1951
and
1952
he
disposed
of
50,000
of
them
at
the
same
price
as
he
paid
for
them,
namely,
4-cent
per
share,
but
realized
the
undermentioned
gains
claimed
by
the
Minister
on
another
50,000
which
he
disposed
of
at
prices
ranging
from
$1
to
$4
per
share.
The
appellant
did
not
dispose
of
the
balance
of
his
shares,
consisting
of
approximately
43,000
4-cent
shares
and
3,000
60
cents
shares,
and
still
retained
ownership
thereof
at
the
date
of
trial.
As
appears
by
the
relevant
documents
transmitted
to
this
Court
by
the
Minister,
pursuant
to
Section
100(2)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
was
filed
by
the
appellant
as
Exhibit
1,
the
Minister,
by
reason
of
the
aforesaid
gains,
added
$85,389.70
to
the
appellant’s
taxable
income
previously
assessed
for
the
year
1951,
which
amount
represented
the
difference
between
the
cost
of
the
aforesaid
shares
and
the
amount
realized
by
the
sale
thereof,
and
for
similar
reasons
a
sum
of
$50,385
was
added
to
the
appellant’s
taxable
income
previously
assessed
in
respect
of
the
taxation
year
1952.
The
Minister
made
the
above
two
re-assessments
on
the
ground
that
the
appellant
together
with
Messrs.
Cloakey,
Slipper,
Ker
and
Mainwaring,
as
owner
or
jointly
as
a
syndicate
or
partnership,
acquired
the
said
shares
with
a
view
to
profit
by
turning
them
to
account
or
trading
in
them
and
that
the
gains
in
question
constituted
profit
from
a
business
or
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
within
the
meaning
of
Section
127(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
due
course
the
appellant
objected
to
the
said
re-assessments
but
the
Minister
confirmed
them.
The
appellant,
by
notice
filed
on
December
28,
1960,
appealed
from
the
said
re-assessments,
and
apart
from
denying
that
the
amounts
realized
on
the
aforesaid
sale
of
shares
are
income
and
affirming
that
they
constitute
capital
gains,
the
said
notice
contains
the
following
as
additional
reasons
in
support
of
the
appeal.
The
purchase
of
the
shares
by
the
appellant
was
for
investment
purposes
only
and
the
sale
by
him
of
some
of
the
shares
was
the
realization
of
an
investment;
the
appellant
was
not
in
the
business
of
trading
in
shares;
the
appellant
did
not
undertake
an
adventure
or
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade;
the
appellant
at
no
time
was
a
promoter
or
a
speculator
and
his
conduct
was
that
of
a
prudent
investor.
Apart
from
denying
the
aforesaid
allegations,
the
respondent
adopted
the
position
that
the
circumstances
reveal
a
joint
venture
where
a
group,
of
which
the
appellant
was
a
member,
conceived
the
idea
of
pooling
their
ability,
knowledge,
training
and
reputation
to
promote
and
develop
oil
or
gas
companies
in
a
similar
manner
to
those
engaged
in
the
promotional
business,
with
a
view
to
making
a
profit
from
the
sale
of
shares
which
they
had
acquired
at
prices
and
in
proportions
which
they
themselves
determined.
The
only
witness
heard
was
the
appellant.
47
documentary
exhibits
were
produced
by
him
without
objection
on
his
examination
in
chief
and
a
further
65
on
cross-examination.
Counsel
for
the
appellant,
during
cross-examination,
took
exception
to
the
filing
of
Exhibit
B
and
it
was
admitted
under
reserve
of
the
said
objection—which
I
will
comment
upon
later.
Except
as
to
the
admissibility
of
the
evidence
above-referred
to,
the
facts
in
the
case
are
not
in
dispute
and
may
be
conveniently
divided
into
those
leading
up
to
the
incorporation,
on
April
12,
1949,
of
Britalta
Petroleums
Ltd.
and
those
which
occurred
in
the
three
succeeding
years.
By
consent,
copies
of
the
above-mentioned
documentary
exhibits,
with
the
exception
of
the
Minister’s
record
(Ex.
1),
were
inserted
in
a
folder
each
page
of
which
was
numbered
consecutively
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
Documents)
for
the
convenience
and
use
of
the
court
and
counsel.
In
reciting
the
details
of
the
facts
I
propose
to
begin
with
the
period
prior
and
leading
up
to
the
incorporation
of
Britalta
on
April
12,
1949.
The
appellant
is
by
profession
a
barrister
and
solicitor
and
one
of
Her
Majesty’s
counsel.
He
was
admitted
to
the
Bar
of
British
Columbia
in
1928
where
he
was
engaged
for
nearly
20
years
in
private
practice,
after
which
he
joined
the
head
office
in
Vancouver
of
British
Columbia
Electric
Company
Limited
(hereinafter
called
B.C.
Electric),
of
which
he
became
a
vice-
president
and
general
counsel
on
a
full-time
basis
and
so
remained
at
all
material
times.
The
said
Company
was
interested
in
importing
natural
gas
from
the
province
of
Alberta
to
replace
its
manufactured
gas
and,
in
the
early
days
of
January
1949,
the
appellant
together
with
Mr.
W.
C.
Mainwaring,
who
was
also
in
the
exclusive
employ
of
B.C.
Electric
and
was
likewise
one
of
its
vice-presidents,
with
a
view
to
obtaining
the
required
natural
gas,
were
designated
to
make
representations
before
a
Royal
Commission
which
was
then
sitting
in
Calgary
and
conducting
an
inquiry
coneerning
Alberta
gas
exportation.
On
their
return
journey,
Mr.
Mainwaring
informed
the
appellant
that
he
had
become
acquainted
with
a
Mr.
George
II.
Cloakey
who
was
an
oil-and-gas
lands
acquisition
expert
and
a
Mr.
Stanley
E.
Slipper
who
was
a
geologist
of
high
repute,
both
of
Calgary—
I
might
here
add
that
while
in
Calgary
the
appellant
also
met
Mr.
Cloakey
but
only
in
a
casual
way.
Mr.
Mainwaring
also
informed
the
appellant
that
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
had
asked
him
to
join
them
in
forming
an
oil-and-gas
company
in
which
they
themselves
wanted
to
retain
a
substantial
interest,
as
they
were
tired
of
working
and
finding
profitable
properties
for
the
benefit
of
others.
Mr.
Mainwaring
also
stated
that
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
desired
his
help
because
they
thought
that
he
might
have
better
access
to
capital
than
they
did
and
that
he
had
agreed
to
join
them.
Mr.
Mainwaring
then
asked
the
appellant
to
likewise
join
the
group,
and
he
agreed
to
do
so.
Mr.
Mainwaring
then
remarked
that
he
intended
to
ask
Mr.
Robert
H.
B.
Ker,
whom
the
appellant
knew
and
who
was
a
well-known
businessman
in
Victoria,
to
take
an
interest
in
the
project.
Mr.
Ker
(as
it
appears
later)
became
the
fifth
member
of
the
group
of
original
shareholders
and
the
first
president
of
Britalta.
Apparently,
no
detailed
discussion
as
to
the
respective
interest
or
responsibility
of
the
parties
had
been
discussed
on
the
Calgary
visit;
but
during
the
next
few
months
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
made
several
trips
to
Vancouver,
where
they
met
Mr.
Mainwaring
and
the
appellant.
The
evidence
of
the
appellant
on
cross-examination
shows
that,
as
a
result
of
the
aforesaid
discussions,
by
April
4
he
was
in
a
position
to
place
before
the
group
several
draft
proposals
of
ways
and
means
for
carrying
out
the
instant
undertaking
(see
Ex.
A
dated
March
29,
1949,
entitled
‘‘Cloak
and
Dagger
Ltd.
Preliminary
Outline”;
Ex.
D,
‘‘Draft
Outline
of
Proposal”
dated
March
30,
1949;
Ex.
E
dated
March
31,
1949,
entitled
“Outline
of
Proposal’’;
Ex.
F,
a
draft
of
Articles
of
Association
dated
April
4,
1949).
Exhibits
A,
D,
E
and
F,
which
were
prepared
by
the
appellant,
indicate,
inter
alia,
that
the
appellant
and
his
four
associates
were
acting
in
the
role
of
promoters;
that,
at
least
initially,
Britalta
was
destined
to
be
a
private
company
with
an
authorized
capital
of
$1,000,000
no
par
value
shares,
the
issued
price
whereof
not
to
exceed
$1
per
share;
that
the
company
would
be
authorized
by
its
Articles
of
Association
to
enter
into
an
agreement
with
its
five
promoters
under
which
they
would
agree
to
subscribe
forthwith
for
250,000
shares
at
/,-cent
per
share
and
the
Company
would
agree
that
whenever
it
proposes
to
issue
shares
beyond
the
first
500,000
it
would
give
to
the
promoters
an
option
to
subscribe
for
a
corresponding
number
of
shares
at
a
price
of
4-cent
each;
also
that
it
was
contemplated
that
the
Company
would
acquire
permits
or
reservations
on
certain
oil-and-gas
lands
in
British
Columbia
and
in
Alberta;
that
the
fees
payable
thereon
would
be
$10,000
and
$26,000
respectively;
that
the
estimated
total
cost
for
the
first
year,
including
the
drilling
of
one
well
in
British
Columbia
and
another
in
Alberta,
would
be
about
$500,000.
On
finalization
of
the
foregoing
draft
proposals,
the
appellant
and
Mr.
Mainwaring
became
the
subscribers
to
Memorandum
of
Association
Exhibit
2
and
to
Articles
of
Association
Exhibit
3,
both
dated
April
12,
1949,
whereby
Britalta
became
incorporated
as
a
private
company
under
the
provisions
of
the
Companies
Act,
R.S.B.C.
1948,
c.
58.
The
concluding
paragraph
21,
entitled
“First
Business’’,
of
the
said
Articles
of
Association
(Documents,
p.
11)
reads
as
follows:
“21.
The
Company
shall
forthwith
enter
into,
adapt
and
give
effect
to
an
agreement
already
prepared
and
for
the
purpose
of
identification
signed
by
W.
H.
Q.
Cameron,
a
solicitor
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
British
Columbia,
expressed
to
be
made
between
George
H.
Cloakey,
Stanley
E.
Slipper,
William
C.
Mainwaring,
R.
H.
B.
Ker
and
A.
Bruce
Robertson
of
the
one
part
and
this
Company
of
the
other
party,
with
full
power
to
agree
from
time
to
time
to
any
modification
of
the
terms
thereof
and
either
before
or
after
the
execution
thereof.
The
basis
on
which
the
Company
is
established
is
that
the
Company
shall
allot
shares
and
give
an
option
to
subscribe
from
time
to
time
for
further
shares
on
the
terms
set
forth
in
the
said
agreement
subject
to
any
such
modification
and
accordingly
it
shall
be
no
objection
to
the
said
agreement
that
all
or
some
of
the
individual
parties
to
the
said
agreement
are
or
may
be
promoters
of
the
Company
or
that
in
the
circumstances
the
Directors
of
the
Company
do
not
constitute
an
independent
Board
and
every
member
of
the
Company
both
present
and
future
is
to
be
deemed
to
join
the
Company
on
this
basis.’’
[Italics
added.]
Before
leaving
the
evidence
dealing
with
the
events
prior
to
the
incorporation
of
Britalta,
I
wish
to
revert
to
the
objection
first
raised
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
in
respect
of
the
filing
of
Exhibit
B
on
the
ground
of
its
inadmissibility.
The
exhibit
consisted
of
a
photostat
of
a
letter
written
by
Mr.
Mainwaring
to
Mr.
Ker
dated
March
31,
1949
(Documents,
p.
87),
a
copy
of
which
had
been
concurrently
sent
to
the
appellant.
It
begins
by
reviewing
the
events
that
occurred
during
the
Mainwaring-
Robertson
visit
to
Calgary
in
January
1949
and
which
could
serve
to
attract
venture
capital
to
the
group
undertaking
in
issue;
it
ends
by
informing
Mr.
Ker
that
the
writer,
before
approaching
some
of
his
own
friends
in
California,
wanted
to
give
Mr.
Ker
the
opportunity
to
approach
some
of
the
latter’s
friends
in
eastern
Canada
who
might
wish
to
provide
all
of
the
capital
required
and
thus
keep
the
development
in
question
entirely
Canadian.
As
appears
at
page
136
of
the
transcript,
the
ground
of
objection
was
that
writings
emanating
from
Mr.
Mainwaring
cannot
constitute
evidence
of
the
purpose
or
intent
the
appellant
had
in
mind
when
he
agreed
to
join
the
original
group
and
that
it
was,
moreover,
improper
to
put
questions
to
the
appellant,
by
way
of
cross-examination,
on
correspondence
between
two
other
people.
I
consider,
as
counsel
for
the
respondent
readily
agreed,
that
what
Mr.
Mainwaring
wrote
could
not
be
and
was
not
offered
as
evidence
of
the
appellant’s
intent
in
embarking
on
the
undertaking
in
question;
but
I
think
that
it
constitutes
some
evidence
of
the
formation
of
a
group
and
of
the
collective
efforts
and
various
roles
played
by
the
members
of
this
original
group,
and
that,
since
Exhibit
B
dealt
with
matters
concerning
which
the
appellant
had
testified
on
his
examination
in
chief,
it
was
proper
subject
matter
on
cross-examination.
Furthermore,
I
might
add
that
the
Court
record
discloses
that
on
February
6,
1962
the
appellant
filed
an
affidavit
wherein
he
declared,
inter
alia,
that
he
had
in
his
possession
a
large
number
of
documents
relating
to
the
case
at
bar
and
to
the
production
of
which
he
had
no
objection,
as
more
fully
appears
by
Schedule
A
of
the
affidavit
(see
court
record)
and
in
which
Exhibit
B
appears
as
second
on
the
list.
Since
I
am
presently
dealing
with
this
section
of
admissibility
of
Exhibit
B,
which
had
been
written
prior
to
the
incorporation
of
Britalta,
I
may
as
well
pause
in
order
to
dispose
of
a
general
objection
(Transcript,
p.
159)
raised
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
in
respect
of
all
similar
documents
dealing
with
the
period
subsequent
to
the
incorporation
of
Britalta.
I
consider
that
counsel
for
the
respondent
was
entitled
to
file
any
documents
relevant
to
the
case
which
the
appellant
admitted
having
in
his
possession
and
to
ask
the
appellant
for
his
comments
thereon.
In
the
absence
of
the
writer
being
called
by
the
respondent
in
rebuttal,
the
comments
or
qualifications
made
by
the
appellant
in
respect
of
any
such
letter
should
be
accepted.
Without
dealing
individually
with
documents
similar
to
Exhibit
B,
I
find
(Transcript,
pp.
182-183)
that
I
allowed,
subject
to
objection,
Exhibit
P
to
be
filed,
being
a
copy
of
a
letter
dated
October
28,
1949,
from
Mr.
Mainwaring
to
Mr.
Cloakey.
It
emanated
from
the
Mainwaring
file
and
the
appellant
had
never
seen
it
prior
to
trial.
I
consequently
sustain
the
objection
which
was
made
to
it.
In
my
deliberations
I
have
only
taken
into
account
copies
of
so-called
similar
letters
which
are
to
be
found
in
Schedule
A
of
the
appellant’s
affidavit.
I
might
here
add
that
the
effort
and
time-saving
device
of
concurrently
sending
copies
to
one
or
more
of
the
group,
when
the
original
was
addressed
only
to
a
particular
member,
was
employed,
as
the
evidence
indicates,
by
the
appellant
himself
(Exhibits
I,
W,
X,
Z-16-31-38).
Now,
dealing
with
the
period
subsequent
to
the
date
of
incorporation,
the
following
is
a
sequence
of
the
main
events
which
are
clearly
established
by
the
evidence
and
which
are
not
contested
by
the
parties.
Effect
was
given
to
paragraph
21
of
the
Articles
of
Association
(supra)
by
an
agreement
dated
May
5,
1949
(Ex.
4—Documents,
p.
13;
Transcript,
pp.
16-18).
The
five
members
of
the
group
accordingly
agreed
to
subscribe
for
250,000
shares
of
the
company
stock
at
an
allotted
price
of
14-cent
per
share,
payable
forthwith
in
cash,
and
in
consideration
for
doing
so
were
granted
the
right
to
subscribe
for
500,000
additional
shares
at
the
same
price
whenever
the
Company
proposes
to
allot
shares
beyond
the
first
500,000
shares
allotted
by
it.
As
appears
by
Exhibit
H
dated
May
12
(Documents,
p.
112),
by
resolution
of
the
board
of
directors,
Mr.
Ker
was
appointed
a
director
and
president,
Mr.
Robertson
a
director
and
secretary,
Mr.
Mainwaring
director
and
treasurer
of
the
Company
and
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
directors,
and
the
250,000
shares
were
allotted
in
the
following
proportions:
14
each
to
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
and
/6
to
each
of
the
other
three
members
of
the
group.
The
said
resolution
also
discloses
that
immediately
after
the
incorporation
of
the
Company
the
subscribers
to
the
Memorandum
of
Association
borrowed
on
behalf
of
the
Company
the
aggregate
sum
of
$12,000,
one-quarter
of
which
($3,000)
was
loaned
by
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Slipper
respectively
and
one-
sixth
($2,000)
each
by
Messrs.
Ker,
Mainwaring
and
Robertson
;
that
notes
of
the
Company,
payable
on
demand,
were
signed
in
favour
of
the
aforesaid
lenders;
that
the
said
borrowings
were
ratified
and
approved.
As
appears
also
by
Exhibit
H
(supra),
the
Company
acquired
a
permit
to
prospect
for
petroleum
products
on
the
Queen
Charlotte
Islands
and
subscribers
to
the
Memorandum
of
Association
were
authorized
to
reimburse
the
appellant
the
sum
of
$413.50
paid
on
behalf
of
the
Company
to
the
Registrar
of
Companies
as
incorporation
fees
and
$10,250
to
the
Deputy
Minister
of
Lands
for
rental
and
permit
fees
under
the
Natural
Gas
Act
of
British
Columbia
in
respect
of
oil-and-gas
lands
on
Graham
Island.
During
the
month
of
July,
Britalta,
through
a
man
named
Newburn,
negotiated
a
farm-out
to
Royalite
Oil
Co.
Ltd.
whereby
it
would
drill
a
well
in
consideration
of
Britalta
giving
its
a
checkerboard
half-interest
in
the
permit
and
by
August
the
agreement
was
signed.
See
Exhibit
J,
a
letter
from
Cloakey
to
the
appellant
dated
July
23,
1949—Documents,
p.
116;
also
Transcript,
p.
49.
The
above
agreement
also
anticipated
that
the
money
loaned
by
the
shareholders
would
be
repaid
to
them
because
the
Company
would
be
entitled
to
obtain
refunds
from
the
Provincial
Government,
up
to
the
full
extent
of
the
rental
and
permit
fee,
as
the
work
performed
by
Royalite
progressed.
Early
in
September,
G.
H.
Cloakey
was
in
touch
with
Robert
L.
Reed,
of
New
York,
who
represented
American
financial
interests,
with
a
view
to
obtaining
the
necessary
financing
to
procure
a
permit
and
earry
out
drilling
operations
on
the
Alberta
oil-and-gas
properties.
As
appears
by
Exhibit
5,
dated
September
8,
1949
(Documents,
p.
16),
the
appellant,
at
the
request
of
Mr.
Cloakey,
addressed
a
letter
to
Mr.
Robert
L.
Reed
containing
an
up-to-date
summary
of
the
main
activities
of
the
Company
since
the
date
of
its
incorporation.
The
Canadian
group
carried
on
negotiations
with
the
American
interests,
who
were
represented
in
New
York
by
Attorney
Robert
L.
Reed
and
in
British
Columbia
by
Jas.
C.
Ralston,
another
legal
counsel,
which
negotiations
continued
over
a
few
months.
In
November
1949,
in
anticipation
of
an
agreement
being
reached
whereby
the
American
group
would
purchase
shares
of
the
Company
to
an
extent
which
would
net
its
treasury
$500,000,
the
Canadian
group
were
allotted
a
further
500,000
shares
at
l/^-cent
per
share.
The
negotiations
between
the
two
parties
culminated
in
two
agreements
dated
December
23,
1949,
in
both
of
which
Jas.
C.
Ralston
as
nominee
for
the
American
group
is
described
as
the
purchaser
(Ex.
7,
Documents,
p.
29;
Ex.
8,
Documents,
p.
24).
The
terms
‘‘
American
group
and
Jas.
C.
Ralston’’
are
later
used
synonymously.
Counsel
for
the
parties
have
agreed
that
a
satisfactory
summary
of
Exhibits
7
and
8
are
contained
in
the
following
letter
dated
December
15,
1949,
signed
by
the
appellant
and
addressed
to
R.
H.
B.
Kerr
(Ex.
Y,
Documents,
p.
145),
which
reads
as
follows:
“
15th
December,
1949
R.
H.
B.
Ker,
Esq.,
909
Government
Street,
Victoria,
B.C.
Dear
Robbie:
Answering
the
first
paragraph
of
your
letter
of
13th
December,
the
following
is
a
brief
outline
of
the
agreements
in
which
Ralston
(who
is
called
the
purchaser)
is
named
as
a
party,
he
being
the
representative
of
Reed
and
associates.
There
are
two
agreements.
The
first
is
made
between
Britalta,
Ralston
and
our
five
selves,
who
are
called
the
sharehoiders.
By
it
the
Company
grants
an
option
(to
the
purchaser)
on
1,250,000
shares
as
follows:
250,000
shares
at
200
per
share
on
or
before
30
days
following
the
effective
date
as
hereinafter
defined
;
All
or
any
part
of
250,000
shares
at
300
per
share
on
or
before
4
months
following
the
said
effective
date;
All
or
any
part
of
250,000
shares
at
400
per
share
on
or
before
12
months
following
the
said
effective
date;
All
or
any
part
of
250,000
shares
at
500
per
share
on
or
before
18
months
following
the
said
effective
date;
All
or
any
part
of
250,000
shares
at
600
per
share
on
or
before
24
months
following
the
said
effective
date.
The
effective
date
is
the
date
after
the
Company
has
increased
its
capital
to
3,000,000
shares
and
on
which
it
can
deliver
a
permit
under
the
Securities
Act
for
the
sale
of
the
1,250,000
shares.
The
second
agreement
is
between
the
shareholders
and
Ralston.
Under
it
the
shareholders
grant
Ralston
an
option
to
purchase
300,000
shares
at
/20
per
share.
The
option
is
exercisable
in
four
installments
of
75,000
shares
each,
exercisable
after
Ralston
has
taken
up
each
of
the
four
respective
blocks
of
shares
from
the
Company.
All
of
the
750,000
shares
held
by
the
shareholders
are
to
be
put
in
escrow
with
the
Royal
Trust
Company.
The
shareholders’
remaining
450,000
shares
remain
in
escrow
until
Ralston
has
paid
the
Company
$350,000,
or
the
first
agreement
has
terminated.
Ralston
grants
the
shareholders
an
option
to
purchase
at
60c
per
share
all
or
any
part
of
125,000
of
the
last
block
of
shares
upon
which
Ralston
has
an
option
from
the
Company.
George
telephoned
me
last
evening
and
said
that
Reed
now
had
$90,000
in
hand
and
was
practically
ready
to
go
ahead
on
the
first
two
blocks
of
shares
at
300
per
share,
he
to
receive
a
commission
of
$25,000
and
the
Company
to
net
$125,000.
I
commented
on
this
in
my
letter
to
George
yesterday.
I
enclose
a
letter
which
I
have
written
him
this
morning,
which
refers
further
to
the
matter.
I
am
writing
a
great
haste.
Yours
truly,
A.
BRUCE
Robertson”
Before
June
1950,
the
drilling
carried
out
by
Royalite
on
the
Queen
Charlotte
Island,
under
its
farm-out
agreement
with
the
Company,
turned
out
to
be
a
dry
hole.
Nevertheless,
as
anticipated
the
permit
fees
and
charges
which
Britalta
had
paid
to
the
Government
of
British
Columbia
were
rebated
to
the
Company,
which
in
turn
paid
the
promissory
notes
it
had
given
to
the
five
original
shareholders
(see
the
appellant’s
letter
to
R.
H.
B.
Ker
dated
September
19,
1950,
Ex.
10—Documents,
p.
33).
In
October
1950,
the
Company,
jointly
with
Deep
Rock
Oil
Corporation,
acquired
a
permit
on
oil-and-gas
lands
in
the
Many
Island
Lake
Field
in
Alberta,
which
lands
were
later
developed
with
success.
The
Americans
had
taken
up,
and
paid
for,
all
of
the
250,000
forty
cents
shares
and
200,000
of
the
250,000
fifty
cents
shares
ahead
of
the
scheduled
date
of
January
1951.
They
had
still
to
take
up
50,000
of
the
50c
shares
and
250,000
of
the
60c
shares.
As
we
have
seen,
when
Jas.
C.
Ralston
had
paid
for
the
300,000
remaining
shares
the
Canadian
group
were
entitled
to
exercise
their
option
on
125,000
out
of
the
250,000
sixty
cents
block
of
shares,
and
if
they
exercised
their
right,
the
Canadian
group
could
throw
them
on
the
market.
The
same
thing
could
occur
for
the
same
reasons
on
the
release
of
450,000
14-cent
out
of
the
750,000
shares
which
the
Canadian
group
had
placed
in
escrow
with
The
Royal
Trust
Company
(Ex.
8,
paragraphs
4
and
5—Documents,
p.
24).
The
brokerage
firm
of
James,
Copithorne
&
Birch
Ltd.
(hereinafter
sometimes
referred
to
as
the
brokers)
mentioned
in
paragraph
6
of
Exhibit
8,
through
market
operations,
had
been
providing
Jas.
C.
Ralston
with
the
finances
necessary
to
acquire
the
1,250
shares
referred
to
in
Exhibit
Y
(supra).
The
said
brokers
became
concerned
that
the
Canadian
group,
when
free
to
do
so,
might
throw
a
considerable
number
of
their
575,000
shares
on
the
market
and
cause
it
to
get
out
of
control
unless
something
was
done
to
prevent
it.
As
a
result,
the
appellant,
on
January
29,
1951
(Ex.
Z-53—
Documents,
p.
183)
enclosed
two
undertakings,
concerning
the
1/2-cent
shares
and
60c
shares
respectively,
addressed
to
the
brokers,
both
dated
January
22,
1951
(Exhibits
13
and
14—
Documents,
pp.
37
and
388),
which
had
been
signed
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Canadian
group.
As
appears
by
Exhibit
13,
the
Canadian
group,
in
consideration
of
the
brokers
continuing
their
financing
of
the
Company,
undertook
that
on
release
of
the
450,000
half-cent
shares
they
would
not
put
any
of
them
on
the
market,
except
with
the
brokers’
approval.
Exhibit
14
makes
reference
to
135,000
sixty
cents
shares.
This
is
explained
by
the
fact
that
Jas.
C.
Ralston
personally
had
obtained
an
option
from
his
principal
on
10,000
sixty
cents
shares
and
he
joined
the
Canadian
group
in
appointing
the
brokers
as
selling
agents
for
his
shares.
I
will
now
deal
with
the
disposition
which
the
appellant
made
first
of
his
60c
shares
and
later
of
his
4-cent
shares.
The
record
thereof
and
the
sums
realized
by
the
appellant,
subject
to
minor
adjustments,
are
set
out
in
paragraph
16
of
the
notice
of
appeal.
As
therein
indicated,
in
respect
of
the
60c
shares,
the
brokers,
in
March
1951,
sold
13,548
shares
out
of
20,833
held
by
the
appellant
at
nearly
$1
a
share,
which
netted
him
$13,118.50.
The
amount
thus
realized
was
a
little
more
than
sufficient
to
pay
the
cost
of
his
acquisition
of
the
said
20,833
shares,
which
amounted
to
$12,499.80.
The
effect
of
this
was
to
leave
the
appellant
holding
7,235
of
the
said
shares
at
no
cost
to
him.
The
appellant
declared
(Transcript,
p.
70)
that
he
stopped
selling
his
60c
shares
when
he
had
sold
enough
to
permit
him
to
pay
the
cost
thereof.
As
appears
by
a
memo
of
a
telephone
communication,
dated
November
7,
1950
(Documents
p.
179—Ex.
Z-20),
which
the
appellant
had
with
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Ker,
the
latter
was
of
the
opinion
that
the
group
should
not
sell
any
more
of
their
60c
stock
than
would
pay
for
the
cost
thereof,
for
fear
of
income
tax.
The
very
next
month,
the
appellant,
who
was
in
England
at
the
time,
received
word
that
a
natural
gas
well
strike
had
been
made
in
the
Many
Island
Medicine
Hat
area
which
was
being
operated
jointly
by
Britalta
and
Deep
Rock
Many
Island
Company
and
that,
by
test,
it
was
estimated
that
the
volume
of
the
gas
resulting
from
the
strike
would
exceed
3-million
cu.
ft.
daily
(Transcript,
pp.
72,
76;
Exhibits
17
and
Z-27—Documents,
p.
187).
By
the
end
of
April
the
stock
of
the
Company
was
selling
at
close
to
$2
a
share.
James,
Copithorne
&
Birch
Ltd.
found
themselves
facing
a
short
market
position,
and
far
from
making
use
of
their
right
to
prevent
the
appellant
and
other
members
of
the
Canadian
group
from
selling
their
shares,
they
were
re-
questing
them
to
sell,
and
some
of
them
did.
The
appellant
was
asked
to
sell
5,000
shares
but
he
declined
(Exhibits
19
and
20,
pp.
44
and
45
of
the
Documents;
pp.
74
and
75
of
the
Transcript).
The
appellant
returned
from
England
in
the
summer
of
1951
(Transcript,
p.
76).
On
July
18
Britalta
was
listed
on
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange.
The
evidence
shows
that
the
appellant
sold
3,000
shares
in
July
and
a
further
1,000
in
September
at
approximately
$4
per
share,
thereby
realizing
$4,000
more
on
4,000
shares
than
he
had
received
by
selling
13,548
shares
at
$2
per
share
in
the
previous
month.
In
respect
of
the
appellant’s
75,000
4-cent
shares
which
he
then
had,
he
procured
the
release
thereof
from
escrow
on
October
5,
1951
(Ex.
Z-84—Documents,
p.
199)
and
within
ten
days
thereof,
through
Mr.
R.
L.
Reed,
he
disposed
of
20,000
of
them
by
private
sale
at
$3.50
a
share,
which
was
10
per
cent
below
the
market
price
(Transcript,
pp.
79
and
following
of
the
Documents).
Starting
at
p.
79,
the
appellant
gave
the
following
explanations
concerning
the
above-mentioned
sale
:
“Well
my
Lord,
at
that
time
I
had
79,285
shares
and
with
a
market
10%,
or
of
which
$3.50
represented
10%,
those
shares
were
worth
over
$300,000.
That
was
an
astronomical
sum
for
me,
L
had
never
thought
I
would
have
that
much
money.
The
shares
had
gone
up
very
fast,
I
was
afraid
they
might
go
down
equally
fast,
and
I
thought
the
prudent
thing
to
do
was
not
to
leave
everything
in
one
place
but
to
realize
some
of
it.
I
still
however
wanted
to
stick
to
my
original
resolve
which
was
to
have
a
substantial
interest
in
the
company,
and
I
did
not
want
to
sell
as
many
as
25,000
shares
which
I
had
the
chance
to
sell,
and
so
I
told
Mainwaring
I
would
be
prepared
to
sell
15,000
shares
but
that
if,
in
order
to
satisfy
whoever
it
was
who
wanted
to
buy
the
shares,
it
was
necessary
for
me
to
sell
more,
I
would
go
as
high
as
20,000
shares,
and
on
the
16th
of
September
Mainwaring
wired
me
to
that
effect.’’
The
last
sale
with
which
we
are
concerned
occurred
in
February
1952
when
the
appellant
sold
12,000
shares
for
approximately
$50,000.
In
reply
to
an
inquiry
about
the
reasons
which
prompted
him
to
sell
this
further
12,000
at
$4.10
a
share,
he
said
at
p.
92
:
‘
I
still
held
58,285
shares
worth
at
the
market
over
$200,000.
And
I
thought
it
was
the
wise
thing
to
do
to
spread
my
risk
by
diversifying
and
so
I
said
I
would
sell
12,000
shares.’’
At
page
177,
during
cross-examination
he
was
asked
about
the
services
rendered
by
him
to
the
Company
and
as
answered
as
follows
:
“Q.
No
charge
was
made
for
those
services?
A.
No.
N
Q.
This
effort
and
time
you
put
in
was
to
advance
the
interests
of
the
company
?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
thus
enhance
the
value
of
the
stock
you
held?
A.
Whenever
you
do
something
as
a
director
for
a
company
you
hope
it
will
enhance
the
value
of
the
stock.
Q.
And
this,
of
course,
was
in
your
case
the
only
commercial
return
that
you
could
get
from
your
efforts?
A.
I
think
that
is
fair.
Whenever
you
go
into
a
company
you
hope
that
its
shares
will
be
worth
more
later
on
than
they
are
when
you
put
your
money
in.
.
.
.
Excuse
me,
getting
back
to
the
last
thing
you
put
to
me,
another
thing
that
one
hopes
for
when
you
invest
in
a
company
is
that
you
will
get
dividends
on
your
shares,
you
don’t
only
look
to
the
possibility
of
selling
the
shares.
Q.
That
is
true.
Did
you
have
that
thought
in
mind
at
that
time
?
A.
Yes,
I
went
into
this
thing
with
one
idea
of
getting
an
interest
in
a
company
which
would
give
me
some
return.
Q.
Well
now,
let’s
put
it
clearly
Mr.
Robertson.
Did
you
go
in
to
purchase
these
shares
at
half
a
cent
with
a
view
to
getting
dividends
on
these
shares?
A.
I
went
in
with
the
idea
that
you
have
investing
in
any
company,
you
hope
that
you
will
get
dividends
and
you
hope
that
you
will
increase
your
substance
by
appreciation
in
the
value
of
the
shares.
Q.
You
are
an
experienced
businessman.
What
chance
did
you
think
that
this
company,
its
ability
to
pay
dividends
on
these
shares?
A.
That
is
what
you
.
.
.
Q.
When
you
went
in,
when
you
were
putting
in
this
investment
of
$200.
A.
I
wouldn’t
have
put
in
a
nickle
if
I
hadn’t
thought
the
company
would
ever
.
.
.
if
I
thought
the
company
would
never
be
on
a
dividend
paying
basis.
Q.
Let’s
be
frank.
You
really
didn’t
put
in
a
nickle,
you
got
these
shares
on
the
hope
or
for
the
efforts
that
the
promoters
were
going
to
make
in
the
hope
you
would
develop
a
company
that
was
really
worthwhile
and
enhance
the
value
of
these
shares,
isn’t
that
right?
A.
I
hoped
that
the
company
would
develop
into
a
paying
proposition.”’
The
following
exchange
of
letters
occurred
between
the
appellant
and
Mr.
R.
L.
Reed.
The
appellant’s
letter
(Ex.
36—Documents,
p.
65)
is
dated
February
18,
1952
and
reads
as
follows:
“
18th
February
1952
AIR
Mail
Mr.
Robert
L.
Reed
Reed,
Crane
&
McGovern
910
Lexington
Avenue
New
York
22,
N.Y.,
U.S.A.
Dear
Bob:
Very
many
thanks
for
your
telegraph
of
Thursday
last
and
your
confirming
letter
of
the
same
day.
It
was
indeed
very
kind
of
you
to
arrange
the
sale
of
my
12,000
shares.
I
feel
that
I
did
the
right
thing
in
selling,
but
for
the
sake
of
all
of
us
I
hope
that
in
the
result
it
will
turn
out
to
have
been
a
frightful
mistake!
With
kind
regards,
Yours
sincerely,
A.
BrucE
ROBERTSON
ABR/MB
The
reply
of
Mr.
Reed
(Ex.
Z-37—Documents,
p.
207)
is
dated
February
29,
1952
and
reads
as
follows:
“
February
29,
1952
A.
Bruce
Robertson,
Esq.,
Q.C.,
425
Carrall
Street,
Vancouver,
B.C.
Canada.
Dear
Bruce:
Just
a
line
to
acknowledge
receipt
of
your
letter
of
the
18th
with
respect
to
the
sale
of
your
stock.
I
am
glad
that
I
could
be
of
assistance
to
you
and
the
others,
but
I
hope,
as
you
say,
that
you
made
a
frightful
mistake
in
selling.
As
I
wrote
Robbie
Ker,
I
am
hopeful
that
now
that
you
three
have
disposed
of
the
shares
you
wished
to,
that
at
least
for
the
time
being
you
will
not
sell
further
shares.
Without
laboring
the
point,
it
is
rather
difficult
to
explain
to
some
people
why
your
respective
shareholdings
become
less
each
time
a
report
to
shareholders
is
put
out.
Considering
the
profits
that
have
been
made,
I
am
sure
all
of
you
will
be
content
to
‘rest
on
your
oars’
at
least
until
the
market
has
become
a
bit
more
stabilized.
I
very
sincerely
feel
that
we
can
build
a
substantial
Company
out
of
Britalta,
and
I
look
forward
to
the
time
in
the
not
too
distant
future
when
I
hope
I
ean
say
4
1
told
you
so’.
With
all
the
best.
Sincerely
yours,
Bob”
Before
proceeding
to
deal
with
the
case
on
its
merits,
I
should
mention
that
the
record
discloses
that
the
appellant
had
seldom
bought
stocks
and
the
Britalta
undertaking
was
the
first
one
of
its
kind
in
which
he
had
been
engaged.
At
no
time
did
the
Company
pay
a
dividend
and,
starting
in
July
1951,
when
Britalta
stock
was
first
traded
in
on
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange,
the
high
and
low
stock
market
quotations
thereof
were
as
follows:
1951
|
$
6.30
to
$3.00
|
1952
|
9.85
to
4.50
|
1953
|
10.25
to
2.75
|
1961
|
3.05
to
2.00
|
I
should
also
add
that
Mr.
Reed
had
become
the
president
of
the
Company
on
June
27,
1951
(Ex.
Z-30—Documents,
p.
190).
Considerable
argument
was
directed
to
the
purpose
or
intent
which
the
appellant
had
in
embarking
on
the
Britalta
venture.
I
use
that
term
because
its
appropriateness
was
not
questioned.
The
present
case
is
somewhat
unique
because,
unlike
in
Regal
Heights
v.
M.N.R.,
[1960]
S.C.R.
902;
[1960]
C.T.C.
384,
I
consider
we
are
not
here
concerned
with
a
case
of
frustration
and
alternative
intentions.
In
effect
it
was
held
in
the
above-
mentioned
case
that
actions
speak
louder
than
words
and
that,
unless
there
is
evidence
to
support
the
taxpayer’s
post
facto
declaration
of
intent,
such
declaration
has
little
if
any
probative
value.
As
I
read
the
appellant’s
evidence,
although
he
may
not
have
said
so
in
so
many
words,
his
declared
purpose
in
acquiring
the
shares
in
issue,
should
they
increase
in
value,
was
twofold
:
first,
to
dispose
of
most
of
them
to
best
advantage
whenever,
in
his
opinion,
an
opportune
moment
presented
itself,
and
secondly,
to
retain
indefinitely
a
substantial
number
of
the
remainder
to
fulfil
a
long-standing
desire
to
possess
a
substantial
interest
in
an
oil
or
gas
company.
The
evidence
clearly
shows
that
the
appellant
disposed
of
approximately
100,000
shares
in
1951
and
1952,
that
ten
years
later
he
still
retained
ownership
of
about
46,000
shares,
and
such
retention,
in
my
opinion,
is
not
inconsistent
with
an
original
dual-declaration
of
intent
but
tends
to
confirm
it.
We
are
here
concerned,
however,
only
with
the
appellant’s
first
intent
or
objective
and
it
becomes
necessary,
I
think,
to
inquire
whether
in
acquiring
and
disposing
of
his
100,000
Brit-
alta
shares
he
did
so
in
a
manner
characteristic
of
a
capital
investment
or
of
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
Although
the
Income
Tax
Act
does
not
define
what
constitutes
a
capital
investment
or
gain,
in
my
opinion
one
aspect
of
the
evidence
affords
a
classical
example
of
such
a
transaction.
It
occurred
when
the
appellant,
in
October
1951,
after
realizing
gains
of
approximately
$70,000,
reinvested
over
$50,000
of
it
in
various
high
grade
listed
securities
of
well-known
companies
on
the
advice
of
Ames
&
Company.
No
one,
I
think,
could
gainsay
but
that
if
in
due
course
he
realized
on
these
securities
and
if
in
doing
so
he
made
a
profit
or
a
loss
it
would
constitute
a
non-
taxable
gain
or
non-deductible
loss.
In
respect
of
what
constitutes
a
capital
gain,
I
will
here
confine
myself
to
simply
observing
that
I
think
it
is
self-evident
that
the
manner
and
means
adopted
by
the
appellant
in
obtaining
the
aforesaid
high
grade
securities
were
greatly
different
from
those
employed
by
him
in
the
acquisition
and
disposal
of
his
Britalta
shares—which
made
the
above-mentioned
$50,000
investment
possible.
I
pass
on
to
the
consideration
of
a
more
positive
test
and
one
concerning
which
our
jurisprudence
provides
more
guidance
in
determining
whether
or
not
a
transaction
constitutes
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
In
the
case
of
Irrigation
Industries
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1962]
S.C.R.
346;
[1962]
C.T.C.
215,
in
which
a
long
list
of
authorities
was
reviewed,
Martland,
J.
observed
at
p.
351
:
II
In
my
opinion,
a
person
who
puts
money
into
a
business
enterprise
by
the
purchase
of
the
shares
of
a
company
on
an
isolated
occasion,
and
not
as
a
part
of
his
regular
business,
cannot
be
said
to
have
engaged
in
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
merely
because
the
purchase
was
speculative
in
that,
at
that
time,
he
did
not
intend
to
hold
the
shares
indefinitely,
but
intended,
if
possible,
to
sell
them
at
a
profit
as
soon
as
he
reasonably
could.
I
think
that
there
must
be
clearer
indications
of
‘trade’
than
this
before
it
can
be
said
that
there
has
been
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.’’
In
examining
this
aspect
of
the
case
I
think
it
is
also
helpful
to
recall
the
recommendations
of
Rowlatt,
J.
in
a
similar
ease,
when
he
referred
it
back
to
the
Commissioners
of
Taxation
for
reconsideration
and
which
was
cited
with
approval
by
Martland,
J
.
in
the
Irrigation
case
(supra)
at
page
356
:
(€
.
but
I
commend
the
Commissioners
to
consider
what
took
place
in
the
nature
of
organizing
the
speculation,
maturing
the
property,
and
disposing
of
the
property,
and
when
they
have
considered
all
that,
to
say
whether
they
think
it
was
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
or
not.’’
Another
suggested
guidepost
is
to
ascertain
whether
the
appellant’s
disposal
of
the
shares
sold
can
be
regarded
as
a
deal
or
deals
or
trades
in
shares
of
the
Company.
Cartwright,
J.
(dissenting)
in
the
Irrigation
case
(supra)
quoted
Lord
Radcliffe
in
Edwards
v.
Bairstow,
[1956]
A.C.
14,
to
the
following
effect
:
“Dealing
is,
I
think,
essentially
a
trading
adventure,
and
the
respondents’
operations
were
nothing
but
a
deal
or
deals
in
plant
and
machinery.”
In
my
opinion,
the
following
factors
are
weighty
elements
tending
to
establish
that
the
appellant,
in
effecting
the
previously
mentioned
purchases
and
sales
by
a
series
of
deals,
organized
a
scheme
for
profit-making
which
was
essentially
a
trading
adventure.
As
appears
by
Exhibits
A,
B,
D,
E,
F
and
I,
the
appellant
as
a
member
of
the
original
group,
by
devoting
much
effort
and
little
money,
helped
to
develop,
promote
and
organize
the
maturing
and
disposal
of
the
greater
portion
of
his
shares.
Leaving
aside
any
evidence
to
which
counsel
for
the
appellant
took
exception,
I
think
the
proof
clearly
shows
that,
beginning
in
January
1949
with
the
meeting
between
Messrs.
Cloakey
and
Mainwaring
the
seed
of
a
collective
venture
was
planted
and
it
grew
and
took
shape
in
the
form
of
a
selective
and
compact
group
possessing
qualities
and
knowledge
which
were
calculated
to
render
more
likely
the
success
of
an
inherently
speculative
venture.
Whether
the
five
members
of
the
original
group
were
bound
to
each
other
by
a
syndicate
or
partnership
agreement
which
was
legally
enforceable,
or
by
a
verbal
understanding
or
gentleman’s
agreement,
is
in
my
opinion
of
little
importance.
At
all
material
times
the
appellant
and
those
associated
with
him
fulfilled
the
various
functions
expected
of
them
as
fully
and
effectively
as
if
they
had
been
evidenced
by
a
signed
and
enforceable
contract.
Among
the
other
significant
features
pointing
in
the
same
direction
is
the
nominal
price
of
14-cent
each
which
the
group
paid
for
the
original
issue
of
250,000
shares,
of
which
the
appellant
was
entitled
to
41,667.
The
same
is
true
of
the
second
lot
of
83,333
shares
acquired
by
the
appellant
out
of
500,000
shares
which
were
issued
to
the
group
at
one
half
cent
each.
These
two
transactions
were
sanctioned
by
the
directors
of
the
Company
for
the
benefit
of
the
promoters
thereof,
who
were
none
other
than
themselves.
It
was
the
intention
of
the
original
group
to
interest
outsiders
in
putting
up
the
capital
necessary
for
development
of
oil
properties.
The
inconsequential
amount
of
$1,875
realized
by
the
Company
on
the
two
above-mentioned
transactions,
as
well
as
the
subsequent
loan,
repayable
on
demand,
made
by
the
sole
shareholders
of
the
Company
to
the
Company
itself,
represented
preliminary
contributions
of
a
promotional
nature,
since,
as
appears
at
page
3
of
Exhibits
D
and
EH,
the
group
estimated
that
the
capital
required
during
the
first
year
of
operations
would
amount
to
about
$500,000.
I
think
the
promotional
and
trading
activities
of
the
appellant,
as
a
member
of
the
Canadian
group,
were
much
the
same
as
those
practised
by
one
who
is
engaged
in
the
promotion
business
and
they
continued
after
the
Company
was
incorporated,
because
he
was
personally
a
party
to
a
contract
(Ex.
8)
wherein,
inter
alia,
the
appellant
and
his
associates,
called
the
vendors,
traded
or
exchanged
option
rights
with
Jas.
C.
Ralston,
called
the
purchaser,
whereby
the
latter
acquired
a
conditional
option
in
the
appellant’s
/3
interest
(50,000
shares)
in
300,000
shares
out
of
the
750,000
owned
by
the
Canadian
group,
in
consideration
of
his
granting
the
appellant
an
option
to
purchase
a
%
interest
in
125,000
shares
(20,388
shares)
which
the
purchaser
had
agreed
to
acquire
from
the
Company.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted
that
the
delay
of
214
years
between
the
date
cf
acquisition
by
the
appellant
of
his
first
block
of
41,667
14-cent
shares
and
October
1951,
when
he
began
selling
them,
was
such
as
to
negative
the
intention
of
making
a
short
term
realization
on
them,
and
the
fact
that
he
did
not
sell
as
many
shares
as
he
could
at
the
first
opportunity
was
a
further
indication
of
a
capital
investment.
In
this
latter
connection
the
evidence
shows
that
on
a
few
occasions
the
appellant
declined
to
sell
as
many
shares
as
he
could
and
in
other
instances
he
was
asked
to
refrain
from
selling.
Whatever
decision
the
appellant
took
was
not
in
my
opinion
indicative
of
a
capital
investment
transaction
but
the
exercise
of
his
own
judg-
ment
in
deciding
whether
or
not
the
occasion
was
sufficiently
opportune.
Insofar
as
the
above-mentioned
delay
is
concerned,
it
is
to
be
noted
that
the
appellant
exercised
his
option
to
acquire
from
Jas.
C.
Ralston
20,833
shares
at
600
each
in
March
1951
and
at
the
first
opportunity
sold
13,548
of
them
during
the
same
month
;
and
following
the
gas
discovery
he
disposed
of
an
additional
4,000
between
July
and
September
1951.
As
far
as
the
4-cent
shares
are
concerned,
he
sold
20,000
in
October
1951
and
12,000
in
February
1952.
I
do
not
think
that
the
date
of
acquisition
is
important,
and,
as
appears
by
the
foregoing,
all
the
sales
made
by
the
appellant
were
effected
within
less
than
a
year
from
the
date
at
which
it
was
first
possible
to
sell
them.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
submitted
that
the
Irrigation
case
was
very
much
in
point
since
it
concerned
an
isolated
purchase
of
shares
by
a
taxpayer
which
were
disposed
of
in
toto.
It
should
be
noted
that
in
the
above
case
the
appellant,
with
money
borrowed
from
the
bank
for
another
purpose,
purchased
4,000
common
shares
out
of
a
public
offering
of
5,000
shares
of
treasury
stock
of
Brunswick
Mining
and
Smelting
Corporation
Limited
at
a
price
of
$10
a
share,
thus
benefiting
the
treasury
of
the
said
Corporation.
to
the
extent
of
$40,000.
Shortly
thereafter,
the
bank
having
demanded
repayment
of
the
loan
within
30
days,
the
Irrigation
Company
disposed—presumably
on
the
public
market—of
the
greater
portion
of
its
Brunswick
shares,
the
value
of
which,
in
the
meantime,
having
risen
within
three
weeks
of
their
acquisition.
The
remainder
of
the
said
shares
were
sold
four
months
later
at
a
sufficiently
large
profit
to
discharge
its
bank
overdraft.
The
Brunswick
transaction
as
between
the
parties
concerned
was
an
at
arm’s
length
transaction
and
the
taxpayer
in
making
the
purchase
had
taken
no
hand
in
the
promotion
of
the
said
company
and
had
acted
in
an
individual
capacity
unconnected
with
any
group
or
association.
At
the
risk
of
redundancy,
I
mention
the
following
additional
facts,
which
I
consider
to
be
indicia
of
trade
present
in
the
case
at
bar
and
not
to
be
found
in
the
Irrigation
case.
The
appellant
joined
with
other
members
of
the
Canadian
group
for
the
purpose
of
promoting
the
Company
(Britalta),
whose
shares
are
in
issue;
he
contributed
his
time
and
ability
without
reward
other
than
what
he
could
derive
from
the
sale
of
his
shares.
He
acquired
his
shares
as
a
result
of
not
one
but
three
transactions;
namely,
the
purchase
in
March
1949
of
41,667
shares
at
the
nominal
price
of
14-cent
per
share;
the
second
purchase,
in
November
1949,
of
83,333
shares
was
also
at
^-cent
per
share;
the
acquisition
in
March
1951,
at
600
each,
of
the
20,833
shares
which
the
appellant
had
under
option
from
Jas.
©.
Ralston
and
in
consideration
of
agreeing
to
sell
50,000
of
his
14-cent
shares
which
were
under
option
to
the
said
Ralston
at
14-cent
per
share;
and
finally,
the
two
undertakings
whereby
he
and
the
Canadian
group
placed
all
their
shares
in
escrow
with
The
Royal
Trust
Company
and,
in
order
to
control
the
market,
undertook
not
to
dispose
of
any
of
them
except
through
and
with
the
consent
of
James,
Copithorne
&
Birch
Ltd.
I
cannot
accept
the
submission
of
counsel
for
the
appellant
that,
even
if
the
sales
of
stock
made
by
the
appellant
in
March
1951
constituted
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
the
discovery
of
the
gas
well
in
April
1951
with
its
beneficial
result
on
the
value
of
his
shares
had
the
effect
of
converting
their
subsequent
sales
into
the
category
of
capital
gains
realized
by
the
appellant
from
an
investment.
I
am
accordingly
of
the
opinion
that
the
Minister
was
justified
in
regarding
the
transaction
in
issue
as
a
scheme
for
profit-making.
For
the
foregoing
reasons
I
consider
that
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed,
with
taxable
costs
in
favour
of
the
respondent.
Judgment
accordingly.