BISSONNETTE, J.:—M. le juge Owen expose les faits qui ont donné naissance à cette instance de même que les lois qui régissent la matière sub judice, de sorte qu’il serait superfétatoire de reprendre l’analyse des uns et des autres. Du reste, le juge de la Cour supérieure, dans une argumentation serrée et qui couvre tout le débat exprime une opinion qui me paraît irréfutable. En substance, je ne ferais que répéter les considérations qu’il formule avec soin et grande clarté.
Si l’on veut voir dans l’autorité conférée au ministre du Revenu national de qui relève l’administration de la Loi de l’impôt sur le Revenu deux catégories de pouvoirs pour fins d’enquête sur les affaires, les biens et la personne d’un contribuable et qu’on se garde de les confondre, le problème ne devrait présenter que peu de difficultés.
En premier lieu, le ministre peut faire procéder à une enquête, même hors la connaissance de la personne soupçonnée de transgresser la loi, et, par là, recueillir où il peut y trouver son profit tous renseignements lui permettant de faire les redressements qui s’imposent. Que par ses préposés, officiers et détectives, le ministre tente de savoir si le train de vie d’une personne corresponde à ses déclarations au fisc, il n’y a rien à redire là-dessus.
L’autre forme d’enquête est bien différente, car elle constitue des préliminaires qui acheminent l’affaire vers une instance Judiciaire, qui peut avoir, à la fois, un caractère civil et pénal.
A cette fin, le ministre constitue une Commission d’enquête. Sous l’empire de la Lori des Enquêtes (S.R.C. chap. 154, art. 4 et 0) ce commissaire a le droit d’assigner des témoins, de leur faire prêter serment, de prendre, par écrit, leurs dépositions et de les rendre contraignables et d’exercer à cet égard l’autorité d’un tribunal judiciaire dûment constitué. Il est inexact de considérer une telle commission comme ayant une pure autorité administrative. Les pouvoirs exercés par les commissions en vertu de la Loi des Enquêtes n’ont jamais été jugés et appréciés comme de simples pouvoirs administratifs. Nous en relevons nombre d’exemples dans la Loi contre les Coalitions et Monopoles ; citons les enquêtes sur le monopole du tabac, du papier, du charbon, etc. Et à ce moment là, il n’y a pas encore d’accusation portée contre ces violateurs de la loi. Or, il n’est jamais venu à l’esprit de personne que les suspects ne puissent être assistés de leurs avocats.
Dans l’espèce, pour qu’il en puisse être autrement, il faudrait que la Loi de l’impôt décrète, de façon catégorique, que les enquêtes seront tenues in camera. Quand il met en branle un appareil à caractère judiciaire, j’estime que le ministre ne possède pas le pouvoir de déroger aux règles fondamentales qui s’appliquent aux tribunaux. Cette opinion a été clairement exprimée dans l’affaire de VAlliance des professeurs v. La commission des relations ouvrières, [1951] B.R. 752; [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140.
Du reste, on peut facilement réaliser les graves dangers que comporte le refus catégorique de permettre aux avocats d’assister leurs clients qui sont l’objet d’une telle enquête. ‘‘In the matter of René Lafleur et autres ’ ’, me paraît signifier qu’une accusation existe, au moins, in potentia. Dans l’espèce, les avocats n’ont demandé que de leur reconnaître le droit d’entendre les dépositions des témoins. Or, ceux-ci auraient la faculté et l’avantage de la présence et de la protection d’un avocat, tandis que celui qui est l’objet de l’enquête serait privé du droit d’entendre les dénonciations qu’on fait valoir contre lui? Avec respect, une telle attitude me paraît manquer de la plus simple logique, de la plus élémentaire justice. En effet, un témoin, même de bonne foi, peut faire une grave erreur et personne ne pourra le mettre en garde contre son affirmation? Que dire s’il dépose par jalousie, malice ou intérêt personne ?
Ce serait une erreur de prétendre que la désignation d’un commissaire qui, après tout n’est que le représentant du ministre lui-même aurait une telle autorité qu’il pourrait, en quelque sorte, exercer des fonctions quasi-judiciaires, quand, par ailleurs, la loi, ne lui attribua aucune autorité. Aussi, quand on s’arrête à considérer la Loi des Enquêtes publiques, trouve-t-on à l’art. 12 (S.R.C. 1952, chap. 154) :
l ‘Les commissaires peuvent permettre à toutes personnes dont la conduite fait le sujet d’une enquête sous l’autorité de la présente loi, et doivent permettre à toute personne contre laquelle il est porté quelque accusation au cours de pareille enquête, d’être représentée par un avocat.”
Mais, cette autorité de permettre comme cette obligation de permettre se distingue en ce sens que dans le premier cas il s’agit de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, lequel, évidemment garde le caractère de fonctions judiciaires, tandis que dans le second cas, on est en face d’une obligation formelle.
Du reste, dans l’interprétation d’une règle de droit public, là où il y pourrait avoir un doute sur la portée d’une de ces dispositions, la Loi de l'interprétation de nos lois (S.C.R. 1952,
c. 198, art. 15) décrète ceci:
“Toute loi, y compris chacune de ses prescriptions et dispositions, est censée réparatrice, qu’elle ait pour objet immédiat d’ordonner un acte que le Parlement considère d’intérêt public ou d’empêcher ou de punir un acte qu’il juge contraire à cet intérêt, et elle doit donc être interprétée de la façon juste, large et libérale, la plus propre à assurer la réalisation de son objet, conformément à son sens, son intention et son esprit véritables. ’ ’
Or, refuser la présence d’un avocat, non seulement ce n’est pas interprété la Loi de l’impôt de ‘‘facon juste, large, et libérale” mais c’est le faire de façon abusive et arbitraire.
Mais il y a plus. Il s’agit d’une ‘‘ Commission of Inquiry’’ qui n’est formée que d’un membre, l’appelant. Qui est-il? Selon la “procuration” qui lui confie cette enquête, il est ‘‘an officer of the Taxation Division of the Department of National Revenue’’. On n’est évidemment pas en présence d’une commission impartiale. Si probe et si sympathique soit-il, l’appelant joue le rôle d’accusateur, d’avocat et de juge, plus que cela celui d’un véritable inquisiteur. Il veut pour des fins ultérieures étayer sa preuve. Or, qui dit inquisition dit “perquisition rigoureuse mêlée d’arbitraire’’. Fonctionnaire dévoué au département dont il fait partie, il est forcément, même malgré lui, préjugé.
J’estime done qu’il ne s’agit pas de l’exercice de pouvoirs administratifs, mais d’une autorité quasi-judiciaire. Tel est aujourd’hui le caractère attributable aux organismes de l’Etat (fédéral ou provincial) comme les commissions, les régies, en un mot le corps qui agissent par vole de délégation de l’Etat. Aussi, devait-on respecter la règle audi alteram partem.
Quant à l’étude de cette maxime, elle est bien élaborée dans le jugement, tant sur la doctrine que sur la jurisprudence.
Je rejetterais l’appel.
Hyde, J.:—This appeal is concerned with the right of the respondent to be present and represented by counsel at all sittings of an inquiry to be conducted by the appellant authorized by the Deputy Minister of National Revenue, acting for his Minister, under the provisions of Sections 4 and 8 of the Income Tax Act (Canada), ‘‘into the affairs’’ of the respondent and some fourteen other taxpayers mentioned in such authorization (Exhibit P-1).
The text of these sections of the Income Tax Act, of Sections 4,5 and 11 of the Inquiries Act made applicable by Section 8 of the former Act, and the pretentions of the respondent in seeking the injunction, are set out in the notes of my colleague Owen, J. so that I do not need to repeat them. As he says, the extent of the rights presently claimed by respondent are not to be found in the Income Tax Act or the Inquiries Act. I likewise agree that there is no provision in the Canadian Bill of Rights which clearly recognizes them. If this latter statute has any application the relevant portion would be Section 2(e) which seeks to ensure the right of all persons:
“to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations ; ’ ’
In my view, however, the inquiry in question is not ‘‘for the determination of ‘respondent’s’ rights and obligations’’ for reasons which will appear in the consideration of what I deem to be the real issue in this case, and beyond this I do not think it is necessary to discuss that aspect of the case.
Respondent’s right, if he is to succeed, must be found in the application of the fundamental principles of justice recognized in Canada—sometimes referred to as “British justice’’, at others as “natural justice’’, ‘‘essential justice’’, or perhaps, in what seems to be the more modern phrase, ‘‘the rule of law’’.
While much can be, and has been written on this subject, we universally recognize two basic propositions. First, a man must not be judge in his own cause. Secondly, no person ought to be condemned unheard.
Respondent’s claim would, of course, be comprised in the second of these; he is not attempting to assert the whole of it, merely the right to be present with his counsel.
It is suggested that he has this right whether appellant is acting in a judicial or an administrative capacity because, in the words of Davis, J. (with whom only Lamont, J. expressed agreement) in St. John et al. v. Fraser, [1935] S.C.R. 452, in either case he must act ‘‘judicially in the sense that (he) must act fairly and impartially’’.
I do not, of course, quarrel with this statement to the extent that any person or body acting in a judicial capacity must act fairly and impartially. I do suggest, however, with respect, that it is going too far to apply that requirement fully to one exercising an administrative function. As I read it, that is not the sense in which it was used in either of the two decisions referred to by Davis, J., namely, O’Connor v. Waldron, [1935] A.C. 76, and Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q.B. 431.
Both of these cases were concerned with the extent to which the statements of certain governmental officials were privileged, in the former a commissioner under the Canadian Combines Investigation Act and in the latter a London County councillor at a meeting considering the granting of a licence. In neither case were the defendants held to be entitled to the absolute privilege of a judicial tribunal which was limited to proceedings before a court of justice and tribunals exercising functions equivalent thereto.
In O’Connor v. Waldron, the defendant commissioner was not considered to have ‘‘attributes similar to those of a Court of justice” such as would be the case with a military court of inquiry or an investigation by an ecclesiastical commission. On the other hand, the fact was recognized, however, and here we come to the passage relied upon by Davis, J.:
“that a tribunal may be exercising merely administrative functions though in so doing it must act ‘judicially’ it is well established, and appears clearly from the Royal Aquarium case. ’ ’
In the Royal Aquarium case, the Master of the Rolls, Lord Esher, in the Court of Appeal (at page 445), after stating that the application for judgment for the defendant based on his claim of absolute privilege must be dismissed, went on to say :
“With regard to the case of Reg. v. London County Council, ex parte Akkersdyk, [1892] 1 Q.B. 190, I do not in any way differ from the decision in that case. The rule applied in that case may be stated: Wherever any person has conferred upon him an authority to decide upon a matter affecting another, which he is bound to exercise fairly and impartially, he must act according to the rules of reason and justice. Therefore, he cannot at the same time act as accuser and judge.’’
Going then to Reg. v. London County Council, ex parte Ak- kersdyk, we find A. L. Smith, J. at page 190 saying:
‘‘In our judgment, the London County Council are adjudicating as to whether a man is or is not to be deprived of his licence ; to use the words of Cotton, L. J., in Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education (43 Ch. D. at p. 379), * Though not in the ordinary sense judges, they have to decide judicially as to whether or not the complaint made is well founded.’ In our judgment, when so acting, they are not emancipated from the ordinary principles upon which justice is administered in this kingdom, and which are, as it has been said, founded on its very essence.’’
In the present instance, the appellant is an officer of the Department of National Revenue authorized ‘‘to make the inquiry” as mentioned but without authority to decide upon any matter affecting the respondent, or anyone else for that matter, or to adjudicate in any sense whatsoever.
The nature of this ‘‘inquiry’’ must be considered in relation to the powers of the Minister as a whole under the Income Tax Act. It provides (Section 44) that a taxpayer shall, each year, file a return of income and estimate the amount of tax payable. The Minister examines the return and then assesses the tax (Section 46).
If the taxpayer is not happy with the assessment he may (Section 55) serve on the Minister a notice of objection whereupon the latter is required to reconsider the assessment and then notify the taxpayer of his decision.
If he is still not satisfied with this decision, the taxpayer may appeal to the Tax Appeal Board (Section 59) and from there to the Exchequer Court of Canada (Section 60).
Now it is obvious that the Minister in making the original assessment or considering an objection cannot be required to limit himself to the facts given him by the taxpayer. Thus tax- payers are required (Section 125) to keep records and books of account ‘‘containing such information as will enable the taxes . . . to be determined’’, and the Minister, or any person authorized by him, is entitled to examine these records and any other documents relating thereto. Specifically, by Section 126 (1) (c) he may
“(c) require the owner or manager of the property or business and any other person on the premises or place to give him all reasonable assistance with his audit or examination and to answer all proper questions relating to the audit or examination either orally or, if he so requires, in writing, on oath or by statutory declaration and, for that purpose, require the owner or manager to attend at the premises or place with him, and ’ ’ and by subsection (2) of this section:
“(2) The Minister may, for any purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act, by registered letter or by a demand served personally, require from any person
(a) any information or additional information, including a return of income or a supplementary return, or
(b) production, or production on oath, of any books, letters, accounts, invoices, statements (financial or otherwise) or other documents,
within such reasonable time as may be stipulated therein.’’ Subsection (3) authorizes search and seizure with court approval, and then comes subsection (4) permitting the Minister to authorize any person ‘‘to make such inquiry as he may deem necessary with reference to anything relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act’’, the power which the Minister has exercised in favour of appellant in the present instance.
The duty of the Minister is clear, namely, to assess and collect the taxes payable under the Act. In doing so
‘“The Minister is not bound by a return or information supplied by or on behalf of a taxpayer and, in making an assessment, may, notwithstanding a return or information so supplied or if no return has been filed assess the tax payable under this Part.’’ (Section 46(6))
At times the assessment is an extremely difficult and complicated operation. Modern commerce and the levying of taxes upon it is very different from what it was during the 19th century. Since then we have seen a vast growth in the scope of government activities. If we are to live in the welfare state it must be supported by all. Public policy in this respect is determined through the democratic process. The surest way to create dissatisfaction with it is to ignore the ‘‘tax dodger”.
The Minister in making the assessment is acting in a purely administrative capacity and so are all those responsible to him, including appellant in the making of his inquiry. The latter is simply collecting facts to enable the Minister to make the assessment. The Minister will rely on such information as may be available to him and will not necessarily base himself on what the inquiry has produced.
But, says respondent, it is not fair that witnesses should be forced to testify under oath in his absence, that his employees, for example, should be examined in this way without confrontation, and even though such testimony could not be used against him before the Tax Appeal Board or the Exchequer Court, it is still there to test credibility with the threat of perjury charges.
Regardless as to whether it is ‘‘fair’’ or not, with respect, “fairness” is not the test. As a purely administrative matter where the person holding the inquiry neither decides nor adjudicates upon anything, it is not for the courts to specify how that inquiry is to be conducted except to the extent, if any, that the subject’s rights are denied him. The taking of sworn statements is a common everyday occurrence. The deponent is frequently examined in subsequent court proceedings where the interests of another may be affected by the statements of that witness. I know of no requirement in law that any person likely to be affected in such a way is entitled to be present with counsel when such a sworn statement is originally made, and I see little distinction from the proceeding in issue.
Indeed, the Criminal Code, Section 440, requires a justice who receives an information that a person has committed an indictable offence to ‘‘hear and consider, ex parte . . . the allegations of the informant, and evidence of witnesses, where he considers it desirable and necessary’’ and when so doing, such evidence must be taken under oath and recorded (refer to Section 453). I would observe also that in considering whether a case has been made out the justice is acting judicially (R. v. Fox, 27 C.R. 132 (Ont. C.A.)), but in the initial stage of bringing an accused to trial for a specific offence. This, of course, is followed by a preliminary inquiry at which the accused is present and entitled either personally or by counsel to cross-examine witnesses and to produce his own if he chooses to do so.
What is important is that the taxpayer is entitled to his day in court where he is assured of a fair and impartial hearing with all evidence for the purpose of determining his case being submitted under the ordinary rules of proof.
If the taxpayer is entitled to the right claimed here he would have the same right under Section 126(1)(c), above quoted, so that the departmental investigation contemplated would be turned into a public inquiry out of all proportion with practical requirements.
In my opinion the petition for injunction should have been dismissed with costs and I would allow this appeal with costs to that end.
RINFRET, J.:—“Ce n’est que lorsqu’il s’agit de définir ainsi ses droits et obligations qu’une personne a droit à une audition impartiale’’; cette phrase, tirée textuellement du factum de l’appelant, dénote, à mon avis, de la part de celui qui l’a écrite, une fausse conception de ce que doit être la justice, même en matière administrative.
Prise à la lettre et reliée à l’argument de l’appelant, que le commissaire nommé en vertu des dispositions de la Loi de l’impôt sur le Revenu ne définit pas les droits et obligations de la personne enquêtée, cette phrase pourrait faire croire que le département, du moins dans l’esprit de celui qui a énoncé ces deux propositions, n’est pas tenu à l’impartialité, elle ouvre la porte au faux concept que, dans son enquête, le commissaire peut, sans tenir compte de la justice naturelle, faire preuve à l’égard de l’enquête, de la pire espèce de partialité et d’arbitraire.
Ce n’est sûrement pas là l’intention de la loi.
Que l’on punisse la fraude, que l’on châtie celui qui s’en est rendu coupable, j’en suis entièrement; mais pour établir cette fraude, l’on ne doit pas procéder avec une partialité et un arbitraire qui sied mal aux personnes chargées de la bonne administration de nos lois.
N’est-ce pas là le principe fondamental de la justice britannique: une personne est innocente jusqu’à ce qu’elle ait été déclarée coupable par un tribunal ou une autorité compétente.
Que l’on recherche la vérité, d’accord, mais que l’on procède avec impartialité, que l’on accorde à l’enquêté un ‘‘fair hearing’’, une audition impartiale, tel que pourvu à l’art. 2(e) de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme : :
C‘ . . nulle loi du Canada ne doit s’interpréter ni s’appliquer comme
(e) privant une personne du droit à une audition impartiale de sa cause, selon les principes de justice fondamentale, pour la définition de ses droits et obligations.’’
Je suis bien d’accord que cette loi ne crée pas de droits, comme elle le déclare elle-même à l’art. 1: ce n’est qu’une reconnaissance “des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales . . . qui ont existé et continueront à exister pour tout individu au Canada quels que soient sa race, son origine nationale, sa couleur, sa religion ou son sexe’’.
Pour mettre de côté la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme, l’appelant soutient
(1) qu’il ne s’agit pas ici d’une cause, et
(2) que l’enquêteur ne ‘‘définit pas les droits et obligations” de l’intimé.
Sur le premier point, j’endosse entièrement le point de vue émis par le juge de première instance à l’effet que les dispositions de l’art. 2(e) doivent se lire avec celles de l’art. 2(d), et qu’elles “s’appliquent à toute audition, devant tout tribunal, commission, office ou autre autorité dont l’objet est de définir les droits et obligations d’une personne”.
L’introduction du mot “cause” dans la version française ne doit pas faire échec à l’expression ‘‘fair hearing’’, beaucoup plus large et non restreinte à une ‘‘cause’’, dans la rédaction anglaise.
Il y a plus cependant, car, aux termes de la loi, il s’agit véritablement, dans la présente instance, d’une “cause”.
Je n’en veux d’autre preuve que le texte même de l’art. 11 de la Loi des Enquêtes (S.R.C. 1952, c. 154) :
“11. (1) Les commissaires, qu’ils soient nommés sous le régime de la Partie I ou de la Partie II, s’ils y sont autorisés par la commision émise dans la cause . . .”.
Le texte anglais est au même effet:
C . . if thereunto authorized by the commission issued in the case . . .”.
Il est incontestable que, par 1’art. 126 par. (8) de la Loi de l’impôt sur le Revenu (S.R.C. 1952, c. 148), l’art. 11 de la Loi des Enquêtes s’applique, et ce, d’autant plus dans la présente instance, puisque l’appelant a reçu l’autorisation spéciale requise dans la “procuration” qui l’a nommé.
La commission de l’appelant doit done être considérée comme ayant été émise dans une “cause”, quoique, dans le vrai sens du mot, aucune action judiciaire n’ait encore été instituée.
Comment autrement interpréter l’art. 11 de la Loi des Enquêtes^. Lorsqu’une action—civile ou criminelle—a été introduite, il ne s’agit plus pour le département de déterminer les droits et obligations, cela devient la fonction du juge au procès.
Mais, soutient l’appelant, . . même s’il s’agit d’une ‘cause’,” le commissaire ne définira pas les droits et les obligations de l’intimé, la détermination s’en fera par le Ministre ou le Sous-Ministre.
C’est, à mon avis, indûment fendre les cheveux en quatre.
D’après la Loi de l’impôt (art. 116(1)), c’est le Ministre qui “assure l’application et l’exécution de la loi, et qui a la direction et la surveillance de toutes les personnes employées à cette fin”.
Le Sous-Ministre peut exercer tous les pouvoirs et remplir toutes les fonctions dévolues au Ministre.
Toutes les dispositions de la Loi de l’impôt réfèrent au Ministre; c’est ainsi qu’en vertu, par exemple, de l’art. 46 c’est ‘‘le Ministre qui doit, avec toute la diligence possible, examiner chaque déclaration de revenu et répartir l’impôt pour l’année d’imposition . . .”.
Après examen d’une déclaration (par. 2), c’est le Ministre qui ‘ ‘ envoyé un avis de cotisation à la personne qui a produit la déclaration”.
J’imagine—ou plutôt je ne saurais imaginer—le Ministre du Revenu examinant chaque déclaration, effectuant la répartition et remettant chaque avis de cotisation à son collègue des Postes qui, lui, se chargerait de chaque livraison individuelle.
Il est évident que le Ministre doit déléguer, qu’il doit avoir un personnel considérable pour recevoir les déclarations, les classer, des cotiseurs pour la répartition, des commis pour l’envoi des avis de cotisations.
Il est aussi évident que ni le Ministre, ni le Sous-Ministre ne saurait, par lui-même, procéder aux enquêtes jugées nécessaires et qu’il doit, pour cette fonction, déléguer ses pouvoirs à des commissaires enquêteurs.
La loi prévoit qu’il pourra agir ainsi et elle donne à ces commissaires les pouvoirs nécessaires à cette fin.
L’enquête est done celle du Ministre ou du Sous-Ministre, tout comme s’il la conduisait lui-même.
'C ’est apparemment la position prise par le département devant la Cour Supérieure, le Sous-Ministre prétendant qu’il est ‘‘seul juge de la manière dont les fonctions de cet. enquêteur doivent être exercées”.
Par cette prise de position, le Sous-Ministre reconnaissait que l’enquête menée par le département était une de sa nature et qu’elle ne pouvait pas être scandée en, d’un côté, la prise des témoignages par le commissaire et, de l’autre, la décision qu’il devait rendre à la suite de cette enquête.
Ainsi considérée, l’enquête ne forme qu’un seul tout; même si elle s’opère en deux phases, ces deux phases sont intimement liées entr’elles et elles aboutissent à la décision du Sous-Ministre et, par conséquent, à la définition ou détermination, par lui, des droits et obligations de l’intimé.
Le premier juge a rejeté la proposition de l’appelant en se basant entr’autres sur le texte français de l’article 126(4) de la Loi de l’impôt:
1 ‘126. (4) Le Ministre peut, pour toute fin ayant trait à l’application ou à l’exécution de la présente loi, autoriser une personne, qu’elle soit ou non un fonctionnaire du Ministère du Revenu National, à faire toute enquête qu’elle juge nécessaire sur une question relevant de l’application ou de l’exécution de la dite loi.”
Le texte anglais se lit : ‘‘. to make such inquiry as he may deem necessary . . .”.
Le mot “he” s’applique-t-il au Ministre ou à la personne désignée? Il pourrait s’appliquer aux deux.
J’estime, pour ma part, que l’enquête menée par le département ne saurait être scandée—la première phase, celle de la prise des dépositions, étant terminée, la seconde, celle de la décision, de la définition des droits et obligations, doit suivre automatiquement: commencée lors de la première séance de l’enquête proprement dite, elle ne se terminera qu’avec la décision du Sous-Ministre, tout comme s’il avait lui-même procédé à l’interrogatoire des témoins au lieu de déléguer, par ‘‘procuration’’, ses pouvoirs à une tierce personne.
Reste à savoir si l’injonction n’aurait pas dû, dans ces circonstances, être adressée au Sous-Ministre.
La question ne nous a pas été soumise à nous et même si l’on peut interpréter le premier jugement comme décidant de la question, l’appelant n’en a pas fait un motif d’appel.
Le factum de l’appelant nous dit (p. 11) qu’il
“n’était pas tenu, en vertu de la loi, de rédiger un rapport sur les faits découverts lors de l’enquête, et il lui suffisait pour donner suite au mandat qu’on lui avait confié de faire parvenir au Ministre ou au Sous-Ministre la transcription des témoi- gnages donnés au cours de l’enquête, sans aucune recommandation. ’ ’
Si tel est le cas, 11 apparaît clairement que le commissaire n’agit que comme secrétaire du Sous-Ministre dont c’est en réalité l’enquête.
Il semble toutefois que Me James Lauren Gourlay, qui est co-commissaire avec l’appelant (d.c., p. 24), a, si l’on en croit son témoignage (d.c., p. 35), des fonctions plus étendues: il agit “as a solicitor, dealing only with the enforcement of the Act, the legal interpretation, the weighing of evidence’’.
“Weighing of evidence’’ ressemble étrangement à un rapport et à une recommandation, implicite à tout le moins.
J’en viens done à la conclusion que l’enquête tombe carrément sous les dispositions de l’article 2(e) de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et que l’enquêteur appelant ne pouvait pas priver l’intimé du droit à une audition impartiale de sa cause, selon les principes de justice fondamentale, puisque celle-ci se terminait par la définition de ses droits et obligations.
Il me semblerait renversant que, sous l’article 2(d), la personne appelée à témoigner dans la cause, devant la commission, ait le droit au secours d’un avocat et que la personne investiguée n’ait pas un droit similaire.
L’on s’est appliqué à soutenir que le commissaire appelant n’était pas lié par les articles 12 et 13 de la Loi des Enquêtes.
Je ne puis pas admettre cette prétention.
Il ne s’agit pas ici—soit dit en toute déférence—de expressio unius est exclusio alterius: il est vrai que l’article 126(4) de la Loi de l’impôt ne mentionne que les articles 4, 5 et 11 de la Loi des Enquêtes mais il y a, pour cela, une bonne raison.
Les articles 4 et 5 sont compris dans la partie I de la loi: “Enquêtes sur les affaires publiques”—il est clair que le commissaire, dans une enquête sous la partie II, “Enquête concernant les départements’’, n’aurait pas eu ces pouvoirs si la Loi de l’Impôt ne les lui avait pas spécifiquement concédés.
Quant à l’article 11, le commissaire doit être spécialement autorisé par la commission qui le nomme, pour en revendiquer les pouvoirs.
Peut-on soutenir que vu la limitation de l’énumération aux articles 4, 5 et 11 dans l’article 126, les autres articles (6 à 10 inclusivement) de la Loi des Enquêtes, ceux qui ont particulièrement trait aux enquêtes de départements, cessent de s’appliquer ?
Les pouvoirs des articles 4 et 5 ne sont que supplétifs à ceux qu’accordent aux commissaires les articles 6 à 10 inclusivement.
Point n’était besoin de référer à ces derniers.
De la même façon, les articles 12 et 13 qui concernent, eux, tant les enquêtes sur les affaires publiques que les enquêtes de départements, doivent s’appliquer à la présente commission et imposent des obligations à l’enquêteur.
“12. Les commissaires peuvent permettre à toutes personnes dont la conduite fait le sujet d’une enquête sous l’autorité de la présente loi, et doivent permettre à toute personne contre laquelle il est porté quelque accusation au cours de pareille enquête, d’être représentée par un avocat.??
Le commissaire a discrétion pour permettre ou refuser à la personne enquêtée d’être représentée par avocat.
L’usage de cette discrétion dans un sens ou dans l’autre prend, à mon avis, un caractère quasi judiciaire sinon judiciaire, il a certes pour résultat de définir ou de déterminer le droit de l’intimé aux services d’un procureur.
Sous cet aspect, il rejoint sûrement les dispositions de l’article 2(e) de la Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme.
A remarquer en effet que c’est de cette décision que se plaint l’intimé: il ne s’oppose pas à l’enquête même mais à la décision du commissaire de l’en exclure.
Est-ce bien certain encore que l’enquête instituée ne porte pas en elle-même les germes d’une accusation possible et ne conduit pas, vu les pouvoirs extraordinaires accordés au département, à une décision effective et à une exécution préalable à toute action judiciaire, et indépendante d’elle.
Il est également apparent qu’un rapport peut être fait contre l’intimé, que ce soit par l’enquêteur Guay, par le co-commissaire et aviseur légal Gourlay qui interprétera la loi et pèsera les témoignages ou par le Ministre ou le Sous-Ministre et, dans ce cas, suivant les dispositions de l’article 13 de la Loi sur les Enquêtes, l’intimé a droit à un avis raisonnable de l’accusation implicite de mauvaise conduite portée contre lui et le droit de se faire entendre en personne ou par le ministère d’un avocat.
Je suis done d’opinion que l’enquête jugée nécessaire par le Ministre du Revenu National n’est pas exclusivement et purement affaire administrative et qu’en raison des pouvoirs extraordinaires accordés au département, elle revêt à plus d’un point de vue en caractère judiciaire suffisant pour conférer à l’intimé le droit de s’y faire représenter.
Le commissaire Guay a, pour les fins de son enquête, certains des pouvoirs dont sont revêtues les Cours d’Archives en matières civiles, le co-enquêteur Gourlay se prononce sur les questions légales et le poids de la preuve et le Ministre ou le Sous-Ministre rend la décision finale laquelle donne ouverture à exécution immédiate, sans intervention des Courts de Justice.
Si l’on s’en rapporte aux deux propositions reproduites au début de ces remarques, l’enquêteur, relevé de son obligation d’impartialité que lui dicte un principe fondamental de justice naturelle, prend plutôt figure d’accusateur.
Je rejetterais l’appel et recommanderais à la Couronne d’en assumer les dépens.
OWEN, J.:—This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court, District of Montreal, February 17, 1961, which enjoined the appellant, Philippe Guay (in his capacity as a person authorized by the Minister to make an inquiry under the terms of the Section 126(4) of the Income Tax Act) to suspend the sessions of the inquiry until the respondent, René Lafieur, has been authorized to be present and to be represented by his legal attorneys at the said sessions.
The conclusions of the judgment appealed from are as follows (p. 70 J.C.) :
‘“ ACCUEILLE la requête en injonction du demandeur; Ordonne que les séances du défendeur agissant en sa qualité d’enquêteur nommé par le sous-ministre du Revenu national en date du 28 décembre 1960 et en vertu des dispositions de l’article 126(4) de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu soient suspendues jusqu’a ce que le demandeur ait obtenu du défendeur l’autorisation d’y être présent et d’y être représenté par ses procureurs; le tout sans frais mais avec recommandation que les frais du demandeur soient payés par le mis-en-cause. ’ ’
By an order, dated December 28, 1960 (Exhibit P-1) the Deputy Minister for Taxation of the Department of National Revenue authorized Philippe Guay, an officer of the Taxation Division of the Department of National Revenue, to make an inquiry into the affairs of the respondent René Lafleur and other individuals and incorporated companies specifically mentioned in the order. Guay was ordered to conduct this commission of inquiry as authorized by Section 126(4) and (8) of the Income Tax Act which give the person authorized to make the inquiry all the powers and authorities conferred on a commissioner by Sections 4 and 5 of the Inquiries Act or which may be conferred on a commissioner under Section 11 thereof.
These two sections of the two Acts read as follows : Income Tax. Act, Section. 126 :
«“ (4) The Minister may, for the purpose related to the administration or enforcement of this Act, authorize any person, whether or not he is an officer of the Department of National Revenue, to make such inquiry as he may deem necessary with reference to anything relating to the administration or enforcement of this Act.
(8) For the purpose of an inquiry authorized under subsection (4), the person authorized to make the inquiry has all the powers and authorities conferred on a commissioner by sections 4 and 5 of the Inquiries Act or which may be conferred on a commissioner under section 11 thereof.’’
Inquiries Act : :
“4. The commissioners have the power of summoning before them any witnesses, and of requiring them to give evidence on oath, or on solemn affirmation if they are persons entitled to affirm in civil matters, and orally or in writing, and to produce such documents and things as the commissioners deem requisite to the full investigation of the matters into which they are appointed to examine.
o. The commissioners have the same power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to give evidence as 18 vested in any court of record in civil cases.
11. (1) The commissioners, whether appointed under Part I or under Part II, if thereunto authorized by the commission issued in the case, may engage the services of such accountants, engineers, technical advisers, or other experts, clerks, reporters and assistants as they deem necessary or advisable, and also the services of counsel to aid and assist the commissioners in the inquiry.
(2) The commissioners may authorize and depute any such accountants, engineers, technical advisers, or other experts, or any other qualified persons, to inquire into any matter within the scope of the commission as may be directed by the commissioners.
(3) The persons so deputed, when authorized by Order in Council, have the same powers that the commissioners have to take evidence, issue subpoenas, enforce the attendance of witnesses, compel them to give evidence, and otherwise conduct such inquiry.
(4) The persons so deputed shall report the evidence and their findings, if any, thereon to the commissioners.’’
The appellant started to hold sittings in the National Revenue Building on Dorchester Street in Montreal on January 10, 1961 after having summoned a certain number of witnesses for the purpose of questioning them under oath with stenography regarding the affairs of the persons subject to the inquiry (i.e. René Lafleur and others). The witnesses were permitted to be represented by legal counsel.
The respondent, René Lafleur, had not been summoned to appear nor had he received any official notice that the commission of inquiry was being held.
In the course of the interrogation of the first witness on January 10, 1961, Lafleur, by his attorneys, made an appearance before Guay and asked that Lafleur be authorized to be present and to be represented by legal counsel at all the sittings of the commission of inquiry. This request was refused and the inquiry continued until January 12, 1961 which was the date of the hearing of the petition for an interlocutory injunction which was the basis of the judgment from which the present appeal has been taken. The appellant, Guay, at that time agreed to suspend sittings of the commission of inquiry until judgment was rendered so that it was not necessary to issue an interlocutory injunction.
Basically the respondent’s petition for injunction asks the Court (p. 6 J.C.): :
11 Ordonner que lesdites séances de ladite commission soient suspendues jusqu’à ce que le demandeur ait obtenu du défendeur l’autorisation d’être présent et d’être représenté à toutes et chacune desdites séances par ses procureurs ;”?
As set out above the judgment appealed from granted this conclusion.
The judgment appealed from held first that the Superior Court had jurisdiction to decide the issue and second that an injunction was the proper remedy. Neither of these points have been raised before this Court.
Turning to what he terms ‘‘le noeud du litige” the learned trial judge then deals with the main question as to whether the plaintiff, Lafleur, has the right to insist that the defendant, Guay, allow the plaintiff and his attorneys to be present at the sessions of the commission of inquiry presided over by the defendant. He asks whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is recognized by law, points out that the Income Tax Act neither recognizes nor denies the right claimed, and states that the Inquiries Act does not answer the question because only Sections 4, 5 and 11 thereof are applicable to the present case.
The learned trial judge expresses the opinion that the inquiry contemplated in virtue of Section 126(4) and (8) of the Income Tax Act and Sections 4, 5 and 11 of the Inquiries Act violates the principles of fundamental justice which jurisprudence has consecrated in the maxim audi alteram partem.
He then points out that in most of the decided cases the right of a person to be present at the hearing or to make representations either personally or by attorney has been recognized only where the rights of this person could be affected by the decision of a tribunal or an administrative body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers and that on the other hand this right has been. refused in the case of certain. hearings conducted by individuals or commissions exercising purely administrative powers because such person or commission was not called upon to decide or determine the rights of the individual. The learned trial judge then continues as follows (p. 56 J.C.) :
“Mais la lecture de ces divers arrêts révèle que dans les cas •où la maxime audi alteram partem n’a pas été appliquée, les tribunaux n’ont pas émis de principes aussi absolus, rigoureux, généraux et constants que ceux qu’a suggérés le défendeur et que la Cour vient de mentionner; elle révèle que le fait que la personne ou la commission chargée de faire enquête n’avait pas pour fonction de déterminer des droits ne fut pas le seul critère retenu par les tribunaux, que les tribunaux ont aussi retenu tantôt des dispositions de la loi particulière en vertu de laquelle l’enquête se faisait et ne vertu desquelles le droit d’être entendu était refusé expressément, tantôt que les plaignants avaient eu un occassion raisonnablement suffisante de se faire entendre ; ces décisions paraissent avoir eu surtout comme critère commun la contestation que le fait pour le justiciable de n’avoir pas été entendu ne lui avait causé aucun préjudice auquel il ne peut être remédié.’’
He next considers the provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights (particularly Section 2(d) and Section 2(e)) and the provisions of the Income Tax Act and holds as follows (p. 67 J.C.) :
“Pour ces raisons, le juge soussigné est d’opinion que l’enquête devant le commissaire enquêteur constitue une audition qui a. pour objet la définition de ses obligations, qu’à raison de cette audition, la liberté et les biens du contribuable sont menacés et que, dès lors, il faut, en vertu de l’article 2(e) de la Loi de Déclaration canadienne des droits, que cette audition soit impartiale.
Dans l’opinion du juge soussigné, l’audition devant le défendeur ne peut, à raison des circonstances et pouvoirs arbitraires susdits du Ministre, être impartiale si l’on refuse au contribuable contre lequel elle est dirigée la permission d’être présent et d’être représenté par ses procureurs, lors de l’audition de témoins obligés de témoigner sous serment, et si on lui refuse, de ce chef, le droit de faire devant l’enquêter les représentations nécessaires à la protection de ses droits et d’offrir lui- même une preuve de nature à éclairer le commissaire, et, par son intermédiaire, le Ministre, de facon juste et impartiale . . .’ ’
Finally the learned trial judge concludes as follows (p. 69 J.C.) :
‘‘Pour ces raisons, le juge soussigné en vient à la conclusion que le refus par le défendeur d’admettre le demandeur et ses procureurs aux séances qu ’il tient et qu ’il tiendra pour les fins de l’enquête qu’il a été charge de conduire en vertu des articles 126(4) et (8) de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu et suivant la procédure régie par les articles 4 et 5 de la Lov sur les enquêtes équivaut à un refus d’accorder au demandeur une audition impartiale pour fins de définition de ses obligations, qu’une telle audition est contraire aux dispositions de la Loi de Déclaration canadienne des droits, que sa continuation causerait au demandeur un prejudice incalculable et irréparable et qu’elle vicie en conséquence jusqu’à ce que les corrections nécessaires y soient apportées l’enquête tenue par le défendeur.”
The appellant, Guay, concisely states his very narrow grounds of appeal as follows (p. 3, appellant’s factum) :
‘ ‘ L ’appelant repose son recours sur les deux points suivants : A—La Loi de l’Impôt sur le Revenu n’obligeait pas le Commissaire appelant à permettre la présence de l’intimé et/ou de ses procureurs aux séances qu'il était appelé à conduire en vertu de mandat qui lui avait été conféré.
B—La Déclaration Canadienne des Droits de l’Homme (ch. 44, 8-9 Elizabeth II) n’a pas et n’avait pas pour effet de conférer ce droit à l’intimé.”
The respondent, Lafleur, meets the appellant on these grounds which he claims to be false propositions and submits the following contrary propositions (p. 7 respondent’s factum) :
“(A) Pour la protection de ses droits, l’intimé avait le droit d’être présent et d’être représenté par procureurs aux séances de la commission d’enquête constituée en vertu de la Loi de l’impôt sur le Revenue.
(B) Ce droit de l’intimé est confirmé dans la Déclaration Canadienne des Droits de l’Homme (8-9 Elizabeth II, chapitre 44) ;”’
Lafleur claims that he has the right to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry presided over by Guay. Lafleur is not claiming any right to cross-examine witnesses summoned to give evidence at the inquiry. At this stage Lafleur is not claiming the right to be heard or to offer evidence.
At opposite ends of the seale there are two forms of procedure, one of which may be referred to as a private investigation and the other as a court case.
I am using the term 4 ‘ private investigation’’ to cover the procedure such as that whereby a detective, an adjuster or some other investigator interviews witnesses and obtains information. Witnesses are visited, asked to give information and notes are taken. In some eases a written statement is signed by the witnesses and in other cases a sworn declaration is obtained. Frequently the information so obtained is embodied in a report. As far as the witnesses are concerned they are free to supply information or to refuse to do so as they see fit. They do not receive a summons or subpoena which compels them to attend at a certain place to give evidence under oath. In such a case it is clear that the person being investigated cannot claim any right to notice of the investigation nor any right to be present either in person or by counsel when the witnesses are interviewed.
At the other end of the scale we have what may be referred to as a court case in which opposing parties put forward their contentions, evidence and arguments are submitted, and a. decision or judgment is rendered whereby the rights of the parties are affected. Here the witnesses are summoned to court and compelled to give evidence under oath. In such case a person whose rights are affected generally has a right to be notified, to be present, to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, to testify on his own behalf and to offer relevant evidence.
In between these two widely separated cases there are many investigations, inquiries or hearings which are neither private investigations nor court cases. These in-between cases in some respects resemble a private investigation and in some respects resemble a court action.
It is difficult—and probably undesirable—to lay down all- embracing rules regarding the rights of individuals concerned in and the obligations of persons conducting these in-between eases, which vary all the way from something close to a private investigation to something very close to a court action. It seems to me that the best procedure is to look at each particular case and deeide it in the light of the nature of the proceeding involved.
The present case is clearly one of the in-between cases. It resembles a private investigation in that Guay makes a report but does not render a decision or judgment. On the other hand it resembles a court action in that the witnesses are summoned to the inquiry where they are compelled to give evidence under oath which is taken down by an official stenographer.
The first problem is where we should look to ascertain the rights, if any, of Lafleur to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry and the obligations, if any, of Guay to permit Lafleur to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry.
It has been suggested that to determine the respective rights and obligations of Lafleur and Guay we should look
(a) at the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Inquiries Act, or
(b) at the relevant provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights, or
(c) at the general principle of justice summed up in the maxim audi alteram partem, or
(d) at the fundamental principle recognized and enforced by our courts to the effect that an inquiry, even though it is purely administrative, should be conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
(a) In my opinion the applicable provisions of the Income Tax Act, Section 126(4) and (8), and of the Inquiries Act, Sections 4, 5 and 11, do not oblige Guay to permit Lafleur to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry. On the other hand these provisions do not expressly prohibit Guay from permitting Lafleur to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry. The extent of Lafleur’s right to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry is not to be found in the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Inquiries Act.
(b) In my opinion the Canadian Bill of Rights does not give the answer to the question as to whether Lafleur has the right to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry which is to be conducted by Guay. The Canadian Bill of Rights which was passed in 1960 did not create new rights. It recognized certain existing rights but it did not restrict any existing rights.
Section 5(1) of the Canadian Bill of Rights reads:
‘ i 5. (1) Nothing in Part I shall be construed to abrogate or abridge any human right or fundamental freedom not enume- rated therein that may have existed in Canada at the commencement of this Act.”
If the right which Lafleur is claiming were clearly recognized in the Canadian Bill of Rights that would be a simple solution to the problem. I do not find any provision in the Canadian Bill of vights which clearly recognizes the right invoked by Lafleur.
Section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 8-9 Eliz. II, c. 44 provides in part as follows :
“2. Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it should operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to
(d) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other authority: to compel a person to give evidence if-he is denied counsel, protection against self erimination or other constitutional safeguards;
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations ; ’ ’
In my view there is doubt as to whether the right which Lafleur is claiming at this stage is ‘‘the right to a fair hearing . . . for the determination of his rights and oblgations’’. However even if the right claimed by Lafleur is not specifically recognized in the Canadian Bill of Rights this does not mean that such right does not exist.
(c) In my opinion it is doubtful whether the principle which is summed up in the maxim audi alteram partem would serve as a basis for deciding whether or not Guay is obliged to allow Lafleur to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry. According to this maxim ‘‘no one is to be condemned, punished, or deprived of his property in any judicial proceeding, unless he has had an opportunity of being heard” (Broom’s Legal Maxims, 9th ed., 1924, p. 78). In my opinion it is not proper to attempt to lay down restrictive conditions which must be met in every case before the right to a fair hearing can be invoked. The right to a fair hearing is not an exception which must be narrowly stated and restrictively interpreted, it is a general rule or fundamental right which must be broadly stated and liberally interpreted. If we give a narrow meaning and a restricted application to the fundamental principle set out in this maxim audi alteram partem it can hardly be said that the proposed inquiry is a judicial proceeding in which Lafleur is liable to be condemned, punished or deprived of his property. However, in the proceeding before us Lafleur is not asking that the court recognize his right to be heard. He is merely asking that he be allowed to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry. In such circumstances he is not obliged to bring his case squarely within a narrow statement of the maxim audi alteram partem, in order to be allowed to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry. We should look elsewhere to determine whether Lafieur is entitled to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry.
(d) In my opinion Guay is obliged to permit Lafleur to be present and to be represented by counsel at the inquiry in virtue of a fundamental principle of justice which has been recognized and enforced by our courts prior to the passage of the Canadian Bill of Rights. According to this fundamental principle an inquiry or investigation, even if it is purely administrative, must be conducted fairly and impartially.
In the Imperial Tobacco case there was an investigation under the Combines Investigation Act. In the judgment of the Ontario Supreme Court, [1939] 3 D.L.R. 750, Hogg, J. stated (p. 756) :
“The investigation is an administrative and not a judicial proceeding. It is conducted for the purpose of obtaining information which, with the conclusions of the Commissioner based upon such information, are submitted to the Minister of Labour. No rights of the persons whose business activities have been investigated are determined or affected by the report itself, and some further action outside of, and apart from the report, is required before such rights are affected.’’ (p. 757) :
“In view of the authorities which I have mentioned, and especially with reference to the judgments of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Proprietary Articles Trade Ass’n case, and O’Connor v. Waldron, it must be concluded that subject to the consideration and determination of the further issues raised on behalf of the applicants, certiorari will not lie against the Commissioner for the reason that in making the investigation in question, he was not a body exercising judicial functions, but was performing a ministerial duty and that his report, which was the result of the investigation, did not affect the rights of the applicant companies or others involved in the investigation.
Although the Commissioner in carrying out his duties, acted as an administrative body and not a judicial body, he was bound to act judicially in the sense that he was obliged to act fairly and impartially, or, in other words, to act according to the dictates of what has sometimes been termed, natural justice.
In St. John v. Fraser, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 465, 64 Can. C.C. 90, Davis, J. affirmed the principle already expressed in the Courts in England, that an administrative tribunal must act to a certain extent in a judicial manner, in as much that such tribunal while exercising administrative functions, must act judicially in the sense that it must act fairly and impartially, and on this point the learned Judge referred to the judgment of Lord Atkin in O’Connor v. Waldron, and to Royal Aquarium L' Summer 77 Winter Garden Soc. v. Parkinson, [1892] 1 Q.B. 481.”’
Having recognized the principle Hoge, J. then found that in the case before him it had not been infringed.
(p. 761):
“I cannot reach the conclusion that the Commissioner acted, during the course of the investigation in question, in a manner which was unfair to the applicants or that he was not impartial. ’ ’
When this judgment was appealed, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 99, Gil- landers, J. of the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the same principle although the Court of Appeal agreed with Hogg, J. that the principle had not been violated.
(p. 108) :
“It is, I think, conceded by both parties that if the Commissioner herein acted as a purely administrative officer, and if the report complained of determines no rights and imposes no obligations providing it has been conducted in a judicial manner in the sense that the procedure does not offend the principles of natural justice, no certiorari would lie.”
(p. 110):
“The words ‘natural justice’ are discussed in the Arlidge case (supra) and by Davis, J. in St. John v. Fraser, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 465 at pp. 473-476, S.C.R. 441, 64 Can. C.C. 90 at pp. 100-108. I cannot think that the appellants in this case have under the circumstances been denied natural or substantial justice.’’
In St. John et al. v. Fraser, [1935] S.C.R. 441, Davis, J., of the Supreme Court of Canada, recognizes this same principle (p. 402-3) :
. Fundamentally, the investigator in this case was an administrative officer, and the machinery set up by the statute was administrative for the purpose of enquiring as to whether or not fraudulent practices had been or were being carried on in connection with the sale of securities of the Wayside Company. The investigation provisions of the statute dealing generally with the prevention of fraud by stock brokers were part and parcel of the administrative machinery for the attainment of the general purposes of the statute. The investigator was not a court of law nor was he a court in law, but to say that he was an administrative body, as distinct from a judicial tribunal, does not mean that persons appearing before him were not entitled to any rights. An administrative tribunal must act to a certain extent in a judicial manner, but that does not mean that it must act in every detail in its procedure the same as a court of law adjudicating upon a lis inter partes. It means that the tribunal, while exercising administrative functions, must act ‘judicially’ in the sense that it must act fairly and impartially. In O’Connor v. Waldron, Lord Atkin refers to cases where tribunals, such as a military court of inquiry or an investigation by an ecclesiastical commission, had attributes similar to those of a court of justice.
‘On the other hand (he continues) the fact that a tribunal may be exercising merely administrative functions though in so doing it must act judicially, is well established, and appears clearly from the Royal Aquarium ease.’
In the Royal Aquarium ease, [1892] 1 Q.B. 431, ‘judicial’ in relation to administrative bodies is used in the sense that ‘they are bound to act fairly and impartially.”
(p. 453-4) :
“. . . The investigation was primarily an administrative function under the statute, and while the investigator was bound to act judicially in the sense of being fair and impartial, that, it seems to me, is something quite different from the right asserted by the appellants of freedom of cross- examination of all the witnesses. It is natural, as Lord Shaw said in the Arlidge ease, [1915] A.C. 120, at 138, that lawyers should favour lawyer-like methods but it is not for the judiciary to impose its own methods on administrative or executive officers.”
The next step is to apply to the present case this fundamental principle of justice which requires that an investigation even if it is only administrative, must be conducted fairly and impartially.
Guay proposes to summon the witnesses of his choice, to oblige them to answer under oath the questions he deems appropriate, to obtain the production of such documents as he sees fit, and then to transmit the testimony of such witnesses, taken by an official stenographer, together with such documents to the Minister. In conducting this investigation Guay proposes to refuse to allow Lafleur to be present or to be represented by counsel. Would Guay be acting fairly and impartially in conducting his investigation in this manner with Lafleur and his counsel excluded? In my opinion he would not.
Lafleur’s right to a fair and impartial investigation implies that he has the right to attend and to be represented by counsel at the sittings of the inquiry.
The proposed investigation into the affairs of Lafleur with Lafleur and his counsel excluded would, in my opinion, be a one-sided and prejudiced inquiry.
The presence of Lafleur and his counsel at the inquiry would tend to discourage exaggerated or biased evidence by the witnesses called and to remind Guay and counsel for the Minister of their duty to act with fairness and impartiality.
Aceording to the fundamental principle of law which requires that the present investigation be fair and impartial Lafleur is entitled to attend the sittings of the inquiry and to be represented by legal counsel at such sittings.
For this reason I would dismiss the present appeal and confirm the conclusions of the judgment appealed from, the whole without costs, but with the recommendation that the costs of the respondent be paid by the Crown.
Montgomery, J.:—I agree with Hyde, J. that this appeal should be maintained.
For reasons of public policy, the Income Tax Act (RS.C. 1952, c. 148 and amendments) gives to the Minister extraordinary powers in assessing and collecting tax. Before making an assessment, he may carry out an investigation but he is not bound to do so. Such an investigation may be purely informal or it may have the more formal character of an inquiry carried out by a person authorized under Section 126(4) of the Act. In the present case appellant has been so authorized, and he has therefore under Section 126(8) the powers conferred upon a commissioner by Sections 4 and 5 of the Inquiries Act (R.S.C. 1952,
e. 154), which give him the right to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to take evidence under oath. (Reference is also made to Section 11 of the Inquiries Act, which does not appear material to the present proceedings. )
The judgment a quo holds that respondent, as one of the persons named by the Minister in the authorization given to appellant, has the right to be present at the inquiry with his legal counsel. No such right is expressly conferred upon him by the Income Tax Act or by the sections of the Inquiries Act to which reference is made above. Sections 12 and 15 of the latter Act do make provision for the hearing of a person the subject of an inquiry and for his representation by counsel. These sections do not in my opinion apply. If it had been the intention of Parliament to make them applicable it would have been simple to have referred to them in the same way as to Sections 4, 5 and 11, or else it might have been provided that the whole of the Inquiries Act would apply where not inconsistent w ith the provisions of the Income Tax Act. I conclude that there is nothing in the law to suggest that Parliament intended to confer upon a person being so subjected to injuiry the right to be present and that there are reasons for supposing that Parliament did not intend him to have such a right.
/ While the Income Tax Act confers upon the Minister wide powers of investigation and assessment, there is nothing final in any such assessment. On the contrary, express provision is made whereby the taxpayer may protest the assessment and appeal to the Tax Appeal Board and to the Exchequer Court. In some eases at least, an appeal lies from the latter court to the Supreme Court. Similarly, if the Minister decides that criminal proceedings should be instituted, these must be taken before the regular courts, subject to the usual rights of appeal. There is, therefore, no question of the taxpayer being denied the opportunity of explaining his position or making a full defence.
There is no serious question that in making the present inquiry appellant is exercising an administrative function. It 1s, however, objected that this administrative inquiry is being carried out by proceedings of a. quasi-judicial nature, and appellant has certain of the powers of a court, particularly the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and to examine them under oath. I cannot find anything in the authorities cited to suggest that this fact alone is sufficient to create a presumption that a person being investigated is entitled to be present at the inquiry and to be represented by counsel. What the authorities do establish is that the mere fact that a board or commission is carrying out an administrative function does not automatically exempt it from judicial control. It may well be that the courts should intervene if there w 7 ere any evidence of bias or partiality on the part of appellant, but it appears that he is merely at- tempting to do his duty and to carry out the inquiry in accordance with the policies of his Department.
My conclusion might be altogether different in a case where an administrative hearing or inquiry or the ministerial decision to be made as the result of such an enquiry were final and not subject to review by the courts. This was the case in Alliance des Professeurs v. Commission des Relations Ouvrières, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 140.
I would maintain the appeal and dismiss the petition for an injunetion, the whole with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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