DUMOULIN,
J.:—J.
&
R.
Weir
Limited,
an
important
Montreal
concern,
dealing
in
marine
and
industrial
works,
appeals
from
the
Tax
Appeal
Board’s
decision,
dated
April
29,
1963
(
(1963),
32
Tax
A.B.C.
33),
which
affirmed
re-assessments
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
of
appellant’s
taxable
income
for
taxation
years
1956,
1957,
1958
and
1959.
The
supplementary
dues
levied
in
connection
with
the
four
years’
period
amount
to
$5,207.62
and
were
imposed,
so
the
respondent
contends
in
para.
10
of
his
Reply,
on
the
assumption
that
‘‘the
appellant’s
dealings
in
government
bonds
were
a
venture
in
the
nature
of
trade
within
the
meaning
of
section
139
(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act’’.
Previously,
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
the
company
had
summed
up
its
viewpoint
in
three
concise
paragraphs,
5,
6
and
7,
hereunder
reproduced
:
“5.
The
Appellant
was
a
manufacturing
company
which,
over
the
years
1956
to
1959,
carried
on
a
program
of
investing
whatever
surplus
capital
it
had,
from
time
to
time,
in
short
term
Government
bonds.
6.
On
these
bonds,
the
Appellant
received
interest,
which
was,
of
course,
duly
returned
as
income
and
made
also
a
small
gain
which
it
contended
was
a
capital
gain.
7.
The
Appellant
bought
these
short
term
Government
of
Canada
bonds
from
investment
dealers,
and
on
the
same
day
and
in
the
same
contract,
resold
the
bonds
to
him
(sic)
for
delivery
thirty
(30)
days
later
at
an
agreed
price.’’
Fifteen
such
transactions
annually
in
Government
of
Canada
bonds
were
made
by
the
appellant
and
a
few
more
by
its
subsidiary
associate,
Welding
Engineers
Limited,
also
of
Montreal,
whose
similar
appeal,
number
1615
of
this
Court’s
1963
records,
proceeded
jointly
with
the
instant
one.
It
may
seem
a
commonplace
to
say
the
issue
consists
in
unravelling
the
nature
of
these
dealings
within
the
purview
of
the
oft
recurring
Section
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
the
record
of
the
case
an
explanatory
brief,
labelled
“Schedule”,
is
filed
and
signed
by
Mr.
John
W.
Robinson,
vice-
president
and
secretary
of
J.
&
R.
Weir
Ltd.,
as
also
of
Welding
Engineers
Ltd.
This
executive
officer
outlines
in
the
document
aforesaid
his
company’s
explanation
of
these
moot
ventures.
The
undergoing
excerpts
are
taken
from
pages
2
and
3
:
Page
2:
“Ever
since
the
inception
of
the
money
market
in
Canada
some
six
years
ago,
it
has
been
considered
acceptable
practice
for
members
of
the
Investment
Dealers’
Association
of
Canada
to
offer
their
clients
the
advantages
contained
in
the
Canada
Money
Market.
This
has
been
achieved
by
the
purchase
by
various
corporations
of
Government
of
Canada
Securities
(and
or
Government
of
Canada
guaranteed
issues)
and
their
resale
at
a
later
date.
.
.
.
To
implement
this
investment,
dealers
offered
to
various
corporate
clients
who
have
temporary
unemployed
funds,
short
term
government
and
government
guaranteed
securities.
There
has
also
come
into
existence
an
type
of
transaction
which
would
involve
lending
[italics
added
throughout]
of
certain
amounts
of
money
to
the
investment
dealer,
who,
in
turn,
would
pay
a
certain
rate
of
interest
on
the
funds
so
borrowed.
To
secure
the
loan,
the
dealer
would
lodge
Government
of
Canada
Securities
with
the
client,
and
in
some
instances
obligate
himself
to
have
this
loan
outstanding
for
a
given
period
of
time
(usually
30,
60,
or
90
days).
In
other
instances,
a
so-called
loan
would
be
entered
into
between
the
client
and
the
dealer
.
.
.
Bonds
were
sold
to
various
corporate
clients
who
had
excess
funds,
at
the
current
market,
flat
coupon
interest,
with
a
day
to
day
money
market
interest
rate
allowed
on
the
amount
of
money
involved.
This
rate
of
interest
so
allowed
since
funds
might
be
required
on
anything
from
1,
30
or
60
days,
the
bonds
being
then
sold
at
the
current
market,
thus
involving
gain
or
loss
by
the
holder
of
the
bonds.’’
Page
3
:
“Bonds
as
placed
with
our
Company
with
respect
to
loans
remain
the
property
of
our
Company
throughout
the
period
of
the
arrangement
.
.
.”?
Especially
noticeable
are
the
frequent
recurrences
of
the
expressions
‘‘loan’’,
‘‘borrowed’’,
and
that
of
‘‘arrangement’’.
The
opening
in
Canada,
a
matter
of
common
knowledge,
of
a
so-called
money
market,
naturally
intensified
this
simple
enough
trading
of
excess
funds
against
short
term
Government
securities,
on
a
monthly
basis,
and
deriving
therefrom
a
dual
source
of
profit,
day
to
day
interest
and
the
par
value
appreciation
as
the
term
of
maturity
drew
nearer.
A
six
to
ten
cents
‘‘natural
increment”
(ef.
Notice
of
Appeal,
para.
8),
on
a
$100
bond
is
meaningless,
but
if
multiplied,
as
in
this
case,
250,000
times,
it
brings
in
$150,
bolstering
up
by
so
much
the
current
interest
“agreed
upon”
as
we
shall
see
(cf.
ex.
A-2).
At
all
events,
it
affords
a
better
yield
than
would
accrue,
here,
from
the
snail
like
pace
of
bank
interest,
were
any
allowed.
In
brokerage
parlance
this
practice
is
called
‘‘buy-backs’’.
In
his
testimony
before
the
Tax
Appeal
Board,
Mr.
John
W.
Robinson
indicated
the
motivating
incentive
that
prompted
the
appellants
to
initiate
these
deals.
Some
quotations,
out
of
the
transcript
filed,
are
in
order;
the
witness
is
examined
by
the
companies’
counsel
:
At
page
7:
“Q.
How
did
you
happen
to
start
making
investments
in
Government
of
Canada
short
term
securities?
A.
As
I
said
previously,
we
first
went
to
the
bank
and
we
found
no
satisfactory
situation
there,
so
we
went
to
thé
brokers,
and
from
discussions
with
the
brokers
it
was
presented
to
us
to
engage
in
this
sort
of
business.’’
From
this
point
on,
there
arises
more
than
a
strong
suspicion
that
the
objective
sought
had
little
in
common
with
a
real
investment
of
surplus
funds,
for
which
banks
are
unfrequent
agents,
and
bears
a
striking
resemblance
to
a
quest
for
the
highest
interest
yield.
Nothing
in
the
following
excerpts
tends
to
modify
this
opinion.
At
page
12:
“Q.
You
knew
at
the
beginning
that
the
value
of
the
bonds
would
increase
day
by
day
approaching
their
maturity.
A.
Yes,
that’s
right.”
Mr.
Robinson
now
is
cross-examined.
At
page
18:
“Q.
These
bonds
were
the
property
of
your
company
as
soon
as
they
were
acquired
for
the
period
stated
in
the
contract?
A.
For
the
period
of
thirty
(80)
days.
Q.
How
come,
if
you
were
the
owners
of
these
bonds,
your
company
was
not
to
receive
the
full
amount
of
the
interest
(3%)
stated
on
the
bonds?
A.
Because
we
were
only
getting
them
for
thirty
(30)
days.
Q.
But
the
bonds
were
paying
three
per
cent
interest,
and
your
company
received
only
one
and
a
quarter
per
cent
?
A.
The
reason
for
that
is
that
the
bond
was
three
per
cent,
and
that’s
three
per
cent
per
annum;
but
we
held
the
bonds
for
only
thirty
(30)
days.”
From
page
21
:
“Q.
When
you
sold
back
your
bonds,
were
you
always
selling
them
back
to
the
same
dealers
who
sold
them
to
you,
Mr.
Robinson
?
A.
Yes.
"
The
witness
admits
these
particular
operations
were
not
transacted
on
the
open
market
but
through
private
contracts.
About
these
contracts,
Mr.
Harry
W.
Andrews,
who,
in
1956,
negotiated
them
with
J.
&
R.
Weir
Ltd.,
and
for
Welding
Engineers,
in
his
then
capacity
of
senior
sales
representative
for
Royal
Securities,
vouchsafes
some
additional
information
to
Mr.
Chagnon,
counsel
for
respondent,
who
proceeds
to
cross-examine
him.
On
pages
38
and
39
:
“Q.
Mr.
Andrews,
I
show
the
contracts
by
which
the
bonds
were
acquired
by
Weir
and
I
ask
you
to
explain
to
the
Court
what
is
meant
by
the
word
‘flat’?
A.
It
means
that
there
is.no
accrued
interest
on
the
transaction
because
the
contractual
agreement
is
not
that
the
coupon
belongs
to
the
purchase
as
such.
Q.
They
belong
to
whom?
A.
They
belonged
to
the
Royal
Securities
in
this
instance
because
the
agreement
is
for
thirty
days
that
they
can
have
the
bonds.
They
actually
owned
the
bonds,
but
it’s
our
agreement
that
they
will
return
them
to
us
at
the
expiration
of
that
time,
so
the
coupon
belongs
to
Royal
Securities
in
these
instances.
Q.
So
the
bonds
were
always
acquired
by
the
taxpayer
or
the
appellant
without
any
coupons?
A.
Oh,
no,
the
coupons
would
be
on
the
bond,
but
they
had
no
right
to
cut
them
off.
Q.
And
the
right
to
cut
them
off
would
be
to
your
company
(i.e.
Royal
Securities
Ltd.)
“.?
A.
Yes.”
It
certainly
would
require
an
astounding
stretch
of
the
imagination
to
perceive
in
such
‘‘arrangements’’
the
customary
traits
of
a
true
and
outright
purchase.
In
this
occurrence,
buying
and
reselling
are
simultaneous
to
such
a
degree
that,
in
fact
and
law,
none
of
those
contracts
ever
took
place,
but
merely
a
thinly
disguised
form
of
short
term
loan
between
the
appellant
and
Royal
Securities.
An
essential
characteristic
of
ownership
resides
in
the
entitlement
to
all
accruing
benefits,
in
this
instance
the
interest
coupons,
which,
as
seen
above,
the
so-called
purchaser
“had
no
right
to
cut”.
Exhibits
A-2
and
A-3,
inter
alia,
each
composed
of
statements
of
sale
slips
to
J.
&
R.
Weir
Ltd.,
and
statements
of
purchase
from
the
latter
by
Royal
Securities
Corporation,
same
dates
in
both
cases,
and,
in
each
instance
again,
two
letters
identically
dated,
one
referring
to
the
would-be
sale
to
J.
&
R.
Weir,
the
other
to
the
supposed
re-purchase
from
it,
leave
no
room
for
doubt
as
to
the
true
nature
of
these
transactions.
The
appellant
company
and
the
investment
dealers
concerned
never
had
the
intention
of
entering
into
a
valid
sale
nor
genuine
investment.
To
all
appearances,
the
appellant
pursued
the
thrifty
purpose
of
putting
its
abundant
spare
cash
to
the
best
use
possible,
in
other
words,
the
highest
rate
of
interest,
and
insofar
its
endeavours
are
encompassed
by
Section
6(1)
(b)
of
the
Act:
“6.
(1)
Without
restricting
the
generality
of
section
3,
there
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
(b)
amounts
received
in
the
year
or
receivable
in
the
year
.
.
as
interest
or
on
account
or
in
lieu
of
payment
of,
or
in
satisfaction
of
interest.”
Out
of
duty,
I
reviewed
the
taxpayer’s
entire
plea
when,
truly,
the
legal
fallacy
in
para.
8
of
the
appeal
might
have
warranted
a
shorter
shrift.
Apart
from
a
split
interest
return,
the
residue
retained
by
Royal
Securities,
it
is
alleged
that
J.
&
R.
Weir
(and
also
Welding
Engineers
Ltd.)
‘‘has
considered
that
the
natural
increment
in
price
of
a
bond
over
that
period
(exactly
30
days)
was
from
six
(.06)
to
ten
(.10)
cents
or
more
per
month,
as
the
bond
was
coming
closer
to
maturity,
and
this
normal
increment
was
considered
as
a
capital
gain
by
the
appellant
.
.
.”
(ef.
Notice
of
Appeal,
para.
8).
So
far,
so
good,
but,
then,
whose
bonds
attracted
that
‘
‘
natural
increment”?
Surely
not
the
taxpayer’s
since
oral
and
literal
evidence,
for
instance,
exhibits
A-2,
A-3
and
R-2,
repetitiously
assert
resales
of
the
bonds
to
Royal
Securities
the
very
moment
they
purported
to
have
been
bought
by
the
appellant.
Indeed,
both
transactions
are
so
inextricably
interwoven
that
resale
seems
to
precede
purchase.
It
does
not
come
as
a
surprise,
therefore,
that
the
real
owners
of
those
bonds,
Royal
Securities
Corporation,
were
alone
empowered
to
cut
off
the
interest
coupons
(H.
W.
Andrews
dixit).
Consequently,
capital
appreciation
benefited
the
investment
dealers
who,
by
anticipation,
apparently
added
this
“increment”
to
the
pre-determined
interest.
At
all
events,
the
investing
intent,
in
its
customary
connotation,
is
lacking.
Irrespective
of
any
other
description,
these
deals
exhibit
all
the
ear-marks
pertaining
to
pursuits
of
profit-making
schemes,
within
the
scope
of
Section
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Statute.
This
was
a
smart
attempt
to
escape
the
long
reach
of
the
tax-
gatherer,
and
insomuch
no
blame
attaches,
.
.
.
income
tax
only.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
decision
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
is
affirmed
and
the
appeal
dismissed.
The
respondent
will
be
entitled
to
recover
his
costs
after
taxation.
Judgment
accordingly.