Tardif T.C.J.:
1 This is an appeal from a notice of confirmation dated February 20, 1995, of an assessment made on October 6, 1994. The reassessment resulted from the refusal by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) to allow the moving expenses claimed by the appellant for the 1992 and 1993 taxation years.
2 At the start of the hearing, Mr. Duguay indicated that he felt prejudiced by the fact that the respondent had added material to the Amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal by rewording the point at issue in paragraph 7.
3 In paragraph 7 of the first Reply to the Notice of Appeal, the point at issue was stated as follows:
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7. The point at issue is whether the appellant moved from Gaspé to Iberville on March 4, 1991, in order to move closer to his new work location for the purposes of his employment.
4 In the Amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal, the point at issue was restated as follows:
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7. The point at issue is whether, in computing his income for the 1992 and 1993 taxation years, the appellant may deduct the moving expenses that he incurred at the time of his move on March 4, 1991.
5 Further to the amendment, the respondent added paragraph 11, which reads as follows:
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11. He contends that the amount claimed in 1993 as a deduction in respect of moving expenses is not deductible because it was claimed in the second year following the taxation year during which the appellant moved, contrary to subsection 62 (1) of the Act.
6 The appellant acknowledged receiving a copy of the Amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal early enough to enable him to prepare adequately for his appeal hearing. Having considered and weighed the arguments made to show what he characterized as prejudice, I do not believe that the amendment prejudiced or caused any harm whatever to the appellant. All the same facts were reproduced in the Amended Reply to the Notice of Appeal. In the circumstances, I find the amendment to be admissible, given that it is essentially a reformulation relying on the same legal bases and on the same facts.
7 Moreover, the appellant admitted the following facts:
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(a) on March 15, 1993, the appellant filed a T1-M Rev. 89 form on which he had written:
(i) date of residence move — March 4, 1991;
(ii) former residence — 1395 Mtée Haldimand, Gaspé, Quebec;
(iii) new residence — 1144 Rue Laflamme, Iberville, Quebec;
(iv) former employer — Centre D'accueil Les Amets, P.O. Box 69, Gaspé, Quebec;
(v) new employer — Commission Scolaire d'Iberville, Iberville, Quebec;
(vi) former work location — Gaspé;
(vii) new work location — Iberville;
(viii) date of move to new work area — December 2, 1992;
(ix) net moving expenses — $6,556.49;
(b) the appellant did not hold new employment in the year of the move;
(c) the appellant received no income from a new employer in the year of the move;
8 The only fact which he denied is set out in subparagraph 6(d), which reads as follows:
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(d) the appellant had no confirmation from a new employer guaranteeing him employment at the time of his move.
9 During argument, the respondent consented to judgment for the 1992 taxation year. The case therefore concerns only the 1993 taxation year.
10 On this point, the respondent indicated that the provisions of subsection 62(1) do not permit moving expenses incurred by a taxpayer to be amortized over more than two years, the first year being the year in which the moving expenses were incurred.
11 The appellant contended, for his part, that as he had not had the benefit of the measure provided for by subsection 62(1) in the year of his move, and as he had only minimal benefit in the following or second year (1992) because of circumstances beyond his control, he should be entitled to carry over the balance of the unused portion to the following taxation year, in this case the 1993 taxation year, corresponding to the third year after the move. In other words, the appellant would like the start of the two-year period to be the year in which the deduction was first claimed, not the year in which the move occurred and in which the moving expenses were incurred, as the wording of the Act very clearly provides.
12 In support of his contentions, the appellant referred to information obtained from a Revenue Canada officer, and in particular to a brochure entitled “ARE YOU MOVING?”:
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— Who can deduct moving expenses?
— What expenses can be deducted?
— How to claim moving expenses
— Information for students and non-residents.
13 This publication was printed under the authority of the Department of Supply and Services Canada in 1990. The explanatory brochure is a guide whose purpose is to put the provisions of the Act into simple language in order to make them more accessible to taxpayers.
14 However, this publication clearly cannot be used as a reference in deciding a case. Where there is inconsistency between the content of such a brochure and the text of the Act, the Act alone must be taken into consideration.
15 Furthermore, I believe it is important to note that the brochure to which the appellant referred does not support his claims. It is simply less clear and less specific than the Act.
16 Furthermore, this brochure gives a clear indication of its value as a reference in an unequivocal caveat which reads as follows:
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This publication was prepared by the Communications and Consultations Branch. It is only a guide, and you should consult the Income Tax Act for more detailed official information.
17 I cannot subscribe to the appellant's interpretation. The Act is clear and specific as to the maximum length of time or period in which a taxpayer may deduct amounts paid in respect of moving expenses in computing his income. The appellant moreover understood that his theory was unsound when I pointed out to him that the effect of his logic would be to make it theoretically possible to take the benefit of the deduction several years after the move.
18 In the appellant's case, this period could not extend beyond the 1992 taxation year, given that the move took place in March 1991.
19 For these reasons, I shall give effect to the consent to judgment in the appellant's favour for the 1992 taxation year and dismiss his appeal for the 1993 taxation year.
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