Rowe J. (orally):
1 The appeals are with respect to the 778appellant's 1991, 1992 and 1993 taxation years. In computing income for the 1992 taxation year, the appellant claimed a deduction for moving expenses of $15,225.00. In computing income for each of the 1991, 1992 and 1993 taxation years, the appellant deducted rental losses arising from rental of a part of her principal residence.
2 The Minister, in undertaking a reassessment, disallowed totally the claim for the deduction of moving expenses in 1992. The Minister then, with respect to amounts claimed as rental losses for 1991, 1992 and 1993, disallowed certain of those expenses and allowed others, arriving at a particular point in which the allowance was calculated by the Minister and an assessment made on that particular basis.
3 The appellant, as this matter was scheduled for trial earlier, produced to the court a document containing, inter alia, recalculations of losses for those particular years arising from the rental income, and that document today was filed as exhibit A-1.
4 In addition, the appellant advised, by use of that document, that she also had expenses in 1991, 1992, and 1993, that pertained to the use of each principal residence during the relevant years for the purpose of generating additional income. That income, in effect, as amended by exhibit A-1, was now taken into account by the appellant in making appropriate calculations for the basis upon which the appellant now says there should be an appropriate allowance made for expenses.
5 In filing her initial returns for 1991, 1992, and 1993, that extra income generated by her was not claimed. In addition, there were also errors made in reporting income from rental in 1991, under-reported, and in 1992, the income turned out to be a different amount than the now revised figure.
6 So the Minister then, with regard to the moving expenses, took the position that the appellant in 1990 had moved from her principal residence in Ottawa to a property in Toronto known as “The Kenilworth Property,” and that prior to July of 1990, the appellant was employed by the Carleton Board of Education, and subsequently, for all relevant times, was employed by the Durham Board of Education.
7 In 1992, in mid-July, the appellant moved from a property known as “The Kenilworth Property”, that she co-owned with her partner, to a property known as “Silver Birch” in Toronto, which she owned 100% thereof.
8 Her employer in 1992, in September, was still the Durham Board of Education, but now she was teaching at a school in Pickering to which she was assigned, and she stated that her location was now 43 kilometres closer than previously when she had lived at the Kenilworth property. Her employer, however, remained the same, and that particular assignment to the new school was not, in fact, made prior to the date of the moving.
9 As well, she indicated that her move was precipitated by the deterioration and ultimate breakup of a relationship that she had, which she described as one that was abusive in nature.
10 Pursuant to the particular provision of the Income Tax Act in question, namely, section 62, the Minister took the position that the facts did not support the claim for the deduction, including the fact that the move was not by reason of or for the purpose of obtaining employment, which was in effect closer to the residence, but was for another purpose. And also, that in working for the Durham Board of Education, after her move from the Carlton Board of Education in Ottawa, her work was characterized by being assigned to various schools within that district from time to time, and accordingly, therefore, nothing had changed.
11 The income earned, in addition to the employment income of the appellant as a teacher during those years and the rental income, apparently came from sources including assisting her father in connection with probate of her stepmother's estate for which she received some reimbursement, also in the form of expenses and in attempting to pursue a writing career, and in 1993, earning income as a consequence of doing tutorials from out of her home, and also travelling on some instances to visit the students that she was tutoring.
12 There was no record or log or document capable of substantiating any source for this particular business, and in all probability, on the evidence before me, whatever sums received by her for helping out in family matters were reimbursements only of travel expenses or other related expenses or were ex gratia payments and were not received by her in the context, at all, of business.
13 Within the definition of business that we know from recent jurisprudence from the Federal Court of Appeal, having in effect revisited the Supreme Court of Canada case of Moldowan v. R. (1977), 77 D.T.C. 5213 (S.C.C.), that particular source in those years has not been made out in the sense that I cannot see, on the evidence before me, that there was any business from a standpoint of there being any reasonable expectation of profit.
14 There was then a sampling during cross-examination of some of the expenses that had been claimed by the appellant in those particular years attributable to that home-based business of hers in a variety of different instances. And that sampling indicated that in almost every occasion those items would not at all be properly deductible in any event because they were not connected with the production of income, or if a causal connection could have been found, they were not reasonable at all.
15 An example was attempting to write off a trip to the United States, to the Province of New Brunswick and to Great Britain in order to do some research for a forthcoming book from which there has not been any revenue generated, nor is there any proof that there is a reasonable expectation even now in the future, in 1997, as opposed to those years in question.
16 The function that I exercise is this. I must decide on the evidence adduced before me whether or not the Minister of National Revenue, in undertaking the assessments appealed, was correct or not. Having regard to all of the evidence presented, and having regard to the information presented by the appellant today, which in effect attempts to revise the initial claim as filed, I am still - at the end of the day - left with the inability to find otherwise than that the Minister's initial assessments should be confirmed and should stand.
17 Accordingly, therefore, with respect to the appeals for the 1991, and 1992 and 1993 taxation years, those appeals are hereby dismissed.
18 MR. McCAIG: What do I do now?
19 HIS HONOUR: You have a couple of options open to you as always with individuals who do not agree with the decision at this level.
20 You have the right to pursue your appeal, remedy, and then subsequent to that, you have other options which may be open to you from a standpoint of you dealing directly with the collections department of Revenue Canada or perhaps taking such other steps to seek remedies as you can under your circumstances.
21 I cannot give you any advice in this regard.
22 MS. McCAIG: Was it a fair trial?
23 HIS HONOUR: Well, you will have to pursue your remedies, as they exist, and you can get some advice in that regard.
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