JACKETT,
P.:—This
is
an
appeal
directly
to
this
Court
from
the
assessment
of
the
appellant
for
the
taxation
year
1963
under
Part
I
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Pursuant
to
Rule
150
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
the
parties
to
the
appeal
stated
questions
of
law
arising
in
the
appeal
in
the
form
of
a
special
case
for
the
opinion
of
the
Court.
Before
referring
to
the
facts
stated
by
the
special
case,
it
is
helpful
to
recall
that
Part
I
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
imposes
an
income
tax
upon
the
taxable
income
for
each
taxation
year
of
every
person
resident
in
Canada
(Section
2),
that
a
person’s
taxable
income
for
a
taxation
year
is
his
“income”
minus
certain
specified
deductions
(Section
3)
and
that
‘‘income’’
for
a
year,
in
so
far
as
a
person
who
has
no
income
source
for
the
year
other
than
a
business
is
concerned,
is
‘‘the
profit
.
.
.
for
the
year’’
from
the
business.
It
is
also
helpful
to
have
it
in
mind
that
the
“profit”
from
a
business
for
a
year
is,
generally
speaking,
the
revenues
of
the
business
for
the
year
minus
the
costs,
other
than
capital
costs,
of
earning
those
revenues.
Generally
speaking,
therefore,
the
cost
of
acquiring
the
capital
assets
employed
in
a
business
operation
and
expenses
related
to
a
period
before
the
business
operation
was
commenced
are
not
deductible
in
computing
the
annual
profits
from
a
business
except
to
the
extent
that
there
exists
special
provision
in
the
statute
authorizing
such
a
deduction.
Applying
such
principles
to
the
case
of
a
corporation
whose
business
consists
in
the
production
of
petroleum
and
natural
gas,
it
would
not,
generally
speaking,
be
possible
to
deduct
drilling
and
exploration
costs
as
a
cost
of
earning
the
revenues
from
its
business
of
producing
petroleum
and
natural
gas
in
the
absence
of
express
authority
for
such
a
deduction.
Such
authority
had
been
granted
from
time
to
time
on
a
term
basis
by
provisions
that
were
not
inserted
in
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
1955
these
provisions
were
made
a
permanent
feature
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
when
Section
22
of
chapter
54
of
the
Statutes
of
1955
added
a
new
Section
83A
to
the
statute.
Section
83A,
as
then
enacted,
read
in
part
as
follows
:
(3)
A
corporation
whose
principal
business
is
(a)
production,
refining
or
marketing
of
petroleum,
petroleum
products
or
natural
gas,
or
exploring
or
drilling
for
petroleum
or
natural
gas,
may
deduct,
in
computing
its
income
under
this
Part
for
a
taxation
year,
the
lesser
of
(c)
the
aggregate
of
such
of
(i)
the
drilling
and
exploration
expenses,
including
all
general
geological
and
geophysical
expenses,
incurred
by
it
on
or
in
respect
of
exploring
or
drilling
for
petroleum
or
natural
gas
in
Canada,
and
(ii)
the
prospecting,
exploration
and
development
expenses
incurred
by
it
in
searching
for
minerals
in
Canada,
as
were
incurred
after
the
calendar
year
1952
and
before
the
end
of
the
taxation
year,
to
the
extent
that
they
were
not
deductible
in
computing
income
for
a
previous
taxation
year,
or
(d)
of
that
aggregate,
an
amount
equal
to
its
income
for
the
taxation
year
(i)
if
no
deduction
were
allowed
under
paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
11,
and
(ii)
if
no
deduction
were
allowed
under
this
subsection,
minus
the
deductions
allowed
for
the
year
by
subsection
(1)
or
(2)
of
this
section
and
by
section
28.
(5)
In
computing
a
deduction
under
subsection
(1),
(3)
or
(4),
no
amount
shall
be
included
in
respect
of
a
payment
for
or
in
respect
of
a
right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
petroleum
or
natural
gas
other
than
an
annual
payment
not
exceeding
$1
per
acre.
Whether
or
not
subsection
(3)
of
Section
83A
would
otherwise
have
permitted
a
deduction
of
a
lump
sum
paid
for
a
right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
petroleum
or
natural
gas’’
as
being
“drilling”
or
‘‘exploration’’
expenses,
the
effect
of
subsection
(5)
was
to
exclude
from
subsection
(3)
deductions
any
amount
paid
for
such
a
“right
.
.
.”
other
than
the
annual
payments
referred
to
therein.
See
Western
Leaseholds
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1961]
C.T.C.
490.
Section
19
of
chapter
8
of
the
Statutes
of
Canada
of
1962
made
certain
changes
in
Section
838A
(to
which
changes
that
do
not
concern
us
in
this
case
had
been
made
in
the
meantime).
So
far
as
is
relevant,
the
1962
amendment
reads
as
follows:
(3)
All
that
portion
of
paragraph
(c)
of
subsection
(3)
of
section
83A
of
the
said
Act
following
subparagraph
(ii)
thereof
is
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor:
“as
were
incurred
after
the
calendar
year
1952
and
before
April
11,
1962,
to
the
extent
that
they
were
not
deductible
in
computing
income
for
a
previous
taxation
year,
or”
(4)
All
that
portion
of
paragraph
(d)
of
subsection
(3)
of
section
83A
of
the
said
Act
following
subparagraph
(ii)
thereof
is
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor:
“minus
the
deductions
allowed
for
the
year
by
subsections
(1),
(2),
(8a)
and
(8d)
of
this
section
and
by
section
28.”
(5)
Section
88A
of
the
said
Act
is
further
amended
by
adding
thereto,
immediately
after
subsection
(8a)
thereof,
the
following
subsections:
“(3b)
A
corporation
whose
principal
business
is
(a)
production,
refining
or
marketing
of
petroleum,
petroleum
products
or
natural
gas,
or
exploring
or
drilling
for
petroleum
or
natural
gas,
may
deduct,
in
computing
its
income
under
this
Part
for
a
taxation
year,
the
lesser
of
(f)
the
aggregate
of
such
of
(i)
the
drilling
and
exploration
expenses,
including
all
general
geological
and
geophysical
expenses,
incurred
by
it
on
or
in
respect
of
exploring
or
drilling
for
petroleum
or
natural
gas
in
Canada,
and
(ii)
the
prospecting,
exploration
and
development
expenses
incurred
by
it
in
searching
for
minerals
in
Canada,
as
were
incurred
after
April
10,
1962,
and
before
the
end
of
the
taxation
year,
to
the
extent
that
they
were
not
deductible
in
computing
income
for
a
previous
taxation
year,
or
(g)
of
that
aggregate,
an
amount
equal
to
its
income
for
the
taxation
year
(i)
if
no
deduction
were
allowed
under
paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
(1)
of
section
11,
and
(ii)
if
no
deduction
were
allowed
under
this
section,
minus
the
deductions
allowed
for
the
year
by
subsections
(1),
(2),
(8),
(4),
(4a),
(8),
(8a)
and
(8d)
of
this
section
and
by
section
28.”
(7)
Subsection
(5)
of
section
83A
of
the
said
Act
is
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor:
“(5)
In
computing
a
deduction
under
subsection
(1),
(2)
or
(4),
no
amount
shall
be
included
in
respect
of
a
payment
for
or
in
respect
of
a
right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
petroleum
or
natural
gas,
acquired
before
April
11,
1962,
other
than
an
annual
payment
not
exceeding
$1
per
acre.
(5a)
Where
an
association,
partnership
or
syndicate
described
in
subsection
(4)
or
a
corporation
or
individual
has,
after
April
10,
1962,
acquired
under
an
agreement
or
other
contract
or
arrangement
a
right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
in
Canada
petroleum,
natural
gas
or
other
related
hydrocarbons
(except
coal)
under
which
agreement,
contract
or
arrangement
there
was
not
acquired
any
other
right
to,
over
or
in
respect
of
the
land
in
respect
of
which
such
right,
licence
or
privilege
was
so
acquired
except
the
right
to
enter
upon,
use
and
occupy
so
much
of
the
land
as
may
be
necessary
for
the
purpose
of
exploiting
such
right,
licence
or
privilege,
an
amount
paid
in
respect
of
the
acquisition
thereof
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
subsections
(3b),
(3d),
(4a),
(4b)
and
(4c),
be
deemed
to
be
a
drilling
or
exploration
expense
on
or
in
respect
of
exploring
or
drilling
for
petroleum
or
natural
gas
in
Canada
incurred
at
the
time
of
such
payment.
(5b)
Where
a
right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
in
Canada
petroleum,
natural
gas
or
other
related
hydrocarbons
(except
coal)
is
disposed
of
by
a
corporation
described
in
subsection
(3b)
or
an
association,
partnership
or
syndicate
described
in
subsection
(4)
after
April
10,
1962,
any
amount
received
by
the
corporation,
association,
partnership
or
syndicate
as
consideration
for
the
disposition
thereof
shall
be
included
in
computing
its
income
for
its
fiscal
period
in
which
the
amount
was
received
unless
the
corporation,
association,
partnership
or
syndicate
(a)
acquired
such
right,
licence
or
privilege
by
inheritance
or
bequest,
or
(b)
acquired
such
right,
licence
or
privilege
before
April
11,
1962
and
disposed
of
it
before
November
9,
1962.”
(15)
Subsections
(1)
to
(12)
and
subsection
(14)
are
applicable
to
the
1962
and
subsequent
taxation
years,
and
subsection
(13)
is
applicable
in
the
case
of
any
taxation
year
ending
after
April
10,
1962.
It
is
the
1962
amendment
to
Section
83A
that
gives
rise
to
the
only
problem
that
now
remains
to
be
decided
in
this
appeal.
The
stated
case
shows
that
the
appellant’s
principal
business
at
all
material
times
was
the
production
of
petroleum
and
natural
gas
;
that,
in
1960
and
1961,
the
appellant
acquired
two
petroleum
and
natural
gas
leases
;
and
that
on
October
15,
1963
the
appellant
sold
such
leases
and
received
therefor
$57,700,
which
amount
was
the
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
‘‘a
right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
in
Canada
petroleum,
natural
gas
or
other
related
hydrocarbons
(except
coal)”.
It
is
common
ground
that
these
leases
were
capital
assets
of
the
appellant’s
business
and
that
subsection
(5b)
of
Section
83A
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
as
amended
in
1962,
required
the
amount
of
$57,700
to
be
included
in
computing
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
1963
taxation
year
as
being
the
proceeds
of
rights
of
the
kind
described
in
that
subsection.
It
is
also
common
ground
that
there
is
no
provision
in
Section
83A
that
permits
the
appellant
to
deduct,
in
computing
its
income
for
any
taxation
year,
any
amount
in
respect
of
the
cost
of
acquisition
of
such
leases
or
in
respect
of
their
value.
The
respondent’s
position
is
that,
while
subsection
(5b)
of
Section
83A
requires
the
$57,700
received
for
the
leases
to
be
included
in
computing
the
appellant’s
income
for
1963,
the
appellant
is
not
entitled
to
any
deduction
in
computing
its
income
for
any
year
in
respect
of
the
cost
or
value
of
such
leases.
The
appellant
contends
that
it
is
entitled
to
some
such
deduction.
While
other
questions
were
raised
by
the
pleadings
and
the
stated
case,
as
a
result
of
the
position
taken
by
the
appellant
at
the
hearing,
the
only
questions
remaining
to
be
decided
are
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
make
some
such
deduction
as
those
to
which
I
have
referred,
and,
if
so,
what
deduction
is
it
permitted
to
make
and
in
respect
of
what
taxation
year
is
it
permitted
to
make
it.
While
I
quite
appreciate
that
the
reason
that
the
appellant
brought
the
appeal
is
that
the
result
of
the
assessment,
and
of
the
position
taken
by
the
respondent,
is
that
the
appellant
is
required
to
pay
a
tax
called
an
‘‘income
tax’’
on
an
amount
that
is
not
only
the
proceeds
of
a
capital
transaction,
but
is
the
gross
amount
of
the
proceeds
of
that
transaction
and
not
merely
the
profit
from
it.
The
result
is
so
harsh
that
it
is
not
unnatural
that
the
appellant
should
strive
for
some
means
of
avoiding
it.
Nevertheless,
I
do
not
consider
that
the
appeal
is
fairly
arguable
once
these
difficult
statutory
provisions
are
comprehended
sufficiently
to
understand
what
Parliament
did
in
1962
in
so
far
as
it
is
relevant
to
the
problems
raised
by
the
appeal.
Prior
to
the
1962
amendment,
an
oil
producing
company
could
include
in
the
computation
of
the
exploration
and
other
expenses
the
deduction
of
which
was
permitted
by
Section
83A
annual
payments
not
exceeding
$1
per
acre
paid
for
a
‘‘right,
licence
or
privilege
to
explore
for,
drill
for
or
take
petroleum
or
natural
gas’’
(hereinafter
called
petroleum
or
natural
gas
‘‘rights’’)
but
could
not
deduct
anything
in
respect
of
any
lump
sum
paid
for
any
such
rights
(Section
83A(5)).
The
1962
amendments
removed
this
restriction
for
the
future
(Section
83A(5a))
and
made
it
possible
to
deduct
any
amount
paid
in
respect
of
the
acquisition
of
petroleum
or
natural
gas
rights
in
the
computation
of
the
exploration
and
other
expenses
the
deduction
of
which
was
permitted
by
Section
83A.
The
result
of
this
was
to
reduce
the
amount
of
the
income
otherwise
subject
to
income
tax
by
the
amounts
so
paid
for
capital
assets.
(Such
a
deduction
bears
some
analogy
to
the
Section
11(1)
(a)
deduction
allowed
for
capital
cost.)
Parliament
apparently
was
of
a
view
that
it
was
only
logical
that,
if
the
cost
of
such
capital
assets
was
to
be
deductible
in
computing
income,
the
proceeds
of
the
disposition
of
such
assets,
when
sold,
should
be
added
back
to
income.
(This
would
have
some
analogy
to
the
recapture
of
capital
cost
allowance.)
Accordingly,
at
the
same
time,
it
was
provided
that,
where
petroleum
or
natural
gas
rights
are
sold,
“any
amount
received
.
..
as
consideration
for
the
disposition”
is
to
be
included
in
computing
income
(Section
83A(5b)).
So
far
as
the
future
was
concerned,
therefore,
the
scheme
adopted
by
subsection
(5a)
and
subsection
(5b)
of
Section
83A
is,
in
its
broad
outline,
easily
understood
and
lends
itself
to
a
rational
justification.
The
problem
arises
in
connection
with
the
treatment
provided
in
respect
of
petroleum
or
natural
gas
rights
acquired
before,
and
disposed
of
after,
April
10,
1962,
the
cut-off
date
adopted
for
the
new
scheme.
The
right
to
deduct
the
full
‘‘amount
paid
in
respect
of
the
acquisition’’
of
petroleum
or
natural
gas
rights
in
lieu
of
the
“annual
payment
not
exceeding
$1
per
acre’’
was
made
effective
in
respect
of
acquisitions
after
April
10,
1962.
(Compare
new
subsection
(5)
and
subsection
(5a)
with
subsection
(5)
as
it
was
before
the
1962
amendment.)
The
obligation
of
bringing
into
income
amounts
received
as
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
petroleum
or
natural
gas
rights
was
imposed
in
respect
of
dispositions
after
April
10,
1962,
unless
(inter
alia)
such
right
was
both
(a)
acquired
on
or
before
that
date,
and
(b)
disposed
of
before
November
9,
1962.
Harsh
as
it
might
appear
in
the
light
of
the
facts
of
this
case,
the
Parliamentary
intention
appears
to
me
to
be
too
clear
for
argument
that
(a)
where
acquisitions
took
place
on
or
before
April
10,
the
$1
per
acre
deduction
was
to
be
the
only
one
permitted,
and,
where
acquisitions
took
place
after
that
day,
the
right
to
deduct
cost
was
to
be
unlimited,
(b)
the
proceeds
of
sale
of
all
such
rights
acquired
after
April
10,
1962,
are
to
be
included
in
computing
income,
and
(c)
the
proceeds
of
sale
of
all
such
rights
acquired
on
or
before
April
10,
1962,
are
to
be
included
in
computing
income
unless
disposed
of
in
the
period
between
April
10,
1962
and
November
9,
1962,
or
unless
they
fall
within
paragraph
(a)
of
subsection
(5b)
of
Section
83A.
In
other
words,
it
seems
clear
that
Parliament
decided
that
it
would
allow
costs
of
these
rights
as
exploration
expenses
and
would,
at
the
same
time,
tax
proceeds
of
the
disposition
of
such
rights.
It
also
seems
clear
that
in
order
to
meet
the
point
of
view
that
proceeds
of
disposition
should
not
be
taxed
where
the
rights
were
acquired
at
a
time
when
costs
were
not
so
allowed,
a
period
of
almost
seven
months
was
provided
during
which
such
rights
could
be
disposed
of
without
giving
rise
to
taxation
of
the
proceeds
of
disposition.
Having
regard
to
my
view
of
the
statutory
scheme
adopted
in
1962
as
just
expressed,
it
follows
that
the
questions
of
law
set
out
in
subparagraphs
(a)
to
(f)
inclusive
of
paragraph
8
of
the
stated
case
are
answered
in
the
negative.
The
remaining
questions
do
not
require
to
be
answered.
Out
of
respect
for
the
argument
of
counsel
for
the
appellant,
I
should
say
that
he
put
forward
a
submission
to
the
effect
that,
when
Parliament
required
an
amount
of
a
capital
nature
to
be
included
in
computing
income,
Parliament
must
have
been
impliedly
treating
it
as
income
from
a
source
(in
this
case
the
source
being
the
disposition
of
the
capital
asset)
and,
in
accordance
with
general
principles,
the
cost
of
earning
the
amounts
that
are
impliedly
deemed
to
be
revenues
from
that
source
must
be
set
off
against
such
revenues.
Had
the
matter
been
one
where
Parliament
had
simply
required
that
an
amount
of
a
capital
nature
be
included
in
computing
income,
I
should
have
felt
constrained
to
give
the
submission,
which
was
put
forward
very
persuasively
indeed,
very
careful
consideration.
As,
however,
in
my
view,
there
can
be
no
doubt,
upon
a
reading
of
the
1962
amendments,
that
the
Parliamentary
intention
was
that,
in
the
ease
of
a
disposition
after
November
9,
1962
of
petroleum
or
natural
gas
rights
that
had
been
acquired
on
or
before
April
10,
1962,
the
proceeds
of
disposition
should
be
included
in
computing
income
and
that
there
should
be
no
deduction
of
any
lump
sum
paid
for
them,
in
my
view
this
is
not
a
case
in
which
it
can
be
implied
that
there
was
a
Parliamentary
intention
that
related
costs
are
deductible.
I
propose
now
to
deliver
judgment
as
indicated
above.
I
also
propose
to
deliver
judgment
that
the
appeal
be
dismissed
with
costs.
I
shall,
however,
defer
delivering
the
latter
judgment
for
one
week
to
provide
an
opportunity
for
the
parties
to
make
any
submission
they
may
wish
to
make
in
writing
or
to
seek
an
opportunity
for
verbal
submissions.