PIGEON,
J.:—The
appellant
is
a
solicitor
who,
over
a
period
of
years,
acquired
some
13
mortgages,
usually
at
a
substantial
discount.
He
was
assessed
for
income
tax
in
1962
on
$700
being
the
amount
of
a
discount
on
one
of
these
mortgages
that
he
collected
at
maturity
in
that
year.
Before
the
Tax
Appeal
Board,
the
assessment
was
upheld
on
the
finding,
not
that
it
was
profit
from
a
“business”,
but
that
‘‘it
was
a
quasi-bonus
and
therefore
“interest
per
se
.
In
the
Exchequer
Court,
Gibson,
J.
did
not
wish
to
pass
on
the
soundness
of
that
conclusion
and
did
not
choose
(those
are
his
words)
to
make
a
finding
that
this
was
profit
from
a
“business”.
He
expressly
founded
his
decision
in
favour
of
the
Minister
on
the
basis
that
this
‘‘was
income
from
a
source
within
the
meaning
of
the
opening
words
of
Section
3
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
’,
adding
:
as
far
as
I
know,
there
is
no
decision
of
this
Court
or
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
which
a
question
of
this
kind
has
been
resolved
by
deciding
that
such
a
discount
was
income
from
a
“source”
within
the
meaning
of
the
opening
words
of
Section
3
of
the
Act,
without
deciding
whether
it
was
income
from
any
of
the
particular
sources
detailed
in
Section
3
or
elsewhere
in
the
Act.
From
this
judgment,
appellant
filed
an
inscription
in
appeal
to
this
Court
as
of
right
without
apparently
realizing
that,
due
to
the
rate
of
tax
applicable,
the
actual
amount
in
controversy
was
less
than
$500.
Respondent
also
appears
to
have
overlooked
the
point
and
did
not
move
to
quash
but,
on
the
contrary,
signed
an
agreement
as
to
contents
of
case
and
did
not
object
to
the
appeal
being
inscribed
for
hearing
at
the
last
term.
Being
No.
17
on
the
Ontario
list,
the
case
was
not
called
before
the
vacation.
In
June,
however,
appellant
became
aware
of
the
doubtful
jurisdiction
and,
on
June
13,
gave
to
respondent
a
notice
of
motion
supported
by
affidavit
which
was
filed
the
following
day.
This
notice
was
‘
‘
that
an
application
will
be
made
to
this
Honourable
Court
or
to
a
Judge
of
this
Honourable
Court
on
the
day
when
this
appeal
comes
on
for
hearing
for
leave
to
appeal
to
this
Honourable
Court,
if
such
leave
should
be
necessary,
.
.
.”’
The
parties
have
now
appeared
before
me
and
argued
the
application
before
the
case
will
be
called.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
agrees
that
the
amount
in
controversy
is
under
$500
and
is
a
‘‘sum
of
money
payable
to
Her
Majesty”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(b)
of
Section
83
of
the
Exchequer
Court
Act
(R.S.C.
1952,
¢.
98)
but
otherwise
he
opposes
the
application.
In
view
of
the
importance
of
the
question
of
law
involved
in
the
decision
sought
to
be
appealed
from,
I
consider
it
desirable
that
it
should
be
reviewed
by
this
Court
and
accordingly
grant
leave
to
appeal.
‘“
In
doing
so,
I
must
point
out
that,
although
this
Court
sometimes
under
special
circumstances
gives
leave
to
appeal
at
the
time
an
appeal
is
heard,
it
is
very
inconvenient
and
highly
undesirable
that
applications
for
leave
should
be
made
at
such
a
late
date.
Especially
is
this
so
when,
as
in
this
case,
the
jurisdiction
for
granting
leave
is
conferred
not
on
the
Court
but.
on
a
judge.
The
orderly
disposition
of
the
business
of
the
Court
requires
that
applications
for
leave
be
brought
promptly.
Also,
when
a
case
is
inscribed
without
jurisdiction,
it
is
respondent’s
duty
to
move
to
quash
if
applicant
does
not
move
for
special
leave.
Under
the
circumstances,
there
will
be
no
costs
of
the
application
to
either
party.
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