JACKETT,
P.:—These
appeals
are
from
the
appellant’s
assessments
under
Part
I
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
the
1964
and
1965
taxation
years.
The
parties
have
filed
a
document
in
which
they
have
agreed
on
the
main
question
to
be
decided
by
the
Court
on
this
appeal.
As
I
understand
that
agreement,
the
main
question
is,
in
effect,
whether
the
contract
under
which
the
appellant
worked
in
the
Trenton
Memorial
Hospital
during
1964
and
1965
was
a
con-
tract
of
service,
so
that
what
he
received
from
the
Hospital
authority
under
the
contract
was
remuneration
from
an
office
or
employment,
or
was
a
contract
for
services,
so
that
the
amounts
so
received
were
fees
earned
in
the
practice
of
a
profession
so
as
to
be
revenues
of
a
‘‘business’’
within
the
meaning
of
that
word
as
used
in
the
Income
Tax
Act.
(If
such
amounts
are
remuneration
from
an
office
or
employment,
the
deductions
that
may
be
made
in
computing
"‘income’’
for
the
purposes
of
Part
I
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
limited
in
the
manner
indicated
by
Section
5
of
the
Act.
If
they
are,
on
the
other
hand,
revenues
of
a
‘‘business’’,
the
deductions
that
may
be
made
in
computing
"
‘income’’
for
the
purposes
of
Part
I
are
not
so
limited.)
Pursuant
to
the
aforesaid
agreement,
there
are
two
subsidiary
questions,
of
which
one
arises
if
the
main
question
is
answered
one
way
and
the
other
arises
if
the
main
question
is
answered
the
other
way.
In
my
view,
no
question
arises
in
this
case
as
to
whether,
even
if
the
appellant
was
not
employed
under
a
contract
of
service
and
was
not
therefore
an
employee
or
servant,
he
was
in
any
event
an
"‘officer’’
because
he
held
an
^office”
within
the
definition
of
that
word
to
be
found
in
Section
139(1)
(ab)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
which
reads
as
follows:
139.
(1)
In
this
Act,
(ab)
"office"
means
the
position
of
an
individual
entitling
him
to
a
fixed
or
ascertainable
stipend
or
remuneration
and
includes
a
judicial
office,
the
office
of
a
Minister
of
the
Crown,
the
office
of
a
member
of
the
Senate
or
House
of
Commons
of
Canada,
a
member
of
a
legislative
assembly,
senator
or
member
of
a
legislative
or
executive
council
and
any
other
office,
the
incumbent
of
which
is
elected
by
popular
vote
or
is
elected
or
appointed
in
a
representative
capacity
and
also
includes
the
position
of
a
corporation
director;
and
"officer"
means
a
person
holding
such
an
office;
To
my
mind,
that
definition
only
applies
where
a
person
has
been
appointed,
elected
or
otherwise
assigned
to
some
preexisting
‘‘position’’
that
carries
"‘a
fixed
or
ascertainable
stipend
or
remuneration’’.
Here
there
is
no
evidence
of
any
such
"‘posi-
tion”
or
of
any
act
whereby
the
appellant
became
the
holder
of
any
such
position.
What
we
have
here
is
a
contract
under
which
the
appellant
supplies
certain
services
for
a
remuneration
and
it
is,
in
my
view,
either
a
contract
of
service
as
a
result
of
which
the
appellant
was
a
servant
or
employee
or
it
is
a
contract
for
services.
That
is
not
to
say
that
there
might
not
be
an
appointment
to
an
office
in
addition
to
such
a
contract,
but
there
is
no
evidence
of
any
such
situation
here.
The
contract
under
which
the
appellant
performed
the
services
in
question
during
1964
and
1965
is
dated
February
15,
1964
and,
by
the
introductory
portion
thereof,
is
expressed
to
be
between
Trenton
Memorial
Hospital
and
‘Doctor
Alexander,
Radiologist
and
Director
of
Radiology’’,
who
is
sometimes
referred
to
in
the
contract
as
"‘The
Radiologist’’.
The
substantive
part
of
the
contract
reads
as
follows:
1.1
Where
"The
Hospital"
appears
in
the
provisions
hereinafter
stipulated,
it
is
understood
that
the
powers
and
duties
to
be
exercised
hereunder
by
“The
Hospital”
shall
be
exercised
by
the
Board
of
Governors.
1.2
“The
Administrator"
shall
mean
the
Administrator
of
the
Hospital.
"The
Department”
shall
mean
the
Department
of
Radiology.
1.3
The
Department
of
Radiology
shall
consist
of
"The
Radiologist”,
and
Employees
who
are
associated
with
the
provision
of
Radiological
Services
or
whose
activities
are
related
to
the
provision
of
Radiological
Services
who
have
been
placed
under
the
Director
of
Radiology
by
the
Administrator
of
The
Hospital.
1.4
Both
parties
recognize
that
there
are
three
aspects
to
the
duties
and
responsibilities
of
"The
Radiologist”
and
"The
Director
of
Radiology”.
The
Radiologist’s
responsibilities
include
the
interpretation
of
films
and
consultation
to
the
Attending
Physician
regarding
Radiological
findings.
In
addition,
the
Radiologist
is
responsible
for
consultation
with
regards
to
methods
and
procedures
used
in
the
Radiology
Department.
As
"The
Director
of
Radiology”
the
Radiologist
is
the
Central
Executive
Officer
of
the
Radiological
service
and
has
all
the
administrative
duties
which
arise
from
this
responsibility.
2.1
"The
Radiologist”
shall
be
a
member
of
the
Medical
Staff
of
the
Hospital
and
have
all
the
responsibilities
and
privileges
which
accrue
from
such
Membership
as
stipulated
in
the
Hospital
Bylaws.
2.2
“The
Radiologist”
shall
establish
Departmental
Procedures
and
Methods
of
Operation.
Provide
Radiological
services
to
aid
in
diagnosis
of
disease
conditions
and
treatment
of
patients.
He
shall
supervise
all
Radiological
work.
Serve
as
Consultant
to
other
Department
Heads
and
Visiting
Physicians,
to
interpret
Radiological
findings.
2.3
The
hours
of
work
per
week
shall
be
such
as
are
necessary
for
the
efficient
operation
of
the
Department.
"The
Radiologist”
shall
be
available
for
emergency
work
at
any
time
of
the
day
or
night.
"The
Radiologist”
agrees
that
sufficient
coverage
shall
be
provided
so
that
equivalent
of
one
full
time
Radiologist
will
be
provided
for
each
regular
9,000
examinations
per
annum
(excluding
all
miniature
Chest
X-Rays).
2.4
The
minimum
annual
vacation
shall
be
one
complete
month.
“The
Radiologist”
shall
be
responsible
for
arranging
coverage
in
his
absence,
including
costs
incurred,
and
shall
ensure
that
the
operation
of
the
Department
will
not
be
interrupted
during
his
absence.
2.5
“The
Radiologist”
shall
reside
in
the
Town
of
Trenton
or
within
a
distance
of
five
miles
thereof.
296
“The
Radiologist”
shall
be
paid
by
“The
Hospital”
for
his
duties
as
Radiologist
for
Examinations
performed
in
accordance
with
the
attached
Schedule
“A”.
Accounting
procedures
for
determining
the
number
of
Examinations
performed
shall
be
subject
to
confirmation
by
procedures
to
be
set
and
approved
by
“The
Hospital”.
Monthly
advances
made
during
the
year
shall
be
subtracted
from
the
total
remuneration,
and
settlement
for
the
year
shall
include
full
value
for
all
advances
made.
5%
reduction
shall
be
made
from
total
remuneration
for
uncollected
accounts.
3.1
“The
Director”
of
Radiology
shall
be
the
central
Executive
Officer
of
the
Department
of
Radiology
and
shall
have
authority
from,
and
be
responsible
to
“The
Administrator”
for
the
administration
of
the
Radiology
Department
in
all
its
activities
and
divisions,
subject
to
the
policies
and
directions
which
are
given
by
“The
Administrator”,
to
“The
Director”
with
due
observation
to
the
best
interest
of
the
Patients
and
all
relevant
legislation,
the
Standards
of
Accreditation
bodies
and
the
provisions
of
the
Hospital
Bylaws.
3.2
Without
limiting
Section
3.1
of
the
Agreement,
“The
Administrator”
shall
assist
“The
Director”
in
his
discharge
of
the
following
responsibilities:
3.21
The
provision
of
the
best
possible
Radiological
service
for
the
patients
of
the
Hospital.
3.22
The
establishment
and
operation
of
Educational
Programmes
and
Training
Courses
which
will
prepare
technicians
for
good,
or
better
Radiographic
Service,
as
approved
by
the
Administrator.
323
|
To
report
and
discuss
with
“The
Administrator”
on
all
|
|
matters
which
in
the
opinion
of
“The
Director”
should
|
|
be
brought
to
the
attention
of,
or
considered
by,
“The
|
|
Administrator”.
|
3.24
|
The
proper
management
of
the
current
operations
and
|
|
the
planning
for
future
operations
of
“The
Radiology
|
|
Department”,
the
Staff,
the
Medical
Staff
and
Per
|
|
sonnel.
|
3.25
|
To
co-operate
with,
and
assist
and
provide
assistance,
|
|
to
maintain
good
relations
with
other
Departments
of
|
|
the
Hospital
for
the
benefit
of
Patients.
|
3.26
|
To
perform
any
other
duties
which
are
mutually
agreed
|
|
upon
by
“The
Director”
and
“The
Administrator”,
to
|
|
be
in
the
best
interest
of
“The
Hospital”.
|
82
Without
limiting
the
provisions
of
Sections
3
3
and
4
of
this
agreement,
the
duties
of
“The
Director”
shall
include:
3.31
|
To
submit
for
"The
Administrator’s"
approval
organi
|
|
zation
plans,
budget
proposals
and
other
administrative
|
|
data
as
requested
by
“The
Administrator".
|
3.34
|
To
recommend
selection
in
employment,
control
and
dis
|
|
charge
of
all
employees
of
“The
Department”.
No
em
|
|
ployee
of
“The
Department”
shall
be
discharged
unless
|
|
in
accordance
with
a
decision
made
by
“The
Director”
|
|
and
confirmed
by
“The
Administrator”.
No
person
shall
|
|
be
employed
unless
that
person
has
been
interviewed
|
|
and
employed
by
the
Personnel
Department
or
someone
|
|
appointed
by
“The
Administrator”
to
act
for
the
Per
|
|
sonnel
Department,
and
an
evaluation
given
to
“The
|
|
Director”.
|
3.33
|
To
ensure
that
labour,
supplies
and
equipment
assigned
|
|
to
“The
Department”
are
used
efficiently
and
economi
|
|
cally.
|
3.34
To
advise
“The
Administrator”
on
Executive
Hospital
problems
pertaining
to
Radiology
and
to
assist
with
these
problems
and
responsibilities
in
whatever
manner
is
mutually
agreed
upon
by
“The
Administrator”
and
“The
Director”.
3.4
The
Board
of
Governors,
upon
the
recommendation
of
“The
Administrator”
shall
have
the
right
to
discharge
“The
Director”
and
terminate
this
Contract
if
he
is
guilty
of
any
criminal
offence
or
indictable
moral
or
criminal
act
of
any
nature,
or
if
after
he
has
received
written
notice
from
“The
Administrator”
that
he
has
refused
to
follow
the
policy
laid
down
by
“The
Administrator”,
and
he
has
had
an
opportunity
to
defend
his
action
to
“The
Administrator”,
and
to
the
Board
of
Governors,
or
three
or
more
Representatives
of
the
Board
of
Governors
appointed
by
the
Board
of
Governors
for
this
purpose.
“The
Director”
may
terminate
this
Contract,
if
in
his
opinion,
“The
Hospital”
has
not
maintained
the
terms
of
the
Contract,
and
he
has
reported
and
defended
his
opinion
to
“The
Administrator”,
and
to
the
Board
of
Governors.
3.41
Termination
of
this
Contract
under
any
Section
shall
be
considered
termination
of
the
complete
Contract.
Either
party
may
terminate
this
Contract
upon
six
months
written
notice
at
their
discretion.
The
notice
to
“The
Hospital”
may
be
given
by
delivery
of
such
notice
to
“The
Administrator”
of
the
Hospital
and
the
notice
to
“The
Radiologist”
may
be
given
by
written
notice
either
delivered
to
him
personally
or
forwarded
by
registered
mail
to
his
last
known
place
of
residence.
4.1
This
Contract
shall
become
effective
February
15th,
1964,
and
shall
be
renewed
automatically
on
January
1st
of
each
year,
from
year
to
year,
unless
either
party
gives
notice
in
writing
to
the
other
party
at
least
six
months
prior
to
the
following
January
1st,
or
unless
the
Contract
is
otherwise
terminated
as
herein
provided.
The
relevant
facts
are,
for
the
most
part,
not
in
dispute.
The
Hospital
authority
operated,
as
an
integral
part
of
the
Trenton
Memorial
Hospital,
a
department
called
the
"‘Depart-
ment
of
Radiology’’.
Apart
from
the
appellant,
that
department
consisted
of
four
technicians,
a
medical
secretary
and
a
porter,
all
of
whom
were
admittedly
ordinary
servants
or
employees
of
the
Hospital
authority.
The
Department
of
Radiology
operated
in
premises
belonging
to
and
maintained
by
the
Hospital
authority,
used
equipment
belonging
to
and
serviced
by
the
authority
and
used
supplies
purchased
by
the
authority.
The
department
carried
out
diagnostic
X-Ray
examinations
of
patients
referred
to
the
department
by
their
own
medical
doctors
and
the
charges
for
such
services
were
made
by
the
Hospital
authority
who
received
payments
for
them,
usually
from
an
insurer
with
whom
the
patient
carried
some
form
of
insurance
against
that
kind
of
expense.
While
the
technicians,
the
secretary
and
the
porter
played
the
supporting
roles
in
the
Department
of
Radiology,
the
appellant,
who
was
a
highly
qualified
radiologist,
played
the
principal
role.
As
appears
from
the
contract.
he
had
two
functions.
He
was
the
administrative
head
of
the
department
and
he
was
the
professional
radiologist.
While
routine
pictures
were
ordinarily
taken
by
technicians,
the
appellant
personally
conducted
all
examinations
calling
for
professional
competence
and
he
personally
interpreted
the
pictures
and
made
the
reports
on
all
examinations,
whether
or
not
he
had
found
it
necessary
to
participate
in
the
taking
of
the
A-Ray
pictures.
He
also
consulted
with
the
referring
physicians,
where
necessary,
and
carried
out
any
follow-up
procedures
that
were
required
for
the
good
administration
of
the
department.
The
appellant
did
not
in
fact
carry
on
any
medical
practice
apart
from
what
he
did
under
the
contract
with
the
‘Trenton
Memorial
Hospital.
There
does
not,
however,
appear
to
be
anything
in
the
contract
that
prohibited
him
from
doing
so,
or,
indeed,
that
required
him
to
devote
any
determinable
amount
of
time
to
his
duties
under
the
contract.
It
was
not
really
suggested
for
the
appellant
that,
by
reason
of
the
professional
nature
of
the
work
that
was
required
to
be
done
under
the
contract,
a
radiologist
could
not
have
been
emploved
as
an
employee
or
servant
of
the
Hospital
authority
to
do
such
work.
The
case
for
the
appellant
is
that,
when
the
contract
in
question
is
correctly
appreciated,
it
was
a
contract
for
certain
services
and
was
not
a
contract
of
service
under
which
he
was
employed
as
an
officer
or
servant
of
the
Hospital
authority.
The
main
features
of
the
contract
in
question
that
were
relied
on
as
indicating
that
this
contract
was
a
contract
for
certain
professional
services,
and
was
not
a
contract
of
service
under
Which
the
appellant
became
an
officer
or
Servant,
are
the
following
:
1.
Article
1.3
provides
that
the
Department
of
Radiology
Shall
consist
of
"The
Radiologist”
and
certain
"‘Em-
ployees’’,
thus
setting
up
a
contrast
between
"‘The
Radiologist”,
i.e.
the
appellant,
and
the
other
persons
in
the
department,
who
are
described
as
"‘employees’’.
2.
Article
2.1
provides
that
"The
Radiologist’’
shall
be
a
member
of
the
"‘Medical
Staff”
of
the
Hospital
and
have
all
the
responsibilities
and
privileges
which
accrue
from
such
”
Membership”
as
stipulated
in
the
"‘Hospital
Bylaws”,
thus
giving
him
the
same
status
as
the
medical
doctors
who
carried
on
private
practices
and
had
the
privilege
of
working
in
the
Hospital.
(It
should
be
noted,
however,
that
a
doctor
who,
as
head
of
the
Pathology
Department,
was
admittedly
an
officer
or
servant
of
the
Hospital
was
also
a
member
of
the
Medical
Staff”.)
3.
Article
2.2
outlines
the
duties
of
"The
Radiologist”
as
being
to
"‘establish’’
departmental
procedures
and
methods
of
operation,
to
‘‘provide’’
radiological
services,
to
"‘super-
vise’’
all
radiological
work
and
to
"‘serve”
as
consultant.
While
the
words
“establish”,
“supervise”
and
‘‘serve’’
indicate
certain
things
that
he
is
to
do
personally,
the
word
“provide”
used
in
relation
to
the
major
part
of
the
professional
work
under
the
contract—the
radiological
services—
seems
to
indicate
that
there
is
no
obligation
that
he
do
such
work
himself.
+
Article
2.3
provides
that
the
hours
of
work
per
week
shall
be
‘‘such
as
are
necessary
for
the
efficient
operation
of
the
Department”
and
that
“The
Radiologist”
shall
be
available
for
emergency
work
at
any
time
of
the
day
or
night.
Here
again,
there
is
an
obvious
omission
to
relate
the
hours
of
work
to
the
appellant
while
the
obligation
to
be
available
is
expressly
related
to
him.
5.
Article
2.3
further
provides
that
“The
Radiologist”
agrees
“that
sufficient
coverage
shall
be
provided
so
that
equivalent
of
one
full
time
Radiologist
will
be
provided
for
each
regular
0,000
examinations
per
annum
.
.
.
”
thus
implying
that,
if
the
volume
of
work
should
require
it,
the
appellant
was
to
provide
the
services
of
more
than
one
radiologist.
6.
Article
2.4
provides
that
the
"‘minimum
annual
vacation”
shall
be
one
complete
month
and
that
"‘The
Radiologist”
shall
be
responsible
"‘for
arranging
coverage
in
his
absence”
including
costs
incurred,
and
"‘shall
ensure
that
the
operation
of
the
Department
will
not
be
interrupted
during
his
absence’’.
7.
Article
2.6
provides
that
"The
Radiologist’’
shall
be
paid
by
"The
Hospital’’
for
his
duties
as
Radiologist’’
for
‘‘Examinations
performed”
in
accordance
with
the
amounts
shown
for
"‘professional
services
only’’
in
Schedule
"‘A’’
to
the
contract,
which
schedule
expressly
provides
that
the
"‘Fee
Schedule
shall
be
the
current
fee
schedule
of
the
Ontario
Medical
Ass’n.”.
Subject
to
a
reduction
of
5
per
cent
for
"‘uncollected
accounts’’,
it
appears
that
the
appellant
was
entitled
to
be
paid
the
full
amount
of
such
fees
regardless
of
how
much
"‘The
Hospital”
actually
collected.
In
fact,
it
would
appear
that
the
appellant
devoted
his
full
professional
efforts
to
carrying
out
the
obligations
that
he
assumed
by
this
contract
except
that,
in
order
to
carry
out
his
obligation
to
arrange
coverage”
during
the
”
minimum
annual
vacation’’
of
one
month,
he
had
an
arrangement
with
the
radiologist
in
a
neighbouring
town
under
which
he
did
all
of
his
colleague’s
work
in
addition
to
his
own
work
while
his
colleague
was
on
vacation
in
return
for
his
colleague
doing
all
his
work
while
he
was
on
vacation.
In
fact,
one
of
the
main
questions
in
issue
in
this
appeal
is
whether
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
deduct
the
costs
of
travelling
that
he
had
to
incur
in
order
to
travel
to
other
towns
in
order
to
do
his
colleague
’s
work
under
this
arrangement.
Another
fact
that
is
not
entirely
irrelevant
is
that
the
Hospital
authority,
while
it
treated
the
head
of
the
Pathology
Department
as
an
employee
for
purposes
of
pension
and
income
tax
deductions
at
the
source,
it
did
not
treat
the
appellant
as
an
employee
for
either
of
these
purposes.
It
is
also
of
some
importance,
in
considering
the
character
of
the
contract
under
which
the
appellant
worked
in
the
Trenton
Memorial
Hospital,
to
have
in
mind
that
the
services
of
an
administrative
character
that
he
performed
are
apparently
of
the
same
general
character
as
those
performed
without
remuneration
by
the
medical
doctors
who
carried
on
general
practices
and
who
were
appointed
‘‘Chiefs’’
of
the
Surgery,
Medicine
and
Obstetrics
Departments
of
the
Hospital.
According
to
Article
12
of
the
relevant
by-laws,
such
"
Chiefs
‘
‘
were
required
to
"
"
supervise
their
respective
Departments’’.
The
case
from
the
point
of
view
of
the
appellant
might
be
summarized
in
this
way:
The
Hospital
authority
operated
a
number
of
medical
departments
as
integral
parts
of
the
Hospital
operation.
The
supporting
staffs
of
such
departments
were
employees
of
the
Hospital.
Apart
from
Radiology
and
Pathology,
the
medical
services
in
such
departments
were
provided
by
practising
doctors
who
were
employed
in
the
course
of
their
practices
to
attend
particular
patients
and
by
a
medical
chief
who
was
appointed
from
among
such
doctors
to
work
on
a
voluntary
basis.
In
the
case
of
the
Radiology
Department,
however,
by
reason
of
the
nature
of
the
work
to
be
performed,
the
Hospital
supplied
the
complete
service
to
the
respective
patients
and
did
not
supply
merely
the
place,
equipment
and
supporting
staff
for
the
use
of
the
doctors
employed
by
the
patients.
To
do
so,
the
Hospital
had
to
arrange
for
the
services
of
a
qualified
specialist
to
do
the
work
that
in
other
departments
was
done
by
doctors
employed
by
the
patients.
This
was
accomplished
in
the
years
in
question
by
the
contractual
arrangement
made
with
the
appellant
under
which
he
not
only
agreed
to
provide
such
professional
services,
but
agreed
also
to
act
as
director
of
the
department.
He
supplied
such
services
on
the
same
terms
as
he
would
have
supplied
them
if
he
had
been
employed
by
the
patients
(subject
to
the
5
per
cent
deduction).
In
all
respects,
he
performed
the
professional
work
for
which
he
was
being
paid
in
exactly
the
same
way
as
if
he
had
been
employed
by
the
respective
patients.
If
he
had
been
employed
by
the
patients,
he
would
have
clearly
been
working
under
contracts
for
services.
The
fact
that
the
Hospital
arranged
with
him
to
perform
the
services
did
not
change
the
nature
of
the
contract
under
which
he
worked.
Conceding,
as
one
must,
that
he
might
have
been
doing
the
same
sort
of
work
under
a
contract
of
service
that
would
have
made
him
an
employee,
in
addition
to
other
indications
in
the
contract
and
to
the
view
taken
by
the
parties
of
the
relationship,
the
requirement
in
the
contract
that
he
assume
the
obligation
of
supplying
^coverage”
by
other
radiologists,
not
only
when
on
vacation
but
when
the
work
becomes
too
much
for
one
radiologist,
is
a
compelling
feature
in
the
foreground
of
this
contract
that
makes
the
proper
characterization
of
this
arrangement
one
of
a
contract
for
services
and
not
that
of
a
contract
of
service.
The
other
view,
being
the
view
that
the
Minister
proceeded
on
in
making
the
assessment,
might
be
stated
as
follows:
The
appellant
has
a
position
or
post
in
the
Hospital
of
a
continuing
and
full
time
character.
He
occupies
an
office
there
and
he
has
no
other
office.
He
is
an
integral
and
essential
part
of
the
Hospital
staff.
To
all
outward
appearances
he
is
just
as
much
a
senior
officer
of
the
Hospital
as
is
the
Administrator.
He
participates
in
the
employment
of
the
staff
under
him.
He
directs
their
activities.
He
is
responsible
to
the
Hospital
authority
for
the
proper
operation
of
his
department
and
he
must
make
his
department
work
in
co-operation
with
the
other
parts
of
the
Hospital
operation.
According
to
any
sort
of
layman’s
sense
of
the
term
the
appellant
had
all
the
functions
and
responsibilities
of
a
senior
officer
on
the
staff
of
the
Hospital.
Counsel
for
both
parties
made
very
helpful
and
extensive
references
to
the
authorities
on
the
distinction
between
a
contract
of
service
and
a
contract
for
services.
I
do
not
think
that
I
need
to
review
the
authorities
as
a
preliminary
to
reaching
a
conclusion.*
It
seems
evident
that
what
is
an
appropriate
approach
to
solving
the
problem
in
one
type
of
case
is
frequently
not
a
helpful
approach
in
another
type.
On
the
one
hand,
a
contract
of
service
is
a
contract
under
which
one
party,
the
servant
or
employee,
agrees,
for
either
a
period
of
time
or
indefinitely,
and
either
full
time
or
part
time,
to
work
for
the
other
party,
the
master
or
the
employer.
On
the
other
hand,
a
contract
for
services
is
a
contract
under
which
the
one
party
agrees
that
certain
specified
work
will
be
done
for
the
other.
A
contract
of
service
does
not
normally
envisage
the
accomplishment
of
a
specified
amount
of
work
but
does
normally
contemplate
the
servant
putting
his
personal
services
at
the
disposal
of
the
master
during
some
period
of
time.
A
contract
for
services
does
normally
envisage
the
accomplishment
of
a
specified
job
or
task
and
normally
does
not
require
that
the
contractor
do
anything
personally.
If,
in
this
case,
the
appellant
had
been
given
a
post
to
work
as
a
radiologist
in
the
Hospital
full
time
for
an
indefinite
period
of
time
at
an
annual
salary
there
could,
I
should
have
thought,
have
been
little
doubt
that
he
was
an
officer
or
employee
of
the
Hospital.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
the
appellant
had
had
an
ordinary
medical
practice
and
had
undertaken
to
do
exactly
the
same
things
that
he
was
in
fact
bound
by
the
present
contract
to
do,
but
to
do
the
office
part
of
the
work
in
his
own
office
as
and
when
he
could
find
time
to
do
it,
and
on
the
same
terms
as
to
payment
as
we
find
in
the
present
contract,
I
do
not
think
that
any
one
would
have
doubted
that
it
was
the
ordinary
work
of
a
practising
doctor,
which
is
a
typical
example
of
work
done
under
contracts
for
services.
The
problem
arises
in
these
cases
because,
in
fact,
there
can
be
a
contract
of
service
that
has
features
ordinarily
found
in
a
contract
for
services
and
there
can
be
a
contract
for
services
that
has
features
ordinarily
found
in
a
contract
of
service.
A
servant
can
be
employed
on
terms
that
he
is
paid
on
a
basis
related
to
the
volume
of
work
and
that
he
himself
hires
and
pays
help
that
is
required.
Compare
the
postmistress
in
Reference
as
to
the
Applicability
of
the
Minimum
Wage
Act
of
Saskatchewan
to
an
employee
of
a
Revenue
Post
Office,
[1948]
S.C.R.
248.
So,
also,
while
a
person
who
contracts
to
do
a
job
ordinarily
has
his
own
place
where
he
works
and
has
his
own
plant
and
equipment
with
which
he
works,
and
supplies
the
materials
required
to
do
the
job,
nevertheless
any
one
or
more
of
these
features
can
be
eliminated
by
special
agreement
without
changing
the
character
of
the
contract
as
a
contract
for
services.
Here
I
am
faced
with
a
contract
that
can
be
analysed
either
as
a
contract
of
service
with
deviations
from
the
normal,
or
a
contract
for
services
with
deviations
from
the
normal.
I
must,
therefore,
seek
some
basis
for
a
conclusion
as
to
what
is
the
correct
character
to
assign
to
it.
On
the
one
hand,
the
functions
performed
by
the
appellant
as
administrative
head
of
his
department
point
very
strongly
to
his
being
a
senior
employee
of
the
Hospital.
In
my
mind,
however,
this
is
largely
counterbalanced
by
the
fact
that
functions
of
the
same
general
character
are
performed
in
other
departments
by
medical
chiefs
who
are
practising
doctors
and
whose
status
as
determined
by
the
by-laws
would
not,
I
should
have
thought,
make
them
employees
of
the
Hospital.
[In
any
event,
it
would
seem
that
that
part
of
his
duties
is
something
that
is
added
on
to
the
obligation
of
providing
the
professional
services,
which
obligation
is
the
main
obligation
of
the
contract
and
the
one
in
respect
of
which
the
remuneration
is
paid.]
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
this
central
obligation
in
the
contract
for
the
appellant
to
provide
coverage”
for
the
professional
radiological
work
of
the
Hospital
whether
or
not
he
is
able
to
do
it
personally
and
regardless
of
the
volume
that
it
may
attain.
This
obligation
clearly
contemplates
a
situation
where
the
appellant
would
have
to
hire
one
or
more
other
radiologists
not
merely
for
some
emergency
or
temporary
period
but
on
a
permanent
basis.
I
find
here
not
only
a
‘‘freedom’’
but
an
obligation
on
the
appellant,
in
certain
possible
circumstances,
to
have
work
under
the
contract
done
by
somebody
other
than
himself.
In
Ready
Mixed
Concrete
(South
East
),
Ltd.
v.
Minister
of
Pensions
and
National
Insurance,
[1968]
1
All
E.R.
453
at
440,
MacKenna,
J.
said:
:
The
servant
must
be
obliged
to
provide
his
own
work
and
skill.
Freedom
to
do
a
job
either
by
one’s
own
hands,
or
by
another’s
is
inconsistent
with
a
contract
of
service,
though
a
limited
or
ococasional
power
of
delegation
may
not
be
.
.
.
While,
during
the
years
in
question,
the
appellant
carried
on
the
work
in
question
as
though
he
were
normally
bound
to
provide
his
own
work
and
skill
to
do
the
designated
work,
the
contract
must
be
classified
according
to
its
terms
and
having
regard
to
the
various
possible
situations
to
which
it
may
apply.
With
considerable
hesitation,
having
regard
particularly
to
the
fact
that
during
the
years
in
question
the
appellant
carried
on
the
work
exactly
as
he
would
have
done
if
he
had
been
an
employee,
my
conclusion
is
that
he
was
working
under
a
contract
for
services
and
was
therefore
not
an
officer
or
servant.
The
appellant’s
remuneration
under
the
contract
was
therefore
revenue
from
a
business
within
the
definition
of
that
word
in
Section
139(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
which
reads
as
follows:
139.
(1)
In
this
Act,
(e)
“business”
includes
a
profession,
calling,
trade,
manufacture
or
undertaking
of
any
kind
whatsoever
and
includes
an
adventure
or
concern
in
the
nature
of
trade
but
does
not
include
an
office
or
employment;
While
it
is
not
relevant
to
my
duty
to
decide
this
appeal
in
accordance
with
the
statute,
I
cannot
refrain
from
expressing
gratification
that
the
result
that
I
have
reached
enables
the
appellant
to
deduct
expenses
of
earning
his
income
that
would
otherwise
not
be
deductible
because
of
the
rigid
provisions
of
Section
5
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Having
made
that
finding
on
the
main
question,
I
turn
to
an
"‘Agreement
of
Parties
by
their
Counsel’’
that
forms
part
of
the
material
put
in
at
trial.
Paragraph
2
of
that
Agreement
reads:
2.
Tf
this
Court
should
hold
that
the
Appellant’s
income
for
1964
and
1965
is
income
derived
from
the
carrying
on
of
a
business,
the
parties
agree
that
the
assessments
are
to
be
referred
back
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
of
such
determination.
In
the
event
of
this
Court
so
holding,
the
Court
shall
also
determine
whether
the
car
expenses
with
respect
to
the
travelling
of
the
Appellant
between
his
home
and
the
seminars
at
Queen’s
University
are
deductible.
In
any
event,
if
the
Appellant’s
income
is
from
a
a
busi-
ness,
the
parties
agree
that
the
car
expenses
of
the
Appellant
that
are
deductible
shall
not
include
the
cost
of
travelling
between
his
home
and
the
Trenton
Memorial
Hospital
but
shall
include
the
car
expenses
with
respect
to
the
exchange
of
coverage
arrangement
with
Dr.
Richards,
including
the
applicable
capital
cost
allowance.
I
must,
therefore,
reach
a
conclusion
as
to
whether
the
car
expenses
incurred
by
the
appellant
in
travelling
between
his
home
and
certain
seminars
at
Queen’s
University
in
Kingston
were
expenses
of
earning
his
income.
On
the
evidence,
I
find
that
the
appellant
attended
these
seminars
once
a
week
for
half
the
year
because
he
found
it
necessary
to
do
so
to
keep
up
with
developments
in
the
field
of
radiology
which
was
a
subject
that
was,
at
the
time,
undergoing
substantial
changes.
On
that
basis,
in
the
absence
of
any
relevant
authority
having
been
discovered
by
counsel
for
either
party,
my
conclusion
is
that
the
travelling
expenses
in
question
were
made
"‘for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income’’
from
the
appellant’s
profession
and
that
they
may
therefore
be
deducted
in
computing
that
income
notwithstanding
Section
12(1)
(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
There
will,
therefore,
be
Judgment
that
the
appeal
be
allowed
with
costs
and
that
the
assessments
under
appeal
be
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
re-assessment
on
the
basis
that
the
appellant’s
income
for
1964
and
1965
was
derived
from
carrying
on
a
business
and
that
the
car
expenses
with
respect
to
the
travelling
of
the
appellant
between
his
home
and
the
seminars
at
Queen’s
University
are
deductible.