GIBSON,
J.:—These
appeals
are
from
four
assessments
whereby
income
tax
in
the
amounts
hereinafter
set
out
was
levied
in
respect
of
income
of
the
appellant
for
the
taxation
years
1961
to
1964
:
Date
of
Assessment
|
Taxation
Year
|
Tax.
Assessed
|
November
18,
1965
|
1961
|
$400,282.34
|
October
28,
1966
|
1962
|
173,695.25
|
November
17,
1967
|
1963
|
309,951.56
|
November
17,
1967
|
1964
|
403,229.99
|
The
issue
in
each
appeal
is
whether
or
not
the
appellant
was
associated
with
a
company
by
the
name
of
Burland
Realty
&
Equipment
Company
Limited
within
the
meaning
of
Section
39(1)(b)*
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
reason
of
being
controlled
by
the
same
group
of
shareholders.
The
respondent
pleads
that
in
assessing
the
appellant
for
its
1961
to
1964
taxation
years
‘‘the
Minister
acted
on
the
assumption
that
at
all
material
times
the
Appellant
was
associated
with
Burland
Realty
&
Equipment
Company
Limited
in
that
both
of
the
said
corporations
were
controlled
directly
or
indirectly
by
the
same
group
of
persons
to
wit
:
Marvin
E.
Goldblatt
Cecil
Levy
Malcolm
Goldblatt
Lawrence
(Larry)
Goldblatt
Morton
Levy
Robert
Levy
Labol
Levy
Abby
M.
Goldblatt
Deborah
Moses.”
The
voting
shares
of
Burland
Realty
&
Equipment
Company
Limited
were
held
by
the
above
group
of
persons
and
by
one
Sorie
Rosenblatt.
(The
fact
that
Sorie
Rosenblatt
is
excluded
from
the
above
list
of
persons
is
immaterial
to
the
decision
in
this
case.)
The
appellant,
in
answer
to
the
above
assumption,
claims
that
it
was
controlled
during
its
taxation
years
1961
to
1964
inclusive
by
a
group
consisting
of
Frank
P.
Goldblatt,
George
Goldblatt,
Morley
B.
Goldblatt
and
Reuben
Levy;
that
Burland
Realty
&
Equipment
Company
Limited
was
controlled
by
the
group
of
persons
above
set
out
in
the
respondent’s
assumption
and
by
Sorie
Rosenblatt;
and
that
as
a
consequence
the
appellant
and
Burland
Realty
&
Equipment
Company
Limited
were
not
associated
corporations
within
the
meaning
of
Section
39(4)*
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
for
the
said
taxation
years.
The
common
shareholders
and.
their
respective
share
holdings
of
the
appellant
at
all
material
times
were
as
follows
:
Shareholders
|
Shares
|
Frank
P.
Goldblatt
|
1
|
George
Goldblatt
|
1
|
Morley
B.
Goldblatt
|
1
|
Reuben
Levy
|
1
|
Franklatt
Investments
Limited
|
117,499
|
Georgelatt
Investments
Limited
|
117,499
|
Molatt
Investments
Limited
|
117,499
|
Rulev
Investments
Limited
|
117,499
|
Sidney
Levy
(after
May
17,
1960,
Ruth
Levy)
|
30,000
|
|
500,000
|
Franklatt
Investments
Limited
is
a
holding
company,
all
the
shares
of
which
are
owned
by
the
children
of
Frank
Goldblatt
and
Morley
B.
Goldblatt
(except
as
to
the
daughter
of
Frank
Goldblatt,
Sorie
Rosenblatt;
but
again
the
exclusion
of
Sorie
Rosenblatt.
is
not
material
to
the
decision
in
this
appeal).
Georgelatt
Investments
Limited
is
a
holding
company,
all
the
shares
of
which
are
owned
by
the
two
children
and
one
son-in-law
of
George
Goldblatt.
Molatt
Investments
Limited
is
a
holding
company,
all
the
shares
of
which
are
owned
by
the
children
of
Frank
and
Morley
Goldblatt
(except
Sorie
Rosenblatt).
Rulev
Investments
Limited
is
a
holding
company,
all
the
shares
of
which
are
owned
by
the
children
of
Reuben
Levy.
In
other
words,
the
claim
of
the
appellant
is
that
the
group
consisting
of
the
four
fathers,
Frank
P.
Goldblatt,
George
Goldblatt,
Morley
B.
Goldblatt
and
Reuben
Levy,
although
they
held
during
the
taxation
years
1961
to
1964
only
one
share
each
in
the
appellant
company,
controlled
the
appellant
company
during
its
taxation
years
1961
to
1964;
and
as
a
consequence,
the
said
two
corporations
during
the
said
taxation
years
were
not
associated
within
the
meaning
of
Section
39(1)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
claim
is
based
on
what
the
appellant
alleges
is
the
true
interpretation
of
an
agreement
dated
May
23,
1957,
between
Franklatt
Investments
Limited,
Georgelatt
Investments
Limited,
Molatt
Investments
Limited,
Rulev
Investments
Limited
and
the
said
four
fathers.
(See
Exhibit
A-2.)
The
appellant
admits
that
if
there
was
not
this
agreement
dated
May
23,
1957
the
appellant
and
Burland
Realty
&
Equipment
Company
Limited
were
controlled
by
the
same
group
of
persons
during
these
said
taxation
years
and
that
the
group
that
controlled
both
of
these
corporations
were
at
least
some
of
the
persons
referred
to
above
in
the
assumption
made
by
the
respondent
in
making
the
said
assessments
;
or
putting
it
another
way,
the
appellant
admits
that
both
these
corporations
were
controlled
by
some
of
the
children
of
the
said
four
fathers
if
there
was
not
the
said
agreement
dated
May
23,
1957.
The
said
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
recites
at
paragraphs
3
to
11
inclusive
as
follows:
3.
The
Board
of
Directors
of
each
of
the
Corporations
shall
be
composed
of
four
(4)
Directors,
respectively,
and
so
long
as
this
Agreement
or
any
of
its
extensions
or
renewals
shall
be
in
full
force
and
effect,
Franklatt,
Georgelatt,
Molatt
and
Rulev
shall
each
have
the
respective
right
to
designate
one
(1)
Director
only
to
the
Board
of
Directors
of
each
of
the
said
Corporations;
provided
however
that
no
person
shall
be
so
designated
as
a
Director
of
any
of
the
said
Corporations
unless
he
has
been
an
employee
or
officer
for
at
least
three
(3)
years
of
any
of
the
Corporations.
4.
It
is
hereby
understood
and
agreed
that
so
long
as
the
Parties
of
fifth,
sixth,
seventh
and
eighth
parts
live
they
will,
at
their
individual
and
respective
options,
be
designated
and
elected
as
Directors
of
the
said
Corporations
or
such
one
or
more
of
them
as
they
shall
respectively
desire.
o.
The
written
consent,
or
affirmative
vote
of
a
majority
of
the
Directors
elected
as
aforeprovided
shall,
so
long
as
this
Agreement
or
any
of
its
extensions
or
renewals
be
in
full
force
and
effect,
be
necessary
for
effecting
or
validating
any
act
of
the
said
Corporations,
or
any
of
them.
6.
The
Parties
hereto
agree
to
execute
and
deliver
any
papers,
documents
and
instruments,
causing
such
meetings
to
be
held,
resolutions
to
be
passed
and
by-laws
enacted,
exercise
their
votes
and
influence,
and
do
and
perform
and
cause
to
be
done
and
perform
such
further
and
other
acts
and
things
as
may
be
necessary,
practicable
or
desirable
in
order
to
give
full
effect
to
this
Agreement
and
every
part
thereof.
7.
If
at
any
time
during
the
term
of
this
Agreement
the
Parties
hereto
shall
deem
it
necessary
to
make
any
alterations,
amendments,
or
change
in
this
Agreement,
or
any
clause
thereof,
for
the
more
advantageous
or
satisfactory
management
of
the
business
of
the
Corporations
and
it
shall
be
lawful
and
proper
for
them
to
do
so
by
the
consent
in
writing
of
Franklatt,
Georgelatt,
Molatt
and
Rulev.
8.
The
Party
of
the
fifth
part
hereby
acknowledges
that
all
shares
held
by
him
in
the
said
Corporations
are
held
by
him
on
behalf
of
and
for
Franklatt,
which
owns
the
whole
beneficial
interest
thereof.
9.
The
Party
of
the
sixth
part
hereby
acknowledges
that
all
shares
held
by
him
in
the
said
Corporations
are
held
by
him
on
behalf
of
and
for
Georgelatt
which
owns
the
whole
beneficial
interest
thereof.
10.
The
Party
of
the
seventh
part
hereby
acknowledges
that
all
shares
held
by
him
in
the
said
Corporations
are
held
by
him
on
behalf
of
and
for
Molatt
which
owns
the
whole
beneficial
interest
thereof.
11.
The
Party
of
the
eighth
part
hereby
acknowledges
that
all
shares
held
by
him
in
the
said
Corporations
are
held
by
him
on
behalf
of
and
for
Rulev
which
owns
the
whole
beneficial
interest
thereof.
The
question
for
decision
in
this
case
therefore,
is
whether
or
not
this
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
deprived
the
children
of
the
said
four
fathers
of
de
jure
control
of
the
appellant
and
vested
such
de
jure
control
of
the
appellant
in
the
said
four
fathers
in
the
taxation
years
of
the
appellant,
1961
to
1964.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
argues
that
de
jure
control
during
the
said
taxation
years
was
absolute
in
the
said
four
fathers
by
reason
of
paragraphs
3
and
4
of
the
said
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
and
that
paragraph
7
thereof,
despite
its
wording
that
‘‘any
alterations,
amendments
or
changes’’
in
the
agreement
may
be
made
or
done
“by
the
consent
in
writing
of
Franklatt,
Georgelatt,
Molatt
and
Rulev’’,
does
not
derogate
therefrom.
Instead,
counsel
argues
that
on
a
correct
interpretation
of
the
whole
of
the
agreement,
its
true
meaning
and
the
intention
of
the
parties
to
it,
was
that
all
of
the
parties,
that
is
including
the
four
fathers,
must
agree
and
consent
before
‘‘any
alterations,
amendments
or
changes’’
could
be
made
in
the
said
agreement.
Counsel
for
the
respondent,
on
the
contrary,
argues
that
paragraph
7
of
this
agreement
gives
the
holding
companies,
and
through
them
the
children
of
the
said
four
fathers,
the
sole
power
to
amend
the
said
agreement
and
as
a
result
the
ultimate
or
long-run
control
of
the
appellant
is
and
was
during
the
said
taxation
years
with
the
group
of
children
referred
to
by
the
respondent
in
the
said
assumption
made
for
the
purpose
of
these
assessments.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
also
argues
that
paragraph
7
of
By-law
No.
1
of
the
appellant
(see
Exhibit
A-1)
which
is
the
general
by-law
relating
to
the
transaction
of
the
business
and
affairs
of
the
appellant,
provides
for
the
removal
from
office
of
a
director
or
directors
at
any
time
by
‘‘resolution
passed
at
a
special
and
general
meeting
of
shareholders
called
for
that
purpose”;
and
that
such
is
in
conflict
with
the
said
paragraph
4
of
the
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
and
that
such
conflict
is
irreconcilable.
As
to
this,
counsel
for
the
appellant
argues
that
said
By-law
No.
1
of
the
appellant
was
passed
in
1951
and
that
the
said
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
being
executed
later,
and
by
reason
of
paragraphs
4
and
6
thereof,
is
operative
to
override
any
action
taken
by
shareholders
under
paragraph
7
of
By-law
No.
1.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
also
argues
that
Sections
308
to
310
(see
Schedule
‘‘A’’
to
these
Reasons)
inclusive
of
The
Corporations
Act
of
Ontario
as
applied
to
the
facts
of
this
case
effectively
gave
to
the
children
of
the
said
four
fathers
de
jure
control
of
the
appellant.
In
sum,
for
the
appellant
to
succeed
on
these
appeals,
the
meaning
it
submits
of
the
said
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
must
be
the
true
meaning.
In
my
view,
on
the
true
meaning
of
the
provisions
of
the
said
agreement
of
May
23,
1957
the
four
fathers
during
the
taxation
years
1961
to
1964
did
not
have
de
jure
control
of
the
appellant.
The
meaning
of
‘‘controlled’’
in
Section
39
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
reference
to
a
corporation
means
the
right
of
control
that
is
vested
in
the
owners
of
such
a
number
of
shares
in
a
corporation
so
as
to
give
them
the
majority
of
the
voting
power
in
a
corporation.*
The
fact
that
a
shareholder
in
such
a
corporation
may
be
bound
under
contract
to
vote
in
a
particular
way
regarding
the
election
of
directors
(as
in
this
case),
is
irrelevant
to
the
said
meaning
of
‘‘controlled’’
because
the
corporation
has
nothing
to
do
with
such
a
restriction.
Instead,
the
only
relevant
fact
is
that
the
voting
power
in
such
a
corporation
remains
in
the
owners
of
such
a
number
of
shares.
In
other
words,
they
do
not
in
any
lesser
way
control
the
corporation
because
they
themselves
may
be
liable
to
certain
external
control
created
by
such
a
contract.*
As
a
consequence,
in
my
view,
this
said
agreement
was
not
the
kind
of
contract
among
shareholders
discussed
in
the
said
decision
in
M.N.R.
v.
Dworkin
Furs
(Pembroke)
Limited
et
al.
(supra)
which
has
the
effect
of
accomplishing
what
was
the
intention
of
the
parties
herein,
namely,
to
give
to
a
certain
group,
the
kind
of
de
jure
control
contemplated
by
Section
39
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
so
as
to
avoid
certain
income
tax
consequences,
because
in
that
case,
by
virtue
of
the
statute
it
became
part
of
the
constitution
of
the
Company.
In
the
result,
therefore,
the
appellant
has
not
proven
that
the
said
assumption
made
by
the
respondent
in
making
the
said
assessments
was
wrong.
The
appeals
are
therefore
dismissed
with
costs
as
of
one
appeal.
SCHEDULE
“A”
TO
REASONS
FOR
JUDGMENT
THE
CORPORATIONS
ACT
R.S.O.
1960,
c.
71
308.
(1)
Shareholders
of
a
company
holding
not
less
than
one-
tenth
of
the
issued
shares
of
the
company
that
carry
the
right
to
vote
at
the
meeting
proposed
to
be
held,
or
not
less
than
one-
tenth
of
the
members
of
a
corporation
without
share
capital
entitled
to
vote
at
the
meeting
proposed
to
be
held,
as
the
case
may
be,
may
request
the
directors
to
call
a
general
meeting
of
the
shareholders
or
members
for
any
purpose
connected
with
the
affairs
of
the
corporation
that
is
not
inconsistent
with
this
Act.
(2)
The
requisition
shall
state
the
general
nature
of
the
business
to
be
presented
at
the
meeting
and
shall
be
signed
by
the
requisitionists
and
deposited
at
the
head
office
of
the
corporation
and
may
consist
of
several
documents
in
like
form
signed
by
one
or
more
requisitionists.
(3)
Upon
deposit
of
the
requisition,
the
directors
shall
call
forthwith
a
general
meeting
of
the
shareholders
or
members
for
the
transaction
of
the
business
stated
in
the
requisition.
(4)
If
the
directors
do
not
within
twenty-one
days
from
the
date
of
the
deposit
of
the
requisition
call
and
hold
such
meeting.
any
of
the
requisitionists
may
call
such
meeting
which
shall
be
held
within
sixty
days
from
the
date
of
the
deposit
of
the
requisition.
(5)
A
meeting
called
under
this
section
shall
be
called
as
nearly
as
possible
in
the
same
manner
as
meetings
of
shareholders
or
members
are
called
under
the
by-laws,
but
if
the
by-laws
provide
for
more
than
twenty-one
days
notice
of
meetings,
twenty-
one
days
notice
is
sufficient
for
the
calling
of
such
meeting.
(6)
Any
reasonable
expenses
incurred
by
the
requisitionists
by
reason
of
the
failure
of
the
directors
to
call
such
meeting
shall
be
repaid
to
the
requisitionists
by
the
corporation
and
any
amount
so
repaid
shall
be
retained
by
the
corporation
out
of
any
moneys
due
or
to
become
due
from
the
corporation
by
way
of
fees
or
other
remuneration
in
respect
of
their
services
to
such
of
the
directors
as
were
in
default,
unless
at
such
meeting
the
shareholders
or
members
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
reject
the
repayment
to
the
requisitionists.
309.
(1)
On
the
the
requisition
in
writing
of
shareholders
of
a
company
holding
not
less
than
one-twentieth
of
the
issued
shares
of
the
company
that
carry
the
right
to
vote
at
the
meeting
to
which
the
requisition
relates
or
not
less
than
one-twentieth
of
the
members
of
a
corporation
without
share
capital
entitled
to
vote
at
the
meeting
to
which
the
requisition
relates,
as
the
case
may
be,
the
directors
shall,
(a)
give
to
the
shareholders
or
members
entitled
to
notice
of
the
next
meeting
of
shareholders
or
members
notice
of
any
resolution
that
may
properly
be
moved
and
is
intended
to
be
moved
at
that
meeting;
or
(b)
circulate
to
the
shareholders
or
members
entitled
to
vote
at
the
next
meeting
of
shareholders
or
members
a
statement
of
not
more
than
1,000
words
with
respect
to
the
matter
referred
to
in
any
proposed
resolution
or
with
respect
to
the
business
to
be
dealt
with
at
that
meeting.
(2)
The
notice
or
statement
or
both,
as
the
case
may
be,
shall
be
given
or
circulated
by
sending
a
copy
thereof
to
each
shareholder
or
member
entitled
thereto
in
the
same
manner
and
at
the
same
time
as
that
prescribed
by
this
Act
for
the
sending
of
notice
of
meetings
of
shareholders
or
members.
(3)
Where
it
is
not
practicable
to
send
the
notice
or
statement
or
both
at
the
same
time
as
the
notice
of
the
meeting
is
sent,
the
notice
or
statement
or
both
shall
be
sent
as
soon
as
practicable
thereafter.
(4)
The
directors
are
not
bound
under
this
section
to
give
notice
of
any
resolution
or
to
circulate
any
statement
unless,
(a)
the
requisition,
signed
by
the
requisitionists,
is
deposited
at
the
head
office
of
the
corporation,
(i)
in
the
case
of
a
requisition
requiring
notice
of
a
resolution
to
be
given,
not
less
than
ten
days
before
the
meeting,
(ii)
in
the
case
of
a
requisition
requiring
a
statement
to
be
circulated,
not
less
than
seven
days
before
the
meeting;
and
(b)
there
is
deposited
with
the
requisition
a
sum
reasonably
sufficient
to
meet
the
corporation’s
expenses
in
giving
effect
thereto.
(5)
The
directors
are
not
bound
under
this
section
to
circulate
any
statement
if,
on
the
application
of
the
corporation
or
any
other
person
who
claims
to
be
aggrieved,
the
court
is
satisfied
that
the
rights
conferred
by
this
section
are
being
abused
to
secure
needless
publicity
for
defamatory
matter,
and
on
any
such
application
the
court
may
order
the
costs
of
the
corporation
to
be
paid
in
whole
or
in
part
by
the
requisitionists
notwithstanding
that
they
are
not
parties
to
the
application.
(6)
A
corporation
and
a
director,
officer,
employee
or
person
acting
on
its
behalf,
except
a
requisitionist,
is
not
liable
in
damages
or
otherwise
by
reason
only
of
the
circulation
of
a
notice
or
statement
or
both
in
compliance
with
this
section.
(7)
Notwithstanding
anything
in
the
by-laws
of
the
corporation,
where
the
requisitionists
have
complied
with
this
section,
the
resolution,
if
any,
mentioned
in
the
requisition
shall
be
dealt
with
at
the
meeting
to
which
the
requisition
relates.
(8)
The
sum
deposited
under
clause
(b)
of
subsection
(4)
shall
be
repaid
to
the
requisitionists
by
the
corporation
unless
at
the
meeting
to
which
the
requisition
relates
the
shareholders
or
members
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
reject
the
repayment
to
the
requisitionists.
(9)
A
director
of
a
corporation
who
authorizes,
permits
or
acquiesces
in
any
contravention
of
any
requirement
of
this
section
is
guilty
of
an
offence
and
on
summary
conviction
is
liable
to
a
fine
of
not
more
than
$200.
310.
If
for
any
reason
it
is
impracticable
to
call
a
meeting
of
shareholders
or
members
of
the
corporation
in
any
manner
in
which
meetings
of
shareholders
or
members
may
be
called
or
to
conduct
the
meeting
in
the
manner
prescribed
by
this
Act,
the
letters
patent,
supplementary
letters
patent
or
by-laws,
the
court
may,
on
the
application
of
a
director
or
a
shareholders
or
member
who
would
be
entitled
to
vote
at
the
meeting,
order
a
meeting
to
be
called,
held
and
conducted
in
such
manner
as
the
court
thinks
fit,
and
any
meeting
called,
held
and
conducted
in
accordance
with
such
an
order
shall
for
all
purposes
be
deemed
to
be
a
meeting
of
shareholders
or
members
of
the
corporation
duly
called,
held
and
conducted.