HEALD,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
against
the
estate
of
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
wherein
estate
tax
in
the
sum
of
$36,341.07
was
assessed
against
the
appellants
as
executors
of
the
said
estate.
The
deceased
was,
on
September
5,
1966,
the
date
of
her
death,
a
married
woman,
the
wife
of
Arthur
G.
Roberts,
one
of
the
appellants
herein.
The
other
appellant
is
a
brother
of
the
deceased.
The
deceased
was
42
years
of
age
at
the
time
of
her
death.
She
and
the
appellant
Roberts
are
the
parents
of
four
children
ranging
in
age
from
8
to
14
years
at
the
time
of
their
mother’s
death.
Mrs.
Roberts
had
enjoyed
good
health
until
about
February
of
1966.
She
went
into
hospital
in
April
of
1966
at
which
time
her
doctors
concluded
that
she
was
the
victim
of
a
terminal
disease.
There
was
no
evidence
that
this
disease
affected
in
any
way
her
mental
capacity
or
her
ability
to
understand
and
execute
documents
and
agreements
so
that
her
legal
ability
to
execute
the
documents
which
she
did
in
fact
execute
shortly
before
her
death
is
not
in
issue.
On
May
27,
1966
the
deceased
executed
a
general
power
of
attorney
in
favour
of
Richard
Britton-Foster,
her
brother,
and
Liselotte
Britton-Foster,
his
wife.
There
was
no
evidence
before
me
that
this
power
of
attorney
was
revoked
at
any
time
prior
to
her
death
on
September
5,
1966.
The
appellant
Roberts
and
the
deceased
were
separated
in
September
of
1965,
at
which
time
the
appellant
Roberts
moved
away
from
the
marital
home
occupied
by
his
wife
and
children.
Mr.
Roberts
returned
to
live
with
his
wife
and
children
in
July
of
1966,
and
there
remained
until
his
-
wife’s
death.
The
deceased
was
possessed
of
substantial
assets
in
her
own
right.
Arthur
G.
Roberts,
her
husband,
testified
that
she
owned
a
portfolio
of
investment
securities,
said
portfolio
having
a
market
value
of
$324,484
at
date
of
death.
This
value
is
admitted
by
both
parties.
Mrs.
Roberts
also
owned
the
marital
home
and
a
ski
cabin
as
well
as
other
miscellaneous
assets.
This
appeal
concerns
only
the
above-mentioned
investment
portfolio.
Mr.
Roberts
testified
that
in
the
weeks
immediately
prior
to
her
death
he
had
many
talks
with
his
wife
and
much
of
their
dialogue
centred
on
the
children’s
future
and
on
how
Mrs.
Roberts’
assets
could
best
be
utilized
for
the
benefit
of
the
children.
As
a
result
of
these
conversations
and
discussions
it
was
decided
to
obtain
advice
from
Mr.
W.
D.
Goodman,
Q.C.,
a
Toronto
solicitor.
Accordingly
Mr.
Roberts
first
consulted
Mr.
Goodman
on
August
30,
1966,
when
Mr.
Goodman
recommended
a
specific
program
and
course
of
action
concerning
Mrs.
Roberts’
investment
portfolio.
During
the
afternoon
of
August
31,
1966
Mr.
Roberts
discussed
Mr.
Goodman’s
proposal
in
detail
with
his
wife
at
their
home.
During
the
evening
of
August
31,
1966
Mr.
Goodman
came
to
the
Roberts
home
at
55
Castle
Frank
Road,
Toronto,
and
explained
to
Mr.
and
Mrs.
Roberts
the
various
steps
and
procedures
implicit
in
the
proposed
plan.
The
Roberts
decided
to
accept
Mr.
Goodman’s
advice
and
to
proceed
with
the
program
suggested
by
him.
Accordingly
during
that
meeting
Mrs.
Roberts
signed
a
letter
of
instructions
to
her
brother
Richard
Britton-Foster,
the
said
letter
of
instructions
being
received
in
evidence
as
Exhibit
P.2.
In
that
letter
Mrs.
Roberts
informed
her
brother
that
she
intended
to
sell
her
investment
portfolio
to
a
company
known
as
Lillooet
Investments
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
Lillooet)
in
return
for
200
common
shares
without
par
value
of
the
capital
stock
of
that
company
representing
all
the
issued
shares
in
that
company
at
that
time;
that
she
wished
to
gift
the
said
shares
to
her
said
brother
and
her
husband
as
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust.
Additionally
the
letter
directed
her
brother
to
utilize
his
power
of
attorney
from
her
to
execute
all
documents
in
her
name
that
might
be
necessary
to
effect
the
said
sale
of
her
securities
to
Lillooet
and
to
transfer
the
said
200
shares
of
Lillooet
to
her
brother
and
husband
in
their
capacity
as
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust.
At
that
same
meeting
the
evening
of
August
31,
1966,
at
the
Roberts
home,
Mrs.
Roberts
also
signed
the
agreement
dated
August
31,
1966
between
herself
and
Lillooet
covering
the
sale
of
her
investment
portfolio
of
‘‘blue
chip
stocks’’
and
bonds
worth
$324,484
to
Lillooet
in
return
for
the
200
no
par
value
common
shares
of
Lillooet
(the
said
agreement
was
received
in
evidence
as
Exhibit
P.3).
Mrs.
Roberts
also
executed
the
said
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust
dated
August
31,
1966
at
the
same
meeting
with
Mr.
Goodman
on
the
evening
of
August
31,
1966.
This
document
was
received
in
evidence
as
Exhibit
P.4.
This
is
a
very
lengthy
document.
Briefly
described,
it
purported
to
settle
the
200
shares
of
Lillooet
on
Arthur
George
Roberts
(husband)
and
Richard
Britton-Foster
(brother)
to
hold
upon
certain
trusts
for
the
benefit
of
the
Roberts
children
and
issue.
Mr.
Roberts’
evidence
at
trial
was
that
Exhibits
P.2,
P.3
and
P.4
were
signed
by
his
wife
at
the
meeting
with
Mr.
Goodman
on
the
evening
of
August
31,
1966
at
their
home
55
Castle
Frank
Road.
This
evidence
is
not
contradicted
by
any
other
evidence
and
conforms
to
the
answers
he
gave
on
examination
for
discovery.
I
accordingly
find
as
a
fact
that
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
signed
and
executed
Exhibits
P.2,
P.3
and
P.4
during
the
evening
of
August
31,
1966
at
55
Castle
Frank
Road,
Toronto.
However,
considerable
further
documentation
forms
an
integral
part
of
this
program
(which
for
convenience
I
will
describe
as
the
Goodman
plan)
and
is
principally
contained
in
Exhibit
P.5
which
consists
of
pages
numbered
1
to
36,
being
resolutions
and
minutes
of
the
shareholders
and
directors
of
Lillooet.
The
dates
on
which
these
resolutions
and
minutes
were
signed
is
not
so
clear
and
is
in
issue.
For
the
moment
in
referring
to
these
minutes
I
will
refer
to
the
date
which
appears
in
them
and
will
have
more
to
say
later
on
concerning
the
date
on
which
they
were
actually
signed.
Lillooet
Investments
Limited
was
duly
issued
a
charter
by
letters
patent
from
the
Provincial
Secretary
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
dated
May
6,
1966
under
the
authority
granted
to
him
by
The
Corporations
Act
of
Ontario.
The
authorized
capital
of
the
company
consisted
of:
2,000
common
shares
without
par
value
(the
charter
provided
maximum
consideration
of
$2,000)
;
2,000
Class
A
preference
shares
par
value
$1
each
;
34,000
Class
B
non-voting
preference
shares
par
value
$1
each;
2,000
Class
C
non-voting
preference
shares
par
value
$1
each.
No
evidence
was
adduced
of
any
dealings
with
any
of
the
preference
shares.
Thus
all
the
relevant
share
transactions
are
transactions
having
to
do
with
the
common
shares
without
par
value.
The
incorporators
of
the
company
were
Herbert
A.
Abramson,
Sol
Shulman
and
Allen
Karp,
all
solicitors
of
the
City
of
Toronto
and
all
members
of
Mr.
Goodman’s
firm
at
that
time.
After
incorporation
the
following
steps
were
taken
as
appears
from
a
perusal
of
Exhibit
P.5.
I
have
set
them
out
chronologically
as
they
appear
in
Exhibit
P.5.
Step
1.
The
transfer
of
one
share
each
by
the
incorporators
to
the
appellant
Roberts,
the
appellant
Britton-Foster
and
Mrs.
Britton-Foster,
the
said
three
transferees
being
elected
directors
of
the
company
with
the
appellant
Roberts
being
elected
president
and
the
appellant
Britton-Foster
being
elected
secretary-treasurer.
The
minutes
evidencing
this
step
bear
date
May
6,
1966.
Step
2.
The
company
directors
passed
a
resolution
providing
for
an
increase
from
$2,000
to
$350,000
as
the
maximum
consideration
for
the
issue
of
the
2,000
common
shares
and
further
resolved
that
the
necessary
steps
be
taken
to
pay
the
fee
on
such
greater
amount
and
to
request
the
Provincial
Secretary
to
issue
a
certificate
that
such
fee
has
been
paid.
The
minutes
evidencing
this
step
bear
date
May
6,
1966.
Step
3.
The
three
shareholders,
that
is
the
appellant
Roberts,
the
appellant
Britton-Foster
and
Mrs.
Britton-Foster
each
executed
declarations
of
trust
wherein
each
of
them
declared
that
he
or
she
held
their
one
share
of
Lillooet
in
trust
for
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts.
These
declarations
of
trust
each
bear
date
August
31,
1966.
Step
4.
The
company
directors
passed
a
resolution
authorizing
the
purchase
of
the
investment
portfolio
of
the
deceased
worth
$324,484
in
consideration
of
the
allotment
and
issue
of
200
common
shares
of
the
company
and
authorized
the
president
and
secretary-treasurer
to
execute
the
said
agreement
on
behalf
of
the
company.
This
is
the
agreement
for
sale
received
in
evidence
as
Exhibit
P.3.
This
resolution
bears
date
August
31,
1966.
Step
5.
The
company
directors
passed
a
resolution
providing
for
the
allotment
and
issue
of
a
further
197
common
shares
of
the
company
to
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
and
also
fixed
the
consideration
for
the
said
allotment
and
issue
as
$324,481.
This
resolution
bears
date
August
31,
1966.
Step
6.
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
transferred
by
way
of
gift
to
the
appellant
Roberts
and
the
appellant
Britton-Foster
as
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust
the
said
197
common
shares
of
Lillooet.
This
transfer
bears
date
August
31.
1966.
Step
7.
Step
7
is
a
separate
declaration
of
trust
of
each
of
Messrs.
Roberts
and
Britton-Foster
and
Mrs.
Britton-Foster
wherein
each
of
them
declared
that
they
held
one
common
share
of
Lillooet
in
trust
for
the
appellant
Roberts
and
the
appellant
Britton-Foster
as
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust.
The
declarations
of
trust
in
Step
7
bear
date
August
31,
1966.
Step
8.
The
company
directors
passed
a
resolution
under
which
each
of
the
existing
shareholders
were
given
the
right
to
subscribe
for
and
have
issued
nine
common
shares
at
ten
cents
per
share
for
each
common
share
presently
held.
The
appellants
Roberts
and
Britton-Foster
in
their
capacity
as
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust
were
thus
allotted
and
issued
1,800
common
shares
at
a
price
of
10
cents
per
share.
This
allotment
and
issue
was
based
on
the
assumption
that
the
said
appellants
as
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust
were
the
owners
of
all
the
previously
issued
200
shares.
To
summarize,
on
August
30,
1966,
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
owned
an
investment
portfolio
with
a
market
value
of
$324,484.
Had
she
died
on
August
30,
1966
this
sum
would
have
been
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value
of
her
estate
for
estate
tax
purposes.
However,
on
August
31,
1966
the
Goodman
plan
outlined
above
was
implemented.
The
appellants
submit
that
the
implementation
of
this
plan
has
the
following
result
:
(a)
The
three
original
incorporators’
shares
belonged
beneficially
to
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
who
gifted
them
to
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust
before
her
death.
(b)
Under
the
sale
agreement
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
was
entitled
to
receive
197
additional
common
shares
of
Lillooet
which
she
also
gifted
to
the
trust
before
her
death.
(c)
In
the
result
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
had
disposed
of
her
entire
interest
in
Lillooet
before
her
death.
(d)
The
directors
of
Lillooet
validly
issued
1,800
additional
common
shares
at
10
cents
per
share.
(e)
At
September
5,
1966,
the
date
of
Mrs.
Roberts’
death,
there
were
2,000
validly
issued
common
shares
of
Lillooet.
The
200
shares
which
Mrs.
Roberts
had
gifted
represented
only
10%
of
the
net
worth
of
the
company.
Therefore
appellants
argue
that
only
10%
of
the
value
of
$324,484
or
$32,448
should
be
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value
of
the
estate.
The
respondent
assessed
the
estate
on
the
basis
of
the
full
market
value
of
$324,484
and
this
appeal
is
from
that
assessment.
I
found
as
a
fact
supra
that
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
signed
and
executed
Exhibits
P.2,
P.3
and
P.4
during
the
evening
of
August
31,
1966
at
her
home
55
Castle
Frank
Road,
Toronto.
I
also
said
that
the
date
of
execution
of
the
further
documentation
forming
an
integral
part
of
this
plan
was
not
so
clear
and
was
in
issue
notwithstanding
the
dates
appearing
on
them.
Lillooet
Investments
Limited
was
incorporated
on
May
6,
1966
by
Messrs.
Abramson,
Shulman
and
Karp
but
did
not
become
an
active
company
while
they
were
its
sole
shareholders.
Mr.
Roberts
says
it
was
what
is
known
as
a
“‘shelf’’
company;
in
other
words
an
existing
company
with
full
legal
status
but
on
the
“shelf”
in
the
sense
of
not
being
actively
engaged
in
a
business
of
any
kind.
His
evidence
was
that
because
a
private
corporation
was
essential
to
the
implementation
of
the
plan
recommended
by
Mr.
Goodman
and
because
this
company
was
available,
it
was
decided
to
purchase
all
of
the
shares
of
Lillooet
presumably
to
save
the
time
and
possibly
some
of
the
costs
involved
in
incorporating
a
new
company.
This
explains
why
pages
1
to
9
of
Exhibit
P.5
are
dated
May
6,
1966.
These
resolutions
were
obviously
prepared
at
the
time
of
incorporation
on
May
6,
1966.
The
names
of
Messrs.
Roberts
and
Britton-Foster
and
Mrs.
Britton-Foster
were
inserted
much
later
because
the
decision
to
purchase
the
shares
of
this
company
was
not
taken
until
August
31.
There
was
no
evidence
as
to
whether
the
incorporators
signed
the
resolutions
on
May
6
or
at
some
subsequent
date
but
in
my
view
the
date
of
signing
by
the
incorporators
is
not
crucial
to
the
decision
in
this
case.
However,
all
of
the
other
resolutions,
minutes,
declarations
and
documentation
contained
in
pages
10
to
36
inclusive
of
Exhibit
P.5
are
dated
August
31,
1966.
In
their
pleadings
the
appellants
state
that
all
of
the
pertinent
share
transactions
in
Lillooet
occurred
on
August
31,
1966.
I
refer
to
paragraphs
2,
3
and
4
of
the
notice
of
appeal
in
this
regard.
This
is
confirmed
by
the
appellant
Roberts
in
his
examination
for
discovery.
See
lines
24
to
30,
page
10;
lines
1
to
5,
page
11;
lines
22
to
30,
page
15;
lines
1
to
20,
page
16;
lines
28
to
30,
page
17
;
lines
1
to
5,
page
18
;
lines
16
to
24,
page
18
;
lines
22
to
30,
page
19;
lines
1
to
15,
page
20;
lines
23
to
25,
page
20.
Additionally,
Mr.
Goodman’s
firm
wrote
a
letter
bearing
date
of
October
14,
1966
to
the
appellants
which
can
best
be
described
as
a
reporting
letter.
The
letter
under
the
signature
of
Richard
W.
J.
Posluns,
a
member
of
Mr.
Goodman’s
law
firm
is
some
10
pages
in
length
and
reports
in
detail
the
various
steps
under-
taken
and
completed
under
the
Goodman
plan.
On
page
9
of
the
letter
Mr.
Posluns
says
:
“Naturally
it
is
most
essential
that
any
estate
tax
and
succession
duty
returns
and
any
correspondence
with
the
respective
departments
be
accurate
in
describing
the
estate
planning
procedures
which
we
have
implemented
and
which
are
reported
to
you
in
this
letter.”
Mr.
Posluns
wrote
this
letter
when
the
various
steps
and
meetings
were
still
fresh
in
his
mind.
He
realized
that
accuracy
was
essential
in
reporting
this
plan
and
every
step
in
it
to
the
Department
because
he
was
well
aware
that
the
Department
would
scrutinize
the
plan
very
closely
having
regard
to
its
result
which
was
to
substantially
reduce
the
amount
of
estate
tax
payable
in
Mrs.
Roberts’
estate.
On
page
4
of
this
reporting
letter
Mr.
Posluns
says:
‘On
the
313??
day
of
August
1966,
the
directors
passed
a
resolution
of
the
company
allotting
and
issuing
a
further
197
common
shares
without
par
value
for
the
sum
of
$324,481
to
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts,
representing
the
purchase
price
payable
in
respect
of
the
purchase
by
the
company
from
Mrs.
Roberts
of
certain
shares.
.
.
.
On
the
same
day
a
resolution
was
passed
by
the
board
of
directors
approving
the
transfer
of
197
common
shares
in
the
capital
of
the
company
from
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
to
Arthur
George
Roberts
and
Richard
Britton-Foster,
trustees
of
the
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
Family
Trust.
.
.
.
At
a
meeting
of
the
board
of
directors
of
the
company
held
on
the
31316
day
of
August
1966,
at
the
hour
of
4
o’clock
in
the
afternoon
a
resolution
was
passed
giving
the
right
to
each
of
the
present
shareholders
of
the
company
to
subscribe
for
and
to
be
issued
nine
common
shares
in
the
capital
of
the
company
at
ten
cents
per
share
for
each
common
share
presently
held
by
each
shareholder.
.
.
.
As
mentioned
above,
the
directors
of
the
company
passed
a
resolution
approving
the
purchase
of
the
securities
and
the
form
of
agreement
of
purchase
and
sale
on
the
31st
day
of
August
1966.”
(The
italics
are
mine.)
Nevertheless
the
appellant
Arthur
G.
Roberts
in
his
evidence
at
trial
swore
that
all
of
the
Lillooet
resolutions
and
minutes
signed
by
himself,
the
appellant
Brittno-Foster
and
Mrs.
Britton-
Foster
were
signed
not
on
August
31
but
in
Mr.
Goodman’s
office
on
the
morning
of
September
1,
1966.
He
admits
that
he
and
Mr.
Britton-Foster
did
meet
with
Mr.
Goodman
in
Mr.
Goodman’s
office
on
the
afternoon
of
August
31
from
about
3.30
p.m.
until
about
5
p.m.,
that
Mr.
Posluns
was
also
present
at
this
meeting
but
denies
that
this
meeting
or
any
portion
of
it
was
the
meeting
of
the
directors
described
on
pages
30
and
31
of
Exhibit
P.5
as
taking
place
at
4
p.m.
on
August
31,
1966.
(This
was
the
meeting
which
declared
the
stock
rights
of
nine
to
one.
)
toberts’
only
explanation
of
this
direct
conflict
between
his
evidence
at
trial
and
his
evidence
on
examination
for
discovery
was
that
because
all
of
the
resolutions
and
documentation
were
dated
August
31,
that
he
assumed
they
were
actually
signed
and
the
meetings
actually
held
on
August
31;
that
between
the
examination
for
discovery
and
the
date
of
trial
he
discovered
his
error
and
was
now
correcting
his
testimony.
I
do
not
accept
this
explanation.
On
the
one
hand
the
notice
of
appeal
gives
the
pertinent
dates
as
August
31
;
Roberts
in
his
examination
for
discovery
swears
the
pertinent
dates
as
August
31
;
Mr.
Posluns
in
his
reporting
letter
of
October
14,
1966
to
the
appellants,
after
stressing
to
his
clients
the
need
for
accuracy
and
full
disclosure,
also
gives
the
pertinent
date
as
August
31;
on
the
other
hand
the
evidence
of
the
appellant
Roberts
at
trial
that
he
was
previously
in
error
and
(a
necessary
inference
from
his
evidence)
that
the
pleadings
were
in
error
and
Mr.
Posluns
was
in
error.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
quite
properly
pointed
out
at
trial
that
no
effort
was
made
to
explain
this
discrepancy.
No
attempt
was
made
to
corroborate
Roberts’
evidence
at
trial—
for
example—a
docket
entry
or
diary
entry
from
the
Goodman
office.
Messrs.
Britton-Foster,
Goodman
and
Posluns
were
present
when
the
documentation
was
signed
and
the
meetings
were
held.
It
would
have
been
a
simple
matter
to
have
one
or
the
other
of
them
give
evidence
on
this
very
important
part
of
the
case.
I
do
not
accept
Mr.
Roberts’
evidence
at
trial
on
this
point.
Accordingly
I
find
as
a
fact
that
all
of
the
resolutions,
declarations,
minutes
and
documentation
signed
by
the
appellants
and
Mrs.
Britton-Foster
as
contained
in
Exhibit
P.5
were
in
fact
signed
and
executed
by
them
on
August
31,
1966.
I
find
further
as
a
fact
that
the
directors’
meeting
recorded
as
held
on
August
31
at
4
p.m.
was
in
fact
held
on
that
date
and
at
that
hour
and
transacted
the
business
as
reported
by
the
minutes
thereof
which
are
contained
on
pages
30
to
32
inclusive
of
Exhibit
P.5.
The
letters
patent
of
Lillooet
provide
that
the
2,000
common
shares
without
par
value
shall
not
be
issued
for
a
consideration
exceeding
two
thousand
dollars
“or
such
greater
amount
as
the
Board
of
Directors
of
the
Company
deems
expedient
on
payment
to
the
Treasurer
of
Ontario
of
the
fees
payable
on
such
greater
amount
and
on
the
issuance
by
the
Provincial
Secretary
of
a
certificate
of
such
payment’’.
(The
italics
are
mine.)
Such
a
provision
in
the
letters
patent
is
permitted
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
Section
26(4)
of
The
Corporations
Act
(Ontario)
(R.S.O.
1970,
c.
89).*
The
directors
of
Lillooet
proceeded
pursuant
to
this
provision
of
the
letters
patent
and
accordingly
passed
a
resolution
increasing
the
maximum
consideration
from
$2,000
to
$350,000
for
the
issuance
of
the
2,000
common
shares
without
par
value.
This
minute
is
dated
May
6,
1966,
but
I
held
(swpra)
that
it
was
signed
by
the
directors
on
August
31,
1966.
Then
on
September
1,
1966
a
letter
was
written
by
Mr.
Posluns
of
the
Goodman
firm
(Exhibit
D.4)
and
delivered
to
the
office
of
the
Provincial
Secretary
the
same
day,
enclosing
a
certified
copy
of
the
said
resolution
and
a
cheque
for
the
Treasurer’s
necessary
additional
fees
and
requesting
the
Provincial
Secretary
to
issue
the
certificate
of
such
payment.
The
evidence
of
Mr.
McCormack,
the
Controller
of
Records
in
the
Ontario
Companies
Branch,
was
to
the
effect
that
the
Provincial
Secretary
signed
the
Certificate
of
Payment
of
Fees
(Exhibit
P.6)
on
September
15,
1966,
and
that
it
was
sent
out
to
the
Goodman
office
on
September
16,
1966.
The
Lillooet
letters
patent
clearly
state
that
the
common
shares
can
only
be
issued
for
an
increased
consideration
on
payment
to
the
Treasurer
of
the
increased
fees
and
on
the
issuance
of
the
certificate
by
the
Provincial
Secretary.
(The
italics
are
mine.)
The
wording
of
the
letters
patent
make
it
clear
that
these
two
steps
are
conditions
precedent
to
the
issuance
of
common
shares
for
an
increased
consideration.
In
the
case
at
bar,
step
1
occurred
on
September
1,
1966,
but
step
2
did
not
occur
until
September
15,
1966.
It
should
also
be
observed
that
Section
26(4)
of
The
Corporations
Act
(Ontario)
which
permits
this
type
of
procedure
to
be
included
in
letters
patent
uses
identical
language
and
it
is
thus
equally
clear
that
the
two
above-noted
steps
are
conditions
precedent
in
the
governing
statute.
I
would
also
like
to
refer
to
the
agreement
for
sale
between
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
and
Lillooet.
Paragraph
7
thereof
states:
“Without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
it
is
expressly
understood
between
the
Parties
hereto
that
the
Purchaser
shall
forthwith
take
such
steps
as
are
necessary
to
enable
the
common
shares
to
be
issued
for
an
aggregate
consideration
equal
to
the
purchase
price
hereunder
and
that
forthwith
upon
receiving
the
required
certificate
from
the
Provincial
Secretary
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
entitling
the
Purchaser
to
issue
the
said
shares
for
the
said
consideration,
it
will
cause
the
common
shares
to
be
issued
to
the
Vendor
in
accordance
with
the
terms
of
this
Agreement.”
(The
italics
are
mine.)
It
is
clear
from
paragraph
7
that
the
shares
to
be
issued
to
Mrs.
Roberts
could
not
possibly
be
legally
issued
any
earlier
than
September
16,
1966,
the
date
on
which
the
Provincial
Secretary’s
certificate
was
sent
out
to
the
Goodman
office.
I
think
it
is
also
significant
that
Mr.
Posluns
in
his
reporting
letter
to
the
appellants
(Exhibit
D.5)
states
on
page
6
thereof:
“A
Certificate
of
Payment
has
been
obtained
dated
the
1st
day
of
September,
1966,
and
the
common
shares
of
the
Company
may
now
be
issued
for
a
consideration
not
in
excess
of
$350,000.”
(The
italics
are
mine.)
It
will
be
recalled
that
this
letter
was
written
on
October
14,
1966.
The
appellants
submit
that
all
of
the
steps
necessary
to
complete
the
Goodman
plan
were
completed
prior
to
September
5,
1966,
the
time
of
death.
I
cannot
agree.
In
my
opinion,
the
allotment
and
issue
of
the
further
197
shares
to
Elizabeth
Ann
Roberts
was
inoperative
prior
to
September
5,
1966
because
no
authority
to
allot
and
issue
was
issued
until
September
15,
1966.
I
have
read
the
judgment
of
my
brother
Cattanach,
J.
in
Oakfield
Developments
(Toronto)
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1969]
2
Ex.
C.R.
149;
[1969]
C.T.C.
219.
In
that
case
Cattanach,
J.
held
that
the
Minister
was
not
precluded
from
establishing
that
supplementary
letters
patent
bore
a
date
antecedent
to
their
actual
issuance.
There
the
supplementary
letters
patent
authorizing
the
issue
of
preference
shares
were
dated
December
20,
1960
but
they
were
not
in
fact
issued
until
February
15,
1961.
It
followed
that
no
preference
shares
were
validly
issued
on
December
21,
1960
as
the
company’s
capital
stock
did
not
include
such
stock
at
that
time.
The
decision
of
Cattanach,
J.
was
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
The
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
was
delivered
by
Mr.
Justice
Judson
(
[1971]
C.T.C.
283).
The
appeal
was
dismissed
on
other
grounds
and
the
rationale
of
Cattanach,
J.
was
not
dealt
with
by
the
Supreme
Court.
I
agree
with
the
reasoning
of
my
brother
Cattanach,
J.
in
the
Oakfield
case
and
in
the
ease
of
The
Deltona
Corporation
v.
M.N.R.,
[1971]
C.T.C.
297
at
323.
In
the
case
at
bar
the
facts
are,
in
my
opinion,
even
stronger
than
in
the
Oakfield
case
(supra).
Here,
the
purported
issue
of
the
additional
197
shares
to
Mrs.
Roberts
took
place
on
August
31,
1966—the
subsequent
gift
to
the
trust
of
the
200
common
shares
and
the
directors’
meeting
allotting
and
issuing
the
1,800
common
shares—all
took
place
on
August
31,
1966,
one
day
before
the
date
of
issue
of
the
Provincial
Secretary’s
certificate.
Putting
the
appellants’
case
at
its
highest
and
disregarding
the
Oakfield
and
Deltona
cases,
the
appellants’
right
to
transfer
the
200
shares
and
to
issue
the
additional
1,800
shares
dates
from
September
1,
1966,
and
yet
all
of
these
steps
occurred
on
August
31,
1966.
It
follows
therefore
that
at
September
5,
1966,
the
date
of
death,
the
transfer
and
disposition
of
Mrs.
Roberts’
investment
portfolio
had
not
taken
place
and
said
portfolio
was
properly
included
by
the
Minister
in
computing
the
aggregate
net
value
of
her
estate.
I
was
invited
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
if
I
found
that
the
Goodman
plan
was
completed,
to
find
further
that
there
was
here
in
form
and
in
substance
an
interrelated
and
interconnected
series
of
transactions,
wherein
the
deceased’s
investment
portfolio
was
transferred
to
a
corporation
controlled
by
the
deceased
at
the
time
of
transfer
in
consideration
for
the
allotment
and
issue
of
all
its
issued
share
capital
to
trustees
to
hold
on
trust
for
the
transferor’s
children
and
that
these
transactions
are,
therefore,
in
form
and
substance
a
disposition
operating
as
an
immediate
gift
inter
vivos
and
accordingly
the
full
market
value
of
the
securities
must
be
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value
of
the
estate
pursuant
to
Section
3(1)
(ec)
of
the
Estate
Tax
Act.*
Having
found
that
the
Goodman
plan
was
not
completed
and
that
the
transfer
and
disposition
of
Mrs.
Roberts’
investment
portfolio
had
not
taken
place
before
her
death
it
is
unnecessary
for
me
to
deal
with
this
submission.
However,
I
have
no
hesitation
in
expressing
the
opinion
that,
when
you
look
at
the
program,
the
plan
and
at
all
of
the
evidence,
there
would
have
been
a
disposition
of
the
marketable
securities
which
would
have
operated
by
way
of
gift
within
the
meaning
of
Section
3(1)(e)
if
the
plan
had
been
completed.
It
seems
to
be
well
settled
in
tax
cases
that
the
substance,
rather
than
the
form
be
regarded
and
also
that
the
intention
with
which
a
transaction
is
entered
into
is
an
important
matter
and
the
whole
sum
of
the
relevant
circumstances
must
be
taken
into
account.t
I
believe
that
the
plan
implemented
in
this
case
was
merely
the
machinery
used
to
effect
a
gift
of
the
investment
portfolio
for
the
benefit
of
the
children
and
that,
accordingly,
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
M.N.R.
v.
H.
Cox
Estate,
[1971]
C.T.C.
227,
Judson,
J.
at
229,
applies
to
this
case
as
well.
Counsel
for
the
appellants
relied
heavily
on
the
case
of
Attorney
General
v.
Oldham,
[1940]
1
K.B.
595
at
606,
607,
608;
affirmed
[1940]
2
K.B.
485.
In
that
case
one
Tate,
in
January
1934,
gave
to
his
daughter
Mrs.
Oldham,
the
defendant,
25,000
ordinary
shares
in
a
company.
In
May
1935
the
company
increased
its
capital
by
the
issue
to
its
ordinary
shareholders
of
bonus
shares,
fully
paid
out
of
the
company’s
general
reserve,
in
the
ratio
of
two
bonus
shares
for
every
five
existing
shares
which
resulted
in
the
defendant
receiving
10,000
bonus
shares.
Tate
died
in
April
1936
and
the
Crown
claimed
estate
duty
on
the
value
of
the
10,000
bonus
shares
as
well
as
on
the
25,000
original
shares.
(The
defendant
admitted
that
duty
was
chargeable
on
the
original
25,000
shares
because
it
was
a
voluntary
disposition
made
by
Tate
less
than
three
years
before
his
death.
)
Mr.
Justice
Wrottesley
held
that
the
bonus
shares
were
not
property
passing
under
the
disposition
made
by
Tate
and,
therefore,
estate
duty
was
not
chargeable
on
their
value.
I
would
observe
that
while
the
operative
words
in
the
governing
English
statute
in
the
Oldham
case
are
similar
to
the
wording
of
Section
3(1)
(c)
of
our
statute,
there
is
no
definition
of
disposition”
in
the
English
statute.
‘‘Disposition’’
is
defined
in
our
statute
by
Section
58(1)(e)
thereof.*
The
Oldham
facts
are
entirely
different
from
the
case
at
bar
and
the
relevant
statute
is
significantly
different.
I
am
therefore
of
the
opinion
that
the
Oldham
ease
cannot
be
applied
to
this
case.
It
is
interesting,
however,
to
read
on
page
606
of
the
Oldham
judgment
the
following
statement
of
the
law
by
the
learned
Justice:
If
what
is
contended
for
is
that
the
Court
must
not
close
its
eyes
to
what
a
transaction
really
provides,
should
that
be
different
from
what
the
form
of
the
transaction
appears
to
provide,
there
is
no
doubt
that
that
is
the
duty
of
the
Court.”
This
statement
of
the
law
by
Wrottesley,
J.
is
not
at
variance
in
any
way
with
the
West
Hill
decision
or
the
Cox
decision
earlier
referred
to.
After
a
careful
consideration
of
the
provisions
of
Sections
3(1)(c)
and
58(1)
(e)
of
the
Estate
Tax
Act
I
have
concluded
that
the
plan
herein
is
clearly
a
disposition
of
securities
within
the
ordinary
meaning
of
the
word
“disposition”
and
within
the
extended
meaning
set
out
in
Section
58(1)
(e).
I
have
read
the
English
eases
cited
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
on
the
proper
interpretation
to
be
given
this
word
in
their
taxing
statutes
and
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
plan
in
the
case
at
bar
would
most
certainly
be
‘‘a
disposition’’
within
the
meaning
of
those
cases.
See
Duke
of
Northumberland
v.
Attorney
General,
[1905]
A.C.
406,
per
Lord
Macnaghten
at
410-412;
Parr
v.
Attorney
General,
[1926]
A.C.
239,
per
Lord
Carson
at
267,
268;
Grey
v.
Inland
Revenue
Commissioners,
[1959]
3
All
E.R.
603,
H.L.
per
Viscount
Simonds
at
605.
The
appeal
is
dismissed
with
costs.