The
Chairman:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
taxpayer
against
notices
of
reassessment
of
income
tax
for
the
years
1966
and
1967
issued
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
September
of
1969.
The
matter
came
on
for
hearing
before
J
O
Weldon,
Esquire,
QC
on
October
13,
1971
at
the
City
of
Saskatoon
in
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
at
a
sitting
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted.
Judgment
was
not
delivered
in
this
case
before
Mr
Weldon’s
term
of
office
with
the
Board
expired,
and
the
parties
have
agreed
in
writing
that
the
decision
be
rendered
by
a
member
of
the
Tax
Review
Board
on
the
basis
of
the
transcript
of
the
evidence
and
argument
adduced
before
Mr
Weldon,
without
the
necessity
of
rehearing
the
appeal
or
of
providing
an
opportunity
to
re-argue
the
case.
At
the
opening
of
the
hearing,
appellant’s
counsel,
Mr
Andrew
Hawrish,
indicated
that
the
appeal
would
be
narrowed
to
one
point,
namely,
that
“the
Appellant
has
filed
his
income
tax
returns
claiming
the
depreciation,
or
a
portion
of
the
depreciation,
of
his
automobile
[for]
which
he
has
not
received
any
compensation
at
all,
and
this
is
the
only
point
that
we’ll
be
arguing”.
This
appears
at
page
2
of
the
transcript.
The
only
witness
called
at
the
hearing
was
the
appellant,
who,
at
the
material
time,
was
district
manager
of
Pepsi-Cola
Canada
Limited
for
Saskatchewan.
His
evidence
is
that
when
he
was
approached
by
management
to
take
the
position
in
question
he
was
asked
if
he
had
a
car
and
was
told
that
he
would
receive
a
mileage
allowance,
and
that
any
bills
for
hotel
accommodation
and
meals
would
be
submitted
on
expense
account
and
he
would
be
reimbursed
therefor.
He
said
that
the
mileage
allowance
was
to
take
care
of
his
automobile
—
“strictly
automobile:
gas,
maintenance,
tires
and
what
have
you”.
(I
am
quoting
now
from
the
fourth
paragraph
on
page
4
of
the
transcript.)
Again,
at
page
39
during
cross-examination
by
Mr
Hynes,
counsel
for
the
respondent,
Mr
Zrobek
agreed,
in
answer
to
a
question
with
regard
to
information
he
had
given
to
the
taxation
officials,
that
he
had
said
that
he
received
a
gasoline
allowance
of
3.3
cents
a
mile
and,
in
addition,
a
further
$60
every
four
weeks
as
car
allowance.
He
agreed
with
Mr
Hynes
that
the
$60
was
to
cover
car
expenses
not
covered
by
the
gasoline
allowance,
but
did
not
agree
that
it
was
to
cover
depreciation,
his
understanding
being
that
the
amounts
paid
him
by
his
employer
were
strictly
for
gasoline,
grease
jobs,
tires
and
maintenance
of
the
car.
There
is
no
question
that
in
the
years
under
appeal
the
appellant
received
from
his
employer
both
a
mileage
allowance
and
a
car
allowance,
plus
an
expense
allowance
paid
on
the
basis
of
vouchers
submitted,
and
that
he
did
not
include
these
items
in
the
income
declared
by
him
on
his
income
tax
returns
for
those
years.
These
amounts
were
payable
to
the
appellant
by
virtue
of
his
terms
of
employment
and
were
intended
to
cover
his
various
out-of-pocket
expenses,
and
therefore
it
was
not
necessary
for
him
to
include
them
when
reporting
his
income
for
the
year.
However,
he
now
claims
that,
in
addition
to
the
amounts
received
by
him
for
such
expenses,
he
should,
under
subsection
11(11)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
be
entitled
to
an
additional
deduction
in
respect
of
depreciation
on
his
motor
vehicle.
The
Act
is
quite
clear
that,
in
order
to
be
entitled
to
take
advantage
of
subsection
11(11)
of
the
Act,
the
taxpayer
must
also
be
entitled
to
deductions
under
subsection
(6)
or
(9)
of
the
said
section
11
for
the
same
taxation
year.
These
latter
deductions
are
only
applicable
to
certain
employees
who,
among
other
things,
were,
by
their
contract
of
employment,
required
to
pay
their
own
travelling
expenses
and
were
not
in
receipt
of
any
allowance
for
travelling
expenses
that,
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
5(1)(b)(v),
(vi)
or
(vii),
was
not
included
in
computing
their
income.
In
my
view,
the
appellant
cannot
fit
within
the
confines
of
either
subsection
(6)
or
(9)
of
section
11,
and
therefore
is
not
entitled
to
any
allowance
for
depreciation
under
subsection
11(11)
of
the
Act.
In
other
words,
having
taken
advantage
of
the
privileges
available
to
him
under
section
5
of
the
Act,
permitting
him
to
exclude
from
his
income
the
travelling
expenses
and
allowances
that
he
received
from
his
employer,
he
cannot
now
seek
to
apply
subsection
(11),
(9)
or
any
other
subsection
of
section
11,
out
of
context
in
order
to
grab
a
further
deduction
for
himself
on
account
of
expenses.
Certain
cases
were
cited
by
the
parties,
but
it
is
clear
on
the
evidence,
as
pointed
out
by
Mr
Weldon
at
page
77
when
giving
his
views
on
the
case,
that
the
appeal
can
be
decided
on
the
general
evidence
adduced
and
on
the
wording
of
the
subsections
involved,
and
that,
since
the
wording
of
subsection
(11)
and
the
other
applicable
provisions
of
section
11
is
clear,
it
is
not
necessary
to
look
too
closely
at
the
cases.
If
in
fact
the
appellant
did
not
receive
adequate
compensation
from
his
employer
for
wear
and
tear
on
his
personal
automobile
in
the
course
of
carrying
out
his
duties,
then
that
was
a
matter
between
himself
and
his
employer
at
the
material
time.
The
fact
remains
that,
having
received
expense
allowances
and
having,
as
stated
previously,
excluded
them
from
his
declared
income
as
he
was
entitled
to
do
under
section
5,
he
cannot
now
avail
himself
of
subsection
11(11)
of
the
Act.
For
these
reasons,
in
my
view,
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed
and
the
assessments
of
the
Minister
for
the
taxation
years
1966
and
1967
affirmed.
Appeal
dismissed.