The
Chairman:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
reassessment
to
income
tax
for
the
taxation
year
1967,
wherein
the
Minister
disallowed
the
deduction
of
certain
sums
claimed
as
losses
or
expenses
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
while
trading
in
securities.
The
appeal
was
heard
at
the
City
of
Windsor
in
the
Province
of
Ontario
on
September
21,
1971
my
J
O
Weldon,
Esquire,
QC,
then
a
member
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted.
The
decision
in
this
case
was
not
delivered
before
Mr
Weldon’s
retirement
from
the
Tax
Review
Board
and
the
parties
have
consented
that
judgment
be
rendered
by
a
present
member
on
the
basis
of
the
transcript
of
the
proceedings
at
the
hearing
before
Mr
Weldon
at
the
time
and
place
aforesaid.
The
facts
in
the
case
are
not
in
dispute
and
no
evidence
was
called
at
the
hearing,
the
proceedings
having
been
limited
to
argument
on
the
part
of
counsel
for
the
respective
parties.
The
following
facts
are
taken
from
the
notice
of
appeal
and
were
agreed
to
by
the
respondent.
From
the
year
1953
until
about
December
of
1963,
the
appellant
was
employed
by
Leslie
Bongard
&
Co
Ltd,
a
stock
brokerage
firm
with
offices
in
the
City
of
Windsor,
in
the
County
of
Essex,
and
elsewhere.
He
served
as
office
manager
and
customer’s
man
during
the
time
he
was
so
employed
and
at
the
same
time
traded
in
securities
on
his
own
account.
During
this
period
he
acquired
a
reputation
for
being
a
competent
young
man
with
a
promising
future
in
the
stock
brokerage
business.
During
the
latter
part
of
1963
the
appellant
was
approached
by
a
representative
of
Waite,
Reid
and
Company
Limited
(hereinafter
called
the
“company”)
and
was
offered
a
position
with
that
company
on
certain
terms,
the
basic
one
being
that,
if
he
accepted,
he
was
to
be
manager
of
a
branch
office
which
the
company
wished
to
open
in
the
City
of
Windsor.
The
company
was
incorporated
under
the
provisions
of
The
Corporations
Act
of
Ontario
as
a
private
company
having
an
authorized
capital
of
$500,000,
dividend
into
50,000
common
shares
with
a
par
value
of
$1
each
and
45,000
6%
non-cumulative,
non-voting
preference
shares
having
a
par
value
of
$10
dollars
each.
The
company
was
also
engaged
in
the
stock
brokerage
business
and
was
a
member
of
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
as
well
as
other
stock
exchanges
across
the
country.
At
the
time
of
this
offer,
apparently,
the
rules
of
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
prohibited
the
company
from
paying
an
employee
a
commission
in
excess
of
33%%
of
the
commissions
earned
by
the
company
upon
business
solicited
by
him
unless
he
was
a
director
of
the
company.
In
order
to
become
a
director,
again
in
keeping
with
the
rules
of
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange,
he
had
to
own
holdings
in
the
company
to
the
extent
of
at
least
$5,000.
He
also
had
to
be
approved
by
the
Stock
Exchange
prior
to
his
election
as
a
director.
It
seems
that,
in
addition,
the
company
was
anxious
to
have
the
appellant
purchase
trading
assets
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
company
to
the
extent
of
$25,000
in
order
for
him
to
become
a.
director.
However,
this
was
not
a
requirement
of
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
but
rather,
or
so
it
appears
from
the
pleadings,
simply
a
company
rule
or
wish.
The
evidence
as
shown
in
the
pleadings
also
indicates
that,
if
the
appellant
became
a
director
of
the
company,
he
would
be
entitled
to
trade
in
securities
listed
on
the
exchange
for
one-fifth
of
the
commission
he
would
otherwise
be
obliged
to
pay.
This
latter
privilege,
of
course,
would
result
in
greater
earnings
on
his
part
should
he
engage
in
personal
trading
in
securities
listed
on
the
Exchange.
In
any
event,
the
appellant
did
accept
the
offer
to
become
the
manager
of
the
company’s
Windsor
office
and
subscribed
for
trading
assets
of
capital
stock
in
the
company
to
the
amount
of
$5,005
for
which
he
received
5
common
shares
and
500
preference
shares.
His
application
to
the
Exchange
was
approved
and
he
was
subsequently
elected
a
director
of
the
company.
However,
the
appellant
did
not
wish
to
purchase
any
shares
in
the
company
in
excess
of
the
number
required
to
qualify
him
as
a
director
in
so
far
as
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
was
concerned,
and
he
failed
to
accede
to
the
requests
by
the
company
to
purchase
additional
shares
to
the
amount
of
$25,000
already
referred
to.
It
seems
that
subsequently
the
rules
of
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange
were
amended
and
he
was
required
to
have
book
holdings
of
at
least
$10,000
instead
of
the
$5,000
previously
required,
and
the
appellant
complied
with
this
new
ruling
by
subscribing
and
paying
for
trading
assets
of
capital
stock
in
the
company
valued
at
$10,700.
It
is
not
disputed
that,
by
virtue
of
his
directorship,
his
income
during
the
course
of
his
employment
with
the
company
was
increased
because
he
was
able
to
participate
in
commissions
beyond
the
percentage
permitted
to
an
ordinary
employee
of
a
company
and
also
because
of
the
lower
rate
of
commission
he
was
required
to
pay
when
he
traded
in
securities
on
his
own
account.
Unfortunately,
the
company
went
into
bankruptcy
in
the
taxation
year
1967
or
1968
and
the
appellant
lost
the
$10,700
that
he
had
as
trading
assets
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
company.
During
the
same
year,
he
had
shown
a
profit
in
his
trading
ventures
on
his
own
account
of
some
$3,000
and
in
his
income
tax
return
attempted
to
write
off
against
these
profits
his
losses
with
the
company
in
the
amount
of
$10,700.
It
is
this
amount
that
has
been
disallowed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
on
the
basis
that
it
was
a
loss
on
capital
account.
As
one
reads
the
argument
in
the
transcript,
counsel
for
the
respondent
does
not
dispute
the
fact
that
the
appellant
was
a
trader
in
his
own
right,
but
argues
that
a
line
must
be
drawn
between
the
normal
trading
operations
carried
on
by
the
appellant
and
the
transactions
whereby
he
purchased
shares
in
the
company
to
the
value
of
$10,700.
According
to
the
allegations
of
the
Minister,
these
latter
transactions
constituted
a
capital
investment
made
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
and
retaining
his
position
with
the
company,
and
not
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
as
were
his
other
operations.
Numerous
grounds
of
appeal
were
raised
by
the
appellant
in
the
Notice
of
Appeal
but,
at
the
hearing,
his
counsel
informed
the
Board
that
he
was
restricting
his
argument
to
one
position
and
one
position
only,
namely,
that
the
appellant
had
suffered
a
loss
in
the
1967
taxation
year
as
a
trader
which
he
is
entitled
to
set
off
against
the
income
that
he
earned
as
a
trader,
and
all
other
positions
were
abandoned.
During
the
course
of
the
argument,
much
appears
to
have
been
made
of
the
fact
that
these
shares
were
not
reviewed
from
time
to
time
and
were
not
considered
for
disposal
by
the
appellant
and
therefore
were
capital
investments
that
he
did
not
intend
to
sell
as
and
when
the
time
was
ripe
for
a
profit
but
intended
to
hold
indefinitely.
However,
the
evidence
indicates
that
he
could
have
disposed
of
those
shares
at
any
time
a
market
was
available
and
still
maintained
his
employment
with
the
company,
although
he
would
have
lost
his
position
as
a
director
and
have
lost
certain
trading
advantages
that
went
with
that
office,
as
outlined
above.
If
one
accepts
the
fact
of
the
qualifications
and
competency
of
the
appellant,
as
the
Minister
has
done
in
his
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
it
would
seem
that
the
company
made
a
great
effort
to
obtain
his
services
as
a
salesman
and
customer’s
man.
Also
for
reasons
which
became
apparent
in
a
very
few
years,
the
company
had
obviously
wanted
him
to
put
up
as
much
as
$25,000
if
he
wished
to
become
a
director,
and
yet,
according
to
the
evidence,
had
never
taken
any
steps
to
dismiss
him,
nor
had
they
even
threatened
to
dismiss
him,
for
his
failure
to
do
so.
In
my
view,
this
further
indicates
that
his
value
to
the
company
was
as
a
salesman
and
that
the
secondary
reason
for
the
company’s
offer
to
make
him
a
director
was
its
hope
of
replenishing
its
diminishing
assets
by
getting
him
to
purchase
a
substantial
amount
of
treasury
stocks
as
his
own
trading
assets.
The
appellant,
who
appears
to
have
been
an
astute
young
man,
refused
to
purchase
more
shares
than
were
absolutely
necessary
to
enable
him
to
take
full
advantage
of
the
benefits
of
a
directorship,
and
proceeded
to
operate
his
own
trading
account,
which
is
shown
in
the
record
as
consisting
of
a
number
of
transactions,
none
of
which
resulted
in
a
very
substantial
profit
but
totalled
in
the
material
year
a
profit
of
some
$3,000.
The
respondent
appears
to
take
the
sole
position
that
the
appellant
purchased
these
shares
to
obtain
his
position
of
manager;
did
not
sell
them
over
the
course
of
the
period
that
he
was
so
employed;
and
therefore
they
were
not
shares
purchased
as
trading
assets
and
must
be
treated
differently
from
those
other
shares
in
which
he
did
trade
from
time
to
time.
The
thrust
of
this
argument
is
that
the
money
laid
out
for
the
company’s
shares
was
a
capital
outlay
for
the
purpose
of
obtaining
his
position
and
therefore
the
loss
was
a
loss
on
account
of
capital.
I
do
not
think
the
evidence
substantiates
that
the
employment
of
this
appellant
was
based
upon
his
purchase
of
shares
in
the
company
but
rather
that
it
was
based
upon
his
ability
to
sell
securities
in
the
area
in
which
the
company
planned
to
open
a
branch
office,
and
that
the
company’s
shares
were
purchased
as
trading
assets
by
the
appellant
to
the
extent
that
he
was
able
to
obtain
certain
trading
advantages
for
himself
in
the
circumstances
above
set
out
by
becoming
a
director
of
the
company
rather
than
merely
an
employee.
From
what
happened
to
the
company
in
the
years
1967
and
1968,
that
is,
its
eventual
bankruptcy,
it
is
questionable
whether
he
could
have
disposed
of
the
shares
even
if
he
had
tried
to,
and
they
were,
in
my
view,
purely
a
trading
asset
that
failed
to
produce
a
profit
save
and
except
for
any
advantage
he
may
have
gained
in
earning
income
from
the
company
in
excess
of
what
he
would
have
earned
had
he
not
been
a
director.
In
his
arugment,
appellant’s
counsel
cites
the
case
of
Freud
v
MNR,
[1969]
SCR
75;
[1968]
CTC
438;
68
DTC
5279,
a
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
upholding
the
decision
of
Gibson,
J
of
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
([1967]
1
Ex
CR
293;
[1966]
CTC
641;
66
DTC
5414).
Counsel
quoted
from
the
Exchequer
Court
decision
(at
296,
643,
5416,
respectively),
where
the
learned
trial
judge
in
that
instance
said:
In
my
view,
if
the
appellant
had
been
successful
and
realized
a
profit
therefrom,
this
gain
clearly
would
be
income
from
a
source
outside
the
sources
specified
in
section
3
[of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952]
but
within
the
meaning
of
“sources”
in
the
opening
words
of
the
section.
In
other
words,
it
would
not
have
been
a
windfall
gain
and
so
not
-a
capital
gain.
It
is
my
opinion
that,
in
the
case
before
this
Board,
if
the
market
had
been
available
and
the
appellant
had
chosen
to
sell
the
shares
of
Waite,
Reid
and
Company
Limited,
and
if
a
profit
had
been
made
on
the
transaction,
the
respondent
would
have
been
quick
to
tax
him
on
the
profits
so
made,
since
unquestionably
he
was
a
trader
and
would
have
been
acting
in
the
normal
course
of
his
business.
I
see
no
distinction
that
should
be
drawn
in
this
case
to
the
detriment
of
the
appellant
by
reason
of
the
fact
that
the
shares,
in
addition
to
being
trading
assets,
also
qualified
him
as
a
director
pursuant
to
the
e-
quirement
of
the
Toronto
Stock
Exchange,
thereby
increasing
the
commissions
that
he
was
able
to
earn.
For
these
reasons,
I
would
allow
the
appeal
in
full
and
refer
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
in
order
to
allow
as
a
deductible
expense
in
the
taxation
year
1967
the
loss
of
$10,700
sustained
by
the
appellant
on
shares
of
Waite,
Reid
and
Company
Limited.
Appeal
allowed.