A
J
Frost:—These
are
income
tax
appeals
in
respect
of
appellant’s
1966
and
1967
taxation
years.
Upon
Notices
of
Objection
duly
signed
and
filed,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
confirmed
the
assessments
on
the
ground
that
the
profit
realized
from
the
sale
of
land
situated
on
111th
Street
and
51st
Avenue
in
the
City
of
Edmonton,
Alberta
had
been
properly
included
in
computing
the
appellant’s
income
under
the
provisions
of
sections
3
and
4
and
paragraph
139(1
)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Subsequently,
the
appellant
filed
two
Notices
of
Appeal,
one
for
1966
and
one
for
1967.
The
appeals
were
heard
together
on
common
evidence
by
the
Tax
Appeal
Board,
as
it
was
then
constituted,
on
September
28,
1971
at
Calgary,
Alberta.
The
appellant
was
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
the
Province
of
Alberta.
The
land
located
at
111th
Street
and
51st
Avenue
in
the
municipality
of
South
Strathcona
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“Block
R”)
was
purchased
by
the
appellant
from
New
Trend
Construction
Ltd
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“New
Trend’’)
in
1960.
Michael
A
Nugent
and
H
Paton
each
owned
50%
of
the
shares
of
both
the
appellant
and
New
Trend.
Block
R
had
been
acquired
by
New
Trend
in
April
1958.
The
municipality
of
South
Strathcona,
located
south
of
the
City
of
Edmonton,
was
annexed
on
December
31,
1958.
Block
R
comprised
8.43
acres
at
time
of
purchase,
and
commercial
zoning
was
obtained
permitting
the
appellant
to
develop
a
golf
driving
range.
With
annexation,
Block
R
lost
its
commercial
zoning.
In
1961
the
appellant
made
an
application
for
commercial
zoning
to
the
City
and
the
application
was
refused.
On
appeal
this
decision
was
reversed,
and
the
appellant
then
started
negotiations
with
tenants
for
a
major
shopping
centre.
In
1966
the
city
of
Edmonton
announced
the
construction
of
a
new
freeway
through
111th
Street
as
part
of
the
Metropolitan
Study
Plan.
This
planning
study
indicated
a
major
north-and-south
freeway,
which
would
involve
taking
150
feet
from
Block
R
thus
making
a
large
shopping
centre
on
that
property
impossible.
A
complicated
replot
of
Block
R
was
worked
out
and,
after
protracted
negotiations
with
city
officials,
the
appellant
appeared
to
have
no
choice
other
than
to
sell
a
portion
of
Block
R
to
the
City
for
the
proposed
freeway.
(In
addition
to
cash
compensation,
the
appellant
received
A
of
an
acre
of
land,
which
it
subsequently
sold.
The
profit
realized
in
respect
of
this
A
of
an
acre
was
not
before
the
Board.)
The
evidence
indicated
that
the
“sale”
to
the
City
of
Edmonton
was
in
the
nature
of
a
take-over
for
freeway
purposes.
The
appellant
received
$35,950
in
1966
in
respect
of
this
sale,
and
the
Minister
included
this
amount
as
income
for
the
appellant’s
1966
taxation
year.
In
1967
the
appellant
discontinued
its
plans
to
develop
a
major
shopping
centre,
as
the
amount
of
land
originally
held
had
been
reduced
and
the
plans
developed
by
the
City
did
not
allow
for
easy
access
to
the
proposed
development,
reducing
commercial
viability
of
appellant’s
plans
for
a
major
shopping
centre
and
thwarting
its
basic
concepts.
In
1967
a
second
sale
occurred
when
Horne
&
Pitfield
Ltd,
a
major
tenant
with
whom
the
appellant
had
been
negotiating,
purchased
a
portion
of
Block
R
at
a
profit
to
the
appellant
of
$152,814.02,
which
the
Minister
characterized
as
income
for
appellant’s
1967
taxation
year.
The
evidence
adduced
indicated
that
Mr
Nugent
and
Mr
Paton
started
to
trade
in
real
estate
in
1955
and
in
1957
New
Trend
was
incorporated
for
the
purpose
of
trading
and
development.
In
April
1958,
Block
R
was
purchased
after
careful
investigation
into
the
area,
which
was
adjacent
to
the
city
boundary
with
the
odds
favouring
annexation
as
“many
people”
were
interested
in
the
area.
Mr
Nugent
testified
that
the
sole
object
of
purchase
was
the
development
of
a
shopping
centre.
The
evidence
further
indicated
that
efforts
were
made
over
a.
number
of
years
to
develop
the
property
as
a
commercially
viable
enterprise,
but
the
feasibility
of
developing
it
as
planned
was
frustrated
by
the
City’s
plans
to
construct
a
freeway
on
part
of
the
land
proposed
for
the
shopping
centre.
The
question
in
issue
is:
Was
Block
R
an
investment
and
was
the
gain
realized
on
sale
subject
to
tax
under
the
appropriate
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act?
Looking
at
the
circumstances
objectively,
I
find
that
Mr
Nugent
and
Mr
Paton
were
speculating
as
to
land
values.
The
appellant
company
was
incorporated
for
the
purpose
of
developing
the
proposed
shopping
centre
and
in
my
opinion,
must
be
characterized
as
a.
speculator
as
its
aims,
objects
and
purposes
were
identical
with
those
of
its
two
shareholders
who
were
speculators.
A
further
indication
of
the
nature
of
the
appellant
is
that
it
was
capitalized
at
$2,
which
in
itself
is
an
indication
of
speculation.
A
company
set
up
for
investment
purposes
usually
has
a
more
imposing
capital
structure
than
a
mere
two-dollar
capitalization.
Low
capitalization,
like
marginal
buying,
is
one
of
the
badges
of
speculation,
and
it
is
not
too
difficult
to
conclude
that
the
company,
like
its
owners,
was
in
fact
in
the
business
of
speculating
in
land.
The
fact
that
New
Trend
and
the
appellant
company
were
both
speculators
would
not
have
prevented
them
from
establishing
an
investment
within
their
various
activities,
but
it
does
preclude
the
pleading
of
frustration
as
a
factor
in
determining
the
capital
or
income
nature
in
respect
of
a
sale
of
assets.
A
speculator
may
invest
and
an
investor
may
speculate,
but
intentions
do
not
necessarily
change
the
character
of
a
taxpayer.
What
a
taxpayer
actually
does
or
accomplishes
is
the
determining
factor
in
a
trading
case
of
this
kind.
If
the
appellant
had
in
fact
established
Block
R
as
an
investment,
the
Board
would
recognize
this
fact
but,
until
intentions
have
materialized
to
a
point
where
they
become
a
reality,
the
appellant
cannot
avoid
having
the
gains
from
what
otherwise
might
have
been
a
sale
of
capital
assets
characterized
as
income
under
the
appropriate
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
In
other
words,
the
appellant’s
efforts
must
go
far
enough
to
establish
beyond
any
reasonable
doubt
that
it
was
in
the
investment
business
in
respect
of
the
matter
in
dispute
and
not
involved
in
land
speculation.
Land
is
a
community
resource,
and
its
value
depends
to
a
large
extent
on
publicly
financed
projects.
Under
our
Canadian
jurisprudence,
land
is
not
an
investment
vehicle
in
the
sense
that
a
corporate
share
is.
Appeals
dismissed.