The
Chairman
(orally
from
the
Bench):—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
taxpayer,
Fairgreen
Investments
Limited,
against
an
assessment
levied
by
the
Minister
for
the
taxation
years
1967
and
1968.
It
also
involves
the
appeals
of
two
other
taxpayers,
Santana
Developments
Limited
and
Maplevale
Developments
Limited,
hereinafter
referred
to
as
Santana
and
Maplevale,
respectively.
The
facts
are
brief
and
are
not
in
dispute.
Messrs
Arthur
Agar
and
Gerard:
C
Conrad
were
each
holders
of
50%
of
the
issued
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
Santana
and
Maplevale
at
all
material
times,
and
therefore
at
all
material
times
those
two
companies
were
associated,
a
matter
which
is
not
in
issue.
Evidence
was
given
by
Mr
Agar
and
by
Mr
Edgar
Abele
as
to
how
the
appellant
company,
in
this
instance
Fairgreen
Investments
Limited,
hereinafter
referred
to
as
Fairgreen,
came
into
existence
and
subsequently
involved
a
third
man,
the
said
witness
Edgar
Abele.
Apparently
Agar
and
Conrad
teamed
up
in
or
about
1960
to
construct
small
neighbourhood
shopping
plazas.
(I
use
the
term
“small”
as
relative
to
what
might
be
thought
of
as
“large’’
shopping
plazas.)
Conrad
apparently
was
the
real
estate
broker
who
located
areas
for
construction,
and
Agar
was
the
man
who
took
care
of
the
construction
requirements.
They
had
built
about
20
of
these
developments
over
the
last
eleven
years.
It
is
obvious
from
the
evidence
that
they
usually
obtained
outside
financial
assistance
in
each
case,
or
in
a
large
majority
of
cases.
They
normally
tried—I
suppose
as
would
be
ultimate
in
the
lives
of
small
contractors—to
build
the
project
within
the
amount
of
the
mortgage.
In
1963
Fairgreen
was
incorporated,
with
Agar
and
Conrad
again
[each]
holding
50%
of
the
stock.
The
practice
appeared
to
be
to
incorporate
a
new
company
for
each
development,
and
this
was
to
be
for
one
of
their
typical
projects.
Abele,
who
had
immigrated
to
this
country
from
Latvia
by
way
of
England,
was
a
carpenter
all
through
the
material
time,
and
had
met
Agar
when
Agar
was
a
carpenterforeman
on
some
construction
work.
Abele
was
in
business
in
the
carpentry
contracting
business
with
another
person
who,
in
1963,
for
health
reasons,
wished
to
remove
himself
from
participation
with
Abele.
Abele
had
some
money
available,
and
he
approached
Agar
on
the
Fairgreen
site
and
asked
to
be
cut
in
on
some
project
with
Agar
and
Conrad.
Apparently
there
was
rapport
between
the
two
people,
and
Agar
spoke
to
Conrad.
However,
nothing
was
in
sight
at
that
time
because
Agar
and
Conrad
had
just
nicely
got
under
way
with
Fairgreen.
Abele
was
persistent
and,
to
show
his
good
faith
and
sincerity,
produced
and
delivered
a
cheque
for
$10,000
to
Agar.
Agar
was
reluctant
to
accept
it
on
location,
not
because
he
did
not
wish
to
have
Abele
as
a
partner
or
as
a
fellow
shareholder,
but
because
he
felt
there
was
an
undue
responsibility
placed
on
him
to
be
possessed
of
this
cheque
in
the
manner
in
which
he
was.
In
any
event,
it
appears
that
Conrad
suggested
that
they
let
Abele
in
on
the
Fairgreen
project
for
$30,000,
$10,000
of
which
they
already
had,
and
the
other
$20,000
would
be
paid
out
of
the
proceeds
of
moneys
to
be
earned
by
Abele
as
the
carpenter-contractor
on
this
and
future
jobs.
Abele
was
evidently
prepared
to
trust
these
other
gentlemen
completely.
The
evidence
does
not
indicate
that
he
sought
independent
legal
advice,
but
he
did
speak
to
a
chartered
accountant
by
the
name
of
Wenner,
who
was
also
the
accountant
for
Agar
and
Conrad.
Wenner
appears
to
have
advised
Abele,
who
says
he
really
did
not
understand
too
much
about
the
technicalities
of
it
but
had
in
effect
requested
that
something
be
reduced
to
writing
to
protect
him
so
that
the
other
two
would
not
be
able
“to
squeeze
him
out”.
He
says,
also,
that
the
accountant
told
him
about
certain
tax
advantages
which
were
not
immediately
available
and
some
discussion
about
associated
corporations
took
place.
It
is
hard
to
tell
whether
Mr
Abele
really
remembers
that
from
so
far
back
or
whether
it
is
a
reconstruction
of
what
has
happened
since
this
appeal
began.
However,
in
any
event,
I
am
satisfied
that
Wenner
advised
well,
and
that
steps
were
taken
by
the
solicitors
for
the
company
to
provide
certain
safeguards
for
Abele.
I
found
at
the
outset
that
the
manner
in
which
these
amendments
were
made
was
rather
unusual,
because
they
were
made
in
the
Original
by-law
in
the
minute
book
by
way
of
erasures
and
retyping
and
initialling
by
the
parties
rather
than
by
the
passing
of
an
amending
by-law.
However,
although
the
minute
book
has
not
been
submitted
as
an
exhibit,
the
evidence
of
Mr
Abele
is
that
certainly
it
was
all
completed
by
the
year
1964.
It
is
not
seriously
contended
by
the
Minister
that
there
was
anything
improper
in
the
amendments
that
took
place.
In
fact,
in
his
argument,
counsel
for
the
Minister
quite
fairly
acknowledged
the
fact
that
the
unanimity
clauses
appear
to
have
been
upheld
by
cases
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
and
that
the
Minister’s
assessments
stand
or
fall
on
the
provisions
of
paragraph
22
of
By-Law
No
1,
which
is
usually
referred
to
in
corporate
jargon
as
“the
general
by-law”
of
a
company.
Before
referring
to
paragraph
22,
I
should
note
the
following:
Paragraph
8,
dealing
with
the
shareholders
of
the
company,
provides
that
three
persons
present
in
person
and
each
entitled
to
vote
thereon,
shall
constitute
a
quorum
for
the
transaction
of
business
at
any
meeting
of
shareholders.
Paragraph
14
provides
that
at
all
meetings
of
shareholders
every
question
shall,
unless
otherwise
required
by
the
letters
patent
or
the
by-laws
of
the
company
or
by
law,
be
decided
by
100%
of
the
votes
duly
cast
on
the
question.
(Let
me
say,
in
passing,
that
there
was
no
evidence
to
show
that
any
Act
or
any
portion
of
the
letters
patent
had
been
breached
or
in
any
way
prevented
the
passage
of
that
clause.
Paragraph
17
removes
the
right
of
the
casting
vote.
Paragraph
19,
dealing
with
directors,
provides
that
three
directors
shall
constitute
a
quorum.
All
of
these
provisions
are
within
the
powers
of
the
directors.
Since
no
question
is
raised
by
the
respondent,
I
assume
that
these
by-laws
were
duly
passed,
duly
ratified
and
duly
confirmed
by
the
shareholders.
Paragraph
28
provides
that
at
all
meetings
of
the
board
of
directors—
I
indicate
directors
because
this
is
part
of
the
section
dealing
with
the
directors
of
the
company—every
question
shall
be
decided
by
a
100%
vote
cast
on
the
question.
These
are
the
safeguards
that
were
requested
by
Abele
and
that
were
put
in
for
his
benefit
with
the
consent
and
approval
of
all
the
parties.
I
should
say
that
he
subsequently
received
one-third
of
the
issued
common
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
the
company.
In
view
of
the
admission
made
by
counsel
for
the
Minister,
I
do
not
think
it
is
necessary
to
deal
with
the
right
and
legality
of
the
unanimity
provisions
that
have
been
referred
to.
I
now
come
to
paragraph
22
of
By-Law
No
1,
on
which
the
Minister
really
bases
his
whole
assessment—at
least
at
the
date
of
the
hearing.
Paragraph
22
provides
for
the
removal
of
directors,
and
is
in
the
normal
phrasing
that
shareholders
may,
by
resolution
passed
by
at
least
a
two-thirds
vote
cast
at
a
general
meeting
of
shareholders,
of
which
notice
specifying
the
intention
to
pass
such
resolution
has
been
given,
remove
any
director
before
the
expiration
of
his
term
of
office,
and
may,
by
a
majority
of
the
votes
cast
at
that
meeting,
elect
any
person
in
his
stead
for
the
remainder
of
the
term.
If
there
is
any
substance
to
that
clause,
then
in
my
view
the
appellant
must
fail.
Therefore
what
can
Conrad
and
Agar
do
to
the
detriment
of
Abele
under
this
clause?
In
my
view,
nothing.
It
is
impossible
for
the
directors
to
hold
a
meeting
or
for
the
shareholders
to
hold
a
meeting
without
a
quorum
of
three.
I
think
it
is
trite
law
to
say
that
a
meeting
without
a
quorum
is
a
nullity.
The
appellant
has
cited
the
case
of
Lumbers
v
Fretz,
62
OLR
635;
(1928),
63
OLR
190;
[1928]
4
DLR
269,
in
this
connection.
So
what
was
the
situation?
In
order
to
give
any
substance
to
paragraph
22,
they
had
to
have
a
meeting,
and
in
order
to
have
a
meeting,
they
had
to
have
all
three
of
them
there,
and
if
all
three
were
there,
Abele
would
have
to
consent
in
effect
to
his
being
deposed
by
the
other
two.
He
had
the
power
to
frustrate
this
clause
by
merely
staying
away,
as
they
could
not
hold
a
meeting
without
him.
I
think
the
law
is
well
settled
and
several
cases
have
been
cited
on
this
matter,
and
I
think
a
reading
of
the
by-law
itself,
which
I
have
already
said
contravenes
no
section
of
The
Corporations
Act
of
Ontario
which
was
in
effect
at
the
material
time,
prevents
paragraph
22
from
having
any
substance.
For
these
reasons,
therefore,
I
think
the
appeal
must
be
allowed
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
Fairgreen
Investments
Limited
is
not
associated
with
Santana
Developments
Limited
and
Maplevale
Developments
Limited,
and
I
so
find.
The
appeals
in
the
other
two
cases
will
follow
the
event
and
in
each
case
the
appeal
will
be
allowed.
Counsel
for
the
parties
relied
on
the
provisions
of
the
Ontario
Corporations
Act,
RSO
1960,
c
71
and
amendments
thereto,
and
the
cases
cited
in
addition
to
Lumbers
v
Fretz
(supra)
were:
Buckerfield’s
Ltd
et
al
v
MNR,
[1964]
CTC
504;
64
DTC
5301;
[1965]
1
Ex
CR
299;
MNR
v
Dworkin
Furs
(Pembroke)
Ltd
et
al,
[1967]
CTC
50;
67
DTC
5035;
[1967]
SCR
223;
and
Pender
Enterprises
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1965]
CTC
343;
65
DTC
5202;
[1966]
Ex
CR
180.
Appeal
allowed.