Maurice
Boisvert:—This
appeal
concerns
the
1967
and
1968
taxation
years
and
has
to
do
with
the
purchase
of
a
farm
which
the
appellant
quickly
disposed
of
by
selling
the
house
and
a
part
of
the
farm
at
a
profit
in
1967,
and
another
part
also
at
a
profit
in
1968.
The
appeal
was
heard
in
Quebec,
Province
of
Quebec
on
October
14,
1971
by
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted.
The
appellant
had,
as
it
is
commonly
expressed,
been
dabbling
in
real
estate,
first
as
an
agent
and
later
as
a
broker.
She
was
married,
with
three
children.
She
liked
to
ski,
and
her
children
even
more
so.
Her
husband
was
not
overly
enthusiastic
about
this
type
of
sport.
Since
the
appellant
wanted
to
go
in
for
skiing
and
her
husband
did
not,
the
couple
were
at
loggerheads.
The
appellant
had
a
brother
who
had
purchased
a
farm
at
Saint-Féréol
which
she
visited
out
of
sheer
pleasure
on
weekends,
with
other
friends.
In
1966
a
gentleman
from
Quebec
City
was
looking
for
a
piece
of
property
for
himself
in
the
Sainte-Anne-de-Beaupré
area.
To
add
to
the
miracles
of
the
good
Saint
Anne,
shrewd
promoters
pictured
the
slopes
of
Mont
Ste-Anne
being
developed
as
a
ski
centre
since
they
were
admirably
suited
to
this
sport.
Quebec
was
gripped
by
ski
fever.
Everybody,
giddy
over
the
long
ski-runs
on
the
mountain,
wanted
to
move
in
closer
and
the
quest
for
old
houses
began.
The
oldest
ones
were
still
on
habitant
lands.
The
gentleman
mentioned
above
wanted
“an
old
Canadian
House
(an
absolute
condition),
an
old
Canadian
house
that
really
did
date
back
to
the
French
régime”,
a
historic
treasure
of
a
house.
Since
he
knew
the
appellant,
being
a
friend
of
the
couple,
he
visited
the
Beaulieu
farm
in
1966
with
the
appellant.
It
happened
that
the
appellant,
after
her
visit,
as
claimed
in
her
testimony,
became
sick
with
desire
to
get
the
house
for
herself.
The
shrewd,
foxy
old
owner
let
them
bend
his
ear
rather
than
pull
his
leg.
The
appellant
did
not
have
any
money
but
she
had
a
gross
income
of
$4,000.
The
declared
net
income
from
her
profession
was
$546.46
for
1967,
and
$1,025.73
for
1968.
The
owner’s
asking
price
for
the
entire
farm
including
machinery,
cows,
pigs,
etc
was
$35,000.
Selling
a
portion
of
it
was
out
of
the
question.
It
was
all
or
nothing.
As
the
story
goes,
the
farm-house
dated
back
200
years;
it
was
dirty
and,
according
to
the
witnesses’
statements,
it
had
smells
that
were
as
old
as
the
house
itself.
But
a
longing
for
the
house
overrode
everything
else.
On
May
24,
1966
the
following
agreement
was
signed
by
the
vendor
and
the
appellant:
(TRANSLATION)
Agreement
concluded
between
the
undersigned
parties:
The
parties
declare
that
on
April
23,
1966,
Mr
Benoît
Beaulieu
promised
to
sell
to
Mrs
.
.
.,
wife
of
Mr
.
.
.,
who
promised
to
purchase
from
the
latter,
a
piece
of
land
bearing
numbers
fifty-four,
fifty-five
and
fifty-seven
(54,
55
and
57)
of
the
book
of
reference
of
the
Parish
of
Sainte-Anne-de-Beaupré
for
the
price
of
thirty-five
thousand
dollars
($35,000),
one
thousand
dollars
($1,000)
of
which
was
paid
on
April
23,
1966,
nineteen
thousand
dollars
($19,000)
payable
upon
the
signing
of
the
deed
of
sale
and
fifteen
thousand
dollars
($15,000)
two
(2)
years
after
the
signing
of
the
deed
of
sale.
At
the
same
time,
all
structures
on
the
said
property,
plus
appurtenances,
livestock,
tractor,
milking-machine
and
all
other
farm
implements
were
included
in
the
aforementioned
sale
price.
This
having
been
declared,
the
parties
agree
as
follows:
(a)
Mr
Benoît
Beaulieu
agrees
to
Mrs
.
.
.’s
selling
or
arranging
for
the
sale
of
the
livestock,
tractor,
milking-machine
and
other
farm
implements
at
any
time
from
this
date,
provided
that
the
latter
pays
him
on
account
of
the
sale
price,
the
sum
of
four
thousand
dollars
($4,000);
(b)
Mrs
.
.
.
agrees
to
pay
in
advance
and
on
account
of
the
sale
price,
a
further
sum
of
six
thousand
dollars
($6,000)
on
the
first
day
of
June,
one
thousand
nine
hundred
and
sixty-six
(1966),
but
the
parties
agree
that
the
balance
from
the
nineteen
thousand
dollars
($19,000),
ie
nine
thousand
dollars
($9,000),
shall
be
paid
by
the
purchaser
to
the
vendor
on
the
first
day
of
September,
one
thousand
nine
hundred
and
sixty-six
(1966).
These
agreements
having
been
concluded,
the
vendor
gives
release
of
all
liens
that
he
might
have
on
the
said
livestock,
tractor,
milking-machine
and
other
farm
implements.
All
the
other
agreements
and
obligations
mentioned
in
the
promise
of
sale
signed
on
April
23,
1966
remain,
in
so
far
as
they
are
not
incompatible
herewith.
Two
days
after
the
signing
of
the
above
agreements,
Mr
Beaulieu
agreed
to
the
following
clause:
(TRANSLATION)
I
undertake
to
purchase
the
tractor
from
Mrs
.
.
.
for
the
sum
of
$1,900,
which
shall
be
deducted
from
the
$6,000
instalment
payable
on
June
1,
1966.
The
appellant
paid
$1,000
on
April
23,
1966.
It
will
be
noted
that
she
was
to
give
$19,000
when
the
deed
of
sale
was
signed.
The
appellant
sold
the
farm
implements
and
livestock
at
an
auction
that
brought
in
about
$5,000
and,
as
agreed,
sold
the
tractor
to
the
farmer
for
$1,900
which
amount
was
deducted
from
the
$34,000
owing.
The
deed
of
sale
was
signed
on
August
18,
1966.
We
see
from
the
deed
of
sale
that
the
farm
described
therein
had
an
area
of
8,064,000
square
feet,
English
measure.
We
also
see
that
there
were
two
sites,
all
as
it
appears
on
a
plan
prepared
by
Mr
Jean-Yves
Massé,
land
surveyor,
dated
May
27,
1966,
a
copy
of
which
is
attached
to
the
deed
of
sale
and
signed
by
the
parties.
Therefore,
we
have
a
200-year
old
house,
two
sites,
and
a
rather
unproductive
farm
situated
at
the
foot
of
the
mountains
forming
the
horizon.
Between
the
agreement
of
May
24,
1966
and
the
date
of
the
deed
of
sale,
August
18,
1966
the
appellant
spent
nearly
$7,000
for
cleaning,
building
a
fireplace,
painting
and
refurbishing,
which
gave.
a
new
appearance
to
the
centuries-old
walls.
During
this
whole
time
the
gentleman,
already
mentioned,
kept
an
eye
on
things;
Mont
Ste-Anne
was
becoming
an
important
ski
centre
to
which
were
added
varied
and
exciting
attractions.
There
were
many
slopes.
To
meet
the
$19,000
instalment
payable
upon
the
signing
of
the
deed
of
sale
the
appellant
had
to
borrow
$20,000
from
her
parents’
estate.
On
March
31,
1967
the
appellant
sold,
for
$45,000,
the
site
on
which
the
house
was
erected
and
the
two
sites
described
in
the
deed
of
sale
between
Mr
Beaulieu
and
the
appellant.
The
profit
was
not
enormous
when
we
consider
the
cost
of
the
improvements
that
were
made.
But
the
appellant
sold
the
house
and
kept
the
fields
and
the
woodlot.
On
July
28,
1968
she
again
sold
a
portion,
about
1,761,250
square
feet,
for
the
sum
of
$17,612.50.
The
purchaser,
an
astute
businessman
and
heir
to
a
large
estate,
was
the
person
with
whom
the
appellant
had
visited
the
old
house
in
1966
before
deciding
to
purchase
it
supposedly
for
herself,
as
well
as
for
the
pleasure
and
enjoyment
of
skiing
and
snow-
mobiling.
On
the
second
sale
the
profit
was
larger
since
the
appellant
retained
ownership
of
the
woodlot
—
a
stand
of
maple
(not
sugar
maple)
but
a
pleasant
shady
spot,
with
underbrush
where
partridge
nested
and
rabbits
romped.
A
pastoral
setting
too
has
its
enchantment.
The
assessor
had
had
enough
of
all
that
and
taxed
the
profits
as
profits
from
the
appellant’s
profession.
Although
the
appellant
did
not
put
the
properties
up
for
sale
directly
by
advertising
or
otherwise,
her
intention
could
not
have
been
other-
wise
than
twosided.
She
already
had
an
interested
person
who
had
a
very
strong
yen
for
the
house.
Then,
she
was
having
problems
with
her
husband
who
was
not
a
romantic
at
heart
since
he
did
not
want
to
go
and
spend
the
weekends
with
the
appellant
and
her
children
in
the
dream
house.
Moreover,
she
had
improved
and
redecorated
the
property
to
make
it
more
suitable
and
attractive.
Lastly,
she
knew
that
she
would
have
to
pay
back
the
$20,000
borrowed
from
her
parents’
estate.
As
so
often
happens
in
such
cases,
Manon’s
dream
faded
into
thin
air.
The
demands
of
an
agonizing,
pressing
and
practical
reality
triumphed.
She
sold
it
to
the
person
who
had
wanted
it
before
she
purchased
it,
in
the
hope
of
bringing
back
to
the
fold
a
husband
who
was
finding
that
he
could
not
afford
the
luxury
of
a
country
house.
Wooded
and
pastoral
landscapes
were
hardly
of
any
more
interest
to
him
than
skiing.
The
sale
and
the
profits
only
made
matters
worse
since
the
appellant
sued
for
divorce
which,
moreover,
she
obtained.
Euphoria
gave
way
to
realism
and,
to
top
it
all,
the
taxation
department,
curious
as
a
ravenous
wolf,
appeared
on
the
scene,
gloomy
and
greedy.
It
is
difficult
to
read
what
goes
on
in
the
mind
of
a
fine,
intelligent
woman.
However,
her
behaviour
always
ends
up
by
giving
away
her
innermost
thoughts.
The
possession
and
occupancy
of
the
house
were
short-lived.
The
appellant
dealt
through
another
real
estate
broker
and
she
used
the
profits
from
the
transactions
to
purchase
apartment
buildings,
one
of
which
she
sold
and
the
other
which
she
still
owns
and
manages
at
a
loss.
Purchases
with
little
money,
entertainment
expenses,
advertising,
social
clubs,
flowers,
gifts
and
subscriptions
—
$7,024.52
in
1967
—
these
are
sufficient
to
conclude
that
the
appellant
was
in
fact
in
the
real
estate
business.
It
should
be
noted
that
on
her
balance
sheets
for
1967
and
1968
the
Ste-Anne
property
appears
in
her
inventory,
along
with
another
property,
an
apartment
building.
The
loan
from
the
estate
rose
from
$20,000
in
1967
to
$45,000
in
1968.
Lastly,
we
see
therein
that
she
owes
$11,000
in
commissions
to
sub-agents.
In
this
case
it
is
impossible
to
conclude
that
she
did
not
want
what
she
got.
Therefore
it
is
without
remorse
but
with
regret
that
I
must
dismiss
the
appeal,
being
bound
by
the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Regal
Heights
Limited
v
MNR,
[1960]
SCR
902;
[1960]
CTC
384;
60
DTC
1270;
by
the
recent
decision
handed
down
by
the
Federal
Court
in
Rosslynn
Estates
Limited
v
MNR,
[1972]
CTC
65;
72
DTC
6051;
and
by
the
decision
handed
down
in
Edward
A
Schaffer
v
MNR,
[1971]
CTC
577;
71
DTC
5306.
It
often
happens
that
a
taxpayer
begins
a
venture
with
a
specific
intention
in
mind
and
ends
up
with
another.
In
this
appeal,
on
the
one
hand
the
appellant’s
husband
was
against
taking
the
risk
and,
on
the
other,
the
appellant
did
not
need
the
property,
except
only
to
satisfy
a
whim
or
make
a
sale.
It
was
the
latter
alternative
that
won
out.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.