A
J
Frost:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
to
income
tax
in
respect
of
the
appellant’s
1969
taxation
year,
wherein
an
amount
of
$5,403.59
which
the
appellant
sought
to
deduct
in
respect
of
‘‘trading
losses”
was
disallowed
as
a
deduction
from
the
income
earned
by
him
in
that
year.
Upon
notice
of
objection
duly
signed
and
filed,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
appellant
on
May
12,
1971,
allowing
an
additional
deduction
of
$519.32
in
respect
of
commissions
paid
on
personal
transactions
but
leaving
the
previous
assessment
unchanged
in
all
other
respects.
The
appeal
was
heard
at
Belleville,
Ontario,
on
December
13,
1971,
by
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted,
and
dismissed
from
the
Bench.
The
appellant
was
engaged
as
a
commission
salesman
during
the
said
taxation
year
with
the
firm
of
Jenkin
Evans
&
Company
Limited
and
placed
orders
for
the
purchase
and
sale
of
securities
on
behalf
of
clients.
The
firm
charged
regular
commissions
for
their
services
as
brokers
and
the
appellant
received
a
percentage
of
the
commissions
earned
with
respect
to
those
accounts
under
his
care.
For
1969,
the
appellant’s
commissions
amounted
to
$13,458.
In
addition
to
placing
orders
for
clients,
he
placed
orders
for
his
own
accounts,
one
of
which
was
maintained
for
long-term
transactions
and
the
other
for
short
transactions;
he
initiated
approximately
two
transactions
per
week
on
his
own
behalf
as
well
as
managing
his
own
personal
registered
retirement
savings
plan
with
Guaranty
Trust
Company
of
Canada
at
its
Belleville
office.
The
appellant
considered
himself
to
be
a
professional
trader,
and
argued
that
he
was
entitled
to
deduct
trading
losses
from
his
income
as
a
commission
salesman.
The
Minister
took
the
position
that
the
appellant
was
not
in
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
securities
within
the
meaning
of
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
declined
to
allow
the
deduction
of
“trading
losses”
from
income
on
the
ground
that
they
were
not
business
losses
sustained
by
the
taxpayer
but
were
rather
losses
of
capital.
Having
considered
the
evidence
adduced,
I
have
formed
the
opinion
that
the
appellant
was
an
employee
and
not
in
business
for
himself.
The
employer
of
the
appellant,
Jenkin
Evans
&
Company
Limited,
was
in
the
business
of
buying
and
selling
securities,
and
the
appellant,
in
so
far
as
his
own
accounts
were
concerned,
was
in
the
same
position
as
any
other
client.
When
he
placed
an
order
for
himself,
he
was
performing
the
same
services
as
he
normally
would
for
other
clients
of
his
firm.
Under
the
circumstances
I
find
that
the
appeal
may
only
be
dismissed
as
was
stated
at
the
end
of
the
hearing.
Appeal
dismissed.
RAINBOW
PIPE
LINE
COMPANY
LIMITED,
Appellant,
and
MINISTER
OF
NATIONAL
REVENUE,
Respondent.
Tax
Review
Board
(W
O
Davis,
QC),
January
25,
1972.
“Nil”
assessment
—
Right
of
appeal.
The
appellant
company,
in
its
returns
for
its
fiscal
years
1967
and
1968,
reduced
its
taxable
income
to
nil
by
carrying
forward
unapplied
portions
of
losses
incurred
in
1965
and
1966.
In
reassessing,
the
Minister
notified
appellant
that
no
tax
was
payable
but,
before
applying
the
losses
to
be
carried
forward,
reduced
appellant’s
claims
for
capital
cost
allowance.
These
assessments,
according
to
appellant,
were
ill-founded
in
fact
and
in
law.
The
Minister
moved
for
an
order
quashing
the
purported
notice
of
appeal
on
the
ground
that
no
appeal
lay
from
nil
assessments.
HELD:
The
question
of
the
right
of
a
taxpayer
to
lodge
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
notice
to
the
effect
that
no
tax
was
payable
was
settled
by
Newfoundland
Minerals
Ltd
v
MNR
(Practice
Note,
[1969]
CTC
639)
where
the
Court
directed
that
the
notice
of
appeal
be
struck
out
on
the
ground
that
there
was
no
right
of
appeal
in
the
circumstances.
Notice
of
appeal
quashed.
S
M
Chumir
for
the
Appellant.
D
MacKinnon
for
the
Respondent.
W
O
Davis:—The
appellant
in
these
proceedings
has
appealed
from
reassessments
to
income
tax
in
respect
of
its
taxation
years
ended
December
31,
1967
and
1968,
wherein
it
was
informed
that
no
tax
was
payable
by
it
for
either
year
as
a
result
of
the
application
of
losses
suffered
by
it
in
1965
and
1966
against
the
income
earned
by
it
in
1967
and
1968.
When
this
matter
came
on
before
me
for
hearing
at
Calgary,
Alberta,
on
November
12,
1971,
at
a
sittings
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted,
counsel
for
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
moved
for
an
order
of
the
Board
quashing
the
purported
notice
of
appeal
on
the
ground
that,
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
no
appeal
lies
from
assessments
stating
that
no
tax
is
payable
by
the
taxpayer.
In
its
corporate
income
tax
return
for
its
fiscal
year
ended
December
31,
1967
the
appellant
reported
net
income
of
$909,607
but,
by
carrying
forward
unapplied
portions
of
losses
incurred
by
it
in
1965
and
1966,
it
reduced
its
taxable
income
for
the
year
to
nil
and
declared
no
tax
payable.
For
its
fiscal
year
ended
December
31,
1968
it
reported
adjusted
net
income
of
$1,018,734,
but
again
reduced
its
taxable
income
to
nil
by
means
of
a
“loss
carry
forward”
and
again
declared
no
tax
payable
by
it
for
the
year.
On
March
9,
1970
the
Minister
issued
notices
of
reassessment
of
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
years
1967
and
1968
in
which
he
notified
the
taxpayer
that
no
tax
was
payable
in
respect
of
either
year
but
in
which,
inter
alia,
according
to
the
T7W
Form
attached
thereto,
he
had,
before
applying
the
losses
to
be
carried
forward,
reduced
the
appellant’s
claims
for
capital
cost
allowance.
The
taxpayer
then
forwarded
to
the
Minister
notices
of
objection
dated
June
3,
1970
in
which
it
complained
that
the
Minister’s
assessments
were
ill-founded
in
fact
and
in
law
because
the
Minister
had
re-
duced
the
amounts
of
capital
cost
allowance
rightfully
claimed
by
the
appellant
by
some
$20,000
in
each
year
thereby
increasing
the
appellant’s
net
income
from
its
business
and
had
arrived
at
the
nil
assessments
issued
only
by
applying
larger
portions
of
the
loss
suffered
by
the
appellant
in
1966
than
the
taxpayer
itself
had
applied
against
its
net
income
for
1967
and
1968
in
its
corporate
returns.
On
February
17,
1971
the
Minister
replied
to
the
said
notices
of
objection
by
issuing
a
notification
to
the
taxpayer
under
the
provisions
of
section
58
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
whereby
he
did
nothing
more
than
confirm
“that
no
tax
was
payable”
by
the
taxpayer
for
its
taxation
years
ended
December
31,
1967
and
1968.
The
question
of
the
right
of
a
taxpayer
to
lodge
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
notice
issued
by
the
Minister
to
the
effect
that
no
tax
Is
payable
has
been
before
the
Courts
for
some
time
and
now
appears
to
have
been
settled
by
a
ruling
of
Gibson,
J
(now
of
the
Trial
Division
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
but
then
of
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada)
in
Newfoundland
Minerals
Limited
v
MNR,
as
set
forth
in
a
Practice
Note
reported
in
[1969]
CTC
639,
which
ruling
was
considered
and
followed
by
me
in
Lazis
v
MNA,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
605.
See
also
Falconbridge
Nickel
Mines
Limited
v
MNR,
[1971]
CTC
789
at
pages
795-6.
In
the
Newfoundland
Minerals
case
(supra),
an
appeal
had
been
instituted
by
the
taxpayer
from
an
assessment
showing
the
tax
payable
by
the
taxpayer
to
be
nil.
When
this
matter
in
due
course
came
on
before
Gibson,
J,
on
appeal
from
the
Tax
Appeal
Board,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
moved
to
strike
out
the
notice
of
appeal
on
the
ground
that
the
Court
had
no
jurisdiction
to
hear
an
appeal
from
a
notification
that
no
tax
was
payable.
The
Court
allowed
the
Minister’s
motion
and
directed
that
the
notice
of
appeal
be
struck
out
on
the
ground
that
there
was
no
right
to
appeal
in
the
circumstances.
A
very
useful
discussion
on
this
ruling
of
Mr
Justice
Gibson
in
the
Newfoundland
Minerals
case
is
to
be
found
at
page
21
of
the
January-
February
1970
issue
of
the
“Canadian
Tax
Journal”
(Issue
No
1,
Vol
XVII!)
as
published
by
the
Canadian
Tax
Foundation.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
sought
to
establish
a
right
on
the
part
of
the
appellant
to
appeal
from
an
assessment
whereby
no
tax
is
payable
if
the
methods
of
computation
employed
by
the
Minister
and
by
the
taxpayer
to
arrive
at
this
result
are
at
variance
but,
after
hearing
counsel
for
the
parties,
I
have
concluded
that,
in
view
of
the
present
state
of
the
law,
I
have
no
alternative
but
to
follow
the
ruling
of
Mr
Justice
Gibson
in
the
Newfoundland
Minerals
case
(supra).
In
the
circumstances,
the
appellant’s
purported
notice
of
appeal
herein
must
be
quashed.
Appeal
quashed.