A
J
Frost:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
income
tax
assessment
in
respect
of
the
appellant’s
1968
taxation
year.
Upon
notice
of
objection
duly
signed
and
filed,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reconsidered
the
assessment
and
confirmed
it
on
the
ground
that
the
$1,422.75
claimed
as
a
deduction
from
income
in
respect
of
medical
expenses
did
not
fall
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
27(1
)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
appeal
was
heard
at
Toronto
on
October
28,
1971
by
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
as
it
was
then
constituted.
The
appellant’s
child
is
suffering
from
childhood
schizophrenia
and
is
being
treated
in
a
normal
school
environment
under
the
supervision
of
Dr
W
A
Hawke
of
the
Hospital
for
Sick
Children,
Toronto,
and
Mrs
Joyce
Jones,
MA,
a
speech
therapist.
The
child
is
not
capable
of
responding
to
regular
teaching
methods.
In-patient
care
was
not
considered
suitable
and
would
have
cost
upwards
of
$15,000
per
year.
The
necessary
services
and
procedures
were
arranged
at
Bayview
Glen
Junior
Schools
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“Bayview”),
an
academic
institution
not
licensed
as
a
private
hospital
or
nursing
home.
During
the
1968
taxation
year
the
appellant
paid
Bayview
a
tuition
fee
of
$1,422.75.
The
question
before
the
Board
is
whether
or
not
the
tuition
fee
paid
by
the
appellant
to
Bayview
is
a
medical
expense
under
the
appropriate
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
appellant
in
his
argument
contended
that
the
method
adopted
was
recommended
by
two
competent
medical
authorities
and
that
no
other
form
of
treatment
was
available
for
his
child
in
the
community.
Procedures
and
services
were
so
arranged
at
Bayview
that
qualified
medical
practitioners
could
effect
treatment,
that
such
treatment
was
singular
and
necessary
in
the
circumstances
and
that
the
tuition
fee
paid
to
Bayview
should
be
regarded
as
a
medical
expense
for
income
tax
purposes.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
in
his
argument
submitted
that
Bayview
being
an
academic
institution,
and
not
a
laboratory
or
centre
for
radiological
or
other
diagnostic
procedures,
tuition
fees
paid
to
it
could
not
be
strictly
construed
as
medical
expenses.
He
referred,
in
particular,
to
Donald
M
Lawson
v
MNR,
[1971]
Tax
ABC
833,
wherein
the
appeal
was
dismissed
on
facts
quite
similar
to
those
of
the
present
case.
On
the
evidence,
Bayview
was
the
only
place
available
where
extensive
care
and
treatment
could
be
provided
at
a
reasonable
cost.
Bayview,
however,
cannot
be
regarded
as
a
“hospital”
or
“laboratory”
in
the
ordinary
sense
and
Parliament,
in
choosing
the
words
“licensed
private
hospital”,
clearly
excluded
academic
institutions.
At
best,
Bayview
can
only
be
regarded
as
a
vehicle
for
prescribed
medical
services.
Enrolment
at
Bayview
may
have
been
essential
to
the
medical
program
adopted
but
the
cost
of
enrolment
does
not
become
a
medical
expense
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
27(1
)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
During
the
hearing,
the
appellant
raised
a
technical
point,
namely,
that
the
Minister
may
not
make
a
reassessment
beyond
the
four-year
limit
from
the
date
of
mailing
the
notice
of
assessment
unless
the
taxpayer
has
made
a
misrepresentation
or
committed
a
fraud.
He
claimed
that
the
original
assessment
was
issued
on
August
11,
1965
and
as
all
subsequent
assessments
were
based
on
identical
terms
of
reference
the
power
of
the
Minister
to
vary
the
basis
of
the
original
assessment
expired
four
years
later
on
August
11,
1969.
The
argument
of
the
appellant
was
quite
ingenious
but
not
one
with
which
the
Board
can
agree,
as
the
assessment
issued
on
August
11,
1965
did
not
relate
to
the
taxation
year
under
appeal.
As
the
language
of
the
Act
speaks
of
“dates”
and
“years”
and
not
the
bases
of
assessments,
the
Board
can
only
conclude
that
Parliament
intended
each
taxation
year
to
stand
on
its
own
merits.
The
Board
is
powerless
to
decide
in
favour
of
the
appellant
as
the
essential
elements
of
the
case
do
not
fit
within
the
provisions
of
paragraph
27(1
)(c)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Appeal
dismissed.
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