Kerr,
J:—Two
appeals
herein
by
the
said
appellant
against
assessments
of
income
tax
were
heard
by
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada,
and
by
a
judgment
of
that
Court
rendered
on
May
21,
1971
(reported
[1971]
CTC
325)
the
appeals
were
allowed
and
the
assessments
in
issue
were
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reassessment;
and
the
judgment
awarded
costs
of
the
appeals
to
the
appellant,
to
be
taxed.
Now
the
appellant
applies
for
an
order
under
this
Court’s
Rule
344
directing
that
the
costs
be
paid
to
the
appellant
in
each
of
the
actions
in
lump
sums,
and
for
an
order
that
the
time
to
apply
under
Rule
344(7)
be
extended
for
that
purpose.
Rule
344(1)
and
(7)
are
as
follows:
344.
(1)
The
costs
of
and
incidental
to
all
proceedings
in
the
Court
shall
be
in
the
discretion
of
the
Court
and
shall
follow
the
event
unless
otherwise
ordered.
Without
limiting
the
foregoing,
the
Court
may
direct
the
payment
of
a
fixed
or
lump
sum
in
lieu
of
taxed
costs.
(7)
Any
party
may
(a)
after
judgment
has
been
pronounced,
within
the
time
allowed
by
Rule
337(5)
to
move
the
Court
to
reconsider
the
pronouncement,
or
(b)
after
the
Court
has
reached
a
conclusion
as
to
the
judgment
to
be
pronounced,
at
the
time
of
the
return
of
the
motion
for
judgment,
whether
or
not
the
judgment
includes
any
order
concerning
costs,
move
the
Court
to
make
any
special
direction
concerning
costs
contemplated
by
this
rule,
including
any
direction
contemplated
by
Tariff
B,
and
to
decide
any
question
as
to
the
application
of
any
of
the
provisions
in
Rule
346.
An
application
under
this
paragraph
in
the
Court
of
Appeal
shall
be
made
before
the
Chief
Justice
or
a
judge
nominated
by
him
but
either
party
may
apply
to
a
Court
composed
of
at
least
3
judges
to
review
a
decision
so
obtained.
On
the
hearing
of
the
application
counsel
for
the
respondent
opposed
the
requested
extension
of
time
and
submitted
also
that
the
costs
should
be
taxed
in
the
usual
manner
pursuant
to
Rule
346
rather
than
by
direction
of
the
Court
in
a
lump
sum.
Rule
346(1)
and
(2)
read
as
follows:
346.
(1)
All
costs
between
party
and
party
shall
be
as
determined
by,
or
pursuant
to,
the
Court’s
judgment
and
directions
and,
subject
thereto,
Tariff
B
in
the
Appendix
to
these
Rules
and
this
rule
are
applicable
to
the
taxation
of
party
and
party
costs.
(2)
Costs
shall
be
taxed
by
(a)
a
prothonotary,
each
of
whom
is
a
taxing
officer,
or
(b)
an
officer
of
the
Registry
designated
by
order
of
the
Court
as
a
taxing
officer,
subject
to
review
by
the
Court
upon
the
application
of
any
party
dissatisfied
with
such
a
taxation.
The
judgment
of
the
Exchequer
Court
was
rendered
only
a
few
days
before
the
Federal
Court
Act
and
the
Rules
of
this
Court
came
into
force.
The
new
tariffs
of
costs
prescribed
by
those
Rules
are
different
from
the
tariffs
of
the
Exchequer
Court,
and
it
was
held
by
the
Associate
Chief
Justice
in
his
Reasons
for
Judgment
(unreported)
in
National
Capital
Commission
v
Bourque,
that
the
new
tariffs
shall
apply
to
costs
incurred
before,
as
well
as
after
they
came
into
force,
when
they
have
not
been
taxed
before
the
new
tariffs
came
into
force,
and
he
pointed
out
that
this
does
not
mean
that
an
applicant
must
be
content
with
the
new
tariffs,
for
it
is
possible
under
section
3
of
Tariff
B
to
have
the
amounts
of
the
tariff
increased
by
direction
of
the
Court
under
Rule
344(7),
ante.
Tariff
B,
section
3
is
as
follows:
3.
No
amounts
other
than
those
set
out
above
shall
be
allowed
on
a
party
and
party
taxation,
but
any
of
the
above
amounts
may
be
increased
or
decreased
by
direction
of
the
Court
in
the
judgment
for
costs
or
under
Rule
344(7).
It
does
not
appear
to
me
that
the
respondent
has
been
prejudiced
by
the
appellant’s
delay
in
moving
to
have
its
costs
taxed
or
to
obtain
a
direction
by
the
Court
for
payment
of
a
lump
sum
in
lieu
of
taxed
costs.
The
application
to
direct
payment
of
a
lump
sum
is
before
the
Court
and
the
merits
respecting
the
amount
of
costs
have
been
spoken
to,
and
in
all
the
circumstances
I
will
determine
the
amount
of
costs
now
rather
than
put
the
parties
to
taxation
with
its
possibility
that
the
matter
would
come
before
the
Court
again
for
review
in
the
event
of
dissatisfaction
with
the
taxation,
although
I
think
that
where
a
judgment
provides
for
costs
to
be
taxed
the
procedure
for
taxing
under
Rule
346
should
normally
be
followed,
in
the
absence
of
circumstances
warranting
a
special
direction
concerning
costs
under
Rule
344(7).
The
appellant
is
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary
of
Sobeys
Stores
Limited,
which
has
developed
an
extensive
chain
of
stores
and
shopping
centres
in
the
Maritime
Provinces,
in
the
course
of
which
numerous
sites
have
been
acquired
and
developed,
and
some
have
been
sold,
including
the
two
properties
concerned
in
these
appeals.
The
appellant’s
solicitors
considered
it
necessary
in
the
appeals
to
deal
with
the
intercorporate
relationships
of
the
appellant
and
its
parent
company
and
affiliates,
and
their
real
estate
transactions,
as
the
result
of
those
appeals
might
also
affect
other
land
transactions
income
tax-wise.
The
two
appeals
were
heard
on
common
evidence.
The
trial
lasted
two
days.
The
appellant
was
represented
by
two
counsel.
Previously,
there
had
been
a
common
discovery
lasting
2
to
3
hours.
The
affidavit
in
support
of
this
application
stated
that
approximately
20
hours
were
spent
in
preparation
for
the
discovery
and
an
additional
15
hours
in
providing
answers
to
questions
for
which
counsel
for
the
respondent
required
undertakings,
and
that
the
time
spent
directly
in
preparation
for
the
trial
was
in
excess
of
130
hours.
The
assessments
in
issue
in
the
appeals
were
in
respect
of
profits
of
$23,000
realized
on
the
sale
of
one
property
and
$28,000
realized
on
the
sale
of
another.
The
affidavit
indicated
disbursements
incurred
in
the
amount
of
$163.45.
The
Bills
of
Costs
submitted
by
the
appellant
amounted
to
$1,221.95
in
one
of
the
appeals,
and
$1,171.50
in
the
other.
It
is
understandable
that
the
appellant’s
solicitors
and
counsel
would
consider
it
necessary
to
have
regard
for
the
implications
of
the
appeals
on
other
real
estate
sales
of
the
companies,
and
would
prepare
for
the
appeals
with
that
in
mind,
but
I
do
not
think
that
more
than
the
costs
prescribed
in
Tariff
B
is
warranted.
I
think
that
an
appropriate
amount
of
costs
on
a
party
and
party
basis
for
services
of
solicitors
and
counsel
for
the
appellant,
and
the
said
disbursements,
would
be
in
the
order
of
$1,200
in
total
for
the
two
appeals,
treating
the
appeals
as
Class
II
cases.
The
Court
therefore
directs
that
the
respondent
pay
the
appellant
a
fixed
or
lump
sum
total
of
$1,200.00
in
lieu
of
taxed
costs
in
these
appeals.
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