Pratte,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
against
the
decision
of
the
respondent
confirming
the
reassessments
of
the
appellant’s
income
tax
for
the
years
1967,
1968
and
1969.
These
reassessments
were
made
on
the
basis
that,
to
the
declared
income
of
the
appellant
for
those
years,
were
to
be
added
amounts
of
$165,937
for
1968*
and
$654,462.50
for
1969.
The
appellant
does
not
deny
having
received
those
amounts;
it
Submits,
however,
that
they
have
been
improperly
included
in
its
income.
The
appellant
is
a
building
contractor
which,
in
the
normal
course
of
its
business,
enters
into
building
contracts
providing
that
a
percentage
of
the
moneys
to
be
paid
to
the
appellant
(which
percentage
is
commonly
called
“holdback”)
will
be
withheld
by
its
customers
for
a
certain
period
of
time
after
the
completion
of
the
work
and
will
be
paid
at
the
end
of
this
period
if
the
work
is
then
accepted
by
an
engineer
or
other
representative
of
the
owner.
It
is
common
ground
that
the
amounts
added
by
the
respondent
to
the
appellant’s
declared
income
were
received
by
the
appellant
from
some
of
its
customers
who,
after
the
appellant
had
transferred
to
them
some
securities,
paid
immediately
“holdbacks”
that
were
not
yet
due
or
claimable.
It
was
also
agreed
at
the
hearing
that
all
those
payments
had
been
received
under
arrangements
similar
to
the
one
that
the
appellant
made
with
one
of
its
customers,
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority,
which
arrangement
is
evidenced
by
the
documents
filed
as
Exhibit
No
1.
The
terms
of
this
particular
agreement
are
set
out
in
a
letter
dated
January
13,
1968
sent
by
the
appellant
to
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority.
The
first
paragraph
of
this
letter
makes
reference
to
the
fact
that
under
several
building
contracts
previously
entered
into
by
the
appellant
and
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority
there
were
holdbacks
that
the
appellant
could
not
normally
claim
until
a
later
date;
the
rest
of
this
letter
reads
as
follows:
You
have
advised
us
verbally
that
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority
will
release
the
above
holdbacks
to
us
upon
deposit
in
escrow
in
our
Bank,
term
certificates
of
Hydro-Quebec
in
an
equal
amount.
In
order
to
complete
this
release
of
holdbacks
we
propose
as
follows:
1.
We
will
purchase
term
notes
of
Hydro-Quebec
made
payable
to
Quebec
Autoroutes
(sic)
Authority
in
amounts
equal
to
the
above
holdbacks
and
maturing
on
the
dates
when
the
holdbacks
become
due.
2.
These
term
certificates
of
Hydro-Quebec
will
be
placed
in
escrow
in
our
bank,
Canadian
Imperial
Bank
of
Commerce,
Phillips
Square
Branch,
and
will
not
be
released
except
on
the
written
authority
of
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority.
3.
The
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority
will
then
immediately
release
to
us
the
holdbacks
covered
by
the
Hydro-Quebec
term
notes
deposited.
4.
The
interest
on
the
Hydro-Quebec
term
notes
will
accrue
for
the
benefit
of
Francon
Limitée
and
when
received
by
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority
from
Hydro-Quebec
it
will
be
remitted
to
Francon
Limitée.
5.
At
the
maturity
date
of
the
Hydro-Quebec
term
notes
the
face
value
of
these
notes
will
be
paid
to
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority,
which
will
in
turn
then
release
these
funds
to
Francon
Limitée
under
the
same
conditions
that
would
have
applied
to
the
holdbacks
for
which
the
term
notes
were
substituted.
Please
indicate
on
the
enclosed
copy
of
this
letter
your
acceptance
of
this
proposal
and
forward
it
to
us
by
return
mail
to
enable
us
to
make
immediate
arrangements
as
outlined.
.
.
.
The
offer
contained
in
this
letter
was
accepted
by
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority
which
“released”
to
the
appellant
holdbacks
of
approximately
$446,000
upon
receiving
notice
that
the
appellant
had
deposited
in
escrow
in
its
bank
a
Hydro-Quebec
term
note
in
the
amount
of
$450,000
bearing
interest
at
7%,
maturing
July
2,
1969,
and
made
payable
to
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority.
The
only
question
raised
by
this
appeal
is
whether
the
respondent
was
right
in
including
in
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
years
under
consideration,
the
amounts
that
the
appellant
received
during
those
years
from
the
Quebec
Autoroute
Authority
and
other
customers
when,
in
the
circumstances
that
I
have
just
described,
these
customers
released
holdbacks
that
were
not
yet
due
and
claimable.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
first
submitted
that
these
payments
were
not
income
since
they
had
been
made
under
an
agreement
which
merely
provided
that
the
appellant
would
substitute
interest-producing
securities
for
the
amount
of
the
holdbacks
that
were
to
become
due
on
a
later
date.
In
a
certain
sense,
it
may
be
said
that
the
arrangement
that
the
appellant
made
with
its
customers
merely
involved
a
substitution
of
one
kind
of
security
for
securities
of
another
kind.
Indeed,
in
a
very
loose
sense,
it
may
be
said
that
the
right
of
the
owner
to
defer
the
payment
to
be
made
to
the
contractor
until
final
acceptance
of
the
work
is,
for
the
owner,
a
“security”.
It
must
not
be
forgotten,
though,
that
if
the
contractor
renounces
to
this
“security”
and,
upon
the
contractor
giving
him
other
kind
of
securities,
pays
amounts
which
under
the
building
contract
are
not
yet
due,
he,
in
so
doing,
pays
the
price
of
the
work
done
by
the
contractor.
In
my
view,
the
fact
that
the
arrangement
made
by
the
appellant
with
its
customer
may
be
construed
as
providing
merely
for
the
substitution
of
securities
for
the
cash
withheld
does
not
support
appellant’s
counsel’s
submission
that
the
amounts
received
by
the
appellant
were
not
part
of
its
income.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
also
argued
that
the
amounts
received
by
the
appellant
represented
the
price
of
the
securities
that
the
appellant
had
purchased
in
the
name
of
its
clients.
In
other
words,
according
to
counsel,
the
arrangement
made
by
the
appellant
with
his
customers
should
be
construed
as
being
a
contract
under
which
the
customers
would
have
agreed:
(a)
to
purchase
securities
and
to
pay
therefor
a
price
equal
to
the
amount
of
the
holdbacks;
(b)
to
amend
the
terms
of
the
building
contracts
so
that
the
amount
payable
to
the
contractor
upon
final
acceptance
of
the
work
by
the
engineer
be
not
that
of
the
holdback
but
that
of
the
securities.
In
my
view,
a
mere
reading
of
the
letter
setting
out
the
terms
of
the
agreement
entered
into
by
the
appellant
and
its
clients
shows
that
it
cannot
be
given
such
an
interpretation.
The
appeal
will
therefore
be
dismissed.
The
respondent
will
be
entitled
to
his
costs.