The
Chief
Justice
and
Thurlow,
J
(delivered
from
the
Bench):—
Except
in
one
respect,
we
adopt
and
rely
on
the
reasons
for
judgment
of
the
Associate
Chief
Justice.
We
cannot,
however,
agree
with
his
conclusion
on
the
facts
of
this
case
that,
even
though
the
articles
in
the
appellant’s
publication
are
of
a
scholarly
character,
the
“principal
function”
of
that
publication
is
not
the
“encouragement,
promotion
or
development
of
.
.
.
scholarship
..
.”.
In
our
view,
from
the
point
of
view
of
subsection
19(4),
the
character
of
such
a
publication
must,
ordinarily,
be
judged
objectively,
on
an
examination
of
the
publication
or
of
evidence
as
to
the
contents
of
that
publication,
and
evidence
as
to
the
persons
among
whom
it
is
circulated,
with
a
view
to
forming
an
opinion
as
to
the
role
that
the
publication
will
play
in
the
hands
of
the
reader.
Applying
that
test,
in
our
view,
if
it
is
found
that
the
contents
of
the
publication
are
of
a
scholarly
character
and
that
the
publication
is
directed
to
persons
learned
in
the
subject
matter
thereof,
it
would,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
to
the
contrary,
follow
that
the
function
of
the
publication
is
the
“encouragement,
promotion
or
development
of
.
.
.
scholarship
.
.
.”.
Furthermore,
if,
to
such
a
publication
addressed
to
such
an
audience,
there
be
added
a
reasonable
amount
of
competitive
advertising,
that
would
not
in
itself
alter
the
character
of
the
publication.
The
statute
itself
contemplates
that
this
may
be
the
situation.
In
this
case,
it
is
common
ground
that
the
non-advertising
matter
is
of
a
scholarly
character
in
the
medical
field
and
that
the
publication
is
addressed
to
the
medical
profession.
In
our
view,
there
is
nothing
about
the
advertising
included
that
is
so
remarkable,
either
in
its
quantity
or
subject
matter
or
any
other
feature
of
it,
as
to
change
the
character
of
the
publication
as
established
by
the
non-advertising
ma-
terial.
There
is,
in
addition,
no
evidence
to
show
that
the
magazine
has
in
fact
some
function
other
than
is
revealed
by
its
objective
character.
We
are
therefore
of
opinion
that
the
appeal
should
be
allowed
and
that
in
place
of
the
answer
given
by
-the
learned
trial
judge
there
should
be
substituted
an
affirmative
answer
qualified,
however,
so
as
to
limit
it
to
the
publication
as
exemplified
by
the
ten
issues
of
it
that
are
before
the
Court.
Sweet,
DJ:—What
is
to
be
done
here
is
included
in
an
agreement
bearing
date
January
5,
1972
between
the
parties,
namely:
The
Federal
Court
of
Canada
shall
determine
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
(3)
of
section
17
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
SC
1970,
chapter
1
and
subsection
(1)
of
section
173
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
following
question:
Is
the
Canadian
edition
of
“Medical
Aspects
of
Human
Sexuality”
a
publication,
the
principal
function
of
which
is
the
encouragement,
promotion,
or
development
of
scholarship
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
(4)
of
the
sections
19
and
12A
of
the
Income
Tax
Act?
Subsection
(1)
of
that
section
19
is:
19.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
an
otherwise
deductible
outlay
or
expense
of
a
taxpayer
for
advertising
space
in
an
issue
of
a
non-Canadian
newspaper
or
periodical
dated
after
December
31,
1965
for
an
advertisement
directed
primarily
to
a
market
in
Canada.
The
periodical
in
question
falls
under
clause
(E)
of
subparagraph
(5)(a)(ii)
of
section
19
of
the
Act
and
accordingly
it
is
to
be
considered
“non-Canadian”
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
19(1).
Nevertheless
subsection
19(1)
would
not
be
applicable
if,
having
regard
to
paragraph
(4)(b)
of
section
19,
the
publication
is
a
“publication
the
principal
function
of
which
is
the
encouragement,
promotion
or
development
of
the
fine
arts,
letters,
scholarships
or
religion”.
The
learned
and
distinguished
Associate
Chief
Justice,
in
his
reasons
for
judgment,
said:
Indeed,
if
the
calibre
of
the
people
who
have
written
these
articles,
as
well
as
most
of
the
articles
themselves,
are
considered,
this
publication
must
be
accepted
as
a
vehicle
for
the
dissemination
of
scholarship
in
a
field
which,
until
recently,
was
one
that
had
never
been
properly
treated
by
doctors.
However
His
Lordship
also
said:
Here
a
most
important
object
of
the
publication
is
to
serve
as
an
advertising
vehicle
and
the
answer
to
the
questions
posed
must
regrettably
be
that
the
principal
object
of
this
publication
is
not
for
the
advancement
or
promotion
of
scholarship.
Of
course
the
advertising
in
a
publication
would
be
an
item,
and
often
an
important
item,
from
which
the
publisher
would
hope
for
financial
benefit.
Doubtless
to
Hospital
Publications
Incorporated
—
a
New
York
corporation,
which
granted
to
the
appellant
the
right
and
licence
to
use
the
name
“Medical
Aspects
of
Human
Sexuality
(Canadian
Edition)”
—
advertising
and
financial
reward
therefrom
was
an
important
consideration.
Furthermore
it
would
be
surprising,
I
think,
if
the
appellant
did
not
also
hope
for
monetary
gain.
It
seems
to
me,
having
regard
to
the
wording
of
paragraph
19(4)(b)
that
what
is
relevant
is
the
principal
function
of
the
publication
per
se
and
not
the
publisher’s
motive
in
publishing.
If
this
were
not
so
one
would
wonder
why
Parliament
would
have
used
the
wording
“any
publication
the
principal
function
of
which”
relating,
as
I
construe
it,
“principal
function”
to
“any
publication”.
I
am
of
the
view
that
if
the
periodical
itself
is
such
that
the
principal
function
of
its
content
—
the
material
which
it
contains
—
is
to
encourage,
promote
or
develop
fine
arts,
letters,
scholarship
or
religion,
it
comes
within
paragraph
19(4)(b)
whether
or
not
the
publisher
hopes
to
make
money
from
its
publication
and
whether
or
not
he
does
make
money
from
it.
If
it
is
established
that
the
principal
function
of
the
content
is
the
encouragement,
promotion
or
development
of
fine
arts,
letters,
scholarship
or
religion,
it
is
irrelevant,
in
my
opinion,
whether
the
motive
inducing
publication
is
altruistic
or
profit
seeking.
If
emphasis
be
needed
for
this
view
it
is
found
in
the
fact
that
pervading
the
entire
section
19,
and
even
the
very
reason
for
its
inclusion
in
the
Act,
is
the
matter
of
outlay
or
expense
of
a
taxpayer
for
advertising
space.
Section
19
is
based
upon
anticipation
of
paid
advertising.
In
my
view
this
applies
also
to
paragraph
(4)(b);
otherwise
I
would
think
that
wording
quite
different
than
what
appears
there
would
have
been
necessary.
If
I
read
His
Lordship’s
reasons
correctly
he
did
reach
the
firm
conclusion
that
the
content
of
the
periodical
did
accomplish
encouragement,
promotion
or
development
of
scholarship
and
in
this
I
respectfully
agree.
On
the
other
hand,
for
the
reasons
given,
I
do
not
think
that
importance
of
the
publication
as
an
advertising
vehicle
would,
in
the
circumstances
which
exist
here,
prevent
it
from
qualifying
under
paragraph
(4)(b)
of
section
19.
Of
course,
the
result
I
feel
should
ensue
is
based
on
the
material
in
this
case.
The
future
could
bring
changes
in
this
periodical’s
content
which
would
impel
a
different
result.
I
would
allow
the
appeal
and
answer
the
question
to
be
answered
in
the
affirmative
qualified
as
stated
by
My
Lord
the
Chief
Justice
and
My
Lord
Thurlow.