The
Chairman
(orally):—This
is
an
appeal
by
Axler
&
Palmer
Limited
against
the
reassessment
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
the
taxation
year
1969.
The
basis
of
the
reassessment
is
that
the
appellant
should
be
required
to
file
on
an
accrual
basis,
whereas
apparently
for
many
years
past
the
appellant
has
been
filing
on
a
cash
basis.
It
is
agreed
between
the
parties
that
if
the
appellant
is
within
the
definition
of
a
profession
in
paragraph
85F(1)(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
as
it
was
in
1969,
then
the
appeal
must
succeed
unless,
and
this
is
not
agreed
by
the
appellant
but
it
is
asserted
by
the
respondent,
the
appellant
is
precluded
by
virtue
of
subsection
(2)
of
section
85F.
The
first
issue
then
that
I
must
determine
is
whether
or
not
the
appellant
falls
within
the
term
of
a
profession
in
section
85F(1)(b)
of
the
Act.
There
is
no
definition
of
a
profession
within
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Several
cases
have
been
cited
to
me
and
dictionary
definitions
have
been
provided
by
the
appellant.
As
well,
I
have
obtained
my
own
dictionary
definition.
I
refer
for
a
moment
to
a
brief
historical
reference
to
the
use
of
the
term
“profession”.
I
think
it
is
well
established
and
one
can
almost
take
judicial
notice
that
in
the
years
prior
to
the
Second
World
War
the
term
“profession”
was
applied
almost
exclusively
to
the
medical
and
legal
professions.
The
term
was
jealously
guarded
by
them
and
is
in
my
belief
still
regarded
by
them
as
their
true
description
and
that
they
are
the
only
true
professions
in
existence
in
modern
day
society.
The
respondent
has
cited
to
me
a
case
decided
by
the
former
President
of
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
(as
it
then
was),
President
Thorson,
in
which
he
was
dealing
with
a
case
under
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act
and
he
held
in
that
case
that
an
optometrist
who
was
also
engaged
in
the
filling
of
prescriptions
for
glasses
failed
to
meet
the
qualification
of
professional
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act.
I
have
indicated
to
counsel
for
the
respondent
in
his
argument,
which
I
have
perhaps
interrupted
on
too
many
occasions,
that
I
believe
the
decision
of
President
Thorson
in
1949
in
Bower
v
MNR,
[1949]
CTC
77;
49
DTC
554,
would
have
been
accepted
almost
without
question
at
that
time.
However,
one
can
almost
take
judicial
notice
of
the
fact
that
over
the
past
twenty-five
years
there
has
been
an
adoption
of
the
term
“professional”
by
many
businesses
or
trades
that
formerly,
if
they
had
existed
at
all,
would
not
have
been
allocated
such
a
lofty
position
in
the
business
world.
Of
this,
judicial
notice
I
think
could
be
taken,
although
it
is
not
really
necessary
to
do
so.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
has
cited
the
case
of
Blackwell
v
MNR,
[1949]
CTC
362;
49
DTC
677,
determined
by
the
Exchequer
Court,
which
even
at
that
early
date
had
the
comment
at
page
367
[679]
(again
a
decision
of
President
Thorson):
Having
regard
to
the
facts
of
the
present
case,
I
have
no
hesitation
in
saying
that
even
if
all
due
allowance
is
made
for
the
fact
that
the
meaning
of
the
word
“profession”
has
been
greatly
enlarged
so
as
to
bring
within
its
ambit
occupations
that
were
not
previously
regarded
as
professions,
it
would
be
a
distortion
of
it
to
say
that
it
extends
to
the
activities
of
a
commercial
traveller.
SO
even
as
early
as
1949
President
Thorson
recognized
that
the
term
“profession”
was
being
given
a
wider
usage
than
had
ever
existed
before.
The
dictionary
definition
of
the
term
in
the
Shorter
Oxford
Dictionary
at
page
1593,
and
I
pick
out
only
one
or
two
phrases,
describes
“profession”
as
“a
vocation
in
which
a
professed
knowledge
of
some
department
of
learning
is
used
in
its
application
to
the
affairs
of
others
or
in
the
practice
of
an
art
founded
upon
it.
In
wider
sense,
any
calling
or
occupation
by
which
a
person
habitually
earns
his
living’.
This
definition
is
quite
old,
but
I
think
is
one
that
is
applicable
to
the
acceptance
that
the
term
now
receives,
not
only
from
the
general
public,
but
from
courts
of
law.
Again,
in
Black’s
Law
Dictionary
at
page
1375,
“profession”
is
described
as
“a
vocation,
calling,
occupation
or
employment
involving
labour,
skill,
education,
special
knowledge
and
compensation
or
profit,
but
the
labour
and
skill
involved
is
predominantly
mental
or
intellectual
rather
than
physical
or
manual”.
Cited
for
support
of
that
proposition
are
American
cases.
There
is
a
quotation
further
down
the
page
which
reads:
The
term
originally
contemplated
only
theology,
law,
and
medicine,
but
as
applications
of
science
and
learning
are
extended
to
other
departments
of
affairs,
other
vocations
also
receive
the
name,
which
implies
professed
attainments
in
special
knowledge
as
distinguished
from
mere
skill.
This
again
is
a
quotation
from
an
American
case.
I
think
the
definition
of
“profession”
as
it
appears
in
these
dictionaries
and
as
the
widening
of
the
term
is
acknowledged
as
far
back
as
1949
by
President
Thorson,
can
safely
be
said
to
include
a
person
engaged
in
a
vocation
or
business
or
a
body
of
persons
engaged
in
an
occupation
or
calling.
In
this
case
we
have
a
limited
company
which
is
created
by
letters
patent
in
the
Province
of
Ontario
and
given
the
right
to
act
as
a
real
estate
broker
which
by
the
terms
of
The
Real
Estate
and
Business
Brokers
Act
of
Ontario,
RSO
1970,
c
401,
gives
the
broker
the
power
to
act
for
others
for
compensation
or
gain,
and
the
evidence
is
that
since
its
inception
in
1956
the
company
has
done
nothing
but
act
as
a
broker,
although
it
did
have
the
right
to
act
in
general
insurance.
There
has
been
filed
as
appellant’s
Exhibit
2
an
exclusive
listing
as
one
of
the
samples
of
the
work
it
does.
The
Income
Tax
Act,
in
its
definition
section,
includes
corporate
entities
as
well
as
individuals
as
“persons”
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act.
Therefore,
I
am
satisfied
that
the
appellant
Axler
&
Palmer
Limited
is,
in
fact,
in
a
profession
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
85F(1)(b).
In
passing
I
would
further
comment,
as
I
did
during
the
course
of
the
argument,
that
the
legal
profession,
which
has
so
jealously
attempted
to
reserve
to
itself
and
a
small
group
the
term
“profession”,
is
more
than
amply
represented
in
the
House
of
Commons
and
in
the
Parliament
that
drafted
the
legislation
in
question.
They,
in
their
wisdom,
did
not
choose
to
define
the
term
“profession”
and
therefore
it
is
not
for
this
Board
or
a
court
of
law
to
seek
any
unusual
meaning
for
the
term,
but
to
accept
the
ordinary
everyday
meaning
that
would
be
placed
upon
it
by
a
layman
reading
an
Act
such
as
the
Income
Tax
Act
by
which
he
is
bound.
Having
disposed
of
that
part
of
the
appellant’s
case
I
am
now
faced
with
subsection
(2)
of
section
85F
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
states,
and
I
quote:
(2)
Subsection
(1)
does
not
apply
for
the
purpose
of
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
carried
on
by
him
jointly
with
one
or
more
other
persons,
unless
each
of
the
other
persons
by
whom
the
business
is
jointly
carried
on
has
elected
to
have
his
income
from
the
business
for
that
year
computed
in
accordance
with
the
method
authorized
by
that
subsection.
We
come
back
then
to
the
purpose
of
section
85F
which
is
to
allow
a
special
method
of
computing
income
to
the
farming
community
and
those
who
are
treated
as
professions.
This
election
is
whether
or
not
they
shall
file
on
an
accrual
or
cash
basis.
The
appellant
in
this
case
has
made
an
election
and
has
filed
on
a
cash
basis
for
some
time.
In
the
year
1969
it
is
challenged,
on
the
basis
that
it
is
not
in
a
profession,
and
I
have
disposed
of
that
portion
of
the
objection.
In
subsection
(2)
I
take
it
to
mean
that
the
subsection
allowing
this
election
of
the
method
of
reporting
tax
only
applies
to
a
taxpayer
who
does
not
carry
on
business
with
another
whose
taxation
year
does
not
correspond
with
his.
The
only
indication
is
that
the
appellant
is
a
party
to
a
syndicate
that
owns
some
real
estate
and
that
has
or
will
eventually
receive
profits
from
that
venture.
To
me
that
has
nothing
whatsoever
to
do
with
the
words
in
subsection
(2).
In
my
view
the
business
referred
to
is
the
business
of
a
profession
as
it
was
carried
on
by
Axler
&
Palmer
Limited
as
an
incorporated
company
and
not
in
partnership
or
jointly
with
any
other
person.
That
it
may
have
income
from
another
source
is,
in
my
view,
not
sufficient
to
deprive
it
of
the
election
contemplated
by
subsection
85F(1)
of
the
Act.
I
would
therefore
allow
the
appeal
in
full
and
refer
the
matter
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
accordingly.
Appeal
allowed.