The
Assistant
Chairman:—This
is
an
appeal
of
Antoine
Hullmann
from
the
income
tax
assessment
dated
September
27,
1971
in
respect
of
his
taxation
years
1963,
1964,
1965,
1966,
1967
and
1968,
and
from
the
assessment
dated
July
28,
1972
in
respect
of
the
1969
taxation
year.
It
was
agreed
by
the
parties
concerned
that
the
appeal
of
Gabrielle
Hullmann
would
be
heard
simultaneously
with
that
of
Antoine
Hullmann
on
common
evidence.
On
February
12,
1973
a
notice
of
motion
was
filed
with
this
Board
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
whereby
an
application
was
made
for
the
striking
out
of
the
notice
of
appeal
for
the
1963,
1964
and
1965
taxation
years
on
the
grounds
that
the
appeal
was
in
respect
of
“nil”
assessments
for
the
said
years.
The
Board
reserved
its
decision
on
the
motion
with
the
understanding
that
this
issue
would
first
be
disposed
of
before
a
decision
could
be
made
on
the
merits
of
the
appeals
before
it.
The
respondent’s
motion
is
based
on
the
case
of
Newfoundland
Minerals
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1969]
CTC
639;
69
DTC
5432,
in
which
the
Exchequer
Court
held
that
neither
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
nor
the
Exchequer
Court
had
jurisdiction
to
hear
an
appeal
from
a
notification
that
no
tax
was
payable.
It
was
considered
in
that
instance
that
the
Minister
neither
reassessed
nor
confirmed
the
assessment
but
that
he
vacated
the
assessment,
and
that
by
striking
out
the
assessment
itself
and
reducing
it
to
“nil”
there
could
not
possibly
be
a
right
of
appeal.
The
question
as
to
whether
an
appeal
lies
from
a
nil
assessment
is
an
important
one
which
can,
in
my
opinion,
seriously
affect
the
taxpayer’s
rights.
The
whole
matter
revolves
around
the
definition
of
“assessment”,
and
in
Okalta
Oils
Limited
v
MNR,
[1955]
SCR
824;
[1955]
CTC
271;
55
DTC
1176,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
defined
an
“assessment”
as
the
amount
of
tax
payable
and
held
that
if
there
were
no
tax
there
would
not
be
an
assessment
and
therefore
there
could
be
no
appeal.
However,
in
Anjulin
Farms
Limited
v
MNR,
[1961]
Ex
CR
381;
[1961]
CTC
250;
61
DTC
1182,
it
was
held
by
the
Exchequer
Court
that
there
was
an
appeal
against
a
nil
assessment.
In
Newfoundland
Minerals
Ltd
(supra)
the
Exchequer
Court
reversed
its
previous
finding
in
this
respect
and
denied
the
taxpayer
his
appeal
in
view
of
the
facts
peculiar
to
that
case
which
had
also
resulted
in
a
nil
assessment.
It
would
be
difficult
indeed
not
to
agree
in
principle
with
the
legality,
soundness,
and
logic
of
this
decision
and
to
apply
it
to
similar
cases
wherein
the
taxpayer’s
rights
in
respect
of
an
assessment
for
a
particular
year
have
been
exhausted.
If
the
assessment
in
a
particular
year
is
nil
and
the
taxpayer
has
no
tax
to
pay
and
no
tax
refund
to
receive,
there
would
normally
be
no
reason
for
an
appeal
from
that
assessment.
However,
if
in
spite
of
a
nil
assessment
the
taxpayer’s
rights
pursuant
to
the
Income
Tax
Act
have
not
been
exhausted
in
respect
of
the
taxation
year
to
which
the
nil
assessment
pertains,
and
the
provisions
of
the
Act
confer
rights
to
the
taxpayer
notwithstanding
the
nil
assessment
such
as,
for
example,
the
right
of
a
taxpayer
to
carry
business
losses
back
to
a
previous
year
or
to
dispute
a
reserve
which
the
Minister
had
set
up
in
order
to
arrive
at
the
nil
assessment
although
the
taxpayer
had
not
claimed
the
reserve,
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
the
taxpayer
cannot
be
precluded
from
appealing
the
nil
assessment
in
order
to
establish
and
exercise
an
existing
right
conferred
on
him
by
the
Act
because
it
might
be
of
great
importance
to
him
at
that
time
to
find
out
how
large
the
loss
is
which
he
may
apply
to
the
previous
or
future
years
or
how
great
a
reserve
he
has
to
account
for
in
future
years.
In
my
view
the
right
to
appeal
from
a
nil
assessment,
or
the
absence
of
such
a
right,
depends
entirely
on
the
facts
of
a
given
case.
The
facts
which
determined
the
outcome
in
the
case
of
Newfoundland
Mineral
Ltd
(supra)
were
obviously
considerably
different
from
those
in
the
case
at
bar.
In
the
present
case,
Antoine
Hullmann’s
rights
in
his
1964
nil
assessment
had
not,
in
my
opinion,
been
exhausted
and
I
allow
the
appeal
to
stand
for
that
year.
In
respect
of
the
1963
and
1965
nil
assessments,
Antoine
Hullmann
was
not
shown
as
having
any
remaining
statutory
rights
and
the
appeals
for
those
years
are
therefore
to
be
quashed
as
requested
by
the
respondent.
The
respondent’s
motion
is
allowed
in
part
and
the
appeal
in
respect
of
the
1963
and
1965
nil
assessments
is
quashed.
The
appeal
in
respect
of
the
1964
nil
assessment
is
to
be
decided
on
its
merits.
The
appeals
now
before
the
Board
in
respect
of
the
taxation
years
1964,
1966,
1967,
1968
and
1969
were
lodged
by
Antoine
Hullmann
and
Gabrielle
Hullmann.
The
principal
issue
in
these
appeals
is
to
determine
whether
the
sale
of
real
estate
was
the
realization
of
a
new
taxable
capital
gain
or
whether
the
properties
had
been
acquired
for
the
purpose
of
turning
them
into
account
and
whether
by
their
course
of
conduct
they
carried
on
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
The
relevant
facts
are
as
follows:
Antoine
Hullmann
immigrated
to
Canada
in
1959
and
proceeded
to
buy
four
rooming
houses—two
on
Admiral
Road,
one
on
Kendal
Road
and
one
on
Marlborough
Avenue
in
Toronto.
In
1960
the
appellant
bought
a
50-unit
apartment
building
at
77
Spencer
Avenue.
In
1962
Gabrielle
Hullmann
arrived
in
Canada
from
Switzerland
and
both
she
and
Antoine
Hullmann
moved
into
the
77
Spencer
Avenue
Building.
At
that
time
the
rooming
houses,
except
the
one
at
145
Marlborough
Avenue,
were
sold.
In
1964
the
appellants
sold
the
Spencer
Avenue
apartment
and
bought
a
108-unit
apartment
building
on
Jameson
Avenue,
Toronto.
The
sale
of
one
building
and
the
purchase
of
the
other
were
transacted
on
the
same
day
by
the
same
real
estate
agent
and
can
be
considered
as
a
“switch”
in
which
the
amount
derived
from
the
sale
of
one
building
went
to
pay
for
the
purchase
of
the
other.
In
1966
and
1967
Gabrielle
Hullmann
became
ill
and
returned
temporarily
to
Switzerland.
There
is
on
record
a
medical
certificate
dated
in
1972
declaring
that
Gabrielle
Hullmann
was
ill.
In
1966
Antoine
Hullmann,
Gabrielle
Hullmann
and
a
Mr
Zlamour
bought
property
on
York
Street
which
was
sold
again
in
1970
at
a
profit
of
$90,000.
The
appellant
also
bought
land
in
Oshawa
in
that
year.
Expropriation
proceedings
were
commenced
in
1970.
In
1967
Antoine
Hullmann,
in
partnership
with
Gabrielle
Hullmann
and
a
Mr
Salamin,
acquired
properties
on
Gowan
Avenue
and
Richview
Side
Road,
both
of
which
were
subsequently
sold.
In
1968
the
Jameson
apartment
building
was
sold
and
Antoine
Hullmann
and
Gabrielle
Hullmann
incorporated
Fornet
Limited—each
holding
50%
of
the
shares.
Fornet
Limited
purchased
land
in
Kitchener
and
Pickering
which
sold
at
a
profit.
In
the
same
year
Antoine
Hullmann
and
Gabrielle
Hullmann
acquired
a
2/3
interest
in
Hulad
Developments
which
owned
land
in
Acton.
The
issue
to
be
decided
is
one
of
facts
and
these
facts
must
be
appreciated
in
their
entirety.
I
do
not
consider
that
telescoping
the
facts
on
the
two
transactions
involving
the
apartment
building
properties
on
Spencer
Avenue
and
Jameson
Avenue
to
the
exclusion
of
the
other
facts
of
the
case
is
a
fair
representation
of
the
activities
of
Antoine
and
Gabrielle
Hullmann
since
1959.
From
the
purchase
of
the
rooming
houses
and
their
sale,
the
purchase
of
the
apartment
buildings
on
Spencer
Avenue
and
Jameson
Avenue,
the
purchase
and
sale
of
land
on
York
Street,
Oshawa,
the
acquisition
and
sale
of
the
Gowan
Avenue
and
Richview
Side
Road
properties,
the
incorporation
of
Fornet
and
the
partnership
in
Hulad,
all
form
part
of
a
consistent
pattern
or
scheme
of
trading
in
lands
and
buildings
without
there
being
any
valid
indication
that
the
acquisition
of
any
of
these
properties,
including
the
apartment
buildings
on
Spencer
Avenue
and
Jameson
Avenue,
were
acquired
for
long-term
investments.
From
the
evidence
adduced
in
these
appeals,
I
conclude
that
Antoine
and
Gabrielle
Hullmann
acquired
the
properties
which
are
the
subject
matter
under
consideration
for
the
purpose
of
resale
and
not
for
a
long-term
investment,
that
their
conduct
in
these
transactions
was
that
of
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
and
that
the
profits
realized
from
the
sales
of
these
properties
were
properly
included
in
the
income
of
Antoine
and
Gabrielle
Hullmann
for
the
1964,
1966,
1967,
1968
and
1969
taxation
years.
The
appeal
of
Antoine
Hullmann
is
therefore
dismissed.
For
the
reasons
given
in
my
decision
re
Antoine
Hullmann,
the
appeal
of
Gabrielle
Hullmann
in
respect
of
the
1964,
1966,
1967
and
1968
taxation
years
is
dismissed.
As
to
the
appeal
in
respect
of
Gabrielle
Hullmann’s
1969
taxation
year,
it
has
neither
been
shown
nor
argued
that
Gabrielle
Hullmann
had
an
interest
at
stake
in
appealing
this
nil
assessment,
and
for
that
reason
and
the
reasons
set
out
above,
the
appeal
for
1969
is
quashed.
Appeals
quashed
in
part,
dismissed
in
part.