Mahoney,
J:—The
trials
of
these
causes
were,
by
consent,
conducted
jointly
in
Toronto,
on
October
11
and
12,
1973.
On
or
about
September
1,
1966
the
plaintiffs,
each
as
to
an
undivided
25%,
and
a
friend,
Gerardo
Fiorini,
as
to
an
undivided
50%,
as
tenants
in
common,
acquired
a
farm
property
of
about
100
acres
for
a
consideration
of
$70,000
of
which
$30,000
was
paid
in
cash.
The
property
was
located
in
Pickering
Township
east
of
Metropolitan
Toronto.
Fiorini,
an
acknowledged
trader
in
real
estate,
found
the
Pickering
property
and
invited
the
plaintiffs
to
join
him
in
its
acquisition.
The
plaintiffs
are
husband
and
wife,
residing
together
in
Toronto.
They
met
shortly
after
the
plaintiff
Armand
Boccia
came
to
Canada
prior
to
World
War
II,
were
married
during
the
war
and
have
together,
through
a
company,
Armand
Construction,
been
engaged
in
the
custom
house-building
business
in
Metropolitan
Toronto
since
their
marriage.
While
Armand
Boccia
was
the
operating
head
of
Armand
Construction,
Numisia
Boccia
played
an
active
part,
making
up
the
payrolls,
paying
the
bills
and
keeping
the
financial
records
up
to
the
point
they
were
turned
over
to
outside
accountants
for
preparation
of
statements
and
so
on.
I
will
refer
later
to
a
number
of
real
estate
transactions,
other
than
the
purchase
of
the
Pickering
property.
There
is
evidence
that
the
plaintiffs
shared
equally
in
some
of
these
transactions;
there
is
no
evidence
that
they
did
not
share
equally
in
all
of
them.
The
money
which
Numisia
Boccia
used
to
purchase
her
share
of
the
Pickering
property
was
accumulated
to
her
credit
by
Armand
Construction
for
services
rendered
to
it
over
the
years.
I
must,
at
the
outset,
reject
the
plaintiffs’
submission
that
the
circumstances
are
such
that
I
could
reasonably
reach
a
different
conclusion
in
each
of
these
cases.
The
plaintiffs
and
Fiorini
all
testified
that
they
acquired
the
property
as
the
site
for
retirement
and
recreational
homes.
In
the
case
of
the
plaintiff
Armand
Boccia,
whose
health
had
been
making
it
difficult
for
him
to
carry
on
his
house-building
activity,
there
was
also
the
stated
intention
to
establish
and
operate
a
cherry
orchard,
a
pursuit
in
which
his
family
had
engaged
commercially
in
Italy
and
which
he
pursues
as
a
hobby
at
his
Toronto
home.
To
these
ends,
the
plaintiff
Armand
Boccia
planted
twelve
sapling
cherry
trees
(Exhibit
A-6)
to
test
the
suitability
of
the
property
for
a
cherry
orchard.
The
trees
were
planted
along
the
driveway
leading
to
an
existing
house.
It
is
not
clear
when
the
planting
took
place.
However,
it
seems
that
some
6
to
8
years
from
planting
would
pass
before
the
trees
produce
fruit.
Further,
the
Boccias
and
Fiorinis
agreed
upon
the
plan
for
the
recreational
and
retirement
home
that
would
eventually
be
built
for
each
family
(Exhibit
A-1).
The
plan
was
one
of
a
custom
home
built
for
a
third
party
by
the
plaintiffs
in
the
course
of
their
business
some
years
previously.
The
Fiorinis
liked
it
too
and
it
was
agreed
that
identical
structures
be
built
as
and
when
the
time
came.
These
recreational
and
retirement
homes
were
to
be
4-bedroom
bungalows
of
some
2,300
square
feet,
exclusive
of
the
attached
double
garage,
on
the
ground
floor
with
full
basements.
The
plaintiffs’
reason
for
deferring
execution
of
their
plans
was
the
wish
to
remain
in
their
present
home
until
their
youngest
child
finished
high
school.
During
the
period
they
owned
it,
the
plaintiffs
and
Fiorini
rented
the
Pickering
property
for
$100
per
month
to
a
tenant
who
lived
on
it
and
kept
the
weeds
down.
It
was
not
otherwise
used
and
the
only
activity
conducted
on
it
by
the
plaintiffs
was
the
planting
of
the
twelve
cherry
trees.
Sometime
during
1968,
offers
for
the
property,
apparently
solicited
by
Fiorini,
started
to
come
in.
The
plaintiffs
cannot
remember
the
details
of
any
of
these,
except
two,
but
say
that
a
number
were
received
by
Fiorini
who
passed
them
on
to
the
plaintiffs
who
declined
to
accept
them
because
of
their
determination
to
use
the
property
for
the
cherry
orchard
and
retirement
home.
The
first
offer
of
which
details
are
recalled
was
for
$249,600,
dated
September
26,
1968
(Exhibit
A-2).
This
came
through
a
real
estate
firm
with
which
Fiorini’s
son
was
associated.
It
was
suggested
that
alterations
to
this
form
constituted
a
separate
offer.
However,
it
would
appear
that
the
alterations,
which
increased
the
price
to
$338,000,
were
made
by
Fiorini
and
constituted
an
offer
by
Fiorini
to
sell
rather
than
a
new
offer
by
the
prospective
purchaser.
In
any
case,
the
plaintiffs
did
not
accept
the
offer
and
there
is
no
evidence
that
Fiorini’s
offer
was
made
with
their
approval.
The
second
offer
of
which
details
are
recalled,
dated
April
2,
1969,
based
on
an
estimated
area
of
104
acres
was
for
$390,000
(Exhibit
A-3)
payable
by
a
$5,000
deposit;
$75,000
cash
on
closing;
approximately
$37,200
by
assumption
of
the
existing
first
mortgage
and
the
balance
by
the
vendors
accepting
a
second
mortgage.
This
offer
was
accepted.
The
subsequent
survey
resulted
in
an
adjustment
of
the
purchase
price
to
$368,700,
the
first
mortgage
was
$36,400
and
the
vendors
accepted
a
second
mortgage
of
$252,310
at
7
/
for
a
term
of
ten
years.
The
second
mortgage
provided
for
partial
discharges
in
the
event
of
subdivision.
The
plaintiffs’
evidence
is
that
they
were
extremely
disappointed
at
feeling
obliged
to
yield
to
Fiorini’s
pressure
to
sell
the
Pickering
property.
In
explaining
their
reasons
for
finally
yielding
to
that
pressure,
the
plaintiffs
both
state
that
it
would
have
been
far
beyond
their
means
to
buy
out
the
Fiorini
interest
at
that
price
and
on
those
terms.
Numisia
Boccia
said
that
they
yielded
to
Fiorini’s
pressure
to
sell
only
after
the
illness
of
Fiorini’s
wife
led
to
Fiorini
being
obliged
to
abandon
his
plan
to
use
the
Pickering
property
as
a
retirement
home.
Armand
Boccia
simply
said
that
they
had
yielded
to
Fiorini’s
pressure
being
anxious
to
preserve
their
long
standing
friendship..
Fiorini
himself
did
not
cite
his
wife’s
illness
as
a
reason
but
said,
in
effect,
that
the
offers,
which
got
progressively
better,
were
too
good
to
turn
down.
The
plaintiff
Armand
Boccia,
still
interested
in
establishing
a
retirement
home,
found
another
suitable
piece
of
property,
some
92
acres,
in
Markham
Township,
northeast
of
Metropolitan
Toronto
and
told
his
friend
Fiorini
about
it.
Fiorini
made
an
offer
of
$252,000
for
the
Markham
property
on
May
14,
1969.
As
agreed
on
the
following
day,
the
purchase
price
was
payable
by
a
$10,000
deposit;
$127,000
cash
on
closing;
$35,500
by
assumption
of
an
existing
first
mortgage
and
$61,500
by
assumption
of
an
existing
second
mortgage.
In
the
result,
the
plaintiffs,
each
as
to
an
undivided
one-sixth
interest,
Fiorini
and
a
third
party,
each
as
to
an
undivided
one-third
interest,
became
owners
of
the
Markham
property.
Again
it
was
a
tenancy
in
common.
On
May
20,
1971
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
both
plaintiffs
as
to
their
1969
income
by
adding
thereto
each
plaintiff’s
share
of
the
net
profit
on
the
sale
of
the
Pickering
property.
The
amount
of
the
reassessment
is
not
in
dispute
in
these
appeals.
During
the
summer
of
1971
Armand
Boccia
raised
for
the
first
time
with
the
other
owners
the
question
of
subdividing
the
Markham
property
so
that
the
plaintiffs
would
not
again
be
frustrated
in
their
desire
to
establish
a
retirement
home
by
pressure
from
their
co-owners.
The
plaintiffs
did
not
pursue
this
because
of
practical
difficulties
including
the
necessity
of
either
paying
off
or
renegotiating
the
existing
mortgages.
The
plaintiffs
had,
in
being
forced
to
sell
the
Pickering
property,
a
practical
demonstration
of
the
problems
that
could
confront
them
and
confound
their
plans
in
a
tenancy
in
common.
Further,
in
selling
that
property,
their
purchasers
had
flagged
for
them
the
possibility
of
at
least
providing
for
partial
discharges
in
certain
circumstances.
Yet,
within
six
weeks,
in
acquiring
yet
another
property
for
a
retirement
home,
they
locked
themselves
into
another
tenancy
in
common
with
a
total
stranger
and
the
co-owner
who
had
pressured
them
into
giving
up
the
Pickering
property
and
into
a
mortgage
that
precluded,
in
a
practical
sense,
severance
of
the
site
for
their
new
retirement
home
from
the
total
Markham
property.
I
find
it
hard
to
accept
the
plaintiffs’
assertion
that
they
had
no
other
reason
for
acquiring
their
interest
in
the
Markham
property
than
to
replace
the
retirement
home
site
lost
to
them
when
they
yielded
to
Fiorini’s
pressure
to
sell
the
Pickering
property.
I
have
equal
difficulty
in
accepting
the
proposition
that
the
planting
of
the
twelve
cherry
trees
was
material
to
the
eventual
establishment
of
an.
orchard
on
the
Pickering
property.
A
100
acre
cherry
orchard
is
a
substantial
undertaking
and
its
operation
may
or
may
not
be
a
suitable
activity
for
a
man
retiring
from
house
building
because
of
health.
It
is
questionable
that
the
planting
of
these
trees
along
the
driveway
will
prove
much
about
the
rest
of
the
property.
There
is
no
doubt,
however.
that
it
would
take
several
years
for
the
test
saplings
to
prove
themselves
and,
assuming
they
did,
several
more
years
before
the
newly
planted
orchard
would
produce.
The
orchard
could
not
have
been
in
production
for
many
years
after
graduation
of
the
plaintiffs’
youngest
child
from
high
school;
indeed
it
appears
that
the
test
program
would
not
have
been
completed
by
that
time.
Yet
completion
of
high
school
by
that
child
was
the
only
reason
given
for
deferring
development
of
the
Pickering
property.
In
addition
to
the
subsequent
acquisition
of
the
interests
in
the
Markham
property,
it
was
established
that
the
plaintiffs,
in
the
course
of
their
custom
house-building
business,
had
purchased,
built
on
and
sold,
one
to
three
lots
per
year
for
a
number
of
years.
They
also,
during
the
relevant
period,
have
held
a
fairly
substantial
mortgage
on
a
property
on
Avenue
Road
in
Toronto.
There
is
no
evidence
before
me
as
to
the
circumstances
under
which
the
plaintiffs
acquired
this
mortgage.
Subsequent
to
the
acquisition
of
the
Pickering
property,
some
cottage
lots
on
Georgian
Bay
and
a
20%
interest
in
50
acres
of
land
in
Mississauga,
west
of
Metropolitan
Toronto,
were
acquired.
The
issue
raised
in
these
cases
is
the
plaintiffs’
intention
at
the
time
they
acquired
their
interest
in
the
Pickering
property.
I
have
already
indicated
that
I
do
not
feel
in
the
circumstances
that
I
can
come
to
a
different
conclusion
in
each
case.
I
do
not
regard
the
fact
that
the
plaintiffs
had,
over
the
years,
engaged
in
the
custom
house-building
business
as
material.
Nor,
in
the
absence
of
evidence
as
to
the
circumstances
under
which
they
acquired
the
Avenue
Road
mortgage,
can
I
regard
the
ownership
of
that
asset
as
being
material.
On
the
other
hand,
I
am
satisfied
that,
as
a
result
of
a
series
of
transactions,
unrelated
to
their
custom
house
building
business,
the
plaintiffs
are
today
engaged
n
trading
in
land
and
interests
in
land
as
a
business
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
139(1
)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
question
is
whether
or
not
they
were
so
engaged
when
they
acquired
their
interest
in
the
Pickering
property.
I
am
satisfied
that
they
were.
While
there
is
no
satisfactory
evidence
before
me
that
would
relate
that
acquisition
to
the
plaintiff’s
previous
business
activities,
there
is
equally
no
satisfactory
evidence
that
would
divorce
it
from
their
subsequent
business
activities.
Indeed
the
weight
of
evidence
before
me
is
very
much
the
other
way.
The
appeals
are
dismissed
with
costs.