Bélanger,
J.*—The
Court,
having
heard
the
parties
through
their
respective
attorneys,
on
the
merits
of
the
present
case,
having
examined
the
proceedings,
the
exhibits
filed,
the
evidence
adduced
and
on
the
whole
deliberated:
Plaintiff
instituted
her
action
personally
and
as
universal
legatee
and
executrix
of
the
will
of
her
late
husband,
John
H
Jackson,
who
died
on
November
11,
1969,
while
domiciled
in
the
Province
of
Quebec,
in
an
airplane
accident,
while
he
was
employed
by
a
joint
venture
called
“Acres-Canadian
Bechtel
of
Churchill
Falls’.
The
above
facts
are
not
contested
by
defendant
who
also
admitted
the
probate
copy
of
the
last
will
and
testament
of
the
late
John
H
Jackson
filed
as
Exhibit
F-1,
together
with
the
following
allegations
of
plaintiff’s
declaration:
The
Defendant,
through
the
Department
of
Revenue,
assessed
Quebec
succession
duties
on,
amongst
other
property,
an
amount
of
$25,000
being
the
proceeds
of
London
Life
Insurance
Company
Policy
No.
3728613-8.
8.
The
Defendant,
through
the
Department
of
Revenue,
also
assessed
Quebec
succession
duties
on
an
amount
of
$125,000,.
being
a
sum
payable
in
virtue
of
The
Insurance
Company
of
North
America’s
Group
Policy
ABL
604080/OK
2997.
9.
The
said
policy
is
an
accident
policy,
which
provides
for
payments
of
certain
amounts
for
certain
types
of
accidents,
including
death.
A
certified
copy
of
the
said
policy
(in
two
separate
parts)
is
filed
herewith
as
Exhibit
-2.
11.
All
Quebec
Succession
duties
assessed
In
respect
of
the
late
John
H.
Jackson
have
been
paid
(with
interest
from
and
after
May
11,
1970)
but
under
protest
and
under
reserve
of
the
right
to
sue
for
recovery
thereof.
Claiming
that
the
proceeds
of
the
above
insurance
policies
should
not
have
been
assessed
and
that
she
made
an
overpayment
in
the
amount
of
$26,722.98,
plaintiff
concludes
as
follows:
WHEREFORE
PLAINTIFF
PRAYS
FOR
JUDGMENT:
(a)
Declaring
the
Quebec
succession
duties
assessment
in
respect
of
the
estate
of
the
late
John
H.
Jackson
incorrect
and
invalid
to
the
extent
that
it
imposes
duty
on
the
following,
namely:
—
London
Life
Insurance
Company,
Policy
No.
3728613-8—Amount
$25,000
—
Insurance
Company
of
North
America,
Group
Policy
ABL
604080/OK
2997—Amount
$125,000;
and
(b)
Ordering
the
Defendant
to
reimburse
to
Plaintiff
the
sum
of
$26,722.98.
The
whole
with
interest
from
May
11,
1970
and
costs.
In
his
contestation,
defendant
admits
that
the
London
Life
Insurance
Company
policy
number
3728613-8
was
applied
for
by
plaintiff
but
denies
that
she
personally
paid
and
bore
the
premiums,
alleging
that
the
deceased
paid
for
same.
With
regard
to
the
assessment
of
the
proceeds
in
the
amount
of
$125,000
of
the
group
insurance
policy,
defendant
alleges
the
following:
3.
Le
produit
de
la
police
d’assurance
désignée
au
paragraphe
8
de
la
déclaration
sous
le
numéro
ABL-604080/OK
2997
a
été
inclus
de
bon
droit
dans
l’actif
de
succession
John
H.
Jackson
puisqu'il
s’agit
du
produit
d’une
police
d’assurance
payable
à
la
mort
de
la
personne
sur
la
tête
de
qui
la
police
a
été
contractée.
In
conclusion,
defendant
prays
for
the
dismissal
of
the
action
with
costs.
In
the
answer
to
plea
of
plaintiff
there
are
no
new
allegations
of
facts.
At
the
trial,
no
evidence
was
presented
because
a
settlement
had
already
been
reached
between
the
parties
with
regard
to
the
proceeds
of
the
London
Life
policy
and
because
all
the
facts
required
to
render
judgment
on
the
proceeds
of
the
group
policy
were
uncontested
and
already
in
the
file.
With
regard
to
the
assessment
of
the
proceeds
of
the
London
Life
Insurance
Company
policy
number
3728613-8,
in
the
amount
of
$25,000,
the
following
settlement
was
confirmed
by
the
parties
in
Court:
it
was
acknowledged
that
three-quarters
of
the
premiums
of
the
said
policy
had
been
paid
and
borne
by
the
plaintiff
who
was
therefore
entitled
to
the
exemption
found
in
the
second
paragraph
of
subsection
26(1)
of
the
Succession
Duties
Act,
RSQ
1964,
c
70;
consequently,
the
parties
confirmed
that
judgment
should
be
rendered
confirming:the
settlement
and
ordering
defendant
to
reassess
the
estate
of
the
late
John
H
Jackson
by
deleting
from
the
dutiable
assets
and
from
the
aggregate
value
three-
quarters
of
the
said
amount
of
$25,000,
being
$18,750,
and
to
make
the
appropriate
refund
of
overpaid
succession
duties.
Both
parties
also
confirmed
the
agreement
reached
between
them
to
the
effect
that
judgment
should
be
rendered
each
party
paying
its
own
costs,
whatever
the
conclusions
reached
by
the
Court.
The
remaining
issue
therefore
concerns
the
sum
of
$125,000
paid
by
Life
Insurance
Company
of
North
America
in
virtue
of
its
group
policy,
filed
by
plaintiff
as
Exhibit
P-2,
in
two
separate
parts
bearing
respectively
numbers
ABL-604080
and
OK-2997.
For
more
conciseness,
both
parts
forming
Exhibit
P-2
shall
be
referred
to
as
the
“group
policy”
whenever
it
is
not
necessary
to
refer
to
one
of
the
parts
separately.
In
the
group
policy,
the
insurer
is
mentioned
under
the
name.
of
“Life
Insurance
Company
of
North
America”.
The
policyholder
is
mentioned
as
“Bechtel
Corporation
and
Affiliated
Interests’.
The
insurance
is
effective
on
a
term
basis
and
the
insured
are
the
persons
falling
under
the
descriptions
to
be
found
in
several
schedules
attached
to
and
forming
part
of
the
policy.
It
is
not
contested
that
plaintiff’s
late
husband
was
one
of
the
insured
to
whom
the
insurance
applied
under
the
group
policy.
For
the
purposes
of
this
case,
the
following
excerpt
from
part
number
ABL-604080,
starting
at
page
one,
is
of
special
interest:
5.
Scope
of
the
Insurance
Subject
to
all
of
the
Exclusions,
Provisions
and
other
terms
of
this
policy,
the
Company
hereby
insures
the
persons
described
in
Schedule
1,
each
herein
called
the
Insured,
against
loss
resulting
directly
and
independently
of
all
other
causes
from
accidental
bodily
injuries
which
arise
out
of
the
hazards
described
in
Schedule
II
and
are
sustained
by
the
Insured
during
the
term
of
this
policy,
herein
called
such
injuries,
to
the
extent
hereinafter
provided.
If
within
one
year
from
the
date
of
accident
such
injuries
shall
result
In
death
of
the
Insured,
dismemberment
or
loss
of
sight,
the
Company
will
pay
for
Loss
of
Life
or
Two
or
more
members
The
Principal
Sum;
Loss
of
One
member
One-half
the
Principal
Sum.
Such
payment
shall
be
in
addition
to
any
other
indemnity
payable
to
the
date
of
loss,
but
only
one
amount,
the
larger
applicable
amount
shall
be
payable
for
all
such
losses
resulting
from
one
accident.
The
“Principal
Sum”
is
the
amount
specified
as
such
in
Schedule
I.
“Member”
shall
mean
a
hand,
foot
or
eye.
“Loss”
shall
mean,
with
respect
to
hands
and
feet,
actual
severance
through
or
above
wrist
or
ankle
joints;
with
respect
to
eyes,
entire
and
irrecoverable
loss
of
sight.
Immediately
after,
the
insurer
proceeds
to
define
what
is
called
“coverage
B”
for
permanent
total
disability;
then
the
hazards
from
which
the
accidental
bodily
injuries
must
arise
for
the
loss
to
be
covered
are
described
in
Schedules
Il
A,
B
and
C
which
form
part
of
the
policy.
In
part
number
OK-2997
of
the
group
policy,
the
insurer
agrees
with
the
policyholder
‘‘to
insure
such
eligible
persons
who
are
identified
on
the
Schedule
of
Insureds
of
this
policy,
herein
called
the
Insured,
against
specified
loss
described
in
the
Description
of
Coverage
resulting
directly
and
independently
of
all
other
causes
from
bodily
injuries
caused
by
accident
occurring
while
this
policy
is
in
force,
herein
called
such
injuries”.
The
following
excerpt
is
from
the
“description
of
coverage”
forming
part
of
the
policy:
DESCRIPTION
OF
COVERAGE
Coverage
A
—
Loss
of
Life,
Limb
or
Sight
Indemnity:
If
such
injuries
shall
result
in
any
one
of
the
following
specific
losses
within
one
year
from
the
date
of
accident,
the
Company
will
pay
the
benefit
specified
as
applicable
thereto,
based
upon
the
Principal
Sum
stated
in
the
Policy
Schedule;
provided,
however,
that
no
more
than
one
(the
largest)
of
such
benefits
shall
be
paid
with
respect
to
injuries
resulting
from
one
accident.
LOSS
of
life
The
Principal
Sum
Loss
of
two
or
more
members
The
Principal
Sum
Loss
of
one
member
One-Half
The
Principal
Sum
Loss
of
thumb
and
index
finger
of
the
same
hand
One-Quarter
The
Principal
Sum
After
the
above
coverage
A,
permanent
total
disability
is
defined
under
the
title
“coverage
B”
substantially
in
the
same
terms
as
in
the
first
part.
From
the
above,
one
cannot
escape
the
conclusion
that
it
is
accident
insurance
which
is
underwritten
in
the
group
policy.
The
fundamental
condition
before
any
right
whatever
can
be
considered
as
flowing
from
such
insurance
is
the
occurrence
of
one
of
the
hazards
described
in
the
group
policy
causing
accidental
bodily
injury.
Unlike
life
insurance,
loss
of
life
is
not
fundamentally
the
occurrence
from
which
the
right
of
the
insured
emanates
but
is
rather
the
happening
which
will
serve
to
establish
the
amount
of
the
indemnity.
In
other
words,
accidental
bodily
injuries
arising
out
of
the
hazards
described
in
the
group
policy
are
the
risks
or
perils
insured
against
and
it
is
the
amount
of
the
indemnity
which
will
depend
on
the
seriousness
of
the
injuries,
the
principal
sum
becoming
due
if
such
injuries
result
in
death
of
the
insured
within
one
year
from
the
date
of
the
accident.
Of
course,
it
is
recognized
that
life
insurance
may
also
be
a
contract
by
which
the
insurer
undertakes
to
pay
insurance
on
the
duration
of
the
life
of
a
designated
human
being,
after
the
expiration
of
a
certain
period
in
his
lifetime,
but
such
insurance
is
even
further
apart
from
the
insurance
described
in
the
group
policy.
Accident
insurance
and
life
insurance
are
different
in
many
respects,
some
of
which
are
described
in
the
following
citations:
Halsbury’s
Laws
of
England,
3rd
edition,
vol
22
at
page
293
(referring
to
personal
accident
insurance
in
paragraph
583):
It
resembles
life
insurance,
and
differs
from
other
types
of
insurance
in
that
it
is
not
a
contract
of
indemnity:
it
is
merely
a
contract
to
pay
a
sum
of
money
on
the
happening
of
a
specified
event,
namely
the
sustaining
by
the
assured
of
personal
injury
by
such
accidental
means
as
may
be
defined
in
the
policy.
The
event
may
involve
the
death
of
the
insured,
but
the
insurance
Is
not
for
that
reason
a
contract
of
life
insurance.
In
the
case
of
life
insurance,
the
assured
is
bound
to
die
some
day,
the
uncertainty
being
as
to
the
date
when
the
death
will
take
place.
In
the
case
of
personal
accident
‘Insurance,
on
the
other
hand,
no
accident
may
ever
happen;
and,
even
if
it
does,
there
is
no
certainty
that
it
will
result
in
death
or
disablement
to
the
assured.
Wyman,
Laws
of
Insurance,
page
278:
“Life
Insurance”
has
been
defined
by
statute
in
the
various
provinces
as
fa
contract
by
which
the
insurer
undertakes
with
the
insured
to
pay
insurance
money
contingently
on
the
death,
or
on
the
duration
of
the
life
of
a
designated
human
being”,
(a)
The
contract
is
not
one
of
indemnity
but
obligates
the
insurer
to
pay
a
sum
certain,
on
the
death
of
the
person
or
after
the
expiration
of
a
certain
period
in
his
lifetime.
The
consideration
is
the
payment
of
certain
periodic
installments
called
premiums
(b).
The
contract
is
evidenced
by
a
document
called
a
policy.
Though
it
has
been
argued
that
the
contract
is
an
annual
one
renewed
from
year
to
year
the
weight
of
authority
is
that
the
contract
is
entire
and
indivisible
and
the
periodic
payments
of
premium
do
not
represent
any
particular
portion
of
the
moneys
accruing
due
under
the
contract.
The
above
comments
are
substantially
in
conformity
with
Article
2589
of
our
Civil
Code
reading
as
follows:
2589.
In
life
insurance
the
sum
insured
may
be
made
payable
upon
the
death
of
the
person
upon
whose
life
it
is
effected;
or
upon
his
surviving
a
specified
period,
or
periodically
so
long
as
he
shall
live,
or
otherwise
contingent
upon
the
continuance
or
determination
of
life.
It
is
apparent
that
the
premium
for
protection
during
a
specified
period
of
time
against
an
accident
which
may
never
occur,
is
not
to
be
calculated
on
the
same
basis
as
the
premium
in
life
insurance,
the
contract
being
entire
and
indivisible
and
the
assured
being
bound
to
die
some
day.
One
should
note
also
that,
in
accident
insurance,
the
insurance
purchasing
value
of
the
premium
is
completely
exhausted
at
the
end
of
the
specified
protection
period,
which
is
not
the
case
in
life
insurance,
with
the
consequence
that
the
estate
of
the
insured
is
affected
differently.
Laverty,
The
Insurance
Law
of
Canada,
page
412:
Life
Insurance
and
its
Relation
to
Accident
Insurance
The
basic
distinction
between
a
life
and
an
accident
policy
lies
in
the
fact
that
almost
invariably
a
straight
life
policy
is
not
an
insurance
for
a
single
year
with
a
privilege
of
renewal
from
year
to
year
by
paying
the
annual
premium,
but
is
an
entire
contract
of
insurance
for
life,
subject
to
discontinuance
and
forfeiture
for
non-payment
of
any
of
the
stipulated
premiums;
whereas
accident
insurance
is
invariably
from
year
to
year
or
for
a
voyage,
and
when
a
time
policy,
it
can
be
discontinued
by
either
party
at
the
end
of
the
period
contracted
for—usually
one
year.
It
has
been
held
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
that
“accident
insurance”
is
not
insurance
of
the
character
embraced
in
the
term
“insurance
on
life”
contained
in
an
application.
For
a
number
of
years
the
legislative
power
of
this
province
has
considered
accident
insurance
and
life
insurance
as
two
distinct
classes
of
insurance
while
enumerating
the
different
classes
of
insurance
which
a
company
may
be
incorporated
to
transact:
Insurance
Act,
RSQ
1964,
c
295,
subsection
8(1):
8.
(1)
A
company
may
be
incorporated
under
the
preceding
sections
of
this
division
for
the
purpose
of
transacting
the
following
classes
of
insurance
and
reinsurance
subject
to
and
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
this
act,
provided,
however,
that
no
company
may
be
incorporated
under
this
act
to
transact
both
fire
insurance
and
life
insurance:
Accident,
automobile,
aviation,
larceny,
housebreaking
or
burglary,
credit,
explosion,
fire,
forgery,
guarantee,
hail,
industrial,
inland
marine,
inland
transportation,
life,
livestock,
ocean
marine,
plate
glass,
sickness,
sprinkler
leakage,
steam
boiler,
tornado,
weather
or
any
other
class
of
insurance
not
specially
provided
for
in
this
section.
The
proper
conclusion
is
that
the
amount
of
$125,000
paid
in
virtue
of
the
group
policy
became
payable
in
virtue
of
a
contract
of
accident
insurance.
In
his
plea,
defendant
alleged
that
the
above
amount
was
rightly
assessed
in
respect
of
the
estate
of
the
late
John
H
Jackson
as
the
proceeds
of
an
insurance
policy
due
by
reason
of
the
death
of
the
person
on
whose
life
the
insurance
was
effected.
Said
assessment
was
made
under
the
Succession
Duties
Act
of
this
province,
RSQ
1964,
c
70,
the
following
sections
of
which
were
particularly
referred
to:
2.
All
property,
moveable
or
immoveable,
the
ownership,
usufruct
or
enjoyment
whereof
is
transmitted
owing
to
death,
shall
be
liable
to
duties
calculated
upon
the
aggregate
value
of
the
property
transmitted,
at
the
rates
fixed
in
section
9.
4.
The
word
“property”
within
the
meaning
of
this
division
includes
all
property,
moveable
or
immoveable,
situate
within
the
Province,
and
all
debts
which
were
owing
to
the
deceased
at
the
time
of
his
death,
or
are
payable
by
reason
of
his
death,
and
which
are
either
payable
in
the
Province
or
are
due
by
a
debtor
domiciled
therein;
the
whole
whether
the
deceased
at
the
time
of
his
death
had
his
domicile
within
or
without
the
Province,
or
whether
the
transmission
takes
place
within
or
without
the
Province.
The
deceased’s
interest
in
an
insurance
contract
on
the
life
of
another
person
shall
be
property
within
the
meaning
of
this
act.
However,
the
sum
of
money
due
by
an
insurer
by
reason
of
the
death
of
an
insured
whose
domicile
is
not
in
this
Province
at
the
time
of
his
death
shall
not
be
deemed
to
be
property
situate
within
the
Province,
although
it
shall
be
included
in
the
aggregate
value
for
the
purpose
of
determining
the
rates
of
duties.
26.
Notwithstanding
any
provision
inconsistent
herewith,
the
proceeds
of
insurance
policies,
including
those
issued
or
appropriated
pursuant
to
the
Husbands
and
Parents
Life
insurance
Act
(Chap.
296),
due
by
an
insurer
by
reason
or
on
account
of
the
death
of
the
person
on
whose
life
the
insurance
was
effected,
shall
be
deemed
to
be
property
whereof
the
ownership,
usufruct
or
enjoyment
is
transmitted
owing
to
such
death
and
shall
be
subject
to
payment
of
the
duties
provided
for
by
section
9,
according
to
the
degree
of
relationship
which
existed
between
the
beneficiary
and
the
person
on
whose
life
the
insurance
was
effected,
even
when
the
latter
did
not
himself
take
out
the
insurance
or
pay
the
premiums
thereon.
However,
the
proportion
of
the
sums
payable
by
an
insurer,
corresponding
to
the
premiums
paid
by
the
beneficiary
thereof
personally
and
actually
borne
by
him,
as
compared
to
the
total
amount
of
premiums,
and
the
portion
of
the
said
sums
which
the
beneficiary
or
assignee
thereof
has
otherwise
acquired
for
full
valuable
consideration
shall
not
be
subject
to
the
duties
imposed
by
this
act
nor
included
in
the
aggregate
value.
Whenever,
after
the
insured’s
death,
the
beneficiary
of
an
insurance
shall
relinquish,
assign
or
transfer
gratuitously
the
entirety
or
part
of
his
rights
to
another
person,
the
latter
shall
be
considered
pro
tanto
as
the
direct
beneficiary
thereof
and
shall
be
liable
for
the
payment
of
the
duties
imposed
by
the
present
act.
The
whole
matter
is
really
governed
by
section
26
as
the
idemnity
paid
by
the
insurer
in
relation
with
the
death
of
the
de
cujus
can
only
be
part
of
the
property
transmitted
owing
to
his
death
if
deemed
to
be
so
in
virtue
of
section
26.
it
seems
clear
that,
before
the
death
of
the
insured,
the
insurance
indemnity
was
not
a
property
or
a
debt
included
in
his
estate,
which
could
then
be
transmitted,
unless
section
26
is
applicable
to
it.
Leaving
out
the
irrelevant
words,
the
text
to
be
interpreted
reads
as
follows:
“the
proceeds
of
insurance
policies
.
.
.
due
by
an
insurer
by
reason
or
on
account
of
the
death
of
the
person
on
whose
life
the
insurance
was
effected,
shall
be
deemed
to
be
property
whereof
the
ownership
.
.
.
is
transmitted
owing
to
such
death
.
.
.”
It
is
the
opinion
of
this
Court
that
the
indemnity
paid
in
virtue
of
the
group
policy
is
not
covered
by
the
above
fiction
of
law
for
two
reasons:
(a)
it
did
not
become
due
by
the
insurer
by
reason
or
on
account
of
the
death
of
the
insured
but
because
the
insured
“directly
and
independently
of
all
other
causes”
suffered
accidental
bodily
injuries
arising
out
of
the
hazards
described
in
the
policy
which
resulted
in
his
death;
as
already
mentioned,
the
accident
was
the
primordial
factor
creating
the
right;
(b)
the
insurance
in
question
was
not
effected
on
the
life
of
the
insured
but
on
the
risks
of
accidents
through
hazards
described
in
the
policy.
Nowhere
in
the
above
text
is
there
any
reference
to
accident
insurance
end
it
seems
to
this
Court
that
the
proceeds
of
such
insurance
could
not
be
considered
as
included
without
supplying
missing
words.
It
is
a
well
settled
rule
of
law
that
the
subject
is
not
to
be
taxed
unless
the
language
of
the
statute
clearly
imposes
the
obligation,
that
all
charges
upon
the
subject
must
be
imposed
by
clear
and
unambiguous
language.
This
language
musi
not
be
strained
in
order
to
tax
a
transaction
which,
had
the
legislature
thought
of
it,
would
have
been
covered
by
appropriate
words.
Maxwell
on
the
Interpretation
of
Statutes,
12th
edition,
page
256.
Defendant
stressed
the
fact
that
in
the
French
text
the
words
on
account
of
the
death
of
the
person
on
whose
life
the
insurance
was
effected”
were
translated
as
follows:
“à
l’occasion
du
décès
de
la
personne
sur
la
tête
de
qui
l’assurance
a
été
contractée”.
In
the
opinion
of
the
undersigned,
the
use
of
the
words
“la
tête”
instead
of
the
words
“the
life”
cannot
change
the
meaning
of
the
section
to
the
point
of
including
accident
insurance;
moreover,
in
the
Canadian
and
British
Insurance
Companies
Act,
RSC
1970,
c
1-15,
subsection
2(1),
under
the
term
“policy
in
Canada”,
with
respect
to
life
insurance,
the
terms
“a
policy
effected
upon
the
life
of
a
person”
are
translated
as
follows:
“une
police
souscrite
sur
la
tête
d’une
personne”.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
decided
that
accident
insurance
is
not
insurance
of
the
character
embraced
in
the
terms
“insurance
on
life”
and,
consequently,
that
an
applicant
for
life
insurance,
in
replying
to
questions
as
to
insurance
on
his
life
then
in
force,
committed
no
breach
of
warranty
in
not
referring
to
the
accident
insurance
policies
which
he
held:
Metropolitan
Life
Ins
Co
v
The
Montreal
Coal
and
Towing
Company,
35
SCR
266.
The
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
gave
its
interpretation
of
an
equivalent
provision,
subsection
3(4b)
of
the
Canada
Estate
Tax
Act,
SC
1958,
c
29,
expressed
partly
in
the
same
words.
The
provision
reads
as
follows
3.
(4b)
For
the
purposes
of
paragraph
(k)
of
subsection
(1),
any
amount
payable
in
respect
of
the
death
of
a
person
under
a
policy
of
insurance
(other
than
a
policy
of
insurance
owned
as
described
in
paragraph
(m)
of
subsection
(1))
under
which
any
life
insurance
was
effected
on
the
life
of
that
person
in
respect
of,
in
the
course
of
or
by
virtue
of
his
office
or
employment
or
former
office
or
employment
as
an
employee
of
any
other
person,
.
It
was
decided
that
the
above
text
could
not
be
interpreted
as
including
accident
insurance:
MNR
v
Estate
of
Sidney
William
Worsley,
[1966]
CTC
804;
67
DTC
5011.
Of
course,
the
words
“life
insurance”
are
mentioned
in
the
section
but
we
also
find
the
words
used
by
the
provincial
legislator
about
insurance
effected
on
the
life
of
a
person.
In
the
federal
section,
there
are
more
reasons
to
exclude
accident
insurance
from
the
provision;
yet
the
provincial
provision
is
a
“deeming
section”
enacted
to
create
a
fiction
of
law
and
its
text
cannot
be
interpreted
as
covering
accident
insurance
without
adding
words
which
were
not
provided
by
the
legislator.
It
is
not
the
function
of
the
Courts
to
supply
missing
words
in
a
statute,
especially
a
deeming
provision,
or
to
give
it
an
effect
that
cannot
be
plainly
gathered
from
the
words
actually
used.
The
conclusion
of
the
Court
therefore
is
that
the
proceeds
of
the
group
policy
are
not
to
be
deemed
to
be
property
whereof
the
ownership
is
transmitted
owing
to
the
death
of
the
insured
and
that,
consequently,
said
proceeds
were
not
dutiable
assets.
A
refund
of
the
duties
paid
in
relation
with
the
amount
of
$125,000
received
in
virtue
of
the
group
policy
should
therefore
be
made
by
defendant.
In
her
conclusions,
plaintiff
claims
interest
from
May
11,
1970
on
the
overpayment
of
duties
which
she
made.
She
is
not
entitled
to
such
interest
as
there
can
be
no
recovery
of
interest
against
the
Crown
unless
provided
by
contract
or
statute,
which
is
not
the
case
with
regard
to
the
present
claim:
The
King
v
Carroll,
[1948]
SCR
126;
The
King
v
Racetts,
[1948]
SCR
28;
Hochelama
Shipping
&
Towing
v
The
King,
[1944]
SCR
138;
Rolland
&
Trust
Général
v
The
King,
[1950]
CS
220.
However,
if
plaintiff
has
paid
interest
on
the
succession
duties
which
were
assessed,
she
is
entitled
to
an
appropriate
refund
of
said
interest
proportionate
to
the
duties
which
were
overpaid.
CONSIDERING
that
plaintiff
is
entitled
to.a
reassessment
of
the
estate
of
the
late
John
H
Jackson
by
deleting
from
the
dutiable
assets
and
from
the
aggregate
value:
(a)
an
amount
of
$18,750
representing
75%
of
the
proceeds
of
the
London
Life
Insurance
Company
policy
number
3728613-8;
(b)
an
amount
of
$125,000
representing
the
payment
made
by
Life
Insurance
Company
of
North
America
in
virtue
of
its
group
policy,
filed
by
plaintiff
as
Exhibit
P-2,
in
two
separate
parts
bearing
respectively
numbers
ABL-604080
and
OK-2997;
CONSIDERING
that
the
Quebec
succession
duties
assessment
already
made
in
respect
of
the
estate
of
the
late
John
H
Jackson
is
incorrect
and
invalid
to
the
extent
that
it
imposes
duty
on
the
assets
mentioned
in
the
preceding
paragraph;
CONSIDERING
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
a
refund
equivalent
to
the
difference
between
the
amount
of
the
succession
duties
and
interest
which
she
paid
in
virtue
of
the
incorrect
and
invalid
assessment
previously
made
and
the
amount
of
the
Quebec
succession
duties
with
interest
which
she
should
have
paid
at
the
time
if
the
assessment
had
been
made
without
including
75%
of
the
proceeds
of
the
London
Life
Insurance
Company
policy
and
the
total
proceeds
from
the
Life
Insurance
Company
of
North
America
group
policy;
CONSIDERING
that
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
no
interest
on
the
said
refund;
CONSIDERING
the
agreement
reached
between
the
parties
that
they
should
each
pay
their
own
costs.
DOTH
MAINTAIN
in
part
the
action
of
plaintiff;
DECLARE
that
the
Quebec
succession
duties
assessment
in
respect
of
the
estate
of
the
late
John
H
Jackson
is
incorrect
and
invalid
to
the
extent
that
it
imposes
duty
on
the
following,
namely:
London
Life
Insurance
Company,
policy
number
3728613-8—amount
$18,750
Life
Insurance
Company
of
North
America,
group
policy
ABL-604080/
OK-2997—amount
$125,000
ORDER
the
defendant
to
reimburse
to
plaintiff
an
amount
equivalent
to
the
difference
between
the
succession
duties
and
interest
paid
according
to
the
assessment
presently
declared
incorrect
and
invalid
and
the
amount
of
succession
duties
and
interest
which
should
have
been
paid
according
to
the
assessment
which
should
have
been
made
without
including
the
two
amounts
mentioned
in
the
previous
paragraph
in
the
dutiable
assets.
The
whole
without
interest
on
the
refund
and
each
party
paying
its
own
costs.
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