Collier,
J:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
taxpayer
from
the
Tax
Appeal
Board.
(now
the
Tax
Review
Board)
which
affirmed
a
reassessment
by
the
respondent
Minister
for
the
1963
taxation
year.
The
respondent
added
to
the
appellant’s
income
the
sums
of
$50,000.
and
$74,750.
The
latter
amount
arose
out
of
certain
transactions
in
the
shares
of
a
company
called
Jaton
Investments
Limited.
The
appeal
in
respect
of
that
portion
of
the
reassessment
has
been
abandoned
and
will
therefore
be
dismissed.
As
to
the
sum
of
$50,000,
the
appellant
asserts
it
was
not
income
but
arose
from
the
sale
of
a
capital
asset,
some
shares.
The
respondent,
on
the
other
hand,
contends
it
was
remuneration
for
services
rendered
to
certain
companies,
or
alternatively,
if
the
amount
was
received
on
the
sale
of
certain
shares,
it
was
income
from
a
business
and
taxable
accordingly.
I
have
set
out
the
respondent’s
position
as
stated
in
the
pleadings.
At
trial,
in
regard
to
the
alternative
argument,
counsel
contended
the
$50,000
was
a
profit
realized
from
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
The
facts.
The
appellant
is
a
successful
businessman.
His
initial
ventures
were
in
the
field
of
real
estate
and
development.
I
accept
his
testimony
that
in
the
summer
of
1962,
and
before,
he
wished
to
make
a
substantial
investment
in
something
outside
the
real
estate
field.
He
had
in
mind
a
public
company
and
his
plan
was
to
acquire
a
large
shareholding.
He
wished
to
participate
in
the
management
of
such
a
company
on
a
long-term
basis,
not
on
a
day
to
day
basis.
A
stock
underwriter
in
Toronto
brought
Milton
Brick
Co
Ltd
(hereafter
“Milton
Brick”)
to
his
attention.
As
the
name
indicates
it
was
in
the
business
of
manufacturing
bricks.
It
had
plans
to
open
a
block
plant
as
well.
Tanz
spoke
with
one
of
the
directors
and
presumably
made
some
inquiries
of
his
own.
He
felt
this
was
the
type
of
investment
he
had
been
looking
for.
The
director
indicated
that
if
an
offer
to
purchase
300,000
shares
at
$4
per
share
were
made,
it
would
be
favourably
received.
That
number
of
shares
gave
control
to
the
extent
of
approximately
60%.
At
that
time
the
appellant
could
not
invest
that
much
money.
He
thought
of
one
Jack
Blume,
whom
he
had
met
earlier
in
1962.
Blume
was
an
American
businessman
who
lived
in
New
York
but
had
an
Ontario
company,
Interworld
Development
and
Investment
Corporation
Limited
(hereafter
“Interworld”)
which
was
mainly
in
the
business
of
loaning
money
to
developers
and
contractors.
Tanz
testified
he
and
some
of
his
companies
were
and
had
been
borrowers
from
Interworld.
Perpetual
Investments
Limited
(hereafter
“Perpetual”)
was
one
of
the
companies.
Interworld
carried
on
business
from
an
office
in
a
suite
of
offices
where
Rose
&
Persiko,
a
firm
of
Toronto
solicitors,
carried
on
business.
That
firm
had
acted
for
Blume
and
Interworld
for
some
time.
They
had
also
acted
for
the
appellant
and
his
companies.
Jack
Blume
was
called
as
a
witness
on
behalf
of
the
respondent.
I
think
it
was
necessary
to
do
so
in
order
to
try
and
offset
the
thrust
of
the
evidence
given
by
the
appellant
and
his
witnesses.
Blume
denied
knowing
in
September
or
October
1962
that
Tanz
and
some
of
his
companies
were
borrowers
from
Interworld.
I
accept
the
evidence
of
the
appellant
and
the
other
witnesses
who
testified
to
the
contrary.
There
are
other
more
serious
conflicts
in
the
evidence.
The
testimony
of
Tanz,
and
of
the
solicitors
Allan
Rose
and
Bernard
Persiko,
on
many
matters,
is
the
opposite
of
the
testimony
given
by
Blume.
I
should
state
now,
before
further
reviewing
the
facts,
that
I
unhesitatingly
reject
the
testimony
of
Blume
where
it
is
in
conflict
with
that
of
the
other
witnesses.
Mr
Blume,
in
my
view,
showed
disregard
for
truth.
In
cross-examination
he
contradicted
himself
on
several
matters
and
in
some
instances
conceded
he
had
given
contrary
testimony
in
other
legal
proceedings.
I
do
not
understand
his
motivation,
but
it
was
obvious
to
me
that
his
unconcealed
antipathy
to
Tanz,
Rose
and
Persiko
has
somehow
persuaded
his
mind
to
believe
in
the
truth
of
what
his
tongue
said.
After
observing
his
manner
when
giving
evidence,
his
evasiveness
in
answering
direct
questions,
and
considering
the
contradictions
elicited,
I
cannot,
on
material
matters,
accept
anything
he
said.
I
resume
the
narrative.
Tanz
got
in
touch
with
Blume.
He
indicated
interest
and
came
to
Toronto.
They
visited
the
Milton
Brick
plant.
Tanz
said
he
and
Blume
agreed
to
purchase
150,000
shares
each
of
Milton
Brick
at
$4
per
share.
Tanz
intended
to,finance
his
investment
of
$600,000
through
his
bank
and
the
sale
of
his
equity
interest
in
two
shopping
centres.
Rose
and
Persiko
prepared
a
letter
of
intent
to
the
directors
of
Milton
Brick
which
was
submitted
on
September
19,
1962.
In
it,
Tanz
and
Blume
offered
to
purchase
not
less
than
300,000
shares
and
not
more
than
310,000
shares
at
$4
per
share.
The
directors
approved
this
offer
the
same
day.
The
closing
date
was
October
30
1962.
Tanz
testified
that
as
of
the
date
of
the
letter
of
intent
(September
19,
1962)
there
had
been
a
change
in
the
earlier
arrangement
between
himself
and
Blume.
Blume
wanted
Interworld
to
be
the
purchaser
of
the
shares
and
Tanz
to
purchase
50%
of
the
shares
of
Interworld.
There
was
a
meeting
with
chartered
accountants
on
October
2,
1962
and
the
arrangement
was
once
more
changed.
The
accountants
sent
a
letter
the
following
day
(Exhibit
5)
outlining
the
method
of
acquisition
of
the
shares:
1.
Interworld
would
obtain
an
interim
loan
from
the
bank
for
the
cost
of
the
shares.
2.
Interworld
would
then
pay
to
each
of
Blume
and
Tanz
an
amount
sufficient
to
buy
the
shares.
3.
Blume
and
Tanz
would
then
personally
buy
the
shares
with
the
funds
transferred
to
them.
4,
After
the
shares
were
acquired,
Tanz
and
Blume
would
sell
them
at
cost
to
Interworld
and
would
be
paid
in
preferred
shares
of
Interworld.
The
shareholders
responded
to
the
offer
and
310,000
shares
were
purchased.
I
accept
the
evidence
of
Tanz,
Rose,
and
Persiko
that
steps
1
to
3
were
carried
out,
but
step
4
was
not.
The
documents
filed
as
exhibits
corroborate
this
finding.
Blume
and
Tanz
became
the
equal
owners,
in
a
practical
and
legal
sense,
of
the
shares.
The
documents
in
connection
with
the
bank
financing
(Exhibits
1-3
and
10-16)
all
indicate
ownership
in
Blume
and
Tanz.
A
draft
agreement
was
prepared
by
the
solicitors
sometime
in
October
1962
(Exhibit
8)
but
was
never
signed
by
Blume
or
Tanz,
although
the
latter
testified
it
was
satisfactory
to
him.
It
is
predicated
on
personal
ownership
of
the
shares
by
Blume
and
Tanz.
The
draft
agreement
provided
for
Tanz
buying
a
50%
interest
in
Interworld,
$100,000
in
cash
and
the
balance
of
$400,000
by
the
sale
of
his
equities
in
some
shopping
centres.
Tanz’s
company
(Perpetual)
paid
$100,000
to
Interworld
on
October
18,
1962
(Exhibit
9)
on
the
basis
of
this
draft
agreement.
On
the
takeover
of
Milton
Brick
on
October
30,
1962
Blume
became
Chairman
of
the
Board
and
Chief
Executive
officer
and
Tanz
became
Executive
Vice-President
as
well
as
a
director.
After
the
closing
Tanz
pressed
Blume,
endeavouring
to
have
him
execute
the
agreements
prepared
by
the
solicitors.
Blume,
according
to
Tanz,
and
again
I
accept
the
latter’s
evidence,
delayed
and
seemed
to
be
worried
about
his
investment,
and
orally
persuaded
Tanz
to
agree
to
sell
Perpetual
to
Milton
Brick.
Nothing,
however,
was
drawn
up
or
signed.
Tanz
was
becoming
frustrated
for
two
reasons.
Firstly,
he
was
not
able
to
finalize
anything
with
Blume,
who
kept
suggesting
changes
of
some
kind,
and
no
documents
were
signed.
I
add
that
not
all
the
draft
agreements
drawn
from
October
to
January
23,
1963
(the
date
Blume
and
Tanz
concluded
their
association)
were
necessarily
produced
in
evidence.
Sometime
after
the
material
events
here,
there
was
a
fire
in
the
offices
of
the
solicitors
and
some
records
may
have
been
lost.
Secondly,
on
the
recommendation
of
Blume,
Milton
Brick
hired
a
man
named
Roberts
as
executive
assistant
to
Blume.
Roberts
came
to
Toronto
in
November.
Tanz
and
Roberts
could
not
get
along.
Tanz
felt
Roberts
was
hurting
the
operation,
that
he
was
Blume’s
man,
and
that
his
(Tanz’s)
relationship
with
Blume,
who
was
mostly
in
New
York,
was
deteriorating.
On
December
10,
1962
there
was
a
meeting
between
the
two.
Blume
had
brought
a
document
providing
for
the
transfer
of
the
Milton
shares
to
Interworld.
Tanz
signed
the
documents
but
later
that
evening
following
further
unsatisfactory
discussions,
it
was
agreed
the
documents
would
not
be
acted
upon
and,
in
fact,
were
never
acted
upon.
Tanz
was
leaving
on
a
holiday
in
December
and
a
pooling
agreement
in
respect
of
the
Milton
Brick
shares,
prepared
by
the
solicitors,
was
signed
by
Blume
and
Tanz
on
December
21,
1962
(Exhibit
20).
This
was
the
only
formal
agreement
ever
signed
by
the
two
protagonists
until
the
break-up
of
January
23,
1963.
The
agreement
asserts
that
the
two
individuals
jointly
own
approximately
320,000
shares
of
Milton
Brick.
It
was
to
be
replaced
by
a
formal
pooling
agreement
to
be
completed
in
the
early
part
of
January
1968.
In
the
first
part
of
January
1963
a
number
of
draft
agreements
were
prepared
on
the
instructions
of
Tanz
and
submitted
to
both
parties.
None
of
these
were
ever
signed.
Tanz
could
not
reach
Blume.
He
says,
and
I
believe
him,
he
was
becoming
more
frustrated
and
was
having
further
problems
with
Roberts.
As
a
result
of
information
given
to
him
by
one
of
the
directors
(now
deceased)
Tanz
demanded
a
meeting
with
Blume.
His
intention,
he
says,
was
to
buy
out
Blume’s
interest
in
Milton
Brick.
Blume’s
version,
which
I
do
not
accept,
is
that
the
arrangement
was,
from
the
inception
and
throughout,
that
Interworld
would
acquire
the
shares
and
that
Tanz
would
match
Blume’s
equity
in
Interworld.
He
endeavoured
to
put
the
blame
for
delay
in
finalizing
matters
at
the
feet
of
Tanz,
who
he
says,
endeavoured
to
change
arrangements
from
time
to
time.
He
said
Tanz
suggested
Milton
Brick
should
purchase
his
interest
in
Perpetual
and
another
company
Tanz
controlled.
Blume
says
these
were
the
companies
he
understood
Tanz
would
bring
into
Interworld.
Blume
said
that
by
January
23,
1963
he
was
totally
perplexed.
I
do
not
accept
his
evidence.
I
think
Blume
at
all
times
was
manoeuvring
to
acquire
somehow
control
of
the
Milton
Brick
shares
and
of
Tanz’s
equity
in
some
of
his
companies
through
Interworld.
I
suspect
his
evidence
is
now
tailored,
in
part
at
least,
to
lend
credence
to
his
claim
that
the
sum
of
$50,000
ultimately
paid
by
Interworld
to
Tanz,
or
some
portion
of
it,
is
deductible
as
an
expense
to
Interworld.
A
meeting
was
held
in
Interworld’s
office
in
Toronto
in
the
evening
of
June
23.
Present
were
the
appellant,
Blume
and
his
wife,
and
the
solicitors,
Rose
and
Persiko.
The
latter’s
secretary
was
in
and
out
of
the
meeting,
taking
notes
and
preparing
documents.
Tanz
complained
of
things
he
felt
were
wrong,
of
Robert’s
conduct,
of
Blume’s
actions,
vacillation
and
procrastination
and
of
what
he
felt
were
Blume’s
allegations
against
him
in
regard
to
the
development
of
the
block’
plant.
He
told
Blume
he
wanted
to
buy
Blume’s
shares
for
their
cost
plus
$75,000.
Blume
refused
and
said
he
would
buy
Tanz’s
shares
for
cost
plus
$10,000.
Tanz
refused.
Allegations
and
counter-allegations
were
made.
Tanz
then
decided
he
had
to
get
out
of
this
association.
He
invited
Blume
to
make
the
same
offer
he
(Tanz)
had
made
Blume.
A
further
stalemate
developed.
The
atmosphere
was
very
tense.
Finally,
Blume
and
Tanz
agreed
that
Rose
and
Persiko
would
act
as
arbitrators
as
to
what
Blume
should
pay
Tanz
over
cost
for
the
shares.
Rose
and
Persiko
went
to
an
adjoining
office,
subsequently
returned
to
the
meeting,
and
stated
they
felt
$50,000
over
cost
was
a
proper
figure.
Tanz
accepted
this
and
both
agreed
documents
should
be
signed
that
evening.
Rose
and
Persiko
corroborate
Tanz
as
to
the
details
of
what
happened
at
this
meeting.
I
have
shortened
the
details
in
my
finding
(supra).
It
was
a
lengthy
meeting,
hostile
and
electric
with
several
impasses,
until
the
sum
of
$50,000
was
accepted.
In
the
presence
of
Blume
and
Tanz,
and
with
suggestions
from
both
of
them,
Rose
dictated
the
documents
(Exhibits
27
and
27A-30)
to
Persiko’s
secretary.
By
Exhibit
27
Blume
purchased
all
of
Tanz’s
Milton
Brick
shares
for
$50,000.
Blume
assumed
all
liabilities
in
respect
of
their
earlier
joint
acquisition
of
the
shares.
These
were
set
out
in
a
schedule
(Exhibit
27A).
Blume
assumed
responsibility
for
the
bank
loan.
The
agreement
concluded
with
a
mutual
release.
Exhibit
28
was
an
agreement
between
Interworld
and
Tanz
providing
that
Tanz
and
his
companies
would,
within
15
days,
repay
all
indebtedness
to
Interworld.
Blume
signed
an
Interworld
cheque
to
Tanz
for
$50,000,
which
Tanz
endorsed
back,
to
be
applied
against
indebtedness
of
him
or
his
companies.
Tanz
signed
a
direction
to
the
bank
authorizing
it
to
transfer
the
Milton
Brick
shares
it
held
on
his
behalf
to
Blume.
It
was
agreed
that
the
$100,000
paid
in
October
1962
on
behalf
of
Tanz
would
be
applied
against
the
indebtedness
of
Tanz
and
his
companies.
That
was
done.
All
matters
the
parties
agreed
to
do
in
the
carrying
out
of
the
agreements
of
January
23
were
eventually
performed.
Blume’s
version
of
the
meeting
is,
on
material
matters,
contrary
to
the
testimony
of
the
others
present
at
it.
He
says
the
meeting
opened
by
Rose
advising
him
that
Tanz
did
not
propose
to
fulfil
the
original
arrangements,
that
neither
Tanz
nor
Perpetual
had
put
up
any
money,
and
that
Tanz
wanted
$75,000
for
his
services
to
Interworld.
Blume
says
he
complained
to
Tanz
who
replied
he
did
not
propose
to
continue
and
stated
he
had
performed
services
for
Interworld.
Blume
says
he
commented
that
this
was
the
first
he
had
heard
of
services
having
been
performed.
Blume
says
he
turned
to
Rose
for
advice.
Rose
recommended
Blume
continue
with
Milton
Brick
by
himself
and
asked
if
he
could
recommend
a
figure
to
be
paid
to
Tanz.
Rose
and
his
partner
came
up
with
$50,000
and
suggested
it
be
paid
by.
Interworld.
Blume’s
explanation
for
having
signed
the
documents
I
have
referred
to
is
that
there
was
nothing
he
could
do.
He
said
he
objected
to
the
paragraphs
in
Exhibit
27
referring
to
Tanz
as
the
owner
of
shares.
Again,
for
reasons
I
have
set
out
earlier,
I
do
not
accept
Blume’s
evidence.
After
listening
to
and
observing
this
witness,
I
am
confident
he
would
never
sign
any
documents
he
really
did
not
want
to
sign.
Tanz,
Rose
and
Persiko
all
positively
state
that
at
the
meeting
Tanz
made
no
claim
for
payment
for
any
services
rendered
to
Interworld
or
Milton
Brick,
or
for
anything
in
the
way
of
commissions
for
having,
from
time
to
time
in
the
past,
introduced
other
borrowers
to
Interworld.
They
testified
there
was
no
mention
by
anyone
of
matters
of
that
kind.
In
his
testimony,
Tanz
said
he
never
expected
nor
sought
any
payment
for
the
work
he
had
done
for
Milton
Brick.
He
had
many
other
interests,
and
spent
only
one
or
two
days
a
week
on
Milton
Brick
matters
as
well
as
some
Saturdays.
Interworld
issued
a
T4
slip
showing
commissions
of
$50,000
paid
to
Tanz
in
1963.
A
copy
was
sent
to
the
District
Taxation
Office
in
Ontario.
Tanz
said,
and
I
believe
him,
he
never
received
a
copy
of
the
T4
slip.
The
first
knowledge
he
had
of
it
was
at
the
hearing
before
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
on
May
30
and
31,
1968.
I
have
finished
with
the
essential
facts.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
firstly
that
the
$50,000
was
remuneration
for
services
rendered
by
Tanz
to
Interworld
in
regard
to
the
acquisition
of
the
Milton
Brick
shares
and
for
services
rendered
to
Milton
Brick.
It
was
also
suggested
that
payment
for
having
introduced
other
borrowers
to
Interworld
was
included
in
the
sum.
This
argument
assumes
two
things:
that
Interworld
was
the
real
owner
of
the
shares
and
that
Blume’s
evidence
is
to
be
accepted.
Counsel
contended
that
whatever
one
may
think
of
his
credibility
as
a
witness,
his
version
is
the
only
one
that
fits
with
the
real
facts.
I
cannot
accept
this
first
argument
or
the
premises
on
which
it
is
based.
It
is
true
that
prior
to
the
closing
date
for
the
acquisition
of
the
shares,
Blume
and
Tanz
had
agreed
they
would
eventually
be
transferred
to
Interworld.
In
fact
and
in
law
the
shares
never
did
get
to
Interworld.
As
planned,
and,
as
I
find,
agreed
to
by
the
two
parties,
the
shares
were
acquired
personally
by
Blume
and
Tanz.
No
further
steps
were
taken
in
the
overall
plan,
because
Blume
delayed
signing
documents
and
proposed
from
time
to
time
changes
in
the
scheme.
As
I
have
earlier
mentioned
I
do
not
accept
Blume’s
testimony
that
Interworld
was
the
actual
purchaser
of
the
shares
from
Milton
Brick
shareholders.
Further,
the
evidence
which
I
accept
is
clear,
that
the
payment
of
$50,000
was
not
payment
for
services
rendered
to
anyone
or
any
company,
nor
was
it
some
type
of
commission.
The
credible
evidence
here
impels
me
to
conclude
the
payment
of
$50,000
by
Blume’s
company
was
payment
for
shares,
a
capital
asset.
Mr
Thomas,
for
the
respondent,
said
in
argument
he
was
not
contending
the
appellant
was
at
the
relevant
times
a
trader
in
shares.
Secondly,
it
was
argued
by
the
respondent
that
the
profit
realized
by
Tanz
was
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
and
therefore
taxable.
It
is
argued
that
Tanz
got
something
(the
right
to
shares)
for
which
he
laid
out
no
money.
The
only
liability
he
incurred
was
by
virtue
of
a
guarantee
to
the
bank
of
the
Interworld
loan;
that
three
months
later
he
sold
this
right
at
a
profit.
It
follows,
it
is
said,
that
the
transaction
was
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade
either
because
the
right
re-
ferred
to
should
be
regarded
as
inventory,
which
the
respondent
sold
at
a
gain,
or
was
the
type
of
transaction
which
a
business
broker
might
carry
out.
I
cannot
accede
to
this
second
argument.
I
think
it
incorrect
to
say
the
appellant
did
not
lay
out
any
money
for
the
acquisition
of
the
shares.
interworid
borrowed
the
money
from
the
bank
and
then
loaned
Blume
and
Tanz
the
funds.
Tanz
later
paid
Interworld
$100,000:
I
see
nothing
unusual
in
someone
using
borrowed
money
to
finance
a
stock
take-over.
These
shares
were
not
inventory
in
the
hands
of
Tanz.
I
accept
his
testimony
he
was
looking
for
a
long-term
investment,
in
my
opinion,
he
would
have
remained
in
Milton
Brick
but,
for
reasons
I
have
given,
decided
he
must
dissociate
himself
from
Blume.
He
attempted
unsuccessfully
to
buy
him
out
to
retain
his
investment.
When
Blume
refused,
his
alternative,
it
seems
to
me
was
to
sell
to
Blume.
In
my
view,
this
was
not
the
sale
of
inventory
nor
the
type
of
transaction
a
business
broker
might
carry
out.
It
was
not,
therefore,
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
The
appeal
in
respect
of
the
$50,000
is
allowed.
The
reassessment
for
1963
is
referred
back
to
the
respondent
with
the
direction
that
the
amount
of
$50,000
profit
on
the
sale
of
shares
in
Milton
Brick
be
deleted
from
the
appellant’s
income
and
his
tax
recalculated
accordingly.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
costs.