Thurlow,
J:—In
my
view
the
second,
third
and
fourth
points
put
forward
by
counsel
for
the
respondents
as
justifying
leave
to
appeal
raise
questions
that
are
fairly
arguable.
I
am
not
persuaded
that
the
same
can
be
said
of
the
first
or
the
fifth
points
so
put
forward.
To
say
that
there
are
three
arguable
points
does
not,
however,
resolve
the
problem
whether
the
question
involved
in
the
case
is
one
which
ought
to
be
submitted
to
the
Supreme
Court
for
decision.
I
do
not
think
it
was
intended
tnat
leave
to
appeal
should
be
granted
either
as
a
matter
of
course
or
simply
because
a
question
is
interesting
or
difficult
or
arguable
or
because
the
decision
will
serve
as
a
guide
to
the
parties
and
to
others
for
the
future.
Rarely
would
there
be
a
case
involving
a
point
of
taxation
law
that
would
not
qualify
for
such
reasons.
On
the
other
hand
there
are
cases
which
raise
an
issue
or
question
so
fundamental
that
it
is
immediately
apparent
that
the
question
is
one
that
ought
to
be
determined
by
the
Supreme
Court.
As
examples
one
can
think
of
important
constitutional
questions
and
serious
questions
arising
on
the
Canadian
Bill
of
Rights.
To
my
mind
the
case
of
Lavell
v
Attorney
General
of
Canada,
[1971]
FC
347,
in
which
leave
was
granted
by
this
Court,
fell
into
that
category.
There
are
undoubtedly
other
types
of
cases
as
well
which
will
meet
the
test
but
save
when
it
is
clear
that
a
case
is
important
enough
to
warrant
an
affirmative
answer
to
the
question
posed
by
subsection
31(2)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
the
proper
course
for
this
Court
is,
I
think,
to
decline
to
grant
leave
and
thus
leave
it
to
the
Supreme
Court
to
determine
in
which
of
such
cases
leave
to
appeal
should
be
granted.
So
approaching
the
present
case
I
reach
the
conclusion
that
leave
to
appeal
should
be
refused.
The
judgment
in
my
view
involves
nothing
more
striking
or
fundamental
than
the
interpretation
of
particular
provisions
of
the
Antidumping
Act
and
the
Customs
Act,
dealing,
in
each
case,
with
how
imported
goods
are
to
be
valued
when
other
statutory
provisions
for
their
valuation
fail.
The
judgment
is
of
some
direct
or
indirect
importance
to
the
respondents
and
is
no
doubt
of
some
general
interest
to
foreign
exporters
and
domestic
importers
as
well
as
to
persons
interested
in
tax
jurisprudence.
In
it,
there
are,
as
I
have
said,
several
arguable
points,
One
of
the
enactments,
the
Anti-dumping
Act,
is
comparatively
new
and
there
has
not
been
occasion.
for
it
or
for
the
somewhat
older
provision
of
the
Customs
Act
to
be
passed
upon
by
the
Supreme
Court.
Notwithstanding
these
features
of
the
matter,
however,
the
interpretation
to
be
put
upon
these
provisions
is
not,
as
I
see
it,
a
question
of
such
general
or
fundamental
importance
or
interest
that
this
Court
should
regard
it
as
one
that
“ought
to
be
submitted
to
the
Supreme
Court
for
decision”,
particularly
since
it
is
open
to
that
Court,
notwithstanding
the
denial
of
leave
by
this
Court,
to
give
leave
if
it
sees
fit
to
do
so,
whether
it
considers
the
question
raised
to
meet
the
test
of
subsection
31(2)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
or
not.
I,
therefore,
concur
in
the
disposition
of
the
application
that
has
been
proposed
by
the
Chief
Justice.
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