Judge
K
A
Flanigan
(orally:
May
7,
1974):—This
is
an
appeal
by
Miss
Sun
Valley
Limited,
a
company
originally
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
under
the
name
of
Joseph
Gould
&
Sons
(Ladies’
Division)
Limited
in
1951,
the
name
being
subsequently
changed
to
the
name
of
the
appellant
in
this
case
in
1952.
The
only
evidence
in
this
case
has
been
provided
by
Morris
Adams
who,
up
until
the
end
of
the
1968
fiscal
year,
was
the
chartered
accountant
in
charge
of
the
auditing
and
preparation
of
financial
statements
of
the
appellant
company
and
Malvern
Sportswear
Limited
and
Billie
Burke
Sportswear
Limited.
He
is
a
man
of
tremendous
knowledge
pertaining
to
the
garment
industry
and
has
very
cleverly
outlined
what
took
place
in
the
operation
of
the
appellant
company
and
the
subsequent
acquisitions
by
members
of
the
families
involved
which,
al-
though
coming
close
to
being
associated
under
section
39,
were
not
associated
companies
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
the
issue
is
whether
or
not
the
Minister
is
correct
in
deeming
them
to
be
associated
under
subsection
138A(2).
As
has
been
pointed
out,
the
onus
is
extremely
heavy
on
an
appellant
in
such
a
case
as
this
and
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Board
and/or
the
Federal
Court
is
very
limited,
in
that
the
appellant
can
only
succeed
if
it
can
be
found
that
none
of
the
main
reasons
for
the
separate
existence,
in
this
case,
of.
the
three
companies
was
the
reduction
of
tax.
As
I
have
said,
and
I
don’t
propose
to
go
into
the
evidence
in
detail,
Mr
Adams
has
explained
why
in
the
garment
industry
the
separate
existence
of
these
three
companies
when
they
were
all
operating
in
their
particular
field
was
necessary.
As
he
says,
the
supplying
of
female
garments
is
a
very
volatile
business.
One
must
not
only
guess
the
styles
and
the
materials
that
will
be
“in”
in
a
given
period,
but
there
are
four
separate
seasons
that
must
be
catered
to
and
delivery
must
be
of
prime
importance
in
fulfilling
or
maintaining
the
market.
Miss
Sun
Valley
Limited
was
engaged
primarily.
in
the
sportwear
business,
which
is
not
to
be
taken,
according
to
Mr
Adams’
evidence,
as
clothing
that
would
be
used
in
the
playing
of
sports,
but
rather
something
less
than
high
fashion:
a
more
casual
type
of
garment,
but
something
more
than
sports
participants’
garments.
Malvern
was
engaged
in
the
making
of
rainwear,
and
subsequently
of
maternity
wear,
and
still
later,
in
the
years
in
question,
was
in
what
is
known
as
“the
petite
wear
business”,
which
is
a
very
exclusive
type
of
business,
manufacturing
garments
for
ladies
who
are
very
small
in
both
height
and
figure
generally.
Billie
Burke
Sportswear
was
primarily,
as
I
recall
it,
engaged
in
the
making
of
blouses
and
dresses,
and
all
three
businesses,
according
to
Mr
Adams,
were
separate
and
distinct
branches
of
the
garment
industry.
The
question
is
whether
or
not
in
the
relevant
years
there
was
any
justification,
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
for
the
continued
separate
existence
of
these
companies.
The
evidence
is
that
Malvern’s
and
Billie
Burke’s
business
was
so
specialized
that
they,
with
the
loss
of
some
of
their
experienced
help,
could
no
longer
compete.
They
therefore,
in
effect,
became
contractors
of
their
space,
machinery
and
workers
to
the
appellant
in
this
case.
The
evidence
of
Mr
Adams
is
that
it
is
quite
common
for
a
manufacturer
to
contract
out
the
sewing
or
seaming
or
even
buttonholing
of
its
garments
to
pieceworkers
rather
than
to
complete
the
entire
manufacturing
process
under
one
roof.
Appellant’s
Exhibit
1
shows
a
list
of
many
contractors
that
the
appellant
used
over
the
years,
and
the
evidence
here
from
Mr
Adams,
whose
evidence
I
find
most
acceptable
and
most
learned
in
the
field,
is
that
it
was
much
cheaper
to
acquire
companies
who
could
contract
the
business
than
it
was
to
start
up
a
separate
company,
put
in
new
equipment
and
lay
out
a
great
deal
of
capital
to
achieve
the
same
result.
When
Billie
Burke
and
Malvern
were
no
longer
able
to
compete
n
the
markets
in
which
they
were
originally
established,
they
had
the
necessary
equipment
and
there
was
a
good
use
for
it
to
be
put
to
>
by
the
appellant
company.
It
is
true
that
the
appellant’s
officers
did
not
plan
in
the
years
in
question
to
really
make
any
money
in
these
two
companies
but
it
was
contemplated
that
it
would
keep
the
cost
factor
to
the
appellant
company
as
low
as
possible
and
this
of
course
would
increase
its
profit.
Any
funds
that
were
earned
by
the
two
contracting
companies
were
loaned
back
to
the
appellant
company
and
interest
was
paid
on
these
loans.
In
one
of
the
years,
I
think,
Malvern
did
make
a
profit
on
its
business
ventures
in
the
“petite”
field,
and
perhaps
even
in
both
years,
but
the
profit
in
the
second
year
was
very
slight.
However,
it
is
conceded
that
their
income
in
the
years
in
question
was
mainly
from
the
interest
received
on
the
moneys
loaned
to
the
appellant
company.
As
has
been
pointed
out,
this
is
not
the
usual
type
of
138A(2)
case
that
one
finds.
It
is
very
similar
to
the
one
!
decided
last
month
in
Calgary,
which
is
not
yet
reported,
which
was
a
car
business
and
which
had
carried
on
two
separate
operations
for
many
years,
one
company
being
the
owner
of
the
land,
the
other
being
the
owner
of
the
dealership,
and
it
was
explained
in
that
case
that
there
were
good
sound
business
reasons
for
such.
separate
existence,
just
as
has
been
explained
in
this
case.
I
find
the
evidence
of
Mr
Adams
most
convincing
and
much
in
line
with
the
case
of
R
v
Bobbie
Brooks
(Canada)
Limited,
[1973]
CTC
431;
73
DTC
5357.
I
am
also
aware
of
the
tests
enumerated
or
set
out
by
Dumoulin,
J
in
the
case
of
Doris
Trucking
Company
Limited
v
MNR,
[1968]
2
Ex
CR
501;
[1968]
CTC
303;
68
DTC
5204,
and
which
have
been
adopted
in
various
fashions
by
other
judges
since
that
time,
the
basic
principle
there
being:
if
all
companies
were
taxed
at
the
same
rate,
would
the
appellant
have
maintained
the
separate
existence
of
the
other
company
or
companies
involved?
In
other
words,
if
there
could
be
no
tax
savings
to
a
taxpayer
by
the
separate
existence
of
the
other
companies,
would
whose
other
companies
exist
or
would
they
be
brought
back
in
as
departments
of
the
main
company?
In
this
case
I
accept
the
evidence
of
Mr
Adams
that
none
of
the
main
reasons
for
the
separate
existence
of
these
three
companies
was
the
reduction
of
tax.
It
may
well
be
that,
as
an
incident
thereto,
there
was
some
tax
savings
in
the
years
in
question,
but
stringent
though
the
onus
is,
the
evidence
need
only
go
so
far
as
to
prove
that
none
of
the
main
reasons
was
the
reduction
of
tax.
On
all
the
evidence
in
this
case
I
accept
that
the
appellant
has
satisfied
that
onus
and
the
appeal
will
be
allowed
and
referred
back
to
the
Minister
for
reassessment
accordingly.
MR
NATHANSON:
Excuse
me,
Mr
Chairman.
I
wonder
if
in
your
judgment
you
could
refer
to
the
loss
carry-back?
THE
CHAIRMAN:
Yes.
MR
NATHANSON:
From
1969
to
1968.
THE
CHAIRMAN:
And
loss
carried
back
from
1969
to
1968
in
the
amount
of
$18,552,
this
latter
amount
being
on
consent.
Appeal
allowed.