Roland
St-Onge:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
reassessment
whereby
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
added
to
the
appellant’s
income
for
the
1965
taxation
year
the
sum
of
$60,000
paid
as
a
contribution
under
a
deferred
profit
sharing
plan.
The
appellant
was
incorporated
around
1964
under
the
laws
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
with
its
head
office
in
the
City
of
Hamilton.
At
all
material
times
it
carried
on
the
business
of
operating
a
placement
service
for
individuals
with
engineering
and
other
technical
qualifications
and
background.
The
said
employees
were
hired
by
the
appellant
company,
then
leased
out
to
specific
projects.
On
September
2,
1965
the
appellant
decided
to
establish
a
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
for
the
benefit
of
any
employee
who
had
or
would
have
twelve
months
of
continuous
service
with
the
appellant.
On
October
21,
1965
the
Minister
advised
the
appellant
that
the
plan
was
registered
and
was
effective
from
September
17,
1965.
On
September
2
of
the
same
year
the
appellant
admitted
into
the
plan
40
employees
who
purportedly
had
twelve
months
of
service
with
the
appellant.
However,
the
evidence
adduced
shows
that
of
the
40
members
admitted
to
the
plan,
12
did
not
have
the
required
length
of
service
and
on
February
21,
1966,
when
$60,000
was
paid
to
the
plan,
10
individuals
were
no
longer
employees
and
10
new
names
were
added
to
the
list.
Furthermore,
the
payment
was
accomplished
by
arranging
a
bank
loan
in
the
amount
of
$47,400
together
with
the
current
funds
on
hand
of
$12,600,
with
a
certified
cheque
drawn
on
the
account
in
the
amount
of
$60,000
payable
to
the
trustees
of
the
plan.
The
next
day
the
trust
acquired
6,000
preference
shares
having
a
par
value
of
$10
per
share
and
consequently
the
$60,000
was
paid
back
to
the
company.
Messrs
Ronald
Goldstein
and
Russell
Oddy
were
at
all
material
times
the
principal
shareholders
of
the
appellant
company.
Mr
Goldstein
testi-
tied
that
in
1962
he
entered
into
a
partnership
agreement
with
Mr
Oddy
in
order
to
recruit
engineers
from
England
and
that
in
1964,
80%
of
the
appellant’s
business
was
the
leasing
of
employees
for
the
execution
of
various
projects.
In
1964
the
appellant
company
owned
90%
of
the
shares
in
a
subsidiary
in
Australia
and
had
a
branch
office
in
London,
England.
Mr
Goldstein
also
explained
that
in
order
to
attract
and
retain
employees
from
England,
the
appellant
company
had
to
pay
their
travelling
expenses
and
had
to
introduce
a
medical
and
a
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
for
its
employees.
Apparently
all
this
did
not
succeed
in
stopping
the
employees
from
leaving
the
company
and
when
the
Government
of
Quebec
introduced
legislation
with
respect
to
the
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
and
directed
the
trustees
of
such
a
plan
as
to
how
to
invest
the
funds,
the
appellant
company
decided
to
discontinue
its
employee
deferred
profit
sharing
plan.
Mr
Goldstein
also
stated
that
as
the
employees
left
the
plan,
he
and
Mr
Oddy
were
the
only
ones
to
get
the
benefit
of
the
money
invested
because
in
his
opinion
they
were
the
only
ones
to
have
a
vested
interest
in
the
said
money
which
was
accrued
to
them
in
the
form
of
preference
shares
and
that
the
fact
of
reallocating
the
unattached
money
to
the
other
employees
was
not
a
guarantee
to
keep
them
from
leaving
the
company.
As
to
acquiring
the
appellant
company’s
preference
shares
by
the
profit
sharing
plan,
Mr
Goldstein
contended
that
it
was
a
sound
investment
because
an
insurance
policy
in
the
amount
of
$69,000
had
been
taken
on
his
life,
with
the
benefits
payable
to
the
company
in
order
to
redeem
the
preference
shares
and
thereby
protect
the
funds
of
the
plan.
Upon
cross-examination
he
further
stated
that
at
all
material
times
he
was
president
of
the
company
and
owns
70
shares
whereas
Mr
Oddy
was
the
vice-president
and
owns
30
shares.
Their
wives
also
had
shares
and
received
remunerations.
He
was
not
certain
whether
all
of
the
40
employees
had
served
for
twelve
months
but
he
admitted
that
he
was
aware
of
the
tax
advantage
in
instituting
the
said
plan.
He
also
admitted
that
within
a
month
after
the
first
contribution
to
the
plan
what
has
been
referred
to
as
being
the
“unattached
money”
was
reallocated
to
the
main
shareholders.
At
that
time
the
appellant
company’s
line
of
credit
was
between
$50,000
and
$60,000.
Mr
Lawrence,
the
appellant’s
chartered
accountant,
testified
that
in
1966
some
$3,600
in
dividends
were
paid
by
the
appellant
for
the
preference
shares
held
by
the
trust
and
that
in
1967
the
money
was
still
in
the
trust
bank
account.
Mr
David
Pawlik,
a
chartered
accountant
and
auditor
for
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
since
1966,
testified
that
in
September
of
1966
he
had
discovered
through
the
payroll
sheet
and
the
T-4
slip
for
each
employee
that
out
of
the
40
employees
who
were
supposed
to
have
twelve
months
of
service,
15
of
them
did
not
have
such
service
with
the
company
and
that,
when
the
contribution
of
$60,000
was
paid
to
the
plan
on
February
21,
1966,
11
individuals
were
no
longer
employees
of
the
company.
To
refute
this
evidence,
Mr
Lawrence
was
recalled
to
state
that
the
appellant
company
had
a
branch
in
Australia,
that
the
employees
sent
there
by
the
appellant
were
paid
through
a
bank
account
in
England,
and
therefore
those
salaries
were
not
shown
on
the
appellant’s
payroll
sheet.
Counsel
for
appellant
argued
that
the
latter
was
reassessed
on
the
basis
that
its
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
was
not
a
bona
fide
transaction
but
a
sham
which
constituted
an
artificial
transaction
under
section
137.
In
reviewing
the
evidence,
counsel
for
the
appellant
stated
that
the
plan
was
introduced,
along
with
other
means
such
as
a
medical
plan
and
the
paying
of
the
employees’
travelling
expenses
from
England,
because
the
appellant
company
wanted
to
attract
and
retain
its
employees;
that
the
said
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
was
abandoned
only
because
of
the
amendments
to
the
Provincial
Income
Tax
Act
which
were
enacted
to
direct
the
trustees
as
to
how
to
invest
the
money
of
the
plan;
that
only
one
contribution
was
made
to
the
plan
early
in
1966
but
that
another
one
would
have
been
made
early
in
1967
had
it
not
been
for
the
amendments
to
the
Income
Tax
Act;
that
Messrs
Goldstein
and
Oddy
received
the
unattached
moneys
because
they
were
the
founders
of
the
appellant
company
and
had
the
most
years
of
service.
In
his
opinion,
although
some
money
was
used
in
1969
for
the
benefit
of
the
two
main
shareholders,
this
action
did
not
constitute
a
sham
because
the
said
shareholders
were
also
employees
of
the
company
and
the
latter
in
1969
could
not
have
anticipated
that
employeemembers
would
leave
their
employment
so
soon.
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
the
Minister
has
the
right
to
attack
the
transaction
although
he
had
accepted
the
plan
for
registration
(MNR
v
Inland
Industries
Ltd,
[1972]
CTC
27;
72
DTC
6013);
that
in
Cam
Gard
Supply
Ltd
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
111;
73
DTC
5133,
Mr
Justice
Cattanach
dismissed
the
appeal
on
the
ground
that
there
was
no
legal
obligation
to
make
the
payments
and
consequently
the
contribution
was
not
made
in
strict
accordance
with
section
76
of
the
Act;.
that
the
pension
plan
was
a
sham
and
consequently
the
deduction
should
not
be
allowed
and
assuming
it
was
a
bona
fide
transaction,
the
Minister
was
still
able
to
use
subsection
137(1)
to
say
that
the
payment
had
artificially
or
unduly
reduced
the
income
of
the
appellant
company
(MNR
v
James
A
Cameron,
[1972]
CTC
380;
72
DTC
6325).
He
also
stated
that
the
appellant
company’s
pension
plan
was
not
in
accordance
with
subsection
79C(7)
of
the
Act
because
the
payment
was
not
made
for
the
benefit
of
“employees
of
the
employer
who
are
beneficiaries
under
the
plan”
and
that
according
to
the
pension
plan,
the
retirement
benefits
except
in
the
discretion
of
the
trustees
could
not
be
paid
until
a
person
reached
the
age
of
65,
no
matter
how
long
he
had
been
with
the
company.
Because
of
the
nature
of
the
appellant’s
business,
its
employees
came
and
went
in
a
proportion
of
40
to
50%.
Consequently
because
of
this
stipulation
it
was
impossible
for
the
appellant’s
employees
to
get
a
benefit
within
a
short
period
of
time
and
according
to
him
this
stipulation
was
clearly
drafted
for
the
benefit
of
the
appellant’s
principal
shareholders.
He
concluded
his
argument
by
saying
that
no
one
other
than
the
main
shareholders
claimed
and
obtained
a
benefit,
that
long
before
the
amendments
were
made
to
the
Quebec
Provincial
Income
Tax
Act
the
principal
shareholders
were
allocating
to
themselves,
and
this
within
one
month
after
the
initial
contribution
of
$60,000,
$1,500
for
each
of
the
employees
who
had
already
left
the
company
and
that,
within
fourteen
months
after
the
date
of
registration
of
the
pension
plan,
only
the
two
main
shareholders
of
the
appellant
company
were
beneficiaries.
According
to
the
evidence
adduced,
it
appears
that
on
the
effective
date
of
the
registration
of
the
plan,
15
people
out
of
40
had
not,
in
fact,
the
length
of
service
required
by
the
plan,
and
that
when
the
$60,000
was
paid
on
February
21,
1966,
11
people
were
no
longer
in
the
employ
of
the
appellant
company.
It
would
have
been
easy
for
the
appellant
to
file
documentary
evidence
to
show
that
the
missing
employees
were
working
in
another
country
and
were
paid
by
the
appellant
company’s
London,
England
office.
The
Board
is
not
satisfied
with
the
evidence
adduced
by
the
appellant
in
that
respect
since
this
shortage
of
employees
with
twelve
months’
service
was
one
of
the
main
allegations
in
the
respondent’s
reply
to
the
notice
of
appeal
and
since
the
appellant
did
not
see
fit
to
introduce
better
evidence
to
rebut
that
important
allegation.
it
must
be
remembered
that
the
appellant
had
the
onus
to
show
that
the
respondent’s
reassessment
was
wrong
in
law
and
in
fact
and,
especially
in
the
case
of
seeking
the
benefit
of
a
deduction,
it
should
fall
squarely
within
the
exempting
section.
In
the
present
case,
the
appellant
company
sought
a
deduction
under
subsection
79C(7)
which
provides
that
the
payment
in
the
plan
must
be
made
for
the
benefit
of
employees
of
the
employer
who
are
beneficiaries
under
the
plan.
It
is
well
established
that
the
appellant
company
allocated
$1,500
for
each
of
15
persons
who
did
not
fall
within
the
provisions
of
the
plan
because
they
did
not
have
the
length
of
service
required
by
the
said
plan
to
qualify
as
beneficiaries,
and
when
the
$60,000
was
paid,
11
people
were
no
longer
in
the
employ
of
the
company.
In
spite
of
this
fact,
the
appellant
company
has
paid
$1,500
for
each
of
the
40
employees,
which
means
that
right
from
the
beginning
the
appellant
company
was
not
complying
with
the
provisions
of
subsection
79C(7).
A
further
study
of
the
plan
shows
that
the
retirement
benefits
could
not
be
paid
until
a
person
reached
65
years
of
age,
no
matter
how
long
he
had
been
with
the
company.
Consequently,
because
of
the
nature
of
the
appellant’s
business,
it
was
impossible
for
its
employees,
except
for
its
two
main
shareholders,
to
become
beneficiaries
of
the
plan.
In
fact,
except
for
the
two
main
shareholders,
fourteen
months
after
the
creation
of
the
plan
no
one
was
a
beneficiary.
It
should
be
remembered
that
in
addition
to
being
the
main
shareholders,
they
were
the
sole
owners
of
the
company,
the
sole
beneficiaries
and
the
trustees
of
the
plan.
No
other
employee
derived
any
benefit
from
this
plan.
Furthermore,
a
scrutiny
of
the
plan
shows
that
it
was
carefully
drafted
for
the
benefit
of
the
appel-
lant’s
main
shareholders.
The
plan
has
all
the
earmarks
of
a
sham
and
certainly
does
not
fit
squarely
within
subsection
79C(7)
of
the
Act.
The
contribution
to
the
plan
was
not
for
the
benefit
of
the
40
employees
of
the
appellant
company
but
only
for
its
two
main
shareholders
who
in
fact
derived
benefits
therefrom
and
this
only
after
fourteen
months
of
its
registration.
For
the
above
reasons,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.