The
Chairman:—This
is
the
appeal
of
John
T
Klue
from
an
income
tax
assessment
in
respect
of
the
1974
taxation
year.
The
issue
in
this
appeal
is
whether
a
deduction
of
$992.74,
claimed
by
the
appellant
for
travelling
expenses
in
his
1974
tax
return,
was
properly
disallowed
by
the
Minister.
The
appellant,
a
Detective
Sergeant
with
the
Metropolitan
Toronto
Police
Force
during
the
pertinent
tax
year,
was
engaged
in
criminal
investigation
in
that
city.
His
working
hours
were
on
a
two-week
rotational
basis
between
the
day
shift
and
the
night
shift,
with
appropriate
time
off
between
shifts.
The
appellant
was
required
to
attend
hearings
of
criminal
cases
in
the
Provincial
Court,
a
Magistrate’s
Court
or
the
County
Court
for
the
purpose
of
giving
evidence
in
cases
in
which
he
had
been
involved
and
filing
pertinent
exhibits.
When
he
was
on
duty,
he
used
his
employer’s
cars
for
the
necessary
transportation
to
and
from
the
courts.
However,
the
appellant
was
also
required
to
attend
court
for
the
same
purposes
when
he
was
off
duty,
at
which
times
he
had
to
use
his
own
car,
for
which
it
is
alleged
that
he
was
not
reimbursed
for
travelling
expenses
by
the
employer.
The
appellant
testified
that
in
1974
he
was
required
to
attend
court
on
84
different
occasions
during
hours
when
he
was
not
on
duty,
and
that
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
in
so
doing
were
computed
as
follows:
4,368
miles
@
18¢
a
a
mile
|
$786.24
|
61
half
days
parking
@
$1.50
per
half
day
|
91.50
|
23
full
days
parking
@
$3.00
per
day
|
69.00
|
The
appellant
also
claimed
in
his
1974
tax
return
a
a
deduction
of
$46
representing
expenses
incurred
for
lunches
for
23
days
@
$2
per
lunch.
However,
during
the
hearing
of
the
appeal,
this
claim
for
$46
was
withdrawn
by
the
appellant.
The
issue
therefore
is
whether
automobile
expenses
totalling
$946.74,
incurred
by
the
appellant
in
travelling
to
and
from
the
courts
at
times
when
he
was
normally
off
duty,
are
deductible.
Counsel
for
the
respondent,
in
his
Reply
to
the
appellant’s
Notice
of
Appeal,
admits
that
the
appellant
was
required
to
appear
at
the
Provincial
Court
House
and
at
the
County
Court
House
as
part
of
his
duties,
but
contends
that
the
appellant,
under
the
contract
of
employment,
was
not
required
to
pay
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
his
duties
and
that
he
was
in
fact
given
a
presribed
allowance
to
cover
this.
The
respondent
concludes
that
the
appellant’s
1974
income
is
from
an
office
or
employment
and
that
therefore
the
deduction
claimed
for
expenses
is
not
permitted
by
paragraph
8(1)(h)
or
subsection
8(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
and
is
also
prohibited
by
subsection
8(2)
of
the
said
Act.
From
the
evidence
adduced,
I
am
satisfied
that
what
we
are
dealing
with
here
are
expenses
incurred
by
the
appellant
in
travelling
from
his
home
at
22
Hamilton
Hall
Drive,
Markham,
Ontario
to
either
the
Provincial
Court
at
60
Queen
Street
West
or
the
County
Court
at
361
University
Avenue,
in
Toronto
(both
of
which
were
from
25
to
28
miles
from
his
residence)
as
part
of
his
normal
duties
as
a
police
officer
at
times
when
he
was
off
duty.
There
is
no
evidence
whatever
thai,
as
suggested
by
the
respondent,
the
expenses
claimed
were
incurred
in
travelling
from
the
appellant’s
home
to
his
employer’s
place
of
business,
namely
the
Police
Station
at
150
Harrison
Street
in
Toronto
to
which
the
appellant
was
assigned
and
which
was
also
some
28
miles
from
his
residence,
nor
are
we
dealing
with
expenses
for
travelling
to
court
when
the
appellant
was
on
duty,
at
which
time
Harrison
Street
Precinct’s
police
car
was
used
for
that
purpose.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
produced,
as
Exhibit
A-1,
a
photocopy
of
part
of
the
contract
of
employment
in
force
in
1974
together
with
a
section
of
The
Police
Act,
RSO
1970,
c
351,
and
amendments
thereto.
Section
55
of
The
Police
Act
for
the
Province
of
Ontario
(Exhibit
A-1),
in
describing
the
duties
and
powers
of
members
of
the
police
force,
states
that
those
officers
are
“charged
with
the
duty
of
.
.
..
laying
informations
before
the
proper
tribunal,
and
prosecuting
and
aiding
in
the
prosecuting
of
offenders,
.
.
.”.
Article
5:05
of
the
contract
of
employment
defines
“Call
Back’
as
the
call
back
of
a
member
after
he
has
reported
off
duty
and
before
his
next
following
tour
of
duty,
and
states
that
it
includes
attendances
at
courts
located
within
the
Municipality
of
Metropolitan
Toronto
during
his
off
duty
hours.
Article
5:07
requires
members
of
the
force
to
forfeit
to
the
Treasurer
of
the
Municipality
of
Metropolitan
Toronto
all
witness
fees,
exclusive
of
transportation
allowance,
received
by
them
for
attending
at
any
court
within
the
limits
of
Metropolitan
Toronto.
Article
5:05,
however,
permits
members
of
the
force
to
receive
overtime
pay
at
the
rate
of
time
and
one-half
for
call
backs
or
to
take
appropriate
time
off
in
lieu
of
pay.
Article
19:01
states
that
a
mileage
allowance
of
10
cents
a
mile
will
be
paid
to
a
member
who
is
requested
to
use
his
own
car
in
the
performance
of
police
duty.
However,
according
to
the
appellant’s
testimony,
which
was
not
contradicted,
this
provision
applies
to
the
use
of
a
member’s
unmarked
car
when
on
police
duty
in
undercover
criminal
investigations,
but
does
not
apply
to
use
of
a
member’s
personal
car
for
attendance
at
court,
for
which
no
travelling
allowance
is
paid.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
appellant
in
this
appeal
is
an
employee,
and
the
question
is
whether
he
qualifies,
under
the
requirements
set
out
in
the
exception
to
the
general
tax
rule
of
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
new
Income
Tax
Act,
to
deduct
from
his
income
the
travelling
expenses
claimed
by
him
in
1974.
Paragraph
8(1
)(h)
of
the
said
Act
reads
as
follows:
8.
(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(h)
where
the
taxpayer,
in
the
year,
i)
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
the
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business
or
in
different
places,
(ii)
under
the
contract
of
employment
was
required
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
the
performance
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment,
and
(iii)
was
not
in
receipt
of
an
allowance
for
travelling
expenses
that
was,
by
virtue
of
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(v),
(vi)
or
(vii),
not
included
in
computing
his
income
and
did
not
claim
any
deduction
for
the
year
under
paragraph
(e),
(f)
or
(9),
amounts
expended
by
him
in
the
year
for
travelling
in
the
course
of
his
employment;
In
my
opinion,
the
appellant
qualifies
for
this
deduction
under
subparagraph
8(1)(h)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
because
attendance
at
court
was
an
essential
and
important
part
of
his
duties
as
a
police
officer
as
set
out
in
The
Police
Act,
and,
as
such,
it
should
be
considered
as
part
of
the
duties
the
appellant
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on.
The
appellant
could
be
subpoenaed
to
appear
at
court,
in
which
case,
he
was
summoned
to
appear
by
being
given
notice
of
a
hearing
well
in
advance
thereof
or
sometimes
he
had
only
a
few
minutes’
notice
of
it.
The
appellant
was
therefore
required,
when
off
duty,
to
leave
an
address
and
telephone
number
where
he
could
be
reached
in
such
an
eventuality.
Moreover,
the
appellant’s
appearances
were
made
at
the
Court
House
on
Queen
Street
or
University
Avenue
in
Toronto
and
not
at
his
employer’s
place
of
business,
which
was
at
150
Harrison
Street.
In
my
opinion,
the
appellant
was
in
fact
ordinarily
required
to
appear
in
court
as
part
of
his
duties
as
a
police
officer
and
to
carry
on
these
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business.
The
appellant
also
meets
the
requirements
of
subparagraph
8(1
)(h)(ii)
of
the
Act
because,
under
the
terms
of
his
contract,
he
was
required
to
pay
the
travelling
expenses
incurred
by
him
in
attending
courts
in
Metropolitan
Toronto
at
times
when
he
was
not
on
duty,
which
attendance,
nonetheless,
constituted
the
performance
of
a
necessary
part
of
the
duties
of
his
office
or
employment.
The
conditions
of
subparagraph
8(1)(h)(iii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
are
also
met
in
that
the
uncontradicted
evidence
was
that
the
appellant
was
not
in
receipt
of
any
allowance
for
travelling
from
his
residence
to
his
obligatory
attendance
at
courts
in
Metropolitan
Toronto.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
seemed
to
contend
that
there
was
no
difference
in
principle,
and
very
little
difference
in
mileage,
between
the
appellant’s
travel
from
his
home
to
the
courts
and
from
his
home
to
his
employer’s
place
of
business,
and
that
the
expenses
were
personal
in
that
they
were
incurred
in
going
to
and
from
the
place
where
the
appellant
was
to
carry
out
the
duties
of
his
employment.
It
appears
to
me
that,
even
though
the
distance
between
the
appellant’s
home
and
the
courts
is
almost
identical
with
the
distance
from
the
appellant’s
home
to
the
police
station
at
150
Harrison
Street
to
which
he
is
assigned,
that
does
not
make
the
Court
House
buildings
identical
with
his
employer’s
place
of
business.
The
appellant
testified
that,
when
he
was
to
attend
court
on
his
off
duty
periods,
he
was
usually
required
to
go
to
the
station
first
to
pick
up
the
necessary
records,
files
and
exhibits
before
proceeding
to
the
courts
to
give
evidence.
In
my
opinion,
the
evidence
is
clear
that
the
appellant,
even
when
he
was
off
duty,
was
ordinarily
required
to
carry
on
certain
duties
of
his
employment
away
from
his
employer’s
place
of
business.
Whether
the
contract
of
employment
or
The
Police
Act
of
Ontario
provide
travelling
allowances
for
attending
courts
outside
Metropolitan
Toronto
is
immaterial
to
the
issue
in
this
appeal.
No
evidence
was
adduced
to
contradict
the
appellant’s
testimony
that
he
did
not
receive
any
travelling
allowance
or
to
prove
that
he
was
not
required
to
pay
his
travelling
expenses
in
attending
any
of
the
courts
in
Metropolitan
Toronto
when
not
on
his
ordinary
tour
of
duty.
In
the
circumstances,
l
cannot
conclude
otherwise
than
that,
for
the
purpose
of
the
issue
presently
before
the
Board,
the
appellant
meets
all
the
conditions
set
out
in
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended.
Although
counsel
for
the
respondent
did
not
refer
to
it
in
his
Reply
to
the
Notice
of
Appeal,
he
cited
in
argument
paragraph
6(1)(b)
of
the
said
Act,
which
deals
with
personal
or
living
expenses
that
must
be
included
in
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income.
Subparagraph
6(1)(b)(vii)
of
the
said
Act
deals
with
the
taxing
of
allowances
for
travelling
expenses
received
by
an
employee
from
his
employer
if
if
computed
by
reference
to
time
actually
spent
by
the
employee
in
travelling
away
from
the
municipality
where
the
employer’s
establishment
is
located
and
at
which
the
employee
ordinarily
works.
I
cannot
see
how
the
said
subparagraph
6(1)(b)(vii)
of
the
Act
can
possibly
apply
to
the
facts
of
this
appeal,
because
no
allowances
for
travelling
expenses
were
paid
to,
or
received
by,
the
appellant.
The
appellant,
in
my
opinion,
conforms
to
all
the
conditions
of
paragraph
8(1)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
amended
by
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
section
1,
and
therefore
the
automobile
expenses
claimed
should
be
allowed.
For
these
reasons,
the
appeal
is
allowed
in
part
and
the
matter
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
in
order
that
he
may
take
into
account
that
this
Board
holds
that
automobile
expenses
in
the
amount
of
$946.74,
claimed
by
the
appellant
to
have
been
expended
for
off
duty
court
attendance
in
1974,
are
deductible
pursuant
to
paragraph
8(1
)(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
applicable
to
that
taxation
year.
In
all
other
respects,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
allowed.