A
J
Frost
(orally:
November
18,
1976):—This
is
an
income
tax
appeal
wherein
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
appellant
with
respect
to
the
fiscal
years
ended
March
31,
1971
and
September
30,
1971,
treating
the
full
amount
of
a
mediation
award
as
income
of
the
fiscal
period
ended
March
31,
1971.
The
appellant
had
two
fiscal
periods
in
the
calendar
year
1971,
the
second
period
being
for
only
six
months.
The
appellant
reported
the
award
money
as
belonging
to
the
second
period
and
the
Minister
reassessed
it
as
belonging
in
the
first
fiscal
period.
In
1963
the
appellant
entered
into
a
contract
with
International
Minerals
and
Chemical
Corporation
(Canada)
Limited,
hereinafter
referred
to
as
IMC,
to
sink
a
shaft
at
Esterhazy,
Saskatchewan.
The
contract
was
insured.
Structural
defects
developed
and
a
large
sum
of
money
had
to
be
spent
by
the
appellant
to
de-water
the
shaft,
and
to
make
repairs.
Invoices
were
sent
to
the
appellant
claiming
reimbursement
for
costs.
These
claims
led
to
a
long
and
protracted
dispute.
Reserves
were
established
on
the
books
of
the
appellant
in
the
amounts
of
approximately
$512,000
in
1969
and
$577,000
in
1971.
On
March
12,
1971
the
appellant
won
an
award
of
approximately
$1,092,000
under
The
Arbitration
Act
of
Ontario,
and
filed
the
award
with
the
Registrar
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Ontario
on
March
22,
1971.
The
award
money
was
paid
to
the
appellant
company
on
April
5,
1971,
five
days
after
its
year-end.
The
appellant
contended
that
the
collectability
of
the
award
remained
in
doubt
until
April
5,
1971,
as
IMC
had
a
right
to
appeal
the
decision
of
the
award
dated
March
12,
1971.
In
preparing
financial
statements
for
the
year-end,
March
31,
1971,
the
appellant
company
included
the
full
amount
receivable
as
income
for
the
year
without
any
reserve
against
the
asset.
However,
in
reporting
for
tax
purposes,
the
appellant
claimed
100%
reserve
on
the
ground
that
the
appellant
had
no
absolute
right
to
the
award
money
until
the
appeal
period
had
expired,
which
was
after
the
appellant’s
year-end.
The
function
of
accounting
is
to
measure
income
according
to
generally
accepted
accounting
principles,
and
to
cause
accounts
to
be
kept
which
accurately
reflect
the
affairs
of
the
company
with
respect
to
its
debtor
and
creditor
relationships,
and
all
other
assets,
both
long
and
short,
and
in
addition
report
as
required
by
statute
to
the
management.
On
the
evidence,
the
Board
finds
that
the
appellant
was
legally
entitled
to
receive
the
sum
of
$1,092,000
although
not
legally
entitled
to
demand
payment
of
it
immediately.
The
amount
was
definitely
ascertained
as
of
the
year-end,
and
no
evidence
was
adduced
to
indicate
that
the
sum
would
not
be
paid
in
full
when
due.
The
indebtedness,
therefore,
had
the
true
quality
of
a
receivable.
On
Friday,
April
2,
1971,
Mr
R
C
G
Wilson,
QC,
the
solicitor
for
the
appellant,
forwarded
the
release
by
taxi
to
the
company
for
signature
by
the
appellant’s
officers,
indicating
that,
if
the
release
were
signed
forthwith,
he
would
exchange
it
immediately,
or
at
least
he
would
exchange
it
for
the
settlement
cheque,
as
of
Monday,
April
5.
For
accounting
purposes
the
true
position
of
the
receivable
was
known
before
the
balance
sheet
and
profit
and
loss
accounts
were
finalized,
and
the
auditor,
accordingly,
showed
the
true
position
in
the
financial
statements
of
the
company.
However,
for
tax
purposes
the
appellant
company
claimed
100%
reserve
on
the
ground
that
the
appellant
had
no
absolute
right
to
the
sum
in
question
as
of
March
31,
1971,
and
as
IMC
could
take
an
adverse
position
at
any
time
prior
to
payment,
and
possibly
upset
the
award.
Counsel
contended
that
no
absolute
entitlement
could
possibly
arise
until
the
time
of
the
appeal
had
expired
or
the
cash
was
received.
For
these
reasons,
he
submitted
that
the
amount
of
$1,092,000
was
not
income
with
respect
to
the
year
ended
March
31,
1971.
In
my
view,
the
award
money
became
a
receivable
of
the
appellant
on
March
12,
1971,
the
date
on
which
the
members
of
the
Board
of
Arbitration
signed
the
decision
and
award
document,
and
at
that
point
in
time
became
properly
assessable
in
the
year
ended
March
31,
1971
as
income
of
that
year.
To
hold
otherwise
would
almost,
in
my
opinion,
make
a
mockery
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
generally
accepted
accounting
principles
and
commercial
practices.
In
this
I
lean
towards
the
cases
MNR
v
Benaby
Realties
Limited,
[1967]
CTC
418;
67
DTC
5275,
and
Vaughan
Construction
Company
Limited
v
MNR,
[1970]
CTC
350;
70
DTC
6268,
both
Supreme
Court
decisions,
as
authority
for
the
proposition
that
the
Income
Tax
Act
requires
profits
or
gains
to
be
included
in
the
calculation
of
income
in
the
year
in
which
the
amount
of
profit
arising
from
an
award
is
determined,
although
the
award
per
se
may
be
subject
to
appeal.
In
my
view,
the
possibility
of
an
appeal
does
not
affect
the
nature
of
the
amount
in
question
as
a
receivable
or
its
character
as
income,
and
under
no
circumstances
can
it
be
considered
as
transferring
the
item
from
one
taxation
year
to
the
next,
or
postponing
the
date
when
the
moneys
become
receivable.
As
to
the
question
of
a
need
for
reserve
for
bad
debts
against
the
amount
outstanding
at
the
year-end,
no
question
of
ageing
or
ability
to
pay
arises,
as
the
creditor
was
in
a
sound
financial
position
and
the
amount
owing
was
for
less
than
30
days.
Further,
accounting
practice
is
to
set
up
reserves
at
the
time
the
balance
sheet
is
prepared
which,
in
effect,
means
that
for
all
practical
purposes
no
reserve
was
required.
For
these
reasons
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.