Roland
St-Onge
(orally:
March
24,
1977):—The
appeal
of
Dr
Arnold
H
Lane
came
before
me
on
March
22,
1977
at
the
City
of
Victoria,
British
Columbia,
and
the
question
at
issue
is
whether
the
recaptured
capital
cost
allowance
assessed
by
the
respondent
was
properly
included
in
the
appellant's
income
within
subsection
20(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
with
respect
to
his
1971
taxation
year.
The
appellant
was
the
owner
of
an
undivided
one-seventh
interest
in
the
assets
of
Meadowlark
Court
Syndicate,
which
assets
comprised
townhouses
in
Edmonton,
Alberta.
On
June
1,
1971
the
appellant
disposed
of
his
interest
in
the
said
assets
of
Meadowlark
Court
Syndicate
to
Tri-A
Developments
Ltd
for
$159,427.
The
respondent
reassessed
the
appellant,
adding
recaptured
capital
cost
allowance
of
$45,077
to
his
income,
as
being
a
disposition
of
an
interest
In
a
partnership.
As
a
matter
of
fact,
the
appellant
claimed
$52,249
in
respect
of
the
said
depreciated
property
for
the
1967,
1968,
1969
and
1970
taxation
years.
The
undepreciated
capital
cost
as
at
January
1,
1971
was
$114,350
and
the
recaptured
capital
cost
allowance
was
$45,077,
or
the
difference
between
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
and
the
deemed
proceeds
of
disposition.
Both
parties
agreed
that
the
figures
were
not
in
dispute.
In
his
Notice
of
Appeal,
the
appellant
contended
that
he
did
not
dispose
of
depreciable
property
used
in
the
business
of
a
partnership.
The
appellant
testified
that
in
1966
he,
together
with
six
other
individuals,
acquired
townhouses
in
different
districts
of
Edmonton,
under
the
name
of
Meadowlark
Court
Syndicate,
and
from
time
to
time
received
dividends
from
the
said
syndicate.
On
June
1,
1971
the
appellant
sold
his
one-seventh
interest
in
the
assets
of
Meadowlark
Court
Syndicate,
because
he
needed
money
to
move
from
Edmonton
to
Victoria.
He
received
a
down
payment
of
$20,000
and
$4,000
the
second
year,
but
thereafter
the
company
Tri-A
Developments
Ltd
ceased
to
make
its
payments.
The
appellant
went
to
see
a
lawyer,
who
told
him
Tri-A
Developments
Ltd
was
only
a
shell
company,
and
that
he
would
be
better
off
by
accepting,
as
a
settlement,
the
sum
of
$6,000.
Consequently,
the
appellant
received
a
total
amount
of
some
$30,000
for
his
one-seventh
interest
in
the
syndicate,
the
last
payment
being
$6,000
in
1973.
Upon
cross-examination,
the
appellant
admitted
that
the
sole
asset
of
the
syndicate,
namely
the
townhouses,
was
registered
in
the
name
of
the
seven
members;
that
the
same
members
had
been
the
owners
of
the
townhouses
from
the
inception
of
the
syndicate,
and
that
from
1967
to
1970
inclusive
the
appellant
had
claimed
and
had
been
allowed
capital
cost
allowance
for
a
total
of
$52,249.
Counsel
for
appellant
referred
the
Board
to
paragraph
6(a)
of
the
respondent’s
reply,
which
mentions
that
the
appellant’s
sale
of
his
interest
constituted
a
disposition
of
an
interest
in
a
partnership.
Then
he
asked
the
Board
to
apply
paragraph
20(6)(j)
of
the
Act,
which
reads
as
follows:
(j)
where
a
taxpayer
has
disposed
of
an
interest
in
a
partnership,
an
amount
equal
to
the
part
of
the
consideration
for
the
disposition
of
the
interest
of
the
taxpayer
in
the
partnership
that
can
reasonably
be
regarded
as
being
in
relation
to
the
interest
of
the
taxpayer
in
the
depreciable
property
of
a
class
that
was
used
in
the
business
of
the
partnership
shall
be
deemed
to
be
proceeds
of
disposition
of
depreciable
property
of
that
class
and
the
person
who
acquired
the
interest
of
the
taxpayer
in
the
partnership
shall
be
deemed
to
have
acquired
an
interest
in
property
at
a
capital
cost
equal
to
that
amount.
He
argued
that
the
appellant
did
not
sell
depreciable
assets,
but
only
an
interest
in
the
partnership,
and
that
he
did
not
receive
income
from
a
business
but
from
property.
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
respondent
argued
that
the
townhouses
were
in
the
names
of
the
seven
members
of
the
syndicate
as
owners,
that
from
the
inception
of
the
syndicate
the
appellant
claimed
and
received
a
deduction
for
capital
cost
allowance
as
owner
in
a
proportion
of
one-seventh
of
the
total
assets,
and
that
he
sold
his
share
for
an
amount
in
excess
of
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
the
said
total
assets.
It
appears
to
me
that
paragraph
20(6)(j)
was
enacted
for
partnerships
which
were
carrying
on
business
with
various
classes
of
assets,
and
in
which
the
partners
had
unequal
interests
therein.
In
the
case
at
bar,
it
is
self-evident
that
the
members
of
the
group,
regardless
of
the
name,
partnership
or
syndicate,
were
in
fact
the
registered
owners
of
the
townhouses.
The
seven
members
of
the
syndicate
are
simply
co-owners
of
townhouses
for
which
they
have
claimed
and
obtained
capital
cost
allowance
from
the
date
of
the
acquisition
up
to
1970,
when
the
appellant
sold
his
interest
in
the
said
townhouses.
I
do
not
see
why
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
should
not
be
allowed
to
recapture
the
amount
of
$45,077,
especially
when
a
taxpayer
transferred
his
ownership
in
two
townhouses
for
an
amount
in
excess
of
the
undepreciated
capital
cost
of
the
said
buildings.
In
this
appeal,
the
Board
prefers
to
rely
on
subsection
20(1),
rather
than
on
paragraph
20(6)(j),
which
paragraph
was
enacted
to
supplement
subsection
20(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Consequently,
the
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.