Delmer
E
Taylor:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
income
tax
assessment
for
the
year
1974
in
which
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
disallowed
an
amount
of
$187.18
claimed
by
the
appellant
as
expenses
in
connection
with
earning
income
for
that
year.
Both
the
appellant
and
the
respondent
rely
upon
an
interpretation
of
section
8
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148,
as
amended
by
section
1
of
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63.
Facts
During
the
1974
taxation
year
the
appellant,
a
lawyer,
was
a
full-time
employee
in
the
Department
of
Justice
of
the
Government
of
Canada.
In
the
late
summer
of
1973
he
was
engaged
by
Dean
H
B
Hubbard
of
the
Faculty
of
Common
Law
of
the
University
of
Ottawa
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
“the
Faculty’’),
acting
on
behalf
of
the
University
of
Ottawa,
to
teach
one
course
in
Administrative
Law
during
the
winter
term
of
the
1973-74
academic
year.
The
arrangement
between
the
appellant
and
Dean
Hubbard,
who
is
the
chief
administrator
of
the
Faculty
of
Common
Law
at
the
University,
was
to
the
effect
that
the
said
course
would
be
given
during
the
winter
term
of
the
1973-74
academic
year,
which
ran
approximately
from
January
2,
1974
until
the
end
of
May
1974,
and
that
the
appellant
would
receive
remuneration
of
approximately
$1,000,
calculated
on
the
number
of
hours
of
lectures,
payable
in
semi-monthly
instalments.
The
course
was
given
during
a
period
of
15
weeks
and
was
composed
in
all
of
45
hours
of
lectures.
Although
the
Faculty
co-ordinates
course
and
classroom
schedules
in
order
to
reduce
timetabling
conflicts
to
a
minimum,
the
appellant
was
consulted
beforehand
as
to
when
he
wished
to
give
the
course
and
the
timetable
reflected
the
appellant’s
opinion.
He
was
provided
with
neither
office
space
nor
secretarial
services
by
the
Faculty
or
the
University
of
Ottawa.
The
Faculty,
at
the
request
of
the
appellant,
did
reproduce
and
distribute
to
students
certain
teaching
materials.
The
Faculty
also
provided
a
lecture
hall
and
scheduled
the
time
for
examination.
The
appellant
and
the
students
arranged
directly
among
themselves,
and
without
consultation
with
or
ratification
by
the
Faculty
or
Dean
Hubbard,
changes
in
lecture
hours,
when
lectures
had
to
be
cancelled,
and
what
hours
would
be
substituted
therefor.
There
is
no
dispute
with
respect
to
the
quantum
or
the
details
of
the
expenditures
themselves,
totalling
$187.18,
for
which
an
allowance
is
sought.
Contentions
The
appellant
contends
that:
(a)
the
legal
relationship
between
himself
and
the
University
of
Ottawa
was
governed
by
a
contract
for
services
under
which
he
was
an
independent
contractor
or
a
self-employed
person;
(b)
the
Income
Tax
Act
does
not
define
what
is
meant
by
“employee’’
and
it
is
therefore
necessary
to
have
recourse
to
common
law
tests
in
order
to
determine
the
nature
of
the
legal
relationship
between
himself
and
the
University
of
Ottawa;
and
(c)
he
was
not
subject
to
a
high
degree
of
control
or
direction
by
the
University
of
Ottawa
nor
was
he
a
sufficiently
integral
part
of
the
organization
of
or
the
operations
carried
on
by
the
University
of
Ottawa
and
the
Faculty
of
Common
Law.
The
respondent
submits
that
during
the
course
of
his
1974
taxation
year
the
appellant
was
employed
by
the
said
educational
institution.
The
opening
statement
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
aids
in
placing
the
matter
in
perspective:
This
appeal
is
in
respect
of
the
1974
taxation
year.
Mr
Molot,
who
is
a
full-time
employee
of
the
Department
of
Justice,
also
taught
a
course
at
the
University
of
Ottawa
Law
School
and
in
1974,
received
payment
in
the
amount
of
$1,010.
He
deducted
a
number
of
expenses
incurred,
totalling,
I
believe,
$187.18.
The
Minister
disallowed
that
deduction
and
it
is
from
that
disallowance
that
we
are
appealing.
The
issue
is
a
relatively
simple
one.
Mr
Molot
has
taken
the
position
that
he
was
self-employed
in
his
dealings
with
the
Law
School
and,
therefore,
allowed
to
deduct
his
expenses
incurred
in
connection
with
his
teaching.
The
position
of
the
Minister
is
that
he
was
an
employee
of
the
Law
School
and,
therefore,
not
allowed
to
deduct
the
expenses.
Before
I
call
my
first
witness,
I
would
like
to
make
a
number
of
general
Submissions.
The
first
is
that
it
is
possible
for
somebody
to
be
an
employee
of
one
person
and
at
the
same
time
be
an
independent
contractor
vis-à-vis
another
person.
I
think
it
is
a
fairly
well-established
proposition
of
law.
If
I
may,
in
this
binder
I
have
a
number
of
cases
to
submit.
There
are
two
cases
in
there
which
establish
that
proposition,
Biron
v
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
28
Tax
ABC
214,
62
DTC
20,
and
Hayes
v
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1973]
CTC
2262,
73
DTC
210.
The
second
proposition
that
I
want
to
establish
is
that
it
is
possible
for
somebody
to
teach
at
a
university
as
an
independent
contractor.
I
don’t
think
there
is
any
question
of
this.
It
has
been
established
in
the
Canadian
courts
in
James
Sim
v
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1966]
CTC
383,
66
DTC
5276,
and
in
the
British
Courts
in
Argent
v
Minister
of
Social
Security,
[1968]
1
WLR
1749,
and
I
shall
be
talking
more
about
those
particular
cases
in
due
course.
The
final
proposition
I
want
to
establish
is
that
the
test
of
whether
a
person
is
an
employee
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
is,
in
point
of
fact,
the
common
law
test.
There
is
no
definition,
no
operative
definition
of
“employee”
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
we
must
stick
to
the
common
law.
Apropos
of
that
particular
aspect,
I
would
like
to
say
that
the
question
of
definition
of
an
employee
in
common
law
seems
to
have
been
undergoing
some
change
in
recent
years.
Until
recently,
the
test
essentially
was
one
of
control,
whether
the
employee,
the
person
employed,
was
under
the
control
of
the
master.
It’s
rather
an
archaic
English
expression.
This
test
has
now
been
modified
to
some
extent.
It’s
been
recognized
more
and
more
often,
especially
in
situations
of
professionals.
The
control
test
is
by
itself
an
unrealistic
test.
It’s
particularly
true,
as
I
say,
in
the
case
of
professionals
because
it
is
almost
impossible
to
control
them
in
their
work.
Two
other
tests
have
now
started
to
appear
and
have
only
recently
been
referred
to
in
the
Canadian
cases.
One
is
the
whole
notion
of
the
extent
to
which
the
person
who
is
employed
is
integrated
within
the
business
operation
of
the
employer.
The
second
is
what
Lord
Justice
Denning
referred
to
as
whether
he
is
part
and
parcel
of
the
organization
of
the
employer.
The
third
test,
if
you
will,
is
quoted
by
Lord
Justice
Somervell
who
puts
it
this
way:
“One
perhaps
cannot
get
much
beyond
this.
Was
the
contract
a
contract
of
service
within
the
meaning
which
an
ordinary
person
would
give
under
the
words.
.
.
.”
That
is,
I
suggest,
simply
if
you
told
the
man
on
the
street
exactly
what
his
relationship
was
to
the
employer,
is
he
or
is
he
not
an
employee?
Within
the
context
of
those
remarks,
I
would
like
to
call
my
first
witness
and
ask
you
to
bear
in
mind
that
the
questions
which
I
will
put
to
him
are
designed
to
look
at
basically
all
three
of
these
aspects
of
the
test,
not
just
the
control
test
which,
as
I
say,
though
important,
has
now
been
downplayed
somewhat
by
the
courts.
Evidence
Evidence
in
support
of
the
case
was
given
by
Henry
A
Hubbard,
Dean
of
the
Faculty
of
Law,
University
of
Ottawa,
Ottawa,
Canada,
and
by
the
appellant
himself.
The
record
of
the
examination-in-chief
of
these
two
witnesses
provides
a
summary
of
the
main
point
brought
forward—
that
in
the
opinion
of
the
witnesses,
there
was
little
“control”
exercised
over
either
full-time
or
part-time
professors,
but
that
there
was
a
difference
in
the
requirements
and
expectations
between
the
two
in
other
fields—research
and
administration.
Submitted
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
with
agreement
from
counsel
for
the
respondent,
was
a
document
identified
only
as
“University
of
Ottawa—Request
for
Part-
Time
Teaching”,
which
although
relating
to
a
year
different
than
the
taxation
year
under
review,
was
nevertheless
established
as
representing
the
form
of
document
which
would
have
been
signed
by
the
appellant
for
the
year
1974.
The
reverse
side
of
the
form
included
the
following:
UNIVERSITE
D’OTTAWA—UNIVERSITY
OF
OTTAWA
TERMS
OF
EMPLOYMENT
PART-TIME
PROFESSOR
1.
PROFESSOR’S
RESPONSIBILITIES
(A)
To
teach
the
programme
of
the
course
for
the
minimum
number
of
hours
stipulated
on
the
front
page
of
the
present
contract
and
to
give
such
assignments
as
may
be
required
by
the
department
concerned.
(B)
To
teach
at
the
appointed
hours
and
places,
as
indicated
in
the
timetable
or
schedule
of
courses
and
to
be
available
for
additional
tutorial
when
needed.
(C)
To
verify
the
list
of
students
registered
in
his
course
and
to
submit
the
corrected
list
to
his
department
on
the
prescribed
date
and
to
refuse
admission
to
any
student
not
duly
registered.
(D)
If
necessary,
to
prepare
two
(2)
sets
of
questionnaires,
one
for
the
final
examination
and
the
other
for
the
supplemental
examination,
both
questionnaires
to
be
submitted
for
approval
to
the
department
concerned
on
or
before
the
prescribed
date.
(E)
To
supervise
at
the
final
examination,
to
mark
the
papers
and
to
submit
the
results
to
the
department
concerned
for
approval
on
or
before
the
requested
date.
2.
CANCELLATION
OF
A
COURSE
The
University
shall
have
the
right
to
cancel
the
present
contract
at
any
time
before
the
beginning
of
the
academic
term
for
any
reason
whatsoever
and
without
notice
to
the
professor.
In
the
event
of
cancellation
and
notwithstanding
any
other
provisions
of
this
contract,
the
University
may
pay,
at
its
discretion,
a
lump
sum
as
full
Compensation
for
all
works
and
services
rendered
by
the
professor.
In
no
circumstances
shall
this
lump
sum
exceed
twenty-five
(25%)
per
cent
of
the
compensation
stipulated
as
salary
by
the
present
contract.
3.
OMISSION
OF
COURSE
The
professor
not
having
worked
the
minimum
number
of
teaching
hours
foreseen
in
the
schedule,
shall
be
paid
on
a
prorata
basis
for
the
number
of
teaching
hours
worked.
4.
CHOICE
OF
TEXTBOOKS
The
textbooks
used
for
the
course
shall
be
specified
by
the
department.
Consequently,
no
textbook
may
be
substituted
without
prior
approval
by
the
head
of
the
department.
5.
ENFORCEMENT
OF
ACADEMIC
REQUIREMENTS
In
no
case
shall
the
professor
exempt
a
student
from
any
academic
requirements.
Should
questions
arise
vis-à-vis
these
requirements,
the
student
shall
be
directed
to
the
proper
authority.
6.
PAYMENT
OF
SALARY
The
salary
payable
for
the
course
shall
be
paid
in
the
manner
set
out
in
section
3
on
the
front
page
of
this
contract.
The
last
payment
shall
be
made
only
after
the
final
marks
have
been
received.
7.
ALLOCATION
FOR
VACATION
It
is
understood
that
the
salary
set
forth
in
this
contract
shall
be
the
full
and
entire
compensation.
No
additional
amounts
shall
be
paid
for
holidays
and
vacations.
The
following
excerpts
from
the
hearing
transcript
serve
to
demonstrate
the
general
verbal
evidence
provided
to
the
Board:
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF
BY
MR
DRACHE:
Q.
Dean
Hubbard,
you
are
responsible
for
the
negotiation
that
led
to
the
hiring
of
Mr
Molot
in
1974?
A.
That’s
correct.
Q.
I
would
like
to
know
what,
in
your
view,
distinguishes
the
role
of
the
full-time
professor
and
the
role
of
the
part-time
professor.
A.
Well,
basically
the
full-time
professor
is
engaged
to
assist
the
faculty
and
the
university
in
its
endeavours
to
fulfill
several
objectives,
the
objectives
of
research
and
teaching
and
the
administration
and
progress
of
the
school
and
the
institution.
Q.
And
part-time
professors?
A.
A
part-time
professor,
in
contrast,
is
engaged
simply
to
give
instruction
in
one
particular
subject.
He
is
not
expected
to
make
any
contribution
to
the
research
objective
of
the
faculty
and
he
is
not
involved
in
any
of
the
administration
of
the
school
and
does
not
share
in
any
of
the
privileges
that
follow
from
faculty
status
such
as
a
right
to
sit
on
the
faculty
council,
to
be
elected
a
member
of
various
committees
such
as
teaching
personnel
committees
that
deal
with
the
terms
of
employment
and
so
on.
Part-time
people
at
our
university
are
excluded
from
participating
in
any
of
these
areas.
They
are
engaged
solely
and
strictly
to
teach
a
particular
course.
Q.
Do
you,
under
any
circumstances,
hire
a
full-time
professor
in
a
situation
where
he
was
not
expected
to
teach?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Would
you
hire
a
part-time
professor
under
those
circumstances?
A.
No.
Q.
When
a
full-time
professor
is
hired,
do
you
hire
him
to
teach
a
specific
course?
A.
That’s
correct.
The
faculty
decides
on
the
basic
curriculum,
what
shall
be
the
list
of
subjects
and
which
instruction
shall
be
offered
and
there
is
a
very,
very
bare
bones
description
of
the
general
content
of
the
course
and
then
we
engage
the
part-time
person
because
of
his
expertise
in
the
area
and
we
leave
it
up
to
him,
really,
to
put
whatever
emphasis
he
wants
on
any
of
the
particular
parts
that
we
have
described
very
generally
and
to
flush
it
out
in
whatever
detail
he
considers
necessary.
Q.
Could
you
require
him
to
teach
a
course
other
than
that
for
which
he
was
hired
to
teach?
A.
No.
Q.
The
full-time
professor,
when
he
is
hired,
is
he
hired
to
teach
a
specific
course
or
a
number
of
specific
courses?
A.
No.
The
full-time
professor
is
under
an
obligation
by
virtue
of
his
contract
of
employment
with
the
faculty
to
teach
whatever
courses
are
assigned
to
him
from
time
to
time
subject
to
certain
general
conditions
that
apply.
Q.
But
he
can
be
required
to
teach
a
course
outside
of
his
particular
field
of
specialization,
that
is,
the
fact
that
he
may
have
done
a
post-graduate
thesis
on
taxation
wouldn't
mean
that
he
could,
in
effect,
disqualify
himself
from
teaching
in
any
field
except
taxation?
A.
Well,
your
example
is
correct.
The
full-time
professor
will
have
to
teach
whatever
he
is
assigned
to
teach
and
if
he
finds
that
he
doesn’t
want
to
do
that,
then
his
relationship
to
the
faculty
may
be
terminated.
Q.
What’s
the
normal
length
of
time
for
the
hiring
of
a
full-time
professor?
A.
The
period
of
engagement
with
the
initial
contract
is
two
(2)
years.
That
may
be
renewed
for
another
two
(2)
years
and
then
a
final
one
(1)
year
contract
would
be
given,
during
which
time
tenure
would
be
considered
and
if
tenure
is
granted,
then
the
person
remains
on
the
faculty
until
there
may
be
some
cause
for
dismissal.
The
reason
for
the
individual
contracts
at
the
beginning
is
that
it’s
a
matter
of
probation.
Q.
What
about
in
the
case
of
part-time
professors?
He’s
also
hired
for
two
(2)
years
at
a
time?
A.
No.
The
part-time
professor
is
required
to
do
only
that
course
and
maybe
just
the
one
time
and
he
may
never
be
hired
again
and
there
is
no
guarantee
that
he
would
be
hired
again.
Q.
You
would
have
situations
in
which
you
would
hire
a
part-time
professor,
say,
in
one
year,
not
hire
him
in,
say,
the
subsequent
year,
and
then
hire
him
again
in
the
third
year?
A.
Yes,
that’s
possible.
So
much
depends
on
the
needs
of
the
school
from
time
to
time.
Q.
That
is,
would
it
be
fair
to
say
that
in
that
sense,
the
part-time
professor
doesn’t
have
any
sort
of
job
security
of
the
nature
of
either
tenure
or
even
the
two
(2)
year
hiring
that
the
full-time
professor?
A.
No,
there
is
no
security
whatsoever.
Q.
He
just
fills
in
as
and
when
you
need
him?
A.
That’s
correct.
EXAMINATION-IN-CHIEF
BY
MR
DRACHE:
Q.
Who
are
you
employed
by,
Mr
Molot?
A.
The
Government
of
Canada.
Q.
In
1974?
A.
1974,
the
Government
of
Canada
as
well.
Q.
And
prior
to
the
Government
of
Canada?
A.
The
University
of
Alberta.
Q.
What
years
were
you
employed
there?
A.
1969
to
1971.
Q.
As
a
full-time
professor?
A.
As
a
full-time
professor,
yes.
Q.
And
you
left
Alberta
and
came
to
work
with
the
Government
of
Canada.
When
did
you
first
teach
part-time?
A.
I
guess
the
first
time
was
at
McGill
in
1973,
the
year
before
I
taught
part-time
at
Ottawa
University.
Q.
I
see.
When
you
filed
your
1973
return,
did
you
characterize
your
status
as
self-employed
or
as
an
employee
of
McGill
University?
A.
Self-employed.
Q.
You
took
deductions
in
respect
of
expenses
that
year?
A.
Yes,
I
did.
Q.
Any
objection
from
the
Minister
that
year
or
yet?
A.
No.
Q.
When
were
you
first
employed
at
Ottawa
U?
A.
The
first
time
was
in
1967.
Q.
As
a
part-time?
A.
As
a
full-time
professor.
Q.
Full-time
professor,
and
the
first
time
as
a
part-time
professor
at
Ottawa?
A.
The
first
time
as
a
part-time
was
in
1974.
Q.
The
year
in
question?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was
there
any
difference
in
your
part-time
status
between
your
experience
at
McGill
and
your
experience
at
Ottawa
U?
Is
there
any
element
of
distinc-
tion
that
you
could
see
in
your
teaching
in
the
earlier
years?
A.
Not
that
I
could
see.
Q.
In
your
own
words,
could
you
describe
the
different
duties
between
full-
time
and
part-time
teaching,
given
that
you
have
been
a
full-time
teacher
and
are
now
a
part-time
teacher?
A.
Well,
as
a
full-time
teacher,
on
the
administrative
side
of
the
faculty
there
was
a
good
deal
of
work
required
in
terms
of
faculty
council,
attendance
committee
work
and
being
in
one’s
office
in
order
to
carry
out
that
kind
of
work
and
to
service
the
students
who
expected
that
you
would
be
there
and
you
were
expected
to
be
there
to
counsel
students
and
to
offer
any
additional
help.
There
was
the
research
aspect
even
though
I
don’t
think
it
was
usually
expressed
by
the
deans
that
employed
me
that
you
must
write
articles
or
write
books.
This
was
certainly
something
that
you
felt,
from
a
career
point
of
view,
you
were
expected
to
do
and
I
spent
my
summers
writing
articles
and
then
just
even
in
course
preparation
which,
to
me,
is
another
aspect
of
research;
much
more
time
could
be
devoted
to
course
preparation
as
a
full-time
professor
than
I
could
devote
to
it
and
that
I
can
devote
to
it
as
a
part-time
lecturer
where
I
have
my
days
occupied
at
my
regular
employer’s
office.
In
terms
of
teaching
itself,
the
teaching—the
classroom
situation
was,
I
would
say,
basically
the
same.
The
difference
really
was
outside
the
classroom,
feeling
much
more
at
ease
in
terms
of
time
to
wait
on
students
and
answer
their
questions.
As
I
expressed
to
students,
one
of
the
most
unfortunate
aspects
of
being
a
part-time
professor
is
that
you
have
no
time
to
come
to
classes
early
in
order
to
discuss
problems
with
teachers
or
to
stay
after
class
and
discuss
matters
with
students.
You’re
always
rushing
in
and
rushing
out
because
you
have
your
responsibilities
to
one’s
full-time
employer.
Invigilation
or
the
examination
scene
requires
one
to
invigilate.
That
is
not
that
time-consuming
but
that
was
a
responsibility
that
I
have
never
been
called
upon
to
perform
as
a
part-time
professor.
Marking
exams
deadlines
are
set
both
for
full-timers
and
part-timers.
I
think
the
big
difference,
of
course,
is
in
terms
of
all
the
monitoring
or,
I
won’t
call
it
supervision,
but
the
monitoring
that
the
faculty
or
the
dean
can
perform
with
respect
to
one’s
duties
in
setting
an
exam,
marking
an
exam,
is
that
you
are
not
on
site.
There
is
really
very
little
opportunity,
except
by
telephone,
to
contact
me,
for
example,
and
ask
where
is
the
exam
and
where
are
the
marks?
I’m
not
on
site
at
the
university.
Of
course,
there
is
the
general
situation,
the
atmosphere.
There
is
no
collegiality,
of
course,
involved
in
what
a
part-time
teacher
does.
There
is
no
meeting
with
one’s
fellow
teachers
because
there’s
no
opportunity
except
at
such
functions
as
law
balls
so
there’s
really
no
opportunity
to
deal
with
one’s—you
can’t
really
call
them
colleagues
because
you
just
never
see
them.
The
hours
that
one
teaches
is
another
aspect.
As
a
full-timer,
my
hours
tended
always
to
be
within
the
9
to
5
range
whereas,
as
a
part-timer,
they
have
never
been
strictly
within
that
range.
At
McGill
it
was
from
approximately
7
o’clock
to
9
o’clock
once
a
week,
and
at
Ottawa
U
it’s
always
run
well
into
the
supper
hour.
This
year
it’s
from
4:15
or
4
o’clock,
excuse
me,
to
5:15
twice
a
week
and
I
think
in
1974
it
was
about
4
o’clock
to
5:30,
twice
a
week,
so
that
those
are
the
basic
distinctions
that
I
see.
During
cross-examination
of
these
two
witnesses,
Dean
Hubbard
and
Mr
Molot,
counsel
for
the
respondent
had
identified
and
admitted
as
evidence
the
following:
Exhibit
R-1—University
of
Ottawa—Teaching
Acceptance
Form
R-2—Letter
dated
February
25,
1975,
from
the
University
of
Ottawa
to
Revenue
Canada—Taxation
R-3—1974
Income
Tax
Return
of
appellant
R-4—T-4
wage
slips
from
Government
of
Canada
and
University
of
Ottawa—1974
R-5—Notice
of
Income
Tax
Assessment—1974
R-6—Letter
dated
September
11,
1975,
from
Revenue
Canada—
Appeals
Division
to
the
appellant.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
during
cross-examination
of
the
witnesses
used
as
reference
the
“Terms
of
Employment’’
on
the
reverse
side
of
the
“Teaching
Acceptance’’
form
(Exhibit
R-1)
and
accordingly
they
are
reproduced:
UNIVERSITY
OF
OTTAWA
TERMS
OF
EMPLOYMENT
1.
Lecturer’s
Responsibilities:
(a)
To
teach
the
program
of
the
course
for
the
stipulated
number
of
hours
and
to
give
in
the
said
course
such
assignments
as
may
be
required
by
the
Department
concerned.
(b)
To
teach
at
the
appointed
hours
and
places,
as
indicated
in
the
timetable
or
schedule
of
courses.
To
be
available
[a]
few
hours
a
day
for
tutorial
purposes.
(c)
To
have
the
students’
roll
in
his
course
available
after
the
third
lecture
and
to
refuse
admission
to
any
student
who
is
not
duly
registered.
(d)
To
prepare
two
sets
of
examination
questions:
one
for
the
final
examination.
Both
sets
shall
be
handed
in
to
the
Department
concerned
for
approval,
at
least
seven
days
before
the
date
of
the
final
examination.
(e)
To
invigilate
the
final
examination,
mark
the
candidates’
papers
and
deliver
the
results
to
the
Department
concerned
for
approval
within
seven
days
following
the
termination
of
lectures.
2.
Payment
of
Stipends:
The
stipends
for
full-courses
shall
be
paid
in
two
instalments:
the
first
instalment,
on
or
before
July
22
and
the
second
on
receipt
of
the
final
marks
only.
The
stipends
for
half-courses
shall
be
paid
only
on
the
receipt
of
the
final
marks.
3.
Cancellation
of
a
course:
In
the
event
that
the
course(s)
which
the
lecturer
has
agreed
to
teach
has
to
be
cancelled
for
lack
of
students,
the
Said
lecturer
shall
have
the
option
either
of
waiving
his
stipend
and
disposing
of
his
time
as
he
sees
fit
or
of
accepting
his
stipend
and
performing
some
other
professional
work
in
the
Department
concerned
or
in
the
Department
of
Extension,
unless
otherwise
previously
agreed
upon
by
the
Director
of
Extension.
4.
Recess
between
lectures:
A
two-hour
lecture
shall
consist
of
two
periods
of
fifty-five
minutes
separated
by
a
ten-minute
recess.
5.
The
lecturer
having
not
given
the
number
of
lectures
foreseen
in
the
schedule
shall
be
paid
only
for
the
number
of
lectures
given.
6.
The
textbook
used
must
be
the
one
determined
by
the
Department
for
the
course
and
not
by
the
professor
himself.
Consequently,
textbooks
must
not
be
changed
without
first
having
permission
from
the
Department
Chairman
and
without
pre-arrangement
with
the
Book
Store.
7.
In
no
case
shall
the
lecturer
exempt
the
student
from
any
academic
requirements.
The
student
shall
be
sent
to
appropriate
authority.
In
re-examination
both
witnesses
asserted
to
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
such
terms
and
conditions
were
not
a
proper
representation
of
the
actual
relationships
between
a
professor
and
the
University,
and
that
in
practical
terms
the
professors
were
allowed
great
latitude.
Argument
Counsel
for
the
appellant
advanced
the
following:
I
believe
that
the
key
to
this
situation
is
the
facts
and
how
they
are
interpreted.
As
I
suggested,
there
are
basically
three
(3)
tests
which
have
evolved
recently.
There
is
the
older,
more
traditional
test
of
control
which
I’m
sure
you
are
very
familiar
with
and
which
we
have
looked
at
in
some
detail
here
today.
The
point
has
been
made,
either
indirectly
or
directly,
that
there
is
not
a
lot
of
difference
in
control
between
the
full-time
and
the
part-time
faculty
members.
There
might
be
some
elements
of
distinction
but
nothing
terribly
different
and
we
are
prepared
to
concede
that
it
is
true
but
not
because
control
has
been
exercised
over
the
part-timers,
but
rather
that
in
the
very
nature
of
being
a
professor
in
a
professional
setting
that
control
is
not
exercised.
For
instance,
Mr
Power
suggested
in
his
job
where
he
is
clearly
an
employee,
control
is
not
exercised
over
Mr
Molot.
He
says
his
opinions
are
his
own.
Control
is
not
really
an
appropriate
test
although
I
would
suggest
to
you
in
this
type
of
situation
what
you
have
is
a
situation
in
which
even
those
people
who
we
quickly
concede
are
employees
under
law,
are
not
controlled
either
or
not
controlled
very
much,
so
the
traditional
masterservant
test
of
control
really
is
not
applicable.
We
go
to
two
tests
which
have
developed
over
the
years—recent
years.
The
first
is
the
notion
of
the
degree
to
which
a
particular
individual
is
integrated
within
the
context
of
the
business.
There
is
a
quotation
of
Lord
Justice
Denning
which
was
cited
with
approval
in
the
Rosen
case
([1976]
CTC
462,
76
DTC
6274)
which
I
know
Mr
Power
will
be
relying
on
to
some
extent
in
which
it
is
said
(at
pp
466
and
6276
respectively):
“One
feature
which
seems
to
run
through
the
instances
is
that,
under
a
contract
of
service,
a
man
is
employed
as
part
of
the
business,
and
his
work
is
done
as
an
integral
part
of
the
business;
whereas,
under
a
contract
for
services,
his
work,
although
done
for
the
business,
is
not
integrated
into
it
but
is
only
accessory
to
it.”
This
was
quoted
with
approval
by
Mr
Justice
Denning
in
Rosen
and
that
is
a
quote
by
Lord
Denning
in
Stevenson
Jordan
and
Harrison,
Ltd
v
MacDonald
and
Evans,
[1952]
1
TLR
101.
Subsequently,
Denning
made
more
pithy
observations:
“In
this
connection,
I
would
observe
that
the
test
of
being
a
servant
does
not
rest
nowadays
on
submissions
or
orders.
It
depends
on
whether
the
person
is
part
and
parcel
of
the
organization.”
(as
read)
The
reference
cases
submitted
to
the
Board
included:
Biron
v
MNR,
28
Tax
ABC
214,
62
DTC
20;
DiFrancesco
v
MNR,
34
Tax
ABC
380,
64
DTC
106;
James
Sim
v
MNR,
34
Tax
ABC
279,
64
DTC
54;
reversed
by
Ex
Ct
[1966]
CTC
383,
66
DTC
5276;
Dr
William
H
Alexander
v
MNR,
[1969]
CTC
715,
70
DTC
6006;
Gertrude
Isaac
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
405,
70
DTC
1285;
Karpati
v
MNR,
[1970]
Tax
ABC
1189,
70
DTC
1773;
Hayes
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
2262,
73
DTC
210;
Rosen
v
Her
Majesty
the
Queen,
[1976]
CTC
462;
76
DTC
6274.
In
support
of
the
two
main
points
(aside
from
“control”)
upon
which
counsel
concentrated,
he
argued:
It
seems
to
me
that
the
whole
thrust
of
the
evidence,
both
of
the
dean
and
Mr
Molot,
is
that
he’s
not
in
any
way,
shape
or
form,
integrated
or
to
use
Lord
Justice
Denning’s
remarks,
he
was
not
“part
and
parcel’’
of
this
particular
organization.
The
fact
that
he
is
teaching
there
and
the
fact
that
one
of
the
roles
of
the
university
is
teaching
is
not
to
suggest
that
he’s
integrated
into
it.
.
.
.
The
second
part
that’s
been
developed,
or
to
use
the
words
of
Lord
Somervell
in
Cassidy
v
Minister
of
Health
(see
Rosen
p
466
[6276]),
and
again
you
have
in
the
cases
given
to
you
by
Mr
Power:
“One
perhaps
cannot
get
much
beyond
this
‘Was
the
contract
a
contract
of
service
within
the
meaning
which
an
ordinary
person
would
give
under
the
words?’
”’
.
.
.
Here
is
a
full-time
professor
at
Ottawa
University,
he
spends
30
or
40
hours
a
week
in
the
building,
he
has
an
office,
he
has
a
secretary,
if
you
look
him
up
in
the
Ottawa
University
phone
book,
his
phone
number
is
in
there,
he’s
a
member
of
the
pension
plan,
a
member
of
the
faculty
union.
These
would
be
indicia
of
employment
to
the
man
on
the
street.
If
we
say
he
is
a
part-timer,
there’s
no
point
phoning
him
there
because
he
doesn't
have
a
phone
number,
you
can’t
call
on
him
there
because
he
doesn’t
have
an
office,
he
doesn’t
have
a
secretary,
he’s
only
there
three
hours
a
week
and,
indeed,
those
three
hours
tend
to
be
at
relatively
odd
times,
he
is
not
covered
by
the
pension
plan,
he’s
not
a
member
of
the
union.
If
you
say
to
the
man
on
the
street
“Is
this
an
employee?”,
it
seems
to
me
that
the
answer
would
be
“no”.
To
put
to
rest
the
argument
of
“control”,
counsel
for
the
appellant
proposed:
I
would
like
to
say
a
couple
of
words
about
the
contract
which
was
signed.
We’ve
made
reference
to
some
parts
of
it.
I
know
that
Mr
Power
is
going
to
suggest
that
even
though
the
powers
in
that
contract
are
not
exercised,
that
in
point
of
fact
they
could
be
exercised
and,
therefore,
that
they
could
be
exercised
and
the
ability
to
exercise
the
power
is
a
crucial
element.
That
seems
to
me
to
a
greater
extent
going
back
to
the
control
argument
which
I
don’t
consider
to
be
terribly
important.
.
.
.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
concentrated
his
argument
on
two
points:
first,
that
of
control,
which
existed
equally
for
both
full-time
and
part-
time
professors,
and
was
amply
evidenced
by
the
terms
of
employment
to
which
earlier
reference
was
made;
and
second,
the
integration
of
the
appellant
into
the
business
operation
of
the
University—providing
educational
services.
Counsel
made
no
reference
to
the
view
that
a
major
determinant
should
be
the
opinion
of
the
“man
on
the
street”
test
but
he
did
comment
on
the
so-called
“economic
reality”
test
which
has
been
held
to
be
applicable
in
similar
situations.
In
support
of
his
position,
counsel
submitted
the
following:
A.
PRINCIPLE
AUTHORITIES
1.
Lionel
Rosen
v
The
Queen,
[1976]
CTC
462,
76
DTC
6274
(FCTD);
2.
Donald
B
MacDonald
v
MNR,
[1974]
CTC
2204,
74
DTC
1161;
3.
Mann
and
Martel
v
MNR—CCH
Canadian
Employment
Benefits
and
Pension
Guide
5958
at
pp
5962-5963;
4.
D
M
Diamond
v
MNR
et
al—CCH
Canadian
Employment
Benefits
and
Pension
Guide
5965
at
pp
5966-5967;
5.
Morren
v
Swinton
and
Pendelbury
Borough
Council,
[1965]
2
All
ER
349
at
351;
6.
Performing
Right
Society
v
Mitchell
et
al,
[1924]
1
KB
762
at
767;
7.
Stevenson
et
al
v
MacDonald
et
al,
[1952]
1
TLR
101
at
111;
8.
Market
Investigations
Ltd
v
Minister
of
Social
Security,
[1969]
2
QB
173
at
183;
9.
Dr
Alexander
v
MNR,
[1970]
Ex
CR
139
at
153;
10.
Winchell
v
MNR,
[1974]
CTC
177,
74
DTC
6152
at
6156;
affirmed
[1974]
CTC
782,
74
DTC
6595
(FCA);
11.
Geophysical
Engineering
Limited
v
MNR,
[1974]
2
FC
735
at
741,
[1974]
CTC
867,
74
DTC
6650
(FCA);
affirmed
[1976]
CTC
687,
76
DTC
6390
(SCC);
B.
SECONDARY
AUTHORITIES
12.
Ready
Mixed
Concrete
(South
East)
Ltd
v
Minister
of
Pensions
and
National
Insurance,
[1968]
2
QB
497
at
517-525;
13.
Montreal
v
Montreal
Locomotive
Works
Ltd,
[1947]
1
DLR
161
at
169
(PC);
14.
Dr
Blatz
v
MNR,
5
Tax
ABC
133,
51
DTC
382;
15.
Thomas
Demco
v
MNR,
39
Tax
ABC
435,
65
DTC
758;
16.
W
H
Payne
v
MNR,
[1976]
CTC
2302,
76
DTC
1233.
C.
COMPARE
WITH
17.
James
Sim
v
MNR,
34
Tax
ABC
279,
64
DTC
54;
reversed
[1966]
CTC
383,
66
DTC
5276
(Ex
Ct).
By
way
of
introduction
to
his
argument,
counsel
gave
the
following
summary:
Now,
Mr.
Chairman,
as
indicated
by
my
learned
friend,
the
law
has
evolved
since
the
days
of
the
early
forties
and
prior
thereto
to
the
present
day
in
the
Courts
evaluating
what
are
the
indicia
to
take
into
consideration
to
determine
between
a
contract
of
or
for
services.
Now,
this
evolution,
Mr
Chairman,
looks
at
the
authorities
beginning
at
number
6,
Performing
Right
Society
v
Mitchell
et
al,
which
is
the
classic
case
of
the
control
test.
We
move
onto
authority
number
7
which
is
Lord
Denning’s
test
in
the
Stevenson
case,
in
which
began
the
“part
and
parcel”
test
or
the
“organizational”
test.
From
there,
we
move,
Mr
Chairman,
to
number
8
in
my
authorities
which
is
the
Market
Investigations
Ltd
case
which
reviews
those
tests
and
brings
in
another
test
called
the
“economic
reality”
test.
Now,
all
these
authorities
are
well
summarized
in
number
3
on
my
list
of
authorities.
That
is
Mann
and
Martel,
a
decision
of
the
Pension
Appeals
Board
where
the
analysis
is
made
and
I
incorporate
that
in
my
argument
in
my
presentation
to
you
instead
of
reading
the
whole
quote
from
it.
Now,
the
modern
test,
Mr
Chairman,
of
bringing
in
what
they
call
the
“integration”
test
and
of
the
diminishing
role
of
the
“control”
test,
has
been
accepted
by
the
past
chairman
of
this
Board
in
authority
number
2
which
is
the
Donald
B
MacDonald
case.
.
.
.
Mr
Chairman,
the
Market
Investigations
Ltd
case
that
I
simply
mentioned
briefly
a
few
moments
ago,
goes
through
the
evolution
also,
the
“control”
test,
the
“part
and
parcel”
test
and
the
“economic
reality”
test.
As
anticipated
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
counsel
for
the
respondent
stressed
the
legal
relationship
that
existed
under
the
contract
signed
by
Mr
Molot,
a
prime
feature
of
which
was
the
element
of
supervision,
direction
and
control:
.
.
.
in
the
contract,
on
its
face,
which
ts
a
legal
contract
with
no
basis
for
any
sham
findings
that
it
is
not
a
valid
contract,
I
submit
that
there
are
elements
there
if
we
have
to
find
another
opinion
of
control.
There
is
some
supervision
in
the
terms
of
that
contract.
That,
coupled
with
the
answer
to
the
question,
as
I
recall,
Dean
Hubbard
agreed
with
the
statement
that
I
read
to
him
about
the
minimum
supervision,
that
there
was
that
minimum
supervision
there
but
we
are
dealing
with
professional
people.
.
.
.
my
proposition
to
you,
for
your
consideration,
is
what
is
important
is
not
whether
such
control
is
factually
exercised,
but
whether
it
is
legally
deposited
with
a
purported
employer.
.
.
.
I
submit
we
have
a
written
contract
and
that
is
the
basic
fact
and
that
would
be
the
inference
of
law
to
be
drawn
from
that
contract
and
that
would
lead
me
in
a
few
moments
to
the
Rosen
decision,
Mr
Chairman.
Further,
he
asserted:
.
.
.
the
business
of
Ottawa
University
is
that
of
offering
education
to
the
students.
They
sell
the
product
of
that
education.
Mr
Molot
and
others
like
him
may
be
part
of
delivering
that
product
but
the
business
is
that
of
Ottawa
University.
Mr
Molot
is
part
of
that
business.
As
I
recall,
the
evidence
of
the
dean
was
that
out
of
24
full-time
professors
versus
33
part-time,
he
explained
yes,
economics
was
a
factor
but
he
made
an
exception
within
the
Ottawa
context
that
they
were
very
fortunate
to
have
people
and
it
seemed
to
me
that
he
was
referring
to
the
Government
and
other
sources,
the
practising
Bar
where
there
are
so
many
people
who
specialize
in
areas
like
Mr
Molot
who
does
have
specialty
in
administrative
law,
not
only
in
teaching
but
also
as
his
functions
at
the
Department
of
Justice.
.
.
.
Findings
To
place
the
matter
in
proper
context,
I
should
like
to
quote
one
further
small
section
of
evidence
from
the
transcript.
The
witness
(Mr
Molot)
had
earlier
established
that
as
a
part-time
professor
practically
his
sole
responsibility
was
teaching,
but
as
a
full-time
professor
he
had
basically
three
areas
of
responsibility:
(a)
teaching;
(b)
research
and
writing;
and
(c)
administration.
His
assessment
was
that
as
a
full-time
teacher
he
devoted
about
60%
of
his
time
to
actual
teaching.
He
was
being
questioned
on
what
distinctions
could
be
made
with
regard
to
supervision
in
the
teaching
element
of
the
work,
between
full-time
and
part-time
arrangements.
The
Chairman:
I’ll
divide
this
into
two
parts.
When
you
were
a
full-time
professor.
and
you
were
a
full-time
professor
at
Ottawa
University,
how
did
the
monitoring
with
respect
to
your
teaching
portion
of
your
total
contribution—
how
did
that
differ
from
the
monitoring
which
you
did
not
receive
in
any
format
when
you
were
a
part-time
teacher?
You
told
me
that
you
don’t
recall
the
dean
coming
in
and
sitting
for
an
hour.
What
direction,
supervision,
control
did
you
get
from
the
teaching
superiors
you
had
in
the
University
when
you
were
full-time
professor
which
would
distinguish
this?
The
Witness:
Well,
it
was
more
informal.
All
I
can
remember
is
apart
from
asking
questions
which
one
had
an
opportunity
to
do,
and
I
was
green
at
the
time,
was
simply
because
I
had
colleagues
on
either
side
of
me
and
a
coffee
lounge
and
so
there
was
opportunity
for,
you
might
say,
this
kind
of
informal
chit-chat
but
I
don’t
remember
any
formal
kind
of
monitoring
or
any
formal
kind
of
assessment
process.
I
really
don’t
recall
that.
It
may
have
been
there,
but
I
don’t
recall
it.
The
Board
concludes
that
informal
monitoring
or
performance
review
procedures
obtained
under
both
teaching
situations.
Dealing
with
the
submission
of
counsel
for
the
appellant,
I
am
unable
to
conclude
from
the
cases
cited
that
there
are
three
new
“tests”
which
may
be
applied—reflecting
separate
“integration”,
“part
and
parcel”
and
“ordinary
man”
criteria.
To
attribute
to
an
expression
“is
employed
as
part
of
the
business,
and
his
work
is
done
as
an
integral
part
of
the
business”
(Rosen,
supra)
the
characteristic
of
providing
two
separate
tests
is
an
extension
of
the
normal
usage
of
the
words
involved,
to
a
degree
not
evident
in
my
reading
of
the
text.
The
interpretation
of
counsel
for
the
respondent
that
it
represents
the
‘part
and
parcel’
test
or
the
‘organizational’
test”
appears
to
me
to
be
more
appropriate.
Further,
the
full
quotation
from
the
Cassidy
v
Minister
of
Health
case
(cited
in
the
Rosen
case
supra)
to
which
counsel
for
the
appellant
has
attached
the
terminology
“ordinary
man”
test,
does
not
leave
me
with
the
impression
that
Lord
Somervell
intended
it
also
to
be
a
unique
point
of
view,
distinct
from
his
observations
regarding
“integration”
of
the
work.
In
my
mind
it
is
possible
that
the
reference
was
intended
only
to
show
that
it
is
often
simpler
to
recognize
the
distinction
than
to
give
a
precise
definition
of
the
difference.
For
that
reason
I
shall
refrain
from
further
comment
on
the
so-called
“ordinary
man”
test
and,
accordingly,
my
view
of
the
argument
of
counsel
is
that
he
rests
his
case
on
the
proposition
that
the
evidence
does
not
show
the
appellant
totally
“integrated”
into
the
life
of
the
University.
In
examining
the
position
put
forward
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
the
Board
notes
that
he
did
not
forcibly
pursue
the
“economic
reality”
argument
and
accordingly,
he
rested
mainly
on
the
question
of
“control”,
with
a
secondary
reference
to
the
“integration”
of
the
appellant’s
work
into
that
of
the
educational
business
of
the
University.
Counsel
dismissed
the
significance
of
the
Sim
case
(supra)
largely
upon
two
grounds:
(1)
that
in
the
Sim
case
there
was
no
written
contract;
and
(2)
that
the
appellant
in
that
case
was
in
a
business
of
his
own
and
not
an
employee.
Counsel
did
not
specify
for
the
Board
the
reasons
these
factors
were
ones
upon
which
the
Board
should
place
great
reliance,
since
the
lack
of
a
written
contract
has
not
always
been
regarded
as
destructive
to
an
appellant’s
case,
and
the
question
remains
as
to
why
a
“business”
v
“employment”
basis
in
a
separate
field
of
endeavour
should
of
itself
be
so
decisive.
Reference
should
also
be
made
to
one
other
judgment
cited
by
both
counsel
and
which
I
have
always
found
particularly
interesting.
This
is
the
case
of
Dr
Alexander
(supra),
in
which
a
distinction
is
made
in
deciding
that
a
“contract
for
service”
existed
rather
than
a
“contract
of
service”
in
that
the
appellant
had
an
undertaking
“to
provide
‘coverage’
as
opposed
to
“do
such
work
himself”.
In
the
said
judgment,
the
following
observations
were
made
at
pages
725
and
6012
respectively:
On
the
other
hand,
there
is
this
central
obligation
in
the
contract
for
the
appellant
to
provide
“coverage”
for
the
professional
radiological
work
of
the
Hospital
whether
or
not
he
is
able
to
do
it
personally
and
regardless
of
the
volume
that
it
may
attain.
This
obligation
clearly
contemplates
a
situation
where
the
appellant
would
have
to
hire
one
or
more
other
radiologists
not
merely
for
some
emergency
or
temporary
period
but
on
a
permanent
basis.
I
find
here
not
only
a
“freedom”
but
an
obligation
on
the
appellant,
in
certain
possible
circumstances,
to
have
work
under
the
contract
done
by
somebody
other
than
himself.
In
Ready
Mixed
Concrete
(South
East),
Ltd
v
Minister
of
Pensions
and
National
Insurance,
[1968]
1
All
ER
433
at
440,
MacKenna,
J
said:
“The
servant
must
be
obliged
to
provide
his
own
work
and
skill.
Freedom
to
do
a
job
either
by
one’s
own
hands,
or
by
another’s
is
inconsistent
with
a
contract
of
service,
though
a
limited
or
occasional
power
of
delegation
may
not
be.
.
.
Although
I
am
unable
to
find
cases
in
which
this
apparent
distinction
has
been
expanded
or
clarified,
it
implies
to
me
that
a
“contract
of
services”
might
well
be
a
contract
of
individual
services
whereas
a
“contract
for
services”
might
be
the
assumption
only
of
an
obligation
to
see
that
a
certain
agreed
upon
task
was
completed,
but
not
necessarily
to
do
it
personally.
Accepting
that
there
was
no
difference
of
control
in
the
teaching
element
of
the
appellant’s
role
between
that
of
a
full-time
and
a
part-
time
professor,
I
have
not
perceived
any
important
and
useful
distinction
between
the
facts
before
me
in
this
case
and
those
in
the
case
of
Rosen
v
The
Queen
(supra),
in
which
the
presiding
judge
gave
a
learned
and
complete
summation
of
the
matter.
In
the
instant
case
control
existed
to
whatever
degree
considered
adequate
and
advisable
by
the
University,
over
its
full-time
staff,
and
the
evidence
does
not
support
the
view
that
it
was
further
diluted
or,
as
alleged,
eliminated
entirely
to
accommodate
the
particular
circumstances
associated
with
part-time
staff.
My
reading
of
the
cases
cited
does
not
lead
me
to
the
conclusion
that
where
control
is
shown
to
exist
and
be
operative,
that
it
should
be
ignored
as
the
deciding
factor.
Rather,
one
might
conclude
that
in
a
situation
where
the
evidence
in
support
of
“control”
is
not
totally
persuasive
on
its
own
merits,
a
conclusion
that
the
case
concerns
an
employee
rather
than
an
independent
contractor
might
be
reached
by
also
reviewing
the
role
(and
integration)
of
the
appellant
in
the
overall
function
of
the
organization.
Control
still
remains
the
main
characteristic
of
a
normal
employer-employee
relationship,
as
indicated
by
the
Rosen
case
(supra).
With
respect
to
the
argument
for
lack
of
“integration”
on
its
own
merits
aside
from
“control”,
as
proposed
by
counsel
for
the
appellant,
the
Board
accepts
that
the
appellant
may
not
have
been
involved
to
a
great
extent
in
the
social
life,
or
the
administrative
detail
and
support
services,
associated
with
the
University
but
the
part
he
played
in
his
role
as
a
teacher
cannot
be
disengaged
from
the
totality
of
the
teaching
function
of
the
institution,
on
these
grounds.
With
reference
to
the
Sim
case,
the
Board
simply
states
as
sufficient
reason
for
distinguishing
the
case
under
appeal
here,
that
there
are
now
available
more
recent
judgments—notably
the
Rosen
case—and
that
the
“carrying
on
of
an
educational
business
or
pursuit”
seems
more
adequately
to
fit
the
role
of
the
University
in
this
appeal,
rather
than
the
taxpayer
as
it
was
held
to
be
in
the
Sim
case.
Decision
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
Email this Content