The
Assistant
Chairman:—The
appellant’s
appeal
to
this
Board
from
an
assessment
for
income
tax
for
the
1973
taxation
year
proceeded
before
this
Board
on
a
statement
of
agreed
facts.
The
relevant
portions
of
the
statement,
excluding
the
“Agreement’
referred
to
in
paragraph
3
thereof,
are:
1.
The
appellant
was
a
resident
of
Canada
from
September
1965
to
March
31,
1971.
2.
Before
September,
1965
the
Appellant
was,
and
since
April
1,
1971
he
has
been,
a
non-resident
of
Canada.
From
1961
to,
September,
1965
the
Appellant
was
resident
in
the
United
Kingdom
and
since
April
1,
1971
the
Appellant
has
been
resident
in
the
United
States
of
America.
The
Appellant
is
and
has
always
been
a
citizen
of
only
the
United
States
of
America.
3.
Annexed
hereto
as
Exhibit
A-1
is
a
true
copy
of
an
agreement
made
as
of
October
4,
1967
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“Agreement”)
between
The
British
American
Oil
Company
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“Company”)
and
the
Appellant.
After
October
4,
1967
and
before
the
exercise
of
the
option
by
the
Appellant,
the
common
shares
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
Company
were
subdivided
on
the
basis
that
each
such
share
was
split
into
two
such
shares.
Pursuant
to
paragraph
9
of
the
Agreement,
the
Appellant
thereupon
became
entitled
to
purchase
twice
the
number
of
shares
(ie
5,000)
at
half
the
price
otherwise
applicable
(ie
$18.69
per
share).
4.
From
September,
1965
to
March
31,
*1971,
the
Appellant
was
an
employee
of
the
Company.
5.
On
or
about
April
1,
1971
the
Appellant
moved
to
the
United
States
and
commenced
to
be
employed
by
Gulf
Oil
Corporation,
an
“affiliated
company”,
within
the
meaning
of
the
Agreement.
Appellant
in
fact
performed
no
duties
of
employment
in
Canada
after
March
31,
1971.
Appellant
had
no
permanent
establishment
in
Canada
after
March
31,
1971.
6.
On
September
26,
1973
the.
Appellant
validly
exercised
his
option
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
the
Agreement
and
purchased
5,000
common
shares
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
Company
at
a
cost
to
the
Appellant
of
$18.69
per
share,
being
an
aggregate
cost
of
$93,437.50
for
all
5,000
common
shares.
7.
The
amount
by
which
the
value
on
September
26,
1973
of
the
5,000
common
shares
exceeded
the
amount
paid
by
the
Appellant
to
the
Company
therefor
is
$77,812.50.
8.
In
the
Appellant’s
Canadian
income
tax
return
for
1973
the
Appellant
reported
as
income
from
his
employment
in
Canada
resulting
from
his
exercise
of
the
option
referred
to
in
paragraph
6
hereof
the
sum
of
$43,606.13.
9.
The
Appellant
computed
the
sum
of
$43,606.13
by
apportioning
the
$77,812.50
excess
referred
to
in
paragraph
7
hereof
according
to
the
number
of
days
between
the
date
on
which
the
option
referred
to
in
paragraph
6
hereof
was
granted
to
the
Appellant
and
the
date
option
was
exercised
by
the
Appellant
in
which
the
Appellant
was
employed
in
Canada
over
the
total
number
of
days
between
those
two
dates.
The
resulting
calculation,
which
was
included
in
the
Appellant’s
1973
Canadian
income
tax
return,
was
as
follows:
“Calculation
of
taxable
portion
of
stock
option
benefit
Date
option
granted
October
4,
1967
Date
option
exercised
Sept
26,
1973
Date
ceased
to
be
resident
in
Canada
and
returned
to
US
April
1,
1971
Days
between
grant
and
exercise
dates:
Spent
in
Canada
|
1224
|
56.04
|
Spent
in
US*
|
960
|
43.96
|
|
2184
|
100.00
|
Taxable
portion
of
stock
option
benefit:
|
|
.5604
x
77,812.50
=
$43,606.13
|
|
Includes
51
days
spent
in
US
on
business
between
|
|
Oct
4,
1967
and
April
1,
1971.”
|
|
10.
On
the
date
on
which
the
Agreement
was
enteted
into
(ie
October
4,
1967),
the
fair
market
value
of
each
common
share
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
Company
was
$36.75
(or
18.375
when
expressed
as
a
value
per
share
following
the
aforementioned
two-for-one
subdivision).
On
the
date
on
which
the
Appellant
ceased
to
be
resident
in
Canada
(ie
April
1,
1971),
the
fair
market
of
each
common
share
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
Company
was
$22.50.
On
the
date
on
which
the
Appellant
exercised
his
option
under
the
Agreement
(ie
September
26,
1973),
the
fair
market
value
of
each
common
share
in
the
capital
stock
of
the
Company
was
$35.00.
11.
By
Notice
of
Re-assessment
dated
July
3,
1974,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
included
in
the
Appellant’s
income
for
his
1973
taxation
year
the
full
amount
of
the
$77,812.50
excess
referred
to
in
paragraph
7
hereof.
Some
paragraphs
of
the
“Agreement”
will
be
referred
to
in
the
course
of
these
reasons.
They
are:
2.
Except
as
provided
in
paragraphs
5
and
6
this
option
shall
only
become
exercisable
by
the
Optionee
after
one
year’s
continuous
employment
immediately
following
the
date
hereof
either
with
the
Company
or
with
a
subsidiary
or
affiliated
company
or
consecutively
with
any
two
or
more
of
them.
4.
This
option
shall
be
exercisable
by
the
Optionee,
except
as
herein
otherwise
provided,
in
whole
at
any
time
or
in
part
from
time
to
time
within
ten
years
after
the
date
hereof,
but
not
thereafter.
5.
In
the
case
of
termination
of
employment
of
the
Optionee
by
reason
of
early
retirement
or
normal
retirement
in
accordance
with
the
retirement
policy
of
the
Company,
subsidiary
or
affiliated
company
with
which
the
Optionee
is
then
employed,
the
provisions
of
paragraph
2
shall
not
apply
and
this
option
shall,
notwithstanding
the
expiry
date
expressed
herein,
and
except
as
herein
otherwise
provided,
only
be
exercisable
prior
to
the
expiry
date
expressed
herein
or
within
six
months
after
the
date
of
the
retirement
of
the
Optionee,
whichever
is
the
shorter
period.
6.
In
the
case
of
the
death
of
the
Optionee
the
provisions
of
paragraph
2
Shall
not
apply
and
this
option
shall
be
exercisable
by
his
personal
repre-
sentatives,
but
notwithstanding
the
expiry
date
expressed
herein,
this
option
shall
only
be
exercisable
prior
to
the
expiry
date
expressed
herein
or
within
twelve
months
after
the
death
of
the
Optionee,
whichever
is
the
shorter
period.
7.
In
the
case
of
termination
of
employment
of
the
Optionee
for
any
reason
other
than
death,
early
retirement
or
normal
retirement
in
accordance
with
the
retirement
policy
of
the
Company,
subsidiary
or
affiliated
company
with
which
the
Optionee
is
then
employed,
and
after
this
option
shall
have
become
exercisable,
then
notwithstanding
the
expiry
date
expressed
herein,
this
option
shall
only
be
exercisable
prior
to
the
expiry
date
expressed
herein
or
within
three
months
after
termination
of
employment,
whichever
is
the
shorter
period.
10.
This
option
is
subject
to
the
condition
that
if
the
Incentive
Plans
Committee
of
the
Board
of
Directors
of
the
Company
shall
determine
that
the
Optionee
has
engaged
in
any
activity
in
competition
with
or
otherwise
prejudicial
to
the
interests
of
the
Company
or
a
subsidiary
or
affiliated
company,
the
said
Committee
shall
have
full
power
and
authority
to
rescind,
cancel
and
terminate
this
option
to
the
extent
that
it
has
not
been
exercised.
The
foregoing
provision
of
this
paragraph
10
shall
apply
whether
the
Optionee
is
or
is
not
at
such
time
in
the
employ
of
the
Company
or
a
subsidiary
or
affiliated
company
and
the
decision
of
the
said
Committee
shall
be
final
and
conclusive.
In
addition,
I
will
be
referring
to
several
subsections
and
paragraphs
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
as
well
as
two
Articles
of
the
Canada-US
Tax
Convention,
as
follows:
2.
(3)
Where
a
person
who
is
not
taxable
under
subsection
(1)
for
a
taxation
year
(a)
was
employed
in
Canada,
(b)
carried
on
a
business
in
Canada,
or
(c)
disposed
of
a
taxable
Canadian
property,
at
any
time
in
the
year
or
a
previous
year,
an
income
tax
shall
be
paid
as
hereinafter
required
upon
his
taxable
income
earned
in
Canada
for
the
year
determined
in
accordance
with
Division
D.
6.
(1)
There
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
for
a
taxation
year
as
income
from
an
office
or
employment
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
applicable:
(a)
the
value
of
board,
lodging
arid
other
benefits
of
any
kind
whatever
(
.
.
.
)
received
or
enjoyed
by
him
in
the
year
in
respect
of,
in
the
course
of,
or
by
virtue
of
an
office
or
employment;
7.
(1)
Where
a
corporation
has
agreed
to
sell
or
issue
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
the
corporation
or
of
a
corporation
with
which
it
does
not
deal
at
arm’s
length
to
an
employee
of
the
corporation
or
of
a
corporation
with
which
it
does
not
deal
at
arm’s
length,
(a)
if
the
employee
has
acquired
shares
under
the
agreement,
a
benefit
equal
to
the
amount
by
which
the
value
of
the
shares
at
the
time
he
acquired
them
exceeds
the
amount
paid
or
to
be
paid
to
the
corporation
therefor
by
him
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
received
by
the
employee
by
virtue
of
his
employment
in
the
taxation
year
in
which
he
acquired
the
shares;
(4)
For
greater
certainty
it
is
hereby
declared
that,
where
a
person
to
whom
any
provision
of
subsection
(1)
would
otherwise
apply
has
ceased
to
be
an
employee
before
all
things
have
happened
that
would
make
that
provision
applicable,
subsection
(1)
shall
continue
to
apply
as
though
the
person
were
still
an
employee
and
as
though
the
employment
were
still
in
existence.
115.
(1)
For
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
a
non-resident
person’s
taxable
income
earned
in
Canada
for
a
taxation
year
is
the
amount
of
his
income
for
the
year
that
would
be
determined
under
section
3
if
(a)
he
had
no
income
other
than
(i)
incomes
from
the
duties
of.
offices
and
employments
performed
by
him
in
Canada,
(v)
in
the
case
of
a
non-resident
person
described
in
subsection
(2),
the
aggregate
determined
under
paragraph
(2)(e)
in
respect
of
him,
(2)
Where,
in
a
taxation
year,
a
non-resident
person
was
(c)
an
individual
who
had,
in
any
previous
year,
ceased
to
be
resident
in
Canada
and
who
was,
in
the
taxation
year,
in
receipt
of
remuneration
in
respect
of
an
office
or
employment
that
was
paid
to
him
directly
or
indirectly
by
a
person
resident
in
Canada,
ARTICLE
VII
1.
A
resident
of
Canada
shall
be
exempt
from
United
States
tax
upon
compensation
for
personal
(including
professional)
services
performed
during
the
taxable
year
within
the
United
States
of
America
if
he
is
present
therein
for
a
period
or
periods
not
exceeding
a
total
of
183
days
during
the
taxable
year
and
either
of
the
following
conditions
is
met—
(a)
his
compensation
is
received
for
such
personal
services
performed
as
an
officer
or
employee
of
a
resident,
or
corporation
or
other
entity
of
Canada
or
of
a
permanent
establishment
in
Canada
of
a
United
States
enterprise,
or
(b)
his
compensation
received
for
such
personal
services
does
not
exceed
$5,000.
2.
The
provisions
of
paragraph
1
of
this
Article
shall
apply,
mutatis
mutandis,
to
a
resident
of
the
United
States
with
respect
to
compensation
for
such
personal
services
performed
in
Canada.
ARTICLE
VIII
Gains
derived
in
one
of
the
contracting
States
from
the
sale
or
exchange
of
capital
assets
by
a
resident
or
a
corporation
or
other
entity
of
the
other
contracting
State
shall
be
exempt
from
taxation
in
the
former
State,
provided
such
resident
or
corporation
or
other
entity
has
no
permanent
establishment
in
the
former
State.
The
primary
position
taken
by
the
appellant’s
counsel
was
that
there
was
no
charging
provision
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
which
charged
the
gain,
or
any
portion
of
the
appellant’s
gain
by
his
purchase
of
the
shares,
to
income
tax
as
his
client,
in
1973,
had
no
income
from
the
duties
of
offices
and
employments
performed
by
him
in
Canada
as
required
by
subparagraph
115(1)(a)(i).
If
he
were
within
that
subparagraph
and
consequently
taxable,
it
was
exempt
from
taxation
by
virtue
of
Article
VII
or
VII
of
the
Canada-US
Tax
Convention.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
also
contended
that
the
result
of
the
proper
interpretation
of
subsection
2(3)
and
section
115
of
the
said
Act
is
that
the
appellant’s
gain
from
the
exercise
of
his
option
must
be
reduced
to
the
extent
it
is
attributable
to
employment
performed
by
the
appellant
outside
Canada,
namely,
in
the
United
States.
This
quantum
could
be
the
increase
in
value
of
the
shares
by
the
time
the
appellant
left
Canada,
without
any
reference
to
either
the
exercise
of
the
option
or
to
the
date
of
exercise
of
the
option,
or
that
portion
of
the
total
gain
realized
when
the
shares
were
acquired
referable
to
his
period
of
residence
in
Canada
after
he
acquired
the
option,
computed
on
the
basis
that
that
gain
accrued
in
equal
daily
amounts
for
the
period
of
time
he
held
the
option.
Likewise
he
contended
that,
if
only
a
portion
were
taxable,
that
portion
was
exempt
by
the
same
Articles
of
the
Canada-
US
Tax
Convention.
As
to
the
facts,
it
must
be
clearly
noted
that
when
the
appellant
received
the
option
from
the
British
American
Oil
Company
Limited
(hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
“company”)
in
1967,
he
was
a
resident
of
Canada;
he
worked
continuously
in
Canada
from
1967
until
March
1971
for
the
company;
he
ceased
being
a
resident
of
Canada
in
the
year
1971;
he
performed
no
services
or
duties
for
the
company
or
any
other
Canadian
person
after
1971;
and
he
exercised
the
option
in
the
calendar
year
1973.
When
he
left
the
company
in
1971,
he
returned
to
the
United
States
and
worked
for
the
parent
of
the
company.
The
rights
he
acquired
under
the
option
remained
‘constant
at
all
times
with
respect
to
the
number
of
shares,
price
per
share
and
the
time
of
exercising
the
option—they
never
varied.
It
should
be
noted
from
the
agreement
that
the
appellant
did
not
have
an
option
to
exercise
until
the
first
anniversary
date
of
the
agreement,
namely,
October
4,
1968
(paragraph
2)
and
the
rights
he
had
under
the
option
expired
no
later
than
October
3,
1977
(paragraph
4).
In
the
case
of
retirement
or
death,
the
option
expired
at
the
expiration
of
the
shorter
period
of
6
months
(paragraph
5),
or
12
months
(paragraph
6)
from
the
event,
or
the
expiry
date.
However
should
the
appellant
do
something
prejudicial
to
the
company,
whether
he
was
then
an
employee
or
not,
the
company
could
rescind
the
option
to
the
extent
it
had
not
been
exercised
(paragraph
10).
Thus,
one
year
after
the
option
was
signed,
the
rights
the
appellant
had
pursuant
to
the
option
were
vested
in
him
for
a
definitive
period
of
time
and,
prior
to
the
stated
expiry
date,
he
could
only
be
divested
of
those
rights
by
the
provisions
of
paragraph
10.
On
retirement
or
death
the
period
of
time
remaining
for
him
or
his
representative
to
exercise
that
option
may
have
decreased
in
time,
but
it
would
not
have
been
less
than
the
shorter
of
the
time
stated
in
paragraph
5
or
6
and
the
expiry
date.
It
should
also
be
noted
that,
once
the
appellant
acquired
his
rights
under
the
option,
the
quantum
and
quality
of
those
rights
did
not
vary
while
he
held
those
rights,
whether
or
not
he
continued
to
work
for
the
company
or
an
affiliated
company.
The
market
value
of
the
stock
might
vary
over
the
life
of
the
option,
but
not
the
rights
that
he
had
acquired
under
the
option.
On
these
facts
and
proceeding
with
the
respondent’s
submission,
pursuant
to
paragraph
2(3)(c)
and
subparagraph
115(1)(a)(i),
there
must
be
found
that
there
was
employment
in
Canada
during
1973.
For
the
appellant
to
be
taxable
in
1973,
since
he
was
not
resident,
he
must
be
within
the
ambit
of
subsection
2(3)
and
the
respondent
says
that
he
is
within
that
subsection
as
he
“was
employed
in
Canada
.
.
.
at
any
time
in
the
year
or
a
previous
year
.
.
.”’.
That
subsection
then
states,
his
taxable
income
upon
which
he
shall
be
taxed
shall
be
determined
pursuant
to
Division
D
of
the
Act.
The
portion
of
that
Division
on
which
the
respondent
relies
is
subparagraph
115(1)(a)(i)
and
no
other.
That
section
says
what
a
non-resident
person’s
taxable
income
earned
in
Canada
pursuant
to
section
3
for
the
year
is.
It
is
his
income
for
the
year
(1973)
if
his
only
income
were
income
from
the
duties
of
offices
and
employments
performed
by
him
in
Canada.
To
succeed
then
in
this
respect,
it
must
be
determined
that
the
gain
the
appellant
had
in
1973
on
exercising
his
stock
option
was
from
the
duties
of
offices
and
employments
in
Canada.
The
respondent
states
that,
were
one
to
stop
one’s
consideration
of
the
“problem
at
this
section,
one
could
not
say
that
the
appellant
was
employed
in
Canada
in
1973
and
so
the
assessment
as
made
could
not
stand.
His
submission
continues
and
he
makes
reference
to
paragraph
7(1)(a),
subsections
7(4)
and
then
6(1)
of
the
Act.
His
submission,
referring
to
subsection
6(1),
paragraph
7(1)(a)
and
subsection
7(4),
is
that
those
portions
of
the
Act
operate
to
deem
employment
in
Canada
in
the
circumstances,
and
to
deem
performance
of
duties
in
Canada
in
1973.
They
determine
the
quantum
of
the
benefit
and
subsection
6(1)
makes
that
benefit
part
of
the
income
of
the
appellant.
Subsection
6(1)
would
bring
only
some
benefits
into
income,
namely,
those
benefits
received
or
enjoyed
by
him
in
the
year
in
respect
of,
in
the
course
of,
or
by
virtue
of,
an
office
or
employment.
In
1973
the
appellant
had.
no
office
or
employment
in
Canada
and,
even
if
he
did
receive
a
benefit
in
that
year,
it
is
not
every
benefit
which
is
to
be
included
in
income,
only
those
enjoyed
by
virtue
of
an
office
or
employment.
In
this
case
the
respondent’s
counsel
states
it
could
be
argued,
although
he
does
not
agree
with
such
an
argument,
that
subsection
7(1)
only
covers
a
situation
where
the
person
who
acquired
thé
shares
was
an
employee
not
only
at
the
time
the
rights
were
acquired,
but
also
at
the
time
the
shares
were
acquired.
He
contends
it
clearly
covers
the
situation
as
long
as
the
employee
was
an
employee
of
the
corporation
when
he
obtained
the
right
to
acquire
the
shares.
In
any
event
his
submission
was
that,
if
there
were
any
doubt
as
to
whether
or
not
subsection
7(1)
applied
to
the
situation
in
this
case,
that
doubt
is
dispelled
by
subsection
7(4).
This
subsection
makes
paragraph
7(1)(a)
apply
to
a
“former’’
employee
and
it
also
states:
“shall
continue
to
apply
.
.
.
as
though
the
employment
were
still
in
existence’’.
The
respondent
states
that,
if
a
former
employee
exercises
an
option
to
buy
shares
of
a
corporation,
which
option
he
received
while
he
was
an
employee
of
that
corporation,
then,
by
subsection
(4)
of
section
7,
subsection
(1)
of
section
7
shall
still
continue
to
apply
as
though
the
person
were
still
an
employee
and
as
though
the
employment
were
still
in
existence.
It
is
to
be
noted
that
the
definitive
article
“the’’
is
used
before
employment—referring
back,
it
would
appear,
to
the
employment
which
existed
when
the
option
was
granted.
The
submission
was
that
the
effect
of
subsection
7(4),
in
so
far
as
employment
is
concerned,
is
that
the
employment
with
the
corporation
which
granted
the
option,
which
employment
was
in
existence
in
1971,
is
still
in
existence
in
1973.
If
the
employment
is
still
in
existence
in
1973,
he
is
still
an
employee
in
1973
and,
if
he
is
an
employee,
he
is
employed.
Based
on
the
definition
of
the
word
“employed”
in
the
Income
Tax
Act,
in
1973
he
was
performing
the
duties
of
an
office
or
employment.
Then
by
applying
paragraph
6(1)(a),
the
benefit
is
income
to
the
appellant
in
1973.
The
respondent’s
counsel,
with
respect
to
the
alternative
submission
of
the
appelant
as
to
apportionment,
just
poses
the
question:
What
is
the
basis
for
any
apportionment
of
the
benefit?
Assuming
the
facts
were
as
they
are
in
this
case
except
that
when
he
left
Canada
the
appellant
immediately
ceased
to
work
for
the
company
or
any
of
its
affiliates
and
worked
for
some
other
company
or
was
unemployed,
why
should
some
of
the
benefit
not
be
taxable
solely
because
he
worked
for
the
affiliate
in
the
United
States
for
some
time?
The
increase
in
the
value
of
the
benefit
is
not
referable
to
further
“work”
or
“employment”
which
the
appellant
performed
after
he
left
Canada.
Obviously,
according
to
the
terms
of
the
option
agreement,
in
March
1973
when
he
left
Canada,
his
rights
had
been
acquired
(paragraph
2)
and
he
could
only
be
divested
of
them
according
to
paragraph
10
of
that
agreement.
He
submitted
that
there
was
no
basis
for
an
apportionment
to
enter
into
consideration
of
this
matter.
After
his
year
of
employment
and
after
he
acquired
his
rights,
he
then
had
the
right
to
acquire
this
stock
at
a
set
price.
Whether
or
not
it
would
be
to
his
advantage
to
buy
the
stock
after
he
had
the
right
to
do
so
would
be
determined
by
the
stock
market
value
of
the
shares,
not
by
his
years
of
employment
with
the
company
or
any
affiliate.
The
appellant’s
position
is
that,
because
of
the
wording
of
subparagraph
115(1
)(a)(i),
since
he
had
no
income
from
the
duties
of
offices
and
employments
performed
by
him
in
Canada
and
as
he
was
not
in
Canada
in
1973,
the
benefit
or
gain
he
realized
on
acquiring
the
shares
cannot
be
subject
to
tax.
As
I
view
the
combined
effects
of
paragraph
(a)
of
subsection
7(1)
and
subsection
(4)
of
section
7
if
needed,
the
benefit
the
appellant
realized
was
a
benefit
he
realized
as
an
employee
of
the
company,
and
if
paragraph
(a)
of
subsection
7(1)
does
not
embrace
the
benefit
the
appellant
realized,
then
it
is
clear
that
subsection
(4)
of
section
7
does,
and
it
says
in
these
circumstances:
“.
.
.
as
though
the
person
were
still
an
employee
and
as
though
the
employment
were
still
in
existence”.
If
the
section
imputes
employment,
as
I
hold
it
does,
then
it
also
should
be
taken
to
impute
the
duties
of
that
employment.
Consequently,
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
benefit
the
appellant
realized
when
he
acquired
the
shares
in
question
is
properly
considered
to
be
part
of
his
1973
income
and,
in
addition,
since
the
gain
he
realized
was
only
referable
to
this
option
(and
the
stock
market
value)
and
not
to
duties
performed
after
his
rights
in
the
option
became
vested
in
him,
there
is
no
basis
for
any
apportionment
of
that
benefit.
The
appellant
contended
that,
even
if
the
benefit
were
taxable
pursuant
to
the
Income
Tax
Act,
that
gain
or
benefit
was
exempt
from
taxation
by
virtue
of
either
Article
VII
or
VIII
of
the
Canada-US
Tax
Convention.
His
argument
was
that
the
appellant
exchanged
his
capital
rights
when
he
acquired
the
shares
from
the
company
and,
assuming
there
is
a
gain
since
in
his
argument
it
was
a
gain
derived
from
the
appellant’s
sale
or
exchange
of
a
capital
asset,
it
(the
gain)
is
to
be
exempt
from
taxation.
According
to
counsel
for
the
appellant,
at
the
time
the
Canada-US
Tax
Convention
was
entered
into,
this
type
of
transaction
was
a
capital
transaction
and
it
continues
to
be
so.
What
transaction
took
place
between
the
appellant
and
the
company?
There
was
no
sale,
and
there
was
no
exchange.
In
effect,
the
appellant
advised
the
company:
“I
will
take
X
number
of
shares
and
here
is
Y
dollars.”
The
only
thing
he
gave
or
surrendered
to
the
company
was
his
Y
dollars.
I
do
not
view
the
transaction
as
being
within
the
purview
of
Article
VIII
of
the
Convention
and
I
hold
that
the
benefit
is
not,
pursuant
to
that
article,
exempt
from
taxation.
Reference
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
to
Article
VII
was
on
the
basis
that
it
would
apply
if
I
should
find
that
the
gain
the
appellant
realized
was
to
be
apportioned.
Article
VII
would
then
operate,
in
his
submission,
to
exempt
that
portion
which
I
found
to
be
taxable.
Having
found
that
the
total
amount
of
the
gain
is
taxable,
then,
in
the
appellant’s
submission,
Article
VII
has
no
application.
The
result
is
that
judgment
will
be
issued
dismissing
this
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.